Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI: The International Consequences of 1989
The Soviet Union's termination, which brought to an end the bipolar world, ushered in an era of U.S. hegemony. Hegemony, however, should not be confused with omnipotence. Hegemony is not omnipotence, but is certainly preponderance. As we look into the future, one of the first questions to think about concerns the future of that hegemony.
Is the future of this American hegemony terminal, or is its future transitional? If it is terminal, then, given the present power relations in the world, it can only lead to one alternative, namely international anarchy, because there is no existent system and no possible combination of states that can supplant the role which the United States currently plays. But if it is transitional, then the question arises: transitional to what, and how?
A second great change that took place with the end of the Soviet Union is related to this American hegemony. It involved the termination of the great global ideological divide that shaped the course of this century: how to organize society, and how to distribute political power within society. Our century was one of fanatical dogmatism dominated by the desire to create a coercive utopia in the social dimension of human life. The question arising from the end of this conflict is this: what are likely to be the intellectually and emotionally mobilizing forces of political discourse in the future?
Let me attempt to dissect these two issues simultaneously. If American hegemony, which truly exists today, is to be transitional — ie, if it is to end in a benign fashion and not by a sudden displacement producing anarchy, nor by an unilateral American desertion from the global scene, which would also produce anarchy — fundamental systemic changes must take place in the process of this hegemony's evolution. These changes must focus on those regions of the world which are most important and hold the greatest potential for change — Europe, Russia, China, Japan and the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. These are the regions in which changes can have significant dynamic consequences, and thus the process of adaptation and the evolution of new political relationships has to be conducted in a fashion that is conducive to stability.
Here, two relationships are more important than any others: the relationship between America and Europe, and the relationship between America and China. Each of these relationships feeds back to other pertinent relationships. The American relationship with Europe will have a significant impact on America's and Europe's relationship with Russia and, of course, with Russia's relationship with Europe and America. The American relationship with Europe will also be most significant for the evolution of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. The American relationship with China will have a significant impact on America's and China's relations with Russia, and again feed back on Russia's relationship with America and Russia's relationship with China; but it will also have a significant impact on the role that Japan plays on the world scene.
The task of the American- European relationship in regards to Russia, as well as the American- Chinese relationship in regards to Russia, is to create a normal set of relationships that facilitates Russia's involvement on a stable and instructive basis in the world. American-European cooperation in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf can contribute to longer term stability in that region, which cannot be indefinitely based on American supremacy. American- Chinese relationships, in addition to their impact on Russia, have a significance, for the stability of North-East Asia where there is a potential for conflict and they will help to define how Japan defines its own role in international affairs as a major power, not only economically, but also over time, politically and militarily.
It its absolutely essential that these relationships, and particularly the first primary set, be handled responsibly and involve increasing cooperation and interdependence. If handled well, they will promote the transitional devolution of American hegemony into something that might, over time, emerge as a cooperative structure of power that gradually replaces what is today an unique set of circumstances in which one power exercises preponderance, even if not omnipotence. But a great deal depends how the American- European relationship evolves.
When I say the American- European, I'm using two words which have entirely different meanings in their political-military context. American means: U.S. political and military power. European means: the political and military postures of a number of European countries that cooperate closely in economics and are beginning to operate more closely in the areas of foreign and military policy, but do not yet represent a common political and military profile. The European members of NATO, it may be interesting to note, spend two-thirds of what the United States spends for military purposes. But for that two-thirds equivalent to U.S. expenditure, the European states obtain a military capability which can be assessed, at most, at about 20% of American military power.
Here is one very critical example: there was no European country in the recent crisis over Kosovo which could have prevailed militarily on its own against Serbia, a country of ten million people that is rather poor and backward. This means that to be a partner of America in the evolving international system, Europe has to unite, Europe has to integrate not only economically, but politically, militarily, and America must adjust to that process. It is going to be difficult on both ends, more difficult on the European side because it will involve greater exertions, but America, too, will have to make some hard adjustments, say within NATO and the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, where the United States has exercised a monopoly of power.
Restructuring the American- Chinese relationship will be more difficult to handle than the American/European one. Sino- American relations are susceptible to hysteria, in terms of American public opinion, and to hysterical manipulation insofar as Chinese public opinion is concerned. Yet, it is essential that China be co-opted into the international system as a factor for stability and not as a part of some strategical elision involving China, Russia, and India against American hegemony. By opting for cooperation, China can avoid a situation in which Japan is tempted to play an increasingly independent security role, which in some respects it is already beginning to do — indeed, in some significant respects.
If Japan goes too far down this road, however, it would create such tensions in the Japanese-Chinese relationship that it would adversely affect also the possibility for a stable American-Chinese relationship. But if these processes can be handled responsibly, if Europe unites, if the EU expands, if NATO expands, if the American-Chinese relationship is more cooperative, if there is greater sharing of political responsibility for the fate of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, particularly once there is a peace treaty between Israel and its neighbors, if there is triangular discourse, cooperation, security arrangements eventually in the Far East, if Russia realizes that its only destiny is not the recreation of an empire that claims the status of a global power but as part of a more closely integrated Europe, which will create for the Russian people the opportunity to become a truly democratic and modern state, then we'll have the makings of something which provides gradually an alternative to the present, rather unique, phase of American preponderance.
Making all these changes will be difficult. But if the world moves in this direction, something along the lines of a new conclave of political global power will begin to take shape, and that will be the beginnings of a new international system.
The second great change — ie, the end of global ideological division — also raises difficult and, perhaps, more complex issues. There exists today a basic, even on an occasion a ritualistic, consensus regarding the notion that democracy and human rights are the points of departure for political organization with some form of free market with varying degrees of social responsibility based on private entrepreneurship as the basis for economic activity. Yes, one can debate about the third way, or the two and a half way, or the three and a half way, but these are essentially marginal debates. In the short run, the great questions regarding social organizations have been resolved.
