Tendency of the Week

The latter is not a very significant event on the world stage but perfectly capable of changing Ukraine's foreign policy. The President meets with regional media people, the Speaker with local councils, and the number one opposition with law enforcement authorities - a sure sign that just a year separates us from the elections.

Under the circumstances Leonid Kuchma is perhaps not the week's main news-maker, yet he managed to get into the limelight with his speech at the regional media seminar. Through with his soliloquy, he left the audience with the impression that they had just heard something they knew only too well from the recent past. Namely, if the President intended to convey the guidelines of his new strategy, they sounded very much like the ones proclaimed during his 1994 campaign.

To begin with, there was the all too familiar Constitutional referendum theme. Contrary to the general belief that this theme was composed by his Administration on the eve of the Constitution Night, the reader should be reminded that a referendum on the key constitutional provisions had been first agreed upon between Leonid Kravchuk and Ivan Pliushch in January 1994, also timed for the elections but in a somewhat different context.

Secondly, the President's desire to have his extraordinary powers prolonged is also nothing new. Some in the regional audience with keen perception took this as a transparent hint at another term in office, sending shivers of alarm through the listeners remembering the 1994 commotion caused by Leonid Kravchuk's repeated declarations about the need to postpone the presidential elections. At the time the electorate was frightened with anarchy and a power vacuum, while administrators at various levels insisted that the elections would have a direct effect on the 1994 summer harvest campaign. I am not exaggerating, it is just that argumentation has gained in scope over the past four years. Of course, no one is trying to convince anybody that the presidential elections will affect the 1999-2000 central heating season. Now the emphasis is on the possibility of an adverse change in the political course.

Thirdly, threatening the world with a Left Parliament is not Mr. Kuchma's discovery, either. His predecessor, Leonid Kravchuk, used this technique quite effectively, considering the presence of Speaker Oleksandr Moroz. Back in 1994 he was portrayed as the counterbalance to the Left and the basis of a stable democracy. In fact, they could have come up with something new over the past years, because even the efforts to curb the role of the parties in the future campaign are the same as in 1994 (and that year also saw an attempt to enact a deficit-free budget program). One can only wonder at how political ideas are repeated in Ukraine.

Yet despite the similar nuances, the leitmotif of the current campaign is essentially different, as evidenced by the President's appearance at the regional conference. In the first place, the key trophy, the presidency, is priced higher. Unlike his predecessor, Leonid Kuchma is determined to have powerful presidential authority. The reader should be reminded that shortly before the previous campaign he had actually refused to act as Chief Executive. Without doubt, this indifference toward actual responsibility played a negative role. Power was compared to a hand grenade with the pin out. Hence its being shifted from the President to Premier to Parliament.

At any rate, Leonid Kuchma's presidency turned the former CC CPU building on Bankova St. into the center of real power in Ukraine. While under Leonid Kravchuk some vaguely loyal skeptics claimed that the Presidential Administration had jurisdiction only over Kyiv's Pechersk District, today no one can complain about a power vacuum. True, some will say that the people do not feel adequately cared for by it, but there is surely enough pressure and to spare. The executive vertical is being formed and efforts are being exerted to suppress separatist trends in the regions and place economic entities under control. All told, we now have a full-fledged government machine, not a figurehead, as the logical result of state building and the current President's authoritarian ambitions. The closer we get to the elections the more apparent is the question, How will this machine operate in the near future? There is also the parallel trend to make changes in the existing system of relationships between the branches of power.

After all, is the President's dissatisfaction with the Constitution anything unexpected? Even at the time of the Fundamental Law's overnight enactment only the most naive did not know that Mr. Kuchma was anything but happy about its contents, that uniting the power branches was a pure formality and the Speaker embracing the President meant a short-lived common law marriage. All politicians agreed that its was a Constitution of compromise and by no means accord. The difference between compromise and accord is precisely that compromise cannot be regarded as a final solution to the problem, so one's desire to change its terms is only natural. Laws cannot be made on such shaky foundations, just short-term arrangements. In fact, the Constitution's Transition Clauses were meant as a time-out to finally determine one's stand, so the parties could reach an agreement. These clauses legally sealed the existing balance of power structures. Their authors believed that by the date of their expiration the confrontation would have blown over somehow. Well, it has not and is not likely to, all things considered.

It was also natural that the desire to change relations between the branches of power emerged even before the formal start of the presidential campaign. The candidates had to tell the electorate what they were actually after, didn't they? Presidential powers were also extensively debated before the previous elections. Mr. Kuchma's stand has since undergone certain changes. Before the summer of 1994 he intended to head the executive branch. Later, his resolve lost some of its steam; he was content with making cadre decisions and issuing ukases in the same vein. At the same time, Leonid Kravchuk was not averse to reducing his functions to cadre control and top-level representation, while Oleksandr Moroz insisted that the government's authority should be expanded. As a result, when voting for President, the people actually established the future pattern of presidential power. Most gave their votes to the stronger presidency. The whole thing turned into a special kind of referendum. Later, the new Constitution affirmed an allocation of powers akin to Leonid Kravchuk's variant.

As a matter of fact, Leonid Kuchma was not the only active operator in the constitutional field, as Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko started talking about strengthening the representative bodies of power even earlier. Mr. Tkachenko's desire to enhance the Verkhovna Rada's influence on the Cabinet, including the right to appoint the Deputy Premiers and heads of powerful ministries, can only mean changes in the Fundamental Law.

For the time being, the Speaker uses the laws currently in effect to build up control over executive structures. One of the bills awaiting their fate in Parliament is about the Council of the National Bank of Ukraine. If enacted, it will deal a heavy blow to the number one banker's independent status, substantially increasing NBU's accountability to the legislature. And the 1999 budget-adopting saga turned out quite entertaining as Yuliya Tymoshenko, with Speaker Tkachenko's blessings, twisted the rules of the game. As a result, something unprecedented happened: the budget was formed by Parliament. Given such legislative enthusiasm, the 1994 dream of establishing quarterly parliamentary control and making corrections in a given year's budget may well come true in 1999. Things like that are envisioned by the existing principles of Verkhovna Rada's supervision, but the vehicle was not fully activated previously. Today, the Tkachenko-led Parliament may start discharging its oversight functions in full measure. Add here the forthcoming expiration of the President's power to issue edicts on the economy and it becomes clear which way the alignment of forces scales will be tipped.

On the other hand, with Parliament getting such extensive powers Mr. Tkachenko would have little need for the President as such. It is safe to assume that the issue of increasing the Prime Minister's authority and enhancing the Cabinet's independence of the presidency will be raised shortly, primarily because the Premier-Speaker duo could turn into a very promising idea in view of the next elections. For various groups of influence this turn of event would mean a way to stability at a time of tempestuous presidential developments.

By Olha LEN