MINSK2: Hamburg deal

Debaltseve is located far from Crimea. Crimea was a breach of the rules of the game yesterday (assuming that any of the players seriously believed such rules actually existed), hence the international community’s response, public outcry, and sanctions [against Russia].

Debaltseve’s current status is regarded by every player as a losing game, simply because there were no rules to breach, because the winning side feared no punishment, and because the sanctions, futile as they were from the outset, were running short. Putin’s choice of the lesser of two evils, the continuation of the war in the Donbas compared to that war being waged beyond the region’s boundaries, has been accepted by Merkel and Hollande in Minsk, and then by Mogherini and the UN Security Council.

There appears to be no way to blame anyone for what has come to pass, and any references to Munich and/or other mistakes verging on crime are useless. Debaltseve is a diagnosis and the patient can’t be blamed for his case history. Discussing Moscow’s fault is also useless. Moscow is what it is. It’s just that someone somewhere thought differently, that all were surprised to watch what was happening past year and few are surprised this year.

Minsk 2 hasn’t failed, not in regard to Debaltseve anyway. The summit participants actually agreed on there being no rules of the game, that they would have to play the game the way Moscow knew it should be played. This wasn’t peace, just the status quo. This is what makes the situation interesting.

Moscow actually spent the [past] year struggling to win the new rights. It has succeeded in convincing [the international community that] any assumptions regarding the war [in Ukraine] and the Kremlin’s involvement are as good as truism, thus to be regarded as mauvais ton. So the Kremlin is involved, so what? What about Crimea? Moscow has spent a year asking the West about its democracy, political feedback, triumphant consumerism, and whether they were prepared to pay the same price for Ukraine as Moscow was, allegedly with no strings attached, without any restrictions or reservations. A rhetorical question, of course. The game would be lost by either the West running short on leverage or nerve energy, or by Moscow running short on national well-being and hard currency funds.

Moscow could pose this question to the international community: “What’s most important for you? Ukraine? Right, it is in the backwaters of Eastern Europe, and even if you see it as a phantom of future global catastrophe, this will not happen today or tomorrow. Moscow is prepared to play the game to the end, no matter what, although it is prepared to negotiate the boundary lines of this offensive with the West.”

Now this is the most unpleasant part of the deal for all the parties concerned, because whatever arrangements can be made will be made with the current Kremlin leader smirking and sharing another nasty joke with the West. The West has put up with the fact that no guarantees can be expected from Moscow. Simply because it is in no position to provide them – not because of its attitude to the international arrangements [regarding Ukraine], but because Moscow habitually regards any deal with the West the way a street con artist regards his customer. The West knows the risks it is taking, hence its requirements. Moscow knows what it wants and can afford today and tomorrow, so any guarantees it gives today will be valid until the next morning. There is one principal difference between Minsk 1 and Minsk 2: in the latter case Moscow said it reserved the right to breach the ceasefire agreement, still to be signed, anytime, and that this right had to be made a proviso of the agreement. The contracting parties had to make do with it. What has happened in Debaltseve ought to have been well expected.

Moscow is happy about being rid of guarantees [in regard to Ukraine] and the West being in no position to impose such guarantees. The situation looks even better than when Russia annexed Crimea (the annexation being de facto recognized by the international community). Debaltseve isn’t a breach of Minsk 2. It is [Moscow’s] new practice on the international arena. A new formula that will have its consequences.

There is one way the West can secure itself against Russia: keeping its distance as far as possible, considering that there is no way to sever all contact with that highly contagious civilization. The big question is what boundary lines the West is prepared to establish to keep that distance in order to survive. It is safe to assume that they would be happy to forget all about Donbas, except that this area in Ukraine is also being held hostage to its territorial integrity, so risking an experiment that would surpass Kosovo would be the last thing it would want to do. Also, Moscow could have an equivalent of ISIL zealots there who would take any orders from Moscow alone and without remorse, but that would be the worst sci-fi scenario possible. As it is, the West is shouldering the burden of Donbas peace keeping, something it would be only too happy to do without.

Debaltseve and Minsk are a signal to Kyiv: the West is running short on aid. If Kyiv wants to keep playing the game Western style, it would be best off making no further political mistakes like having its forces encircled, considering that all such mistakes are its own fault, its surviving political tradition.

The West’s involvement in the events in Ukraine is even more ephemeral than the Minsk accords. There are grim political forecasts about the coming Armageddon after Moscow breaches the accords and realizes it can take the next step. The West is biding its time trying to figure out the new reality, while Moscow is trying to figure out its current status, how it can assert itself before being cut off from SWIFT. Small room for compromise left.

Minsk 2 is a Hamburg deal, not the Munich one, just as Debaltseve isn’t the Sudetenland crisis (as currently portrayed by history buffs). Munich was what it was, although Russia’s annexation of Crimea could be compared to what happened in Munich, considering that then and later the rules of the games were adjusted to what was actually happening and then ignored. A year after Crimea, all rules of the game have been violated, leaving the smoking ruins of Debaltseve for all to see, contrary to all agreements officially signed and broadcast across the world, with no secret protocols attached.