SDPU(o) leader on the specifics Of Ukrainian politics

“Following the 1999 presidential elections, Hryhory Surkis told The Day the time of transparency was approaching. Do you think the elections have produced the conditions for greater transparency in business and politics? If not, why?”

“I think Ukraine is undoubtedly making progress in all spheres, with the statistical data and ongoing societal processes proving this. As this country has set out on a new election marathon, I would like to note among other things such a major achievement in the election practice as adoption of a very transparent law on elections to Verkhovna Rada. This is a very important point because one thing is idle talk about transparency and openness, loyalty or opposition to the regime, and quite a different thing is the existence of a specific legislative framework that fixes the same conditions for everybody and makes it possible to conduct political struggle if not by civilized European standards (for this depends not only on the law but also on the mentality of the candidates) then at least approaching these standards. Thus, a fundamental step forward has been taken in comparison with 1998. As to other spheres, recent macroeconomic achievements indicate that positive changes do exist — perhaps not as much as expected by our citizens and the executive and legislative branches — but still they are substantial. For example, real wages and salaries have risen by almost 20% over the past year. In other words, we can say confidently today that some irreversible progress has been achieved. To judge whether or not this progress is effective, one must, of course, proceed from such notions as the well-being and living standards of the common people. However, experienced experts know that macro and microeconomic indices are entirely different things. Changes cannot materialize overnight: there always is a certain, sometimes quite long, gap in time between the passage of a law and getting any significant results. Yet, at least a positive foundation is being laid today, which must accordingly yield positive results.”

“You once acted as a powerhouse of the parliamentary majority that supported Premier Viktor Yushchenko. But then... And what do you think happened then?”

“In fact, there was no truly effective and productive cooperation with the Cabinet of Ministers from the very outset. The parliament and parliamentary majority simply worked in the interests of the government. In the first months of his term Mr. Yushchenko, as far as I remember, would drop such phrases as ‘the government is not a cooperative’ or ‘nobody is going to start giving out portfolios.’ There was no cooperation for the government to base its political priorities on the views of the fractions that formed the majority, to say nothing of forming a coalition government. That was their mistake. Yet, the mechanism of cooperation worked one way or another, thanks primarily to the government majority which was supposed to prove that the goal of the so-called velvet revolution was constructive work rather than taking power and distributing portfolios. So the Yushchenko government was simply lucky: we discussed the bills proposed mainly by the cabinet and president along with passing dozens of laws which had had no earthly chance of being adopted during the previous eight and a half years of independence. And we did so in the name of constructive lawmaking, not in the name of the Yushchenko government. This lasted as far as November 28, 2000, when the so- called cassette scandal erupted. In that situation, Yushchenko took a special, so to speak, isolated stand, believing that the legislative branch should work the way it did. We did not object in fact because with any premier the parliament should indeed pass socially important laws, relegating personal ambitions to the background. But we still failed to establish a truly constructive cooperation which presupposes a two-way movement. But for the so-called tapegate, things would have gone on this way. None of the majority factions that took lawmaking seriously could have set the following condition to the government: either you give us a ministerial portfolio or we will never vote for your bills. I am sure nobody would have stooped to this. However, as the tapegate broke, the Right political forces in fact quit the parliamentary majority and took a position not conducive to further constructive work. Unlike the centrists, they had always supported Yushchenko, but the latter, as you remember, failed to take a clear stand on tapegate, as he also did in January-February 2001, when he was in no hurry to react to the very fact of a majority being formed in Verkhovna Rada, which also deserves an unambiguous judgment. So the parliamentary majority was in fact destroyed, with 165-187 votes remaining not in the least due to the Yushchenko government’s unprincipled stand. Of course, every political force has the right to its own assessment of what happened, but the job of a parliament is to pass laws rather than dismiss somebody from office. This balance was upset in that situation. As early as February I openly said that if no coalition government were formed we would not be able to cooperate with this cabinet. In other words, there will be a different cabinet and, accordingly, its head.”

“The impression is that your relationship with Viktor Yushchenko is something more than just a relationship between two representatives of the national political elite. Particularly, some journalists pay much attention to what they call the confrontation of two Viktors. How would you personally assess your relationship?”

