We must encourage Europeans to hear the truth

When Russia launched an aggression against Ukraine, many of us were almost sure that Europe would not tolerate this kind of madness next to its borders. Imagination conjured up the pictures of European intellectuals who urge their leaders to punish Putin and his Gazprom; European analysts who indefatigably organize public debates, inviting adequate Ukrainian speakers instead of Russian lobbyists; well-known Western political journalists who shower world publications with articles on how important it is to defend Ukraine. We imagined high-profile TV talk show hosts to invite Ukraine’s ambassadors at least as often as those of Russia, and politicians critical of the Kremlin as often as Sovietologists in love with Russia or analysts poisoned by participation in the Putin-sponsored Valdai Club.

Many of us were almost convinced that even if there were a soft spot, this would be leaders of the same EU countries that once thwarted the NATO Membership Action Plan for Ukraine. Our reasoning was as follows: they have been after the Russian two birds in the bush all the time, forgetting that it is sometimes much more important to have one Ukrainian bird in the hand. And you don’t have to look for two birds in the bush, for they will come by themselves.

What can we see in reality? We can see that it is European leaders, including Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande, who have proved, much to the surprise of many Ukrainians, to be far more prepared to say on the international level “who’s who” in the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. Unfortunately, this does not apply to all the leaders. Here is a small, but very telling, example. When the ambassador of a south European EU country to Ukraine advised his minister to establish closer contact with the newly-appointed Ukrainian government, the latter answered something like this: “But they are all fascists!” He said it seriously, without any jokes. So if a minister allows himself to say so, what can we expect from an ordinary Spaniard, Cypriot, or Greek?

And it is on the lowest level – the level of public opinion in the EU countries – that we can see the most unexpected problems today. The proof of this is a sociological survey which showed that about 60 percent of Germans opposed sanctions against Russia. There are nuances, of course: to oppose sanctions does not mean to approve of Russia’s actions. For while many Ukrainians view Western sanctions against Russia as an end in itself, many Europeans still regard them as an instrument. Moreover, my impression is that there is still no consensus about the extent to which this instrument is effective. Are these sanctions effective at the stage of threats or that of application? It is quite possible that Russia is an exception from the rules, when sanctions are more effective when they are being applied rather than used as a bugbear.

What makes it difficult to open the eyes? Lack of information or lack of willingness to hear the truth? In all probability, lack of information caused by the lack of willingness to hear the truth, for the truth is awful and uncomfortable. The truth spoils relishing a glass of cool wine on a quiet terrace in Provence. It keeps you from almost hugging and kissing the crowds of Russian tourists in the posh boutiques of Milan and real estate agencies in London.

For the truth is that Europeans have raised a neighboring monster with their own hands, and now they should either muster courage and drive it into a trap or pretend that it does not matter much for them and wait until it gathers strength and is mature enough to jump over the EU fence.

I spent almost three days in the company of 20 representatives of Europe’s leading analytical centers, such as Chatham House in the UK and IFRI in France. They visited Kyiv by invitation of the Institute of World Politics and the CIDOB center, our partner in Spain. We invited them to see with their own eyes what is going on in Ukraine, feel the atmosphere, enter into closer contact with their expert counterparts in Kyiv and other regions of Ukraine, and meet government members.

Contacts with analysts from absolutely different EU countries, as well as continuous discussions with European ministers and diplomats, help us see the most vulnerable spots in the perception of Ukraine and of what is going on in the east of this country. To see where we should redouble our efforts, it is sufficient to sum up the questions and remarks that emerged during the debates and draw certain conclusions from them. The conclusions are, in particular, as follows:

♦ The Europeans still – deliberately or unknowingly – mix up definitions. They are still asking if it is a war between Russia and Ukraine or what is now going on in the east and has occurred in Crimea should be called otherwise. The answer “hybrid war” does not suit everybody – not because it is “hybrid” but because it is a “war.” Most of them do not understand that if we do not call this thing a “war” in the contemporary meaning of the word and react accordingly, tomorrow we may well have to deal with a war in the traditional meaning of this word.

♦ Another question: “Why do you call them [gunmen in eastern Ukraine. – Author] terrorists? How do you tell ‘separatists’ from ‘terrorists’?” Here, the National Security and Defense Council Secretary Andrii Parubiy joked wittingly after detailed explanations to the Europeans about weapons, seizures of hostages, tortures, and human shields: “We could also call them pirates, but there is no sea over there.” Incidentally, he did not mind the Europeans coming up with a better definition, but they failed to do so.

♦ My next conclusion is: Europe is still unaware of a real danger to itself on the part of Russia. Many Europeans of different levels confessed to me that they had only heard from their Ukrainian counterparts that Russia had unleashed a war not against Ukraine but against Western civilization and Russian tanks might as well find themselves somewhere near Riga. They clearly consider this an exaggeration and even an intellectual provocation of sorts on the part of Ukraine. Only a few minds understand that it is not a Russian-Ukrainian crisis. It is exclusively a Russian crisis which, unfortunately, has surfaced in Ukraine. Tomorrow, it may emerge in Moldova or, say, Serbia, or somewhere else. It is like in the case of an abruptly weakened immunity – you never know which organs or bodily functions it will affect next time.

♦ Viewing the current situation as almost a domestic problem of Ukraine partly results from the fact that Europeans lack hard evidence of OFFICIAL Russia’s involvement in the eastern situation. I say “partly” because there is an overt failure to understand to what extent the Donbas separatist terrorists were brought up by the Kremlin and to what extent by Yanukovych (the Family) or someone else who has a Ukrainian passport. In other words, who does the copyright belong to – to Putin and Co. or to Yanukovych and Co., to official Russia or unofficial Ukraine? The story of the “Marksman” as a Russian military intelligence officer does not sound convincing to Europeans. In their opinion, there is too little hard evidence to directly link the Kremlin with all this. Ukraine is in fact in rather a paradoxical situation. We have always suffered from a victim image. Today, the image of a victim (particularly, Putin’s victim) would suit us very well, but the world is not exactly rushing to recognize us as one. The point is that to recognize Ukraine as a victim today would mean to do one’s utmost for the Kremlin to be a victim tomorrow. It is a too risky endeavor for a flagging European Union.

♦ The Europeans find it very difficult to understand how the Ukrainian authorities are trying to ensure security in eastern Ukraine. What is a true hit and perhaps the most unexpected thing for me and my Institute colleagues is the never-ending question: how come volunteers, people who have received no professional training, are being given weapons and sent to the battlefield? We have to explain patiently that these volunteers do not act on their own but only within the framework of the law and as part of legitimate units. And nobody forces them to carry out special operations – they usually guard checkpoints, for which even a month’s crash course is enough.

These are just some of my observations. Europe has much more questions. For them to be answered, an entirely different level of communication is needed – on the part of the government, independent experts and activists, and our actual and potential EU allies. We need the efforts of Ukrainian oligarchs to carry out a large-scale campaign to promote Ukraine rather than their own beloved selves in this country. We should set up our own, Ukrainian, government-sponsored Valdai-type club, so that former Sovietologists could gradually change into Ukrainophiles. It is necessary to replace ambassadors in the EU countries, whose governments still believe that fascists are in Kyiv, not in Moscow. We must stop exaggerating the role of Brussels and put more emphasis on the capitals of other EU member states (in particular, to add presence in the Berlin-Paris-Rome-Madrid tetragon). We must not just spread information but encourage Europeans to hear the truth, for, like it or not, the truth is on our side.

Aliona Hetmanchuk is director of the Institute of World Politics