Why do we struggle for state recognition of the OUN and the UPA?
Every year in October on the feast of St. Mary the Protectress, Ukrainians celebrate the day of the Ukrainian army, or Ukrainian arms. In recent days various actions focusing on the need for state recognition of the OUN during the Second World War were held. It is obvious that from year to year this holiday celebration has practically turned into a day of public confrontations because so-called left-wing and pro-Russian forces are trying to counteract by all means Ukrainian nationalists’ intentions to honor the memory of the fighters for Ukraine’s freedom in a fitting manner.
The “battle of Khreshchatyk,” which took place last October, is evidence of this. Since then the question of the state’s recognition of the OUN and the UPA has become extremely acute. Although the present government, like the previous one, is practically ignoring this problem, the dilemma must be solved sooner or later, because, on the one hand, too many promises to do this were proclaimed, and on the other, it has become obvious that the supporters of the OUN and the UPA are not going to back down.
Recently, the leaders of Ukrainian nationalist organizations sent an appeal to President Yushchenko, requesting decisive measures aimed at restoring historical justice in connection with the veterans of the national-liberation movement. At the same time, the character and style of the appeal attest to the radicalization of the movement to recognize the OUN and the UPA. The nationalists’ intention to hold “the UPA march” on Khreshchatyk illustrates the fact that the demands for historical justice can take place not just by “peaceful means.”
Meanwhile, the “saga” of OUN and UPA recognition, or rather, the saga of non-recognition, has generated some new aspects that require additional commentaries.
First of all, it should be emphasized that a lot of politicians have appeared in the milieu of people who allegedly support the OUN and the UPA, who are not accentuating the necessity of the state’s recognition of the OUN and UPA movement but the necessity of its “rehabilitation.” The term “rehabilitation” first entered political practice in 1953, when immediately after Stalin’s death a party commission was created to examine the archives of the security organs and other sources, systematize them, and present to a court official requests for the rehabilitation of people who were unlawfully repressed by Stalin’s totalitarian regime. Three types of rehabilitation existed: a “total” one, where rehabilitated people’s names could be published without any limitations; the qualification “committed certain errors,” and “civil rehabilitation,” which concerned the annulment of the reason behind an arrest, in particular, accusations of espionage, treason, sabotage etc., which were fabricated by Stalin’s terrorist apparatus.
Obviously, the term “rehabilitation” cannot be used in reference to those OUN and UPA veterans who fought with weapons in their hands for Ukraine’s independence, i.e., with open eyes and the clear purpose of struggling against the imperialistic Soviet Union and fascist Germany. If, because of this struggle, they were imprisoned in the Bolsheviks’ concentration camps, this fact only underlines their heroism.
In other words, the government of independent Ukraine does not have to, nor should it, “rehabilitate” fighters for its independence. So the appeals for the “rehabilitation” of the OUN and the UPA are politically irresponsible, legally incorrect, and cynical vis-a-vis these combatants.
Lately, the movement for the recognition of the OUN and the UPA has gradually been turning into a struggle for the proper honoring by the Ukrainian state of all veterans of the national-liberation movement, not only nationalists and insurgents. The above-mentioned appeal underlines the necessity of the state’s recognition of all Ukrainian military formations that took part in the events connected with the struggle for the restoration of Ukraine’s independence.
In this context it is reasonable to raise a question about the restoration of historical justice, at least in reference to two such formations: the Carpathian Sich and the Galicia Division.
The Carpathian Sich, or the People’s Defense Organization, was a paramilitary organization created in Zakarpattia in 1938-1939. After Carpatho-Ukraine’s declaration of independence in 1939, the Carpathian Sich became its national army, headed by the famous political and public figure, Colonel Mykhailo Kolodzinsky.
In March 1939, defending Carpatho-Ukraine’s integrity and sovereignty, the Carpathian Sich offered armed resistance to the Hungarian occupation. Approximately 2,000 Sichovyks were waging an unequal but heroic war against the numerically superior enemy forces. Under the occupiers’ attack separate divisions of the Carpathian Sich were forced to retreat to Romania and Slovakia. However, this did not save the Ukrainian patriots because the Romanian authorities extradited some of these Ukrainians to Hungary, the latter handed them over to Poland, where they were cruelly repressed and executed.
The Carpathian Sich’s struggle against the Hungarians was the first armed action against Hungarian fascism, and it proved its readiness to defend the national honor of Carpatho-Ukraine with weapons in their hands. Many Sichovyks are still living in Zakarpattia, Lviv region, and other regions of western Ukraine. They are not simply living but waiting for the Ukrainian government to carry out its duty — acknowledge their struggle on the state level.
Another Ukrainian armed formation, the Galicia Division, has long been the subject of debate. Memories of 2002 are still fresh. That year the State Duma of the Russian Federation, before Ukraine’s parliamentary elections, passed a declaration with the expressive title “In Connection with the Actions in Ukraine connected to the Former Soldiers of the Galicia Division.” Russia’s brutal interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs launched a discussion concerning the place and role of the division in the national-liberation movement.
From the modern perspective, the Galicia Division should definitely be treated as a Ukrainian military formation that was carrying out military operations against the occupiers. The fact that the division was fighting under foreign flags only accentuates the Ukrainian people’s tragedy of being forced to fight in such a way for the liberation of their motherland. This is also confirmed by the fact that the division was not charged with crimes by the Nuremberg court. Most of the division’s veterans were repressed by the Soviet government, namely for “wanting an independent Ukraine.”
Today there is a Galician Brotherhood of Former Combatants of the First Ukrainian Division Galicia in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast. Its members are also waiting: when will the authorities in Kyiv acknowledge their military rank?
Now I will give an answer to the question listed in the title of my article. We are fighting for state recognition of the OUN and the UPA because we are convinced that until the Ukrainian government hails them and honors the memory of all those who were fighting for their country’s liberation from different occupiers, Ukraine will not be able to guarantee national understanding and accord, i.e., become a truly European and democratic state. We understand this. Ultimately, the government has to understand this.