“You know, I have always taken an honest and frank attitude toward Mr. Yushchenko. He sometimes took offense, for example, when I said publicly at a press conference what I thought about the fate of his government. He didn’t like that, but two months later he had to leave office. Moreover, I want to say that we have never quarreled anywhere on any occasion and never opposed our personal ambitions. I take an absolutely normal attitude toward him and wish him success in the elections in particular and in politics in general. As to his comments that he will never agree to cooperate with the Communists and SDPU(o), this is his personal position to which he undoubtedly has the right. For instance, I say that in the new parliament we will cooperate with forces that will adhere to the principles we will instill in lawmaking. It is not ruled out that these will be absolutely different political forces, including the Right, the moderate Left, etc. And saying today that we won’t cooperate with somebody is, in my opinion, nothing but an outrageous statement. Yes, we have a specific attitude toward the Communists and nationalists, but there are enough moderate people among the Right and Left political forces, who can support us at least on occasion.”

“At a Day roundtable, leader of the Party of Regions Volodymyr Semynozhenko said that one of the first problems they will try to solve in parliament will be implementation of the all-Ukrainian referendum’s results. What are your thoughts about this?”

“Steadfast and principled. We have never changed it. We have always advocated changes in the system of relationships between the individual branches of government, above all the legislative and executive, by way of cooperation which would be enshrined in a legislative act rather than be based on gentlemen’s agreements.”

“Are there no gentlemen?”

“Yes, there are some, but this is a shaky ground. You listen to the tapes and then go on; somebody doesn’t like something and steps aside... But if there was a legislatively approved mechanism whereby, if the majority disintegrates and is unable to produce a new one and the government loses support, both institutions would be obliged to resign, then people’s deputies would be more serious about cooperation within the majority. For example, the Socialist faction supported — quite wisely — Mr. Kinakh as the future prime minister. It is their votes that we would have lacked to approve his candidature. But what then? They refused to support the bills proposed by the Kinakh Cabinet only two weeks later. What was their logic? Is this constructive? This seems to me it was a somewhat amateurish step. Things would be entirely different if we could introduce a Constitutional provision, under which failure to form a parliamentary majority would lead to the dissolution of Verkhovna Rada.”

“The perception that a parliamentary seat is a profitable business has much reason. And now that many relatives, including children, of well-known politicians go to Verkhovna Rada on the ticket of various political parties, a question arises: has parliament really become such a profitable place?”

“I have never researched this. I will say honestly and frankly that I would not dare offer any of my relatives a place on the list or as party leader permit somebody to put his brother, father, or other relative on our party list, especially if these relatives have nothing to do with politics. Yes, we do have quite good examples of related politicians, for example, the Zaichuk brothers: Valentyn is State Secretary in the Ministry of Education, a former minister and ambassador, Borys is chairman of the Pension Fund. If these two brothers were put on a certain party list, would anybody make any criticism? But if an individual from a different sphere is placed on a list just to get a seat in the parliament, I don’t accept it.”

“Do you think the new parliament will form a majority? And if so, will the latter be constructive from the voters’ point of view?”

“A Ukrainian proverb says, ‘You saw what you were buying.’ It is quite simple with parties and blocs but much more difficult with the other part of parliament, the 225 deputies elected in territorial districts. Every candidate is usually asked what he will do first if elected. Formerly, he or she would answer that they would pass the Constitution, then they began to mention other important laws, and still later they started saying what the voters wanted to hear. But the point is one deputy will never adopt anything on his own: he will have to enlist the support of at least another 225 deputies. This is why we say that political democracy in Ukraine should develop in a way that the political structure of society should accordingly influence that of parliament.

“I would love to see a majority in parliament. If we form one, it is sure to be constructive. For if there are 226 deputies, no matter whether they support or oppose the executive, is anything else needed to pass laws?”

“Parliament took great pains to pass the Land Code. Did you feel somewhat frustrated when the president publicly criticized the parliament just after the code was passed?”

