What Is To Be Agreed On and How
As has been reported, the leaders of the parliamentary factions and groups of people’s deputies conferring Wednesdays on whether or not pass the political reform bill turned out to disagree on a number of issued of principle. Among other things, they failed to agree whether the parliament should elect the president, imperative “mandates,” procedures of proportional representation, the deadline for the presidential campaign, as well as presidential powers. Is there a chance of reciprocal concessions or agreements?
Hennady RUDENKO, People’s Deputy, SDPU(O), Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Ecological Issues:
Our faction will discuss the new bill only next week. As for its prospects, I tend to agree with the speaker; the problem should either be solved in the immediate future or we should stop discussing the reform as such. What makes the situation a paradox is that we all understand that we need the reform, yet each offers his view on what this reform should be all about. I think that the bill is an opportunity that we mustn’t pass up, or it will be too late. I am trying to convince my colleagues that this is what we must do.
Artem BIDENKO, School of Political Analysis:
In the new session the problem of the political reform has been transformed from a clearly formulated issue into one of solving personal PR problems. While previously attempts were made to adopt a rational approach, with clearly stated views on separate clauses, expressed by opposition and head of state, this session appears to have noticeably shifted emphasis. Withdrawing the presidential bill could also be regarded as another campaign trick, considering the introduction of the bill authored by Oleksandr Moroz, Petro Symonenko, and Viktor Medvedchuk. Even though regarded as a compromise of sorts, the document leads a number of people to press for changes. Volodymyr Lytvyn said there were 172 signatures in support of submitting the bill to the Constitutional Court, adding that the political reform issue should be closed unless it collects 226 votes during this session. His misgivings do not seem without foundation. The political reform appears to have crossed the line beyond which it can no longer be regarded as a logical step. Now it’s hard to figure out who is for what. Any clear dividing line disappeared largely due to the collaboration of Medvedchuk, Moroz, and Symonenko. Now it is practically impossible to determine who is with which camp.
Naturally, a compromise will be worked out, but somewhere in the middle such. that cardinal decisions like whether or not the next head of state will be elected by the parliament or whether Verkhovna Rada will have a second house remain anyone’s guess. In that case the political reform will fail and a host of good ideas will be reduced to campaign posturing. Politicians will most likely seek compromises with regard to changes in the political reform, rather than the reform as such, changes that will be acceptable to all parties concerned. The very idea of the political reform will lose its original meaning, although politicians will continue discussing it as a real attainment. The man in the street, however, will see that what is happening is not political change but certain constitutional amendments, which will not affect anything that goes on in the country.
Most likely, Verkhovna Rada will register a degree of oppostion-majority rapprochement. Our Ukraine may well press for a vote in which each deputy will be allowed to decide for himself. In a word, the stated political reform will not be this parliament’s swan song.
Viktoriya PODHORNA, Center for Social and Political Projecting:
The situation that has developed now that the political reform is in its third phase [of parliamentary hearings] appears quite unattractive to many political forces. To this end, the bill appears quite problematic and risky for both its authors and other participants in the political process. The version proposing reductions in presidential powers and introducing a parliamentary system is not likely to pass, because it doesn’t address any of the issues a genuine political reform should solve, the more so that there is much of the Leftist program, even Bolshevism. The concept of parliamentary government upheld the Left, primarily the Communists, has nothing to do with parliamentarism as recognized and practiced by the civilized world. In essence, councils of people’s deputies and Western-style parliamentarism are worlds apart. Soviet parliamentarism relies on a single political force or coalition dominating all the others within a given historical period, while the Western concept upholds a multiparty system and pluralism, something the Left has never accepted; it further relies on the people’s active participation in the electoral process to effectively control the political process.
No one can deny that political reform must be carried out in Ukraine. In order to find a compromise we have to reach a certain pact. A noted researcher named Philip Schmid noted that a situation where all the political forces are well aware of each other, knowing which can do what, and what can be achieved by their concerted effort, is a most complicated situation, in any country in the transition phase, considering that such forces may eventually find a way to agree with the realities, so they can make sure none of them will get the upper hand. A number of countries appear to have failed such tests of democracy. There will be no democracy in Ukraine without compromise; there can be only return the authoritarian system or some hybrid transition regime.
Today, the political reform is a problem of democracy itself in Ukraine. If the current coalition continues with its own strategy, they will surely become hostages of that system, and that system won’t work. Parliamentary systems have very rarely proved effective, for this takes a collosal political tradition, a strongly developed party structure, and an advanced civil society. One feels Symonenko’s hand in this bill, and it looks extremely unattractive not only to representatives of the opposition.
Serhiy TELESHUN, Ph.D. in political science and president of the Spivdruzhnist Foundation:
Today discussing Ukraine’s strategic development makes no sense, because the power players associate the political reform with two things, both likely to determine this country’s political and economic standing in the next decade: the presidential campaign and the 2006 parliamentary elections. The legitimacy of the next president and parliament, the powers vested in both, will determine the alignment of both political forces and all those destined to continue the political reform; it will likewise signify an end to the privatization of the most strategically important enterprises in Ukraine and attract the interest of the international community.
Whatever compromises can be achieved will primarily depend on economic interest. Such economic compromises are in a latent phase. We don’t have to compromise politically to betray our economic interests. This stays in the lobby or in the form of confidential arrangements between the key players. This is an entirely different aspect of the issue.
Another factor concerns the tactical interests of the political players, especially those who have no chance of winning Ukraine’s highest political post. They are attempting to retain their key political potential, so they can make the most of it in the next parliamentary elections. These are the Socialist and the Communist Parties, as well as several other political forces interested in achieving a political compromise, a situation in which they would be able to have their opponents’ or partners’ guarantees of further cooperation. Political forces, considering their respective ideological stands, current popularity, and being in a position to voice their attitude toward the powers that be, will be hard put to compromise. This is particularly true of Our Ukraine, although even there they have different views on the political reform. The Tymoshenko Bloc might perhaps favor making certain arrangements, but here one has to allow for the ideological, personal, and business factors. Should these problems be solved, I would agree that Tymoshenko might reconsider her attitude toward the reform.
I doubt that all such arrangements will become reality and prove lasting, as each sees every such proposition not only in light of his own political-economic interests, but also attempts to add his own proposals.
