The Revolution’s Media Guidelines
A lot of books have been quickly churned out about the Orange Revolution: documentary publications and glossy illustrated books (Kyiv’s Independence Square was a real bonanza for photographers). The latest book cropped up the other day. What is special about this one is that it was edited by Mykhailo Pohrebynsky, director of the Kyiv- based Center for Political and Conflict Studies. He is the political scientist whom the former opposition blamed for drawing up the notorious temnyky (media guidelines) and backing the pro-governmental candidate Viktor Yanukovych. Until recently, Pohrebynsky frequently appeared on television programs, criticizing the ex-oppositionists. After the elections, however, he dropped out of sight. Now he is back in the public eye as the host of the roundtable “Colored Revolutions in the Post-Soviet Space: Political Consequences,” which saw the launch of a new book on the Orange Revolution. Among its authors are Ukrainian, Russian, and German political scientists, including both fervent supporters and opponents of the Orange Revolution, as well as researchers who try their best to maintain a neutral and unbiased stance. This is what the abstract says — and this is correct. Incidentally, the list of authors includes some frequent contributors to Den/The Day, such as Volodymyr Fesenko, Oleksandr Lytvynenko, and Alexander Rahr, who were also invited to air their views on the “Orange events” and their consequences at the roundtable but failed to show up, like many others. The Day’s correspondent, who has considerable experience in covering this type of event, saw many unknown experts at the roundtable.
Besides Mr. Pohrebynsky, there was another better known expert — Volodymyr Malynkovych — director of the Ukrainian branch of the International Institute of Humanitarian and Political Research, who likes “neither the former government nor the present one.” He characterized the political scientists in attendance as people “with a certain degree of opposition to the new government, people who do not consider the Orange Revolution ideal.” He said this is the reverse side of the medal seen earlier, for the conferences that were organized by the Razumkov Center were never patronized by political scientists who cater to the government.
By all accounts, Mr. Pohrebynsky has not changed his views. He still takes a dim view of the Orange Revolution. This oozes from almost every one of his remarks about the Maidan, when he talks about “a square that gathered 2,000-3,000 people or maybe some 200,000-300,000.” This political scientist expects his book will trigger a reaction, especially a negative one, for he admits that most of the materials are critical in nature. He claims he also invited current government officials to write their own articles, for the sake of balance, but they were too preoccupied with portfolio distribution and other problems. The editor did manage to dig up at least one valuable opinion of the book, which was printed on the back cover. According to the blurb provided by Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, “included among the authors of this book are both firm supporters and relentless opponents of the Maidan. I am grateful to the former. As for the latter, I would like to recall the well-known aphorism, ‘Revolutions begin to win respect when they present no more danger.’ The hostility that is felt in their words means only one thing: fear of the people, who rose from their knees and demanded the implementation of their inalienable and undeniable rights.”
Mr. Pohrebynsky says that no one-neither society, experts, nor the leadership-have a definite idea of what exactly happened at the end of last year. He says, for example, that the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently dressed down a Russian official who remarked that unconstitutional things had gone on during the Orange Revolution. “But if the leadership claims that everything was constitutional, then what has it got to do with revolution?” Mr. Pohrebynsky asks. “And what is the new government’s legitimacy based on: revolution or the constitution?”
Mr. Malynkovych tried to answer his colleague’s question. “If by legitimacy one means the level of public support, one can say that the opposition acted legitimately because the government had already lost public support by that time.” At the same time, according to Mr. Malynkovych, “the previous government had legal instruments to use force, but it would be naive to think that Leonid Kuchma, bereft of public support, could have opted for this simply owing to his own legality, especially since Yanukovych was not his henchman — he represented the interests of the clan that already held sway in the country.” This political scientist says that if he were Yushchenko, he would immediately award Kuchma the “Order of the Orange Revolution No. 1.” The way things look, that’s not such a remote possibility.
On the whole, the book ‘The Orange’ Revolution: Versions, Chronicles, Documents lives up to its title. Despite the proliferation of other publications on this subject, this book should be read in order to understand who has drawn lessons from the events of November-December 2004 and who hasn’t.