“I do not share the president’s critical assessment of the parliament as a whole. I have repeatedly said that there is Verkhovna Rada, and there are individual political forces. One can and should criticize individual political forces but not Verkhovna Rada as a whole. Any assessment should be objective. Even today, when Verkhovna Rada is politicized as never before, one should level criticism only at the forces that artificially increase the level of its politicization, politicizing normally juridical or economic processes. Perhaps the parliament today should indeed dissolve itself and explain to the voters that laws will be made henceforth by a new parliament.”

“Very often, political forces are classified against such a criterion as loyalty or disloyalty to the president or, to be more exact, to the person of Leonid Kuchma. Do you think this is a good criterion? Do you consider yourselves a pro-presidential party?”

“The for or against Kuchma criterion does exist, but it can only be applied by political entities that are not self-sufficient, for this is no ideology. I would not apply it to our party or, say, the Communist Party which is undoubtedly an ideologically oriented party. There is the president, the chief executive whom we, incidentally, put forward before other parties did so and resolutely supported in the elections. But this does not mean that this kind of party loyalty should turn into the blind support of all presidential actions.

“We are sure to support the president’s basic principles, views, and priorities that correspond to those of our party. We always say openly if our principles differ. This applies to the election law: I still believe that Verkhovna Rada should be elected on the basis of a mixed system with the balance tipped toward proportional representation. We also disagree to the interpretation of the local election law. In the final analysis, I believe there should not be such a thing as loyalty of a political force to the head of state. There can be only support or opposition. I think that all that has happened in the last few years since the 1999 elections is support of the majority and the president. If this is ample reason to call us a pro-presidential force, then we really are one.”

“When Yuliya Tymoshenko was in the Yushchenko government, one of her hits was that Mr. Yushchenko and she had allegedly cut off the supply lines of parliamentary oligarchs, thus bleeding them white and stirring up their indignation and unbridled anger, and that this was the alleged reason why Mr. Yushchenko and she were dismissed from office. What will you say to this? Which of the current parties could be called an oligarchic pioneer? You seem to have lost leadership in this area.”

“I regret it as does everybody else...

“First, Mrs. Tymoshenko bandies this idea about because she stands to gain from it. In essence, before arguing over this point, one must clearly define who are oligarchs and whether Mr. Yushchenko or Ms. Tymoshenko herself belong to them. Secondly, there is no proof except emptily worded statements of what they did in one sphere or another, including the still-depressed energy sector. This situation existed both in 2000, when this sector was run by Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko, and in 2001. As to the funds they allegedly found to enhance budget revenues, this is also just a legend for campaign consumption. Conversely, the results of the Kinakh cabinet’s performance say that this government is far more effective than that of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. As to oligarchs, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology conducted a poll last summer with a question: Who are oligarchs and whom do you see among them? Ms. Tymoshenko ranked second, preceded only by Pavlo Lazarenko. I seem to have ranked eleventh.”

“Many of our enterprises are currently being auctioned off: they are in fact being privatized for debts. Companies are just being made to run up debts and then sold at their liquidation value. Could you comment on shadow privatization? Can this be stopped?”

“Such is the legislative basis. If we are building a market economy, there have to be market mechanisms. That this is being done on purpose is also the economic policy of rivals or of those who want to acquire the enterprises. Unfortunately, the law allows this. For example, all the lawsuits over Rosava and Donbasenerho were lost by the plaintiffs. We adopted a moratorium on the seizure of state property and introduced some restrictions, but this is not a market mechanism. This rather resembles experiments in some industries and is a temporary action typical of Ukraine’s transition economy. The state should have reacted to this earlier, when the imperfect laws were being passed. And those who followed the government’s line in privatizing state-run property should have sounded the alarm when such laws were adopted and state interests were infringed upon. As I remember, Donbasenerho was valued at 200 million hryvnias, while it really costs about $500 million. The cost of Rosava was twenty to thirty times higher than the acquisition price. On the other hand, we express a desire to live in a law- governed state. This means observance of the law in force, and, as court rulings show, the latter is being observed. There have been irregularities due to the oversight of some public officials who did not pay enough attention in time. Now, on the one hand, we must protect state interests and, on the other, improve the law, for this is the only way to forestall such losses in future. The law adopted is, of course, imperfect: it is in fact a preventive measure, something like first aid. I mean the law on a moratorium on property seizure. As to the privatization process as a whole, we also had a dilemma: voucher or certificate-based privatization vs. money-based privatization. These two diametrically opposed paths of privatization were discussed as long ago as 1991-1993. We opted for the certificate-based privatization, although there were as many advocates of the other way. And only now, aware that budget revenue is a weighty component of financial operations, have we switched to money-based privatization. But so many years have passed, so many facilities have been privatized in one way or another, so many facilities are no longer favorable to investment... We have now opted for money-based privatization, but many facilities which were our national wealth just five or six years are unable to attract investors. This is also a fact. You can try to sell anything, but who’ll buy it? That the buyers show no interest means that we no longer have attractive facilities. We have made serious mistakes in privatization, and both the legislative and the executive branches are to blame.”

