Foreign challenges, domestic risks

Taras STETSKIV: Ukraine is being weakened by the feud between the President and the prime minister, which is used by the essentially non-Ukrainian opposition and stimulated from abroad

Two weeks ago the Ukrainian intelligentsia sent a letter to the guarantor countries urging them to convene an international conference to make sure Ukraine has effective national security guarantees, as declared by the Budapest Memorandum, and calling on the EU leadership to take a clearly formulated stand in securing Ukraine’s national sovereignty, but no one has responded so far. Regarding Dmitry Medvedev’s recent message to Viktor Yushchenko and the bill on the use of Russian Armed Forces outside Russia, the authors of the letter note: “For the first time in a long time there are signs that the Kremlin does not rule out the possibility of using force among its arsenal of foreign-police tools concerning Ukraine.”

Another thing is whether it is worth appealing to the international community, considering that the key problem is within Ukraine. After all, neither the political leadership of Russia, nor that of any other country would have dared address Ukraine in such an openly humiliating tone if Ukraine’s so-called political elite had clearly and consistently adhered to the national interests, rather than their own, aimed at bettering their ratings. The Russian President’s message makes it perfectly clear that any unity of interests between Russia and Ukraine — even when it comes to protecting Ukraine’s national prestige and dignity — is out of the question. This is our key problem; we don’t want such powerful “friends,” let alone such foes abroad.

In any other country, when it comes time to defending the national interests, the opposition invariably sides with the government. This is standard practice, not idle talk. In Ukraine, it is playing the game, traditionally siding with different parties—or keeping mum.

Those criticizing this message agree that the letter sent by the Ukrainian intellectuals couched abstract terms, so there is little likelihood of a response from the addressee. Taras STETSKIV, however, does not agree with this assumption. Where will this message be sent before long? What are its tactical and strategic objectives? These and other issues are discussed below.

Mr. Stetskiv, how was the idea of this message to the countries that are the guarantors of Ukraine’s national security conceived? What kind of response do you expect?

“This idea was conceived toward the end of August, when it was finally obvious that there would be no [official] response to Medvedev’s statement, and when all but few of the main contestants in the presidential race simply kept silent about this unprecedented interference with Ukraine’s domestic affairs. In fact, it was then that a dialog materialized, resulting from the interviews with Yaroslav Hrytsak, Yurii Andrukhovych, and Ihor Yukhnovsky. We had a number of intellectuals involved in the project, including academicians, totaling 29 noted Ukrainian scholarly figures who signed this letter.

“Here is the logic: we wanted to give a signal to Ukrainian society, as well as to those wielding power in Russia and Europe, that Ukraine is well aware of the essence of Medvedev’s statement, and that the Ukrainian intellectuals, public figures, and politicians are deeply concerned over the issue. By and large, this was meant as an appeal to Europe, a warning against the consequences. This was the direct tactical reason behind it, although there are more deep-reaching aspects to the matter.

“December 5 will mark the 15th anniversary of the Budapest Memorandum. It was signed in 1994 by five countries — the US, UK, Russia, and, later, China and France. In return for Ukraine’s nuclear-free status, the signatories undertook to guarantee its national security. This date, December 5, is a certain landmark when we stop and think what the Budapest Memorandum is worth 15 years after it was signed. Does this instrument provide any substantial guarantee of Ukraine’s independence? The key message contained in the letter to the guarantor countries was the proposal to convene an international conference and discuss the alternatives to the Budapest Memorandum, since its ineffectiveness is clearly apparent.

“Regarding our expectations, the message in question was sent to the guarantor countries through their embassies. A separate message will be forwarded to the European Commission, the Visegrad Group, and Sweden, which now hold presidency in the European Commission. This is a call for a discussion and we count on launching a dialog aimed at holding this international conference.”

Returning to the Russian President’s statement, a number of experts here and elsewhere in Europe associate Medvedev’s verbal attack against Ukraine with the launch of the presidential campaign here. Does this mean that the Russian political leadership has drawn no conclusions from the 2004 presidential campaign in Ukraine?

“I think that Medvedev’s statement was designed to address several issues. First, there is doubtlessly his domestic competition with Putin, as the two are competing to win the title of Russia’s number-one nationalist and the restorer of the great Russian empire. Second, there is an attempt to interfere with Ukraine’s elections process.

