What will happen in 2015?

Borys Kolesnikov on the parallels between American and Ukrainian oligarchs

Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Infrastructure of Ukraine Borys Kolesnikov is known for his tendency to raise issues which his Party of Regions usually avoids as well as his inclination to speak on the importance of historical memory. In particular, he said in a recent comment for Time weekly magazine that the Party of Regions was hoping to become something like the Republicans in Washington, but had no counterpart, no eternal Democrats to create competition. “They [the Republicans. – Ed.] have been around for 80 years. They are eternal,” he said. In fact, the Grand Old Party, or GOP, as it is called in the US, is much older, having been founded in 1854 and completely dominating the political scene until 1932. In addition, Kolesnikov drew the parallels between American and Ukrainian oligarchs and spread of the Chicago and Donetsk clans. In particular, he said that the spread of the Donetsk clan around the country was no different from what happened after Obama took office. “This is a law of life. Obama is from Chicago, so his whole team is from Chicago,” said Kolesnikov. Speaking about the role of oligarchs in Ukraine, Kolesnikov said it was a copy of the American model, except with a delay of about a hundred years.

Whether the historical parallels which the vice prime minister drew between Ukraine and the US have a basis in reality, we will try to find out in the upcoming issues of The Day.

By Oleksandr PALII, political scientist, historian, Ph.D. in Political Science

Conclusion One. The majoritarian system, with its relative majority that theoretically allows one to win even with one percent of votes, provided it is more than one’s opponent has, is in actuality a massive fraud. Unless the MPs are elected by the absolute majority of votes, democracy is doomed. As it is, the absolute majority of winners has received some 30 percent of votes, considering that these people will represent the entire community. This electoral system has drastically reduced the role of the community – and that of democracy – while raising high the importance of intrigue and manipulations, including by all those “technical” parties and candidates that go through the motions of campaigning and deceive the electorate. Incidentally, the competition between UDAR and United Opposition resulted in ruling party men winning in more than 20 electoral districts. Now this really changes the situation in parliament. The main point on the past campaign’s agenda was not opposition vs. ruling party, but squabbles within the multiparty opposition camp.

Where and when opposition candidates won, their victories were not democracy but coincidences, wheelings and dealings rather than bona fide contacts with the electorate. Moreover, the relative majority system had sharply raised the cost of falsification and bribery, considering that the outcome in the majoritarian districts was often determined by a hundred, even a dozen votes. Before the elections some experts said between five and seven percent of ballots could be rigged, little enough. Now they say that was enough to falsify the whole campaign in most majoritarian districts. Under this electoral system victory is often one with less than one percent of votes. The fact remains that this system was instituted with the opposition sitting on their thumbs, with no voice of protest against such blatant infringement of democracy heard. The NGOs also remained silent, probably for want of professionalism or funds for it. Recently the United Opposition and UDAR recalled their hopeless nominees, albeit without tangible success. Was it really that they lacked the wits to secure competitive two-round selection?

Conclusion Two. The ruling party has deliberately created an environment in which everything is up for sale, except that this party is the richest one, because it controls the Treasury and natural resources. No campaign fund ceiling was instituted, just as there were no television campaign commercial limitations. All this was meant to substitute a genuine election campaign with a competition among moneybags and their spin doctors.

Conclusion Three. In view of the above conclusions, the role of spin doctors is markedly on an upward curve, with live talk shows becoming a means of banal fraud, mostly because of the audience, with Ukraine’s TV viewers receiving heaps of useless information about who hurled a bucketful of dirt at whom, along with hair-raising news and plain disinformation. The government’s information machine is working full blast, at the taxpayer’s expense, for the benefit of those currently in power, let alone the information machines of the oligarchs.

Conclusion Four. The parliamentary campaign in Ukraine was rigged, as evidenced by the number of regional election committees’ protocols processed, with a self-evident trend of trying to process them twice as quickly in the east and south, rather than the center of Ukraine, the main campaign battlefield. In other words, the authorities in the central areas protracted the vote-counting process, allowing ballots to be falsified. This calls for harsher vote-counting procedures, including security cameras covering every polling station, showing the observers a close-up of every ballot. The last ballot must be cast at 18:00 rather than 20:00, so the country can learn the results before midnight, reducing the possibility of fraud, considering the physical condition of the members of the vote-counting commissions and observers.

Conclusion Five. Information obtained from various sources during the election campaign points to efforts to intimidate not only opposition activists but ordinary voters and make them cast their ballots for a certain candidate, on pain of unemployment without pension. The ruling party has made it clear that any attempt to make it stand down – except for a massive coordinated public effort – is for the birds, because it has the administrative resource and all law-enforcement agencies on its payroll. Percentage? No problem. It will be composed tomorrow morning.