“Meanwhile, the State Property Fund chairman is running for a seat.”

“These mistakes were committed in 1992-1993, when the fund was headed by a different chairman.”

“But the former chairman Yury Yekhanurov is also running in the elections.”

“...And everybody will try to prove he’s right. Yet, it is too late: we have lost so much.”

“Could you comment on the situation with the law on compact discs? For the so-called reform fractions, the most frequent guests of the US Embassy, voted against it. Yet, the hard destiny of this project has shown that it is difficult to establish a majority in our parliament that

would support the president who thinks we need this law. Then we saw the parliamentary bill amended, but, although the law was adopted, sanctions were the imposed.”

“The situation with the government-regulated production and export of laser discs is difficult both politically and economically. We tried to pass several laws. We finally adopted the last version which did not satisfy the US. I have dealt quite long with this matter and met a large number of American representatives. I am aware that their demands were a little excessive. Nevertheless, we must put economic interests above everything else here. On the one hand, I agree with the president that sanctions against Ukraine are not a characteristic feature of our cooperation with the United States. We had been warned about them and should have set the right priorities. We should have balanced the American requests to cease piracy, on the one hand, and, on the other, the threat of losing forty to fifty thousand jobs and the potential losses of metallurgical, chemical and light industries estimated at $500 million a year. There are different viewpoints about the sanity of US actions. My personal view is that parliament made a mistake. I think we should have met the US halfway to retain at least forty to fifty thousand jobs. But, on the whole, I think the US has imposed unjustifiably harsh sanctions.”

“What is your view on the problem of corruption? Now some law-enforcement agencies do not hide their links with businessmen via special foundations. Given the never-ending budget deficit, can this turn the law-enforcement bodies into a kind of store for call-in orders?”

“Indeed, such special foundations have been officially registered with army and police agencies. We try, on the legislative level, to forestall the likely abuses related to these foundations. It is no secret that today all off-budget funds comprise payments connected with budget expenditures and revenues. Yet, abuses through the foundations by some law- enforcement bodies should be dealt with primarily by public prosecutors. I will also note that very much will depend here on society, on political and non-governmental forces. It is one thing when a special foundation helps render assistance to, say, the families of policemen who died in the line of duty. And it is quite a different thing when such foundations run counter to their officially-declared principles.”

“Chairman of the Accounting Chamber, Valentyn Symonenko, has repeatedly tried to persuade The Day that there are no effective mechanisms of control over not only privatization but also local budget earnings, VAT returns, etc.”

“First, the first amendment to the Constitution has considerably extended the powers of the Accounting Chamber. Monitoring budget expenditures and revenues are entirely different things. The Accounting Chamber has been furnished today with a closed- loop system of powers, which will allow it to exercise more effective oversight over all financial flows in Ukraine. This is an unequivocally positive thing. But let me draw your attention to the fact that Verkhovna Rada passed the first Constitutional amendment in such an important field as the powers of oversight bodies. Just compare: the first amendment to the US Constitution is the law on the freedom of speech, while in this country it is the law on enhanced supervision. In general, our deputies pay more attention to oversight than to creating favorable conditions for economic development. This is not always good. Yet, the first amendment to the supreme law of Ukraine is fully justified and will undoubtedly be used in favor of the state.