“Through his message Medvedev says that Moscow will cooperate only with the kind of government that will show a loyal attitude to the Kremlin. What does this mean? It actually means pressure on the Ukrainian electorate. They start by bullying our voters and will say then, ‘Of course, we won’t attack you, if you elect the right kind of President, who will pursue a policy of loyalty with regard to Russia.’ This course would mean dependency on Russia. This particular passage of his statement is a clear interference with Ukraine’s domestic affairs.”

Russia’s leadership is paying special attention to the army and its equipment. Medvedev makes this clear in his article “Forward, Russia!” The article appeared in print just as the State Duma adopted the bill on the use of Russia’s troops abroad in the first reading. Why do you think this bill was passed at precisely this juncture? Is this coincidental or is there some hidden implication?

“I believe there are two basic factors at play in Russia’s military rhetoric. First, the psychological one, I mean the awareness of what used to be an empire; any great power tends to spend much of its budget on the army and foreign policy. The second factor is that Russia has adopted the doctrine of restoring this empire and views its army as an attribute of power. It is in this context that I evaluate the passage of this bill by Russia’s parliament.

“A closer look at the relations between Ukraine and Russia after August 11, 2009, when Medvedev made his statement, shows a series of measures taken by the Russian Federation, including a meeting with Merkel, followed by another anti-Ukrainian statement, the ambassador case, and the passage of the bill allowing use of Russia’s armed forces abroad. In other words, Russia has taken a number of steps that demonstrate the fact that Medvedev’s message was anything but coincidental and that it was not a result of an emotional outburst. It is [part of] a purposeful anti-Ukrainian strategy.”

Ukraine doesn’t seem to have a clear-cut strategy in terms of relations with the Russian Federation. Why?

“In fact, the worst thing is that Ukraine doesn’t have a clearly formulated strategy aimed at protecting its national interests in the current situation. This situation has changed. What made Russia adopt its current strategy? Russia wants to take advantage of this situation, now that NATO’s door was shut before Ukraine, leaving Ukraine and the European Union vis- -vis the Russian Federation.

“Russia believes that this is a unique opportunity to drag Ukraine back into its sphere of influence. Russia sees France’s and Germany’s stand (these two countries actually blocked Ukraine’s and Georgia’s accession to the Membership Action Plan. — N.R.). Russia is aware that Obama is too busy reloading relations with Moscow and other countries, so he is indifferent to Ukraine, and so Russia pulled out all the stops.

“I would like to emphasize that it was Putin, not Medvedev with his statement, who launched this project. I mean Putin’s statement during the NATO summit in Bucharest when he declared that a great number of Russians live in Ukraine and that Ukraine was not a state but some kind of artificial entity. Putin and Medvedev echo each other in this matter, even though they could start fighting each other for different reasons.

“The main reason why Ukraine does not have a strategy is the colossal feud on the upper political echelons. I mean the struggle between the President and the prime minister. This struggle is being used by the opposition, which is essentially non-Ukrainian and is being stimulated from abroad. This struggle follows some of the worst examples from Ukrainian history when power play resulted in losing national statehood.”

It is hard to deny the assumption that our domestic rifts are an additional trump card for Russia in its anti-Ukrainian game. Is there a possibility that this problem will be minimized, if not totally removed, during the coming presidential campaign? What would be Ukraine’s foreign policy after the presidential election? Yushchenko can be criticized for anything but not his approach to foreign policy.

“I agree that Yushchenko understood where Ukraine’s national interests lay. However, he did little along this line.

“In answering your question, let me tell you that the domestic political situation will change after the presidential election only if the next President publicly declares Ukraine’s stand and will work hard to upgrade this country during the five years of his or her presidency, trying to integrate it into NATO and the European Union. Only in this case can we speak about changes for the better with protection of Ukraine’s national interests. There is a simple solution to this problem; you have to work hard during the first year of your presidency, making unpopular decisions, for later it will be too late to make any such decisions.

“Last but not least, the new President will have to launch an information campaign in Ukraine, aimed at informing the general public about NATO, the Tashkent Pact, Ukraine’s nuclear-free status, the possibilities of reversing this status, and neutrality and its implications for the Ukrainian people. Then, instead of living by the Soviet propaganda clich s portraying NATO as an aggressor, our society will understand the essence of the situation. Then public support of Ukraine’s NATO membership will be 50, rather than 20, percent.”