Conclusion Six. There are no truly dedicated law-enforcement officers left in Ukraine, not after the ruling party provided for election campaign bribery and blackmail, with some opposition activists’ homes being attacked, with hand grenades hurled through their windows.

Conclusion Seven. Ukrainian society, an impoverished one, a sad sequel to the fallen Soviet Union, exposed to bribery, post-Soviet mentality, bad politicians. The next Ukrainian parliament will be packed with MPs who simply paid for their votes, with the PoR candidates using government funds. At best, the electorate cast their ballots for janitors. At worst, they did so for bribe-givers from whom they had each received between 200, 500, and 1,000 hryvnias.

Conclusion Eight. Fifty-seven percent turnout. In other words, Ukrainian politics and parliament are totally discredited. The Verkhovna Rada is where the MPs shout at each other, without making any decisions. The Ukrainian parliament has lost its role as a legislative body, as the site of a political dialog. Mykhailo Chechetov isn’t responsible. They who placed him there are.

Conclusion Nine. People in the south and east of Ukraine, even though distrusting the current administration, are just starting to look for alternatives. Between 12 and 20 percent in Sevastopol, the Donbas, and the Crimea are for Opposition Three, compared to 32 percent in Kharkiv and 40 percent in Kherson and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. People in the south and east of Ukraine have spent decades living in an information ghetto. The opposition would find it easier collecting votes in Lviv than offering these people any acceptable proposals.

Conclusion Ten. Ukraine’s opposition looks sluggish. There is no drive. Fatherland, for example, relied on the slogan “We’ll Stop Them!” Its actions were dramatically to the contrary.

POSITIVE ASPECTS

(1) The opposition has won the elections on a proportionate basis, beating the Party of Regions 5:4. Moreover, five out of six exit polls read the opposition was the winner – in other words, over 50 percent of the respondents said so. PoR-affiliated Research&Branding was the exception, stating that this advantage over the ruling party was relative. These exit polls and the sociologists’ unwillingness to dirty their hands must serve as a lesson for the regime. Most likely the latter will try to hire a couple of their own men during the next campaign and then have them adjust the results accordingly. The opposition’s victory in terms of voters’ lists implies a serious obstacle for the [ruling party’s] reforms, including the land one, considering that the opposition represents the majority of the Ukrainian people, according to the voters’ lists.

(2) Freedom’s victory is, of course, the culmination of the campaign. Even though totally unexpected by some, it was well to be expected by those versed in the history of election campaigns in [independent] Ukraine. Freedom and United Opposition shared the bonus of radicalism, previously absorbed by Yulia Tymoshenko, during the 2006, 2007, and 2010 campaigns. This allowed her to get better results than forecast by sociologists. Political analysts and spin doctors often tend to judge people by comparing them to themselves. Likewise, they often refuse to see radical changes in them. Spin doctors on Bankova St. in Kyiv are likely to make Oleh Tiahnybok into Viktor Yanukovych’s opponent during the 2015 presidential campaign, considering that he is the only opponent worthy of Yanukovych’s effort. If he meant what he said as the leader of Freedom, the man will adequately respond to the challenge.

(3) Another heart-lifting result of the parliamentary campaign is what has happened to the “technical projects.” Natalia Korolevska, with her millions in the campaign purse, with [noted] soccer players and actors appearing in campaign commercials, failed primarily because her action program made little sense. Viktor Yushchenko ended up alongside Oleh Liashko, an outcome significant for the ex-head of Ukrainian state, a final popular verdict for the Orange Revolution.

(4) The passage of time will act against the Party of Regions. Most likely, this party will form a majority in the Ukrainian parliament, with communist support. But the crisis, the tightening of belts are still on the agenda. This will cost the PoR support outside and inside the Verkhovna Rada.

Now the main conclusion. Only a strong society enjoys the privilege of electing communal members to [executive and legislative] posts. As it was, elections in Ukraine were held without dramatic violations only within the stronger [ethnic] communities – in the west of Ukraine, but not throughout the region. The local community is stronger than anywhere else in Ukraine. That was where the truly competitive elections were held. In the east and south, the ruling party candidates had every advantage, often because their intimidated opponents knew better than compete. In the central part of Ukraine, the struggle centered on the intermediate situation, with the local community having enough strength to refuse to carry out the ruling party’s assignments but lacking strength to change the situation, for want of unity and understanding. In fact, the communities located all over central Ukraine, from Khmelnytsky to Sumy to Polissia to Kirovohrad won only where they had strong leaders and understanding. Sad but true, there are Ukrainian families whose members are divided on casting their ballots. If and when Ukrainian society gets united, those in power will have to pay heed. As it was, the existing electoral system offered the ruling party every opportunity to win the campaign, owing to the relative majority procedures. One thing is clear: combined effort will keep the regime under control, preserving Ukraine’s national dignity and securing its happier future.