“Of course, in this country everything does not depend on supervision alone: there is also such a thing as mentality and attitude toward work. For example, VAT compensation should not be regarded today as a separate business, the more so that we adopted an unrealistic budget for 2002. It is no secret that the budget deficit 1.7% of projected GDP (UAH 4.3 billion) is a figure that takes into account neither the 5 billion hryvnias of VAT compensation nor the 7 billion in finance privileges under current law. It will be recalled that the budget law incorporates freedom for the implementation of these privileges. If all these shortcomings are to be added to the official deficit, it will rise to UAH 16 billion or 4% of GDP. Meanwhile, worldwide economic practice confirms that a budget of over 3% deficit means a critical economic situation. We must think how to get out of this situation. Let us recall that we did not include privatization earnings under budget revenues.”

“And is there anything left to sell?”

“We can find something if we try. But this should, of course, be an additional mechanism.”

“A question about foreign influence on the election campaign: the divisions run along such lines as pro-Russian, pro- Western, and pro-American. Would you comment on the lineup of political forces according to this criterion? For example, critics attribute your party to the pro-Russian forces, emphasizing that you have even sought the assistance of Russian experts and mentioning SDPU(o) links to Russian business.”

“No, we don’t have such links with Russian business on the political level. In all probability, businessmen who are members of our party do have common financial and economic interests with some Russian business elements. But there are no grounds at all to claim that Russian business is supporting our party today. As to experts, I want to note that, indeed, election technologies envisage the employment of the best specialists. Such experts are available today in Russia, the US, and the countries of Europe. But the situation in Ukraine is very special. We have already spoken about the particularities of Ukrainian politics. I don’t think any of the Russian, American, or Western European experts will be of help here. Only our compatriots can understand the mentality of our people, our voters, the way they develop trust in certain politicians and political forces. We make maximum use of this. I and the political force I lead favors a pro-Ukrainian — not pro-Western or pro-Russian — vector of development. We do not move from this ground, and I think our concrete steps prove this. As to the assistance of individual Russian experts, we, for example, sought their help in the development of the Internet resources for our party and its leaders. I think they did it on a high-tech level, for which we are grateful to them. But it is an exaggeration to say they can give advice during the election campaign.”

“The most recent events in Russia after Vladimir Putin’s election showed that innovative approaches toward politics had reinforced the Russian political elite. Russia seems to have outstripped Ukraine in terms of European integration, our pride and joy. We began our relationship with the US as if we were strategic partners but then we lost very much. Can we catch up with Russia?”

“You don’t have to go very far for the answer. You pointed out quite rightly that we started, say, from a pro-American position. But we should not forget that Russia and CIS countries receive 40% (60% then) of Ukrainian exports. In other words, instead of reading the tea leaves on where to go and how, we should be guided by economic arguments and indicators. If our products and services are competitive in the CIS and Russia, we must develop our economy in precisely this direction. We can thus, so to speak, train ourselves and move further toward the West. We must proceed from the fact that not only Ukraine but also Russia has made a European choice. Overestimating our capabilities would mean losing.”

“But Russia does not ask Ukraine whether or not we will go to Europe together. Suffice it to recall Putin’s latest visit to Warsaw.”

“This is normal because they stood to gain. And I think Russia should not in turn condemn some of our steps, which it unjustly interprets as anti-Russian.”

“Now, so to speak, standing questions: your attitude toward the Ukraine-NATO relationship and the language problem?”

“The cooperation between Ukraine and NATO should remain on the current level. In my opinion, Ukraine cannot become a NATO member, and we should maintain our neutral status.”

“And if Russia becomes a NATO member?”

“These things should not be linked: Ukraine can only join NATO when this serves its interests. I do not see such interests today. As to the language question, this is an issue of principle. We have been insisting for years on the implementation of Constitutional provisions in this respect. The Constitution states clearly that only Ukrainian can be the official language. And this is our stand. But the same article of the Constitution says the Russian language has the right to free development and can be used on Ukraine’s territory along with the languages of other ethnic minorities. It is this formula that we must put into practice through a law to this effect. Incidentally, the implementation of Constitutional provisions requires the adoption of about seventy laws. I can say we have not yet passed 43 laws, including one on languages. It is of great importance to stop political speculation on the question of language.”