How can Putin be stopped?

Ukraine may have become truly independent, for the first time in its history, after the Revolution of Dignity. Before that, although formally independent, this country was heavily economically and politically dependent on the northern neighbor, Russia. It is common knowledge that Russia became a true empire when it annexed Ukraine, and that without Ukraine there is no Russian empire. Not surprisingly, Ukraine’s national independence, proclaimed August 24, 1991, was met with undisguised hatred by the Soviet elite that was sinking into historical oblivion and by its successor, the Russian elite. Until the very last minute Gorbachev had kept trying to talk Kravchuk into signing the Union Agreement that would allow to keep the Soviet Union, even if formally, ephemerally, under a different name. Yeltsin at first didn’t seem to mind, feeling sure that Russia would tell the puppet center of a “rejuvenated Union” what to do and thus keep Ukraine and other Union republics (even if not all of them) under control.

The Baltic States, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia were, of course, to be kissed good-bye even before the August coup. In fact, no one in the Kremlin worried too much about the loss of Armenia, considering that it badly needed Russia’s (or the Union’s) support vs. Azerbaijan and Turkey, that Yerevan would agree to the presence of Russian (Soviet) troops on its territory and thus remain within the orbit of Moscow, regardless of who would be at the helm there, the president of Russia or the Union. The Kremlin and Russia’s White House put up with the loss of these republics. Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Central Asian republics did not intend to secede at the time, whereas Ukraine, considering its territory, population, and industrial – especially military industrial – potential, remained a prize worth fighting for, and fight they did.

If Ukraine had remained part of a “rejuvenated Union,” Russia (which would have embodied the Union) would have been regarded very much like a superpower on the international arena. It would have then instantly become what Putin is trying to make it today, the indisputable hegemon in the post-Soviet region of the world, claiming exclusive influence on Eastern Europe. Russia would have then done its utmost to prevent that part of Europe from joining the European Union, let alone NATO. When it became clear that Ukraine was calling it quits, such plans had to be laid aside. Yeltsin came up with the initiative of liquidating the Soviet Union, hoping that before long all the “younger brothers” (ex-Soviet republics) would realize they had made the wrong decision, after facing all kinds of problems with their national independence, and return in the “eldest brother’s” embrace. But when they started taking their time returning, the Russian elite began to treat the ex-republics they regarded as responsible for the collapse of the USSR with growing hatred. This addressed the Baltic States in the first place because they had unquestioningly sided with the West. Then there was Georgia with its desperate attempt to break free from Moscow’s embrace under Gamsakhurdia and Saakashvili. But first and foremost, there was Ukraine whose independence had made keeping the Union, however reformed, impossible in principle.

From day one of Ukrainian national independence, Moscow has been doing its best to tie Ukraine as close as possible to Russia, including the deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea and support for pro-Russian politicians (in terms of funds and propaganda), helping Ukrainian oligarchs get integrated into the Russian economy (Roshen in Lipetsk is one of many examples). In Russia, the media were stepping up a brainwashing campaign rooted in the allegation that Russians and Ukrainians are a single people, but that there are enemies who are trying hard to disunite them. In public, Ukrainians were emphatically referred to as brothers while surreptitiously upholding the good old propaganda cliche of them being smart khokhols always looking for a chance to gyp their Russian brother, stealing his gas… Russians are brainwashed into treating the Ukrainian language the way it was treated in tsarist Russia: as a patois of “King Russian,” spoken at best by illiterate muzhiks, sometimes sounding funny enough in operetta scenes and folk songs. One is reminded of Mikhail Bulgakov’s White Guard where one of the negative characters, Talberg, refers to the Hetman’s government as a “ludicrous operetta.”

The opening of each school with Ukrainian as the language of instruction, especially in Ukraine’s predominantly Russian-speaking areas like Crimea and Donbas, was presented by the Russian media as a manifestly unfriendly act in regard to Moscow, even as an attempt to forcefully Ukrainize the Russian-speaking part of the Ukrainian population. Meanwhile orders came from “upstairs” to forget all about the age-old Russification campaign in Ukraine. Most importantly, Russian politicians kept saying at home, in Ukraine, and across the world that the state of Ukraine was a stillborn child, that it could be kept alive only if sustained by Russia, as a gesture of goodwill.

One has to admit that this policy of the Russian political leadership in regard to Ukraine has been effective in many respects, among other things owing to the compliance and unscrupulousness of the Ukrainian political elite. The latter, with few exceptions, preferred to build its relations with Russia on a hard-cash-for-loyalty basis. Loyalty was understood as being prepared to take no domestic or foreign policy actions that could cause irritation in Moscow, in exchange for financial contributions done in many different ways. There were deviations from that pattern, but they were exceptions that proved the rule. Ukraine’s first president Leonid Kravchuk was the only one to try to build a genuinely independent nation-state. In fact, he made tangible progress, promoting Ukrainization, laying the foundations of the national Armed Forces, returning control over Crimea, with the leading members of the international community actually recognizing Ukrainian independence. But under the presidency of his successor [Leonid Kuchma] corruption blossomed and Ukraine became far more dependent on Russia.

President Viktor Yushchenko came to power on the crest of the wave of the Orange Revolution. He tried to uphold Ukrainization and was determined to join NATO, but his glaring political incompetence and harsh confrontation with Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko buried all his good intentions. His ill-famous successor, Viktor Yanukovych, made Vladimir Putin believe that he had finally won the big game, that Russia now had full control over Ukraine. Yanukovych was a puppet and he, the puppeteer. The man had a criminal record and old habits that die hard; he knew nothing about state administration, domestic or foreign politics. In that sense he was an ideal choice for Putin. But then came the Revolution of Dignity and Yanukovych fled Ukraine. The Russian leader took this as a personal insult, but much worse so, as the end of his Ukrainian project, his cherished dream of restoring the empire. This explains Putin’s super aggressive response.

I might as well point out that, apart from Kravchuk, Poroshenko, with all his drawbacks, remains the best president of Ukraine. One ought to remember that he is acting in the face of Russia’s undisguised armed aggression. The president and his fellow Ukrainians will have to go through many ordeals in their struggle for independence, against Russia and its agents. One thing I feel sure about is that the state of Ukraine has asserted its status, despite the territorial and manpower losses, despite the complicated economic situation. Even though there are reasons to believe that the coming Independence Day may prove to be as dramatic as it did last year (I mean the Ilovaisk tragedy), considering the stepping up of [Kremlin-backed separatist] hostilities in the Donbas.

Not coincidentally the Russian foreign minister stressed that the contact line in the Donbas increasingly resembles a front line. The Russian president, speaking in the annexed Crimea, pointed out that Russia has 3 million Ukrainian refugees, mostly people of draft age. Independence Day may well see a massive invasion of Ukrainian territory by Russian troops posing as “Ukrainian volunteers.” That was exactly how Bolshevik Russia tried to invade Bessarabia and the Baltic States in 1924. They had Red Army men recruited from those countries in the front ranks. At that time the lack of popular support put a quick end to the rebellions incited by Soviet agents, preventing a large-scale Soviet invasion.

The state of Ukraine must learn to defend itself. Decisive repulse is the only way to end the Russian aggression in Donbas and force Putin to abandon his plans for absorbing Ukraine by establishing a puppet regime there.