While Pentagon Hawks are active in the desert and Congress busy considering
President Clinton's impeachment, the presidential campaign is picking up
momentum in Ukraine.
The latter is not a very significant event on the world stage but perfectly
capable of changing Ukraine's foreign policy. The President meets with
regional media people, the Speaker with local councils, and the number
one opposition with law enforcement authorities - a sure sign that just
a year separates us from the elections.
Under the circumstances Leonid Kuchma is perhaps not the week's main
news-maker, yet he managed to get into the limelight with his speech at
the regional media seminar. Through with his soliloquy, he left the audience
with the impression that they had just heard something they knew only too
well from the recent past. Namely, if the President intended to convey
the guidelines of his new strategy, they sounded very much like the ones
proclaimed during his 1994 campaign.
To begin with, there was the all too familiar Constitutional referendum
theme. Contrary to the general belief that this theme was composed by his
Administration on the eve of the Constitution Night, the reader should
be reminded that a referendum on the key constitutional provisions had
been first agreed upon between Leonid Kravchuk and Ivan Pliushch in January
1994, also timed for the elections but in a somewhat different context.
Secondly, the President's desire to have his extraordinary powers prolonged
is also nothing new. Some in the regional audience with keen perception
took this as a transparent hint at another term in office, sending shivers
of alarm through the listeners remembering the 1994 commotion caused by
Leonid Kravchuk's repeated declarations about the need to postpone the
presidential elections. At the time the electorate was frightened with
anarchy and a power vacuum, while administrators at various levels insisted
that the elections would have a direct effect on the 1994 summer harvest
campaign. I am not exaggerating, it is just that argumentation has gained
in scope over the past four years. Of course, no one is trying to convince
anybody that the presidential elections will affect the 1999-2000 central
heating season. Now the emphasis is on the possibility of an adverse change
in the political course.
Thirdly, threatening the world with a Left Parliament is not Mr. Kuchma's
discovery, either. His predecessor, Leonid Kravchuk, used this technique
quite effectively, considering the presence of Speaker Oleksandr Moroz.
Back in 1994 he was portrayed as the counterbalance to the Left and the
basis of a stable democracy. In fact, they could have come up with something
new over the past years, because even the efforts to curb the role of the
parties in the future campaign are the same as in 1994 (and that year also
saw an attempt to enact a deficit-free budget program). One can only wonder
at how political ideas are repeated in Ukraine.
Yet despite the similar nuances, the leitmotif of the current campaign
is essentially different, as evidenced by the President's appearance at
the regional conference. In the first place, the key trophy, the presidency,
is priced higher. Unlike his predecessor, Leonid Kuchma is determined to
have powerful presidential authority. The reader should be reminded that
shortly before the previous campaign he had actually refused to act as
Chief Executive. Without doubt, this indifference toward actual responsibility
played a negative role. Power was compared to a hand grenade with the pin
out. Hence its being shifted from the President to Premier to Parliament.
At any rate, Leonid Kuchma's presidency turned the former CC CPU building
on Bankova St. into the center of real power in Ukraine. While under Leonid
Kravchuk some vaguely loyal skeptics claimed that the Presidential Administration
had jurisdiction only over Kyiv's Pechersk District, today no one can complain
about a power vacuum. True, some will say that the people do not feel adequately
cared for by it, but there is surely enough pressure and to spare. The
executive vertical is being formed and efforts are being exerted to suppress
separatist trends in the regions and place economic entities under control.
All told, we now have a full-fledged government machine, not a figurehead,
as the logical result of state building and the current President's authoritarian
ambitions. The closer we get to the elections the more apparent is the
question, How will this machine operate in the near future? There is also
the parallel trend to make changes in the existing system of relationships
between the branches of power.
After all, is the President's dissatisfaction with the Constitution
anything unexpected? Even at the time of the Fundamental Law's overnight
enactment only the most naive did not know that Mr. Kuchma was anything
but happy about its contents, that uniting the power branches was a pure
formality and the Speaker embracing the President meant a short-lived common
law marriage. All politicians agreed that its was a Constitution of compromise
and by no means accord. The difference between compromise and accord is
precisely that compromise cannot be regarded as a final solution to the
problem, so one's desire to change its terms is only natural. Laws cannot
be made on such shaky foundations, just short-term arrangements. In fact,
the Constitution's Transition Clauses were meant as a time-out to finally
determine one's stand, so the parties could reach an agreement. These clauses
legally sealed the existing balance of power structures. Their authors
believed that by the date of their expiration the confrontation would have
blown over somehow. Well, it has not and is not likely to, all things considered.
It was also natural that the desire to change relations between the
branches of power emerged even before the formal start of the presidential
campaign. The candidates had to tell the electorate what they were actually
after, didn't they? Presidential powers were also extensively debated before
the previous elections. Mr. Kuchma's stand has since undergone certain
changes. Before the summer of 1994 he intended to head the executive branch.
Later, his resolve lost some of its steam; he was content with making cadre
decisions and issuing ukases in the same vein. At the same time, Leonid
Kravchuk was not averse to reducing his functions to cadre control and
top-level representation, while Oleksandr Moroz insisted that the government's
authority should be expanded. As a result, when voting for President, the
people actually established the future pattern of presidential power. Most
gave their votes to the stronger presidency. The whole thing turned into
a special kind of referendum. Later, the new Constitution affirmed an allocation
of powers akin to Leonid Kravchuk's variant.
As a matter of fact, Leonid Kuchma was not the only active operator
in the constitutional field, as Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko started talking
about strengthening the representative bodies of power even earlier. Mr.
Tkachenko's desire to enhance the Verkhovna Rada's influence on the Cabinet,
including the right to appoint the Deputy Premiers and heads of powerful
ministries, can only mean changes in the Fundamental Law.
For the time being, the Speaker uses the laws currently in effect to
build up control over executive structures. One of the bills awaiting their
fate in Parliament is about the Council of the National Bank of Ukraine.
If enacted, it will deal a heavy blow to the number one banker's independent
status, substantially increasing NBU's accountability to the legislature.
And the 1999 budget-adopting saga turned out quite entertaining as Yuliya
Tymoshenko, with Speaker Tkachenko's blessings, twisted the rules of the
game. As a result, something unprecedented happened: the budget was formed
by Parliament. Given such legislative enthusiasm, the 1994 dream of establishing
quarterly parliamentary control and making corrections in a given year's
budget may well come true in 1999. Things like that are envisioned by the
existing principles of Verkhovna Rada's supervision, but the vehicle was
not fully activated previously. Today, the Tkachenko-led Parliament may
start discharging its oversight functions in full measure. Add here the
forthcoming expiration of the President's power to issue edicts on the
economy and it becomes clear which way the alignment of forces scales will
be tipped.
On the other hand, with Parliament getting such extensive powers Mr.
Tkachenko would have little need for the President as such. It is safe
to assume that the issue of increasing the Prime Minister's authority and
enhancing the Cabinet's independence of the presidency will be raised shortly,
primarily because the Premier-Speaker duo could turn into a very promising
idea in view of the next elections. For various groups of influence this
turn of event would mean a way to stability at a time of tempestuous presidential
developments.
By Olha LEN