But there is growing confusion in the world, in particularly among its most modern societies, regarding a different issue which is likely to be very divisive. The twentieth century was dominated by a debate over the social organization of the human condition based on alternative concepts of history and even of human personality. Now I think we're at the beginnings of a great debate regarding the personal dimension of human life.
The Nazis and Communists represented the zenith of man's hubris in the notion that by political means a human utopia could be created. We may be on the eve of an even greater hubris, but probably exercised spontaneously and not on the basis of political direction. It is going to be much more uncontrolled and dynamic. It will not involve the harnessing of power on a deliberate basis, but rather the harnessing on a spontaneous basis of the exploding scientific abilities to improve, to transform, to create the human person. That is altogether a new era of human affairs.
For most of human history, mankind coped, struggled with, and sought to control the externalities of our existence. Now, increasingly, the great divide and the big questions facing us will pertain to the internalities of existence, to the self, rather than to the outside. Just look at the issues that are beginning to agitate the political debate in advanced societies: birth control, death control, life prolongation, health cures, improvements in appearance, intellectual enhancement, personality alteration, human cloning, brain transplants, synthesis of human and artificial intelligence. All are within our grasp; they are all, in different ways, being pursued, but without any basic criteria guiding their application. We're confused philosophically, we're uncertain religiously.
The danger here is not only of uncontrolled changes with unpredictable consequences, but also of creating a greater gap in the human condition between those societies in which these capabilities will be applied massively and those societies that lack the means for their application. It may create an altogether a new inequality in the human condition, one not measured by income, which was the consequence of the Industrial Revolution to which Marxism responded, but an inequality in the human condition of an organic type. This will pose serious problems in a world which, incidentally, is becoming ever more divided in terms of income as well.
Look at the UN human development report for 1998 which provides a few glaring statistics on the inequality in the human condition economically which may provide the basis for a greater inequality scientifically. Some statistics speak for themselves: the three richest people in the world have combined personal assets, on their own, in excess of the entire GDPs of the 48 least developed countries. Americans spend $8 billion per annum in cosmetics. The UN estimates that it would take $6 billion per annum to provide basic education for everyone in the world. Europeans spent $11 billion per annum on ice cream, making $9 billion dollars available to the UN would provide clean water and safe sewers for everyone who lacks them. Americans and Europeans spent $17 billion on pet food, an increase in aid of $13 billion would provide basic health and nutrition for everyone who lacks it in the world. The world's richest individuals, 225 of them, have the combined wealth of over $1 trillion and of the 4.4 billion people in developing countries 3/5 lack access to safe sewers, 1/3 have no access to clean water, and 1/5 have no access to medical services.
This revolution in the internalities of our existence, which is unpredictable in its scope and uncertain in its direction, is taking place in a setting of deepening division in the material existence of humanity. This, I believe, poses some serious questions for the future. The twentieth century was a criminal century, in terms of its ideological debates and political expression. It started, incidentally, with an enormous wave of optimism. If you go back to the leading European and American newspapers on the year January 1, 1900 they were filled with optimism. As we move towards the next century, I think we would be well advised, precisely because of the victory of 1989, to make a very sober, realistic, and philosophically responsible assessment of the problems that we all may together confront.
N.B. Zbigniew Brzezinski is a former national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter and is currently a professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University.
The Soviet Union's termination, which brought to an end the bipolar world, ushered in an era of U.S. hegemony. Hegemony, however, should not be confused with omnipotence. Hegemony is not omnipotence, but is certainly preponderance. As we look into the future, one of the first questions to think about concerns the future of that hegemony.
Is the future of this American hegemony terminal, or is its future transitional? If it is terminal, then, given the present power relations in the world, it can only lead to one alternative, namely international anarchy, because there is no existent system and no possible combination of states that can supplant the role which the United States currently plays. But if it is transitional, then the question arises: transitional to what, and how?
A second great change that took place with the end of the Soviet Union is related to this American hegemony. It involved the termination of the great global ideological divide that shaped the course of this century: how to organize society, and how to distribute political power within society. Our century was one of fanatical dogmatism dominated by the desire to create a coercive utopia in the social dimension of human life. The question arising from the end of this conflict is this: what are likely to be the intellectually and emotionally mobilizing forces of political discourse in the future?
Let me attempt to dissect these two issues simultaneously. If American hegemony, which truly exists today, is to be transitional — ie, if it is to end in a benign fashion and not by a sudden displacement producing anarchy, nor by an unilateral American desertion from the global scene, which would also produce anarchy — fundamental systemic changes must take place in the process of this hegemony's evolution. These changes must focus on those regions of the world which are most important and hold the greatest potential for change — Europe, Russia, China, Japan and the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. These are the regions in which changes can have significant dynamic consequences, and thus the process of adaptation and the evolution of new political relationships has to be conducted in a fashion that is conducive to stability.
Here, two relationships are more important than any others: the relationship between America and Europe, and the relationship between America and China. Each of these relationships feeds back to other pertinent relationships. The American relationship with Europe will have a significant impact on America's and Europe's relationship with Russia and, of course, with Russia's relationship with Europe and America. The American relationship with Europe will also be most significant for the evolution of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. The American relationship with China will have a significant impact on America's and China's relations with Russia, and again feed back on Russia's relationship with America and Russia's relationship with China; but it will also have a significant impact on the role that Japan plays on the world scene.
The task of the American- European relationship in regards to Russia, as well as the American- Chinese relationship in regards to Russia, is to create a normal set of relationships that facilitates Russia's involvement on a stable and instructive basis in the world. American-European cooperation in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf can contribute to longer term stability in that region, which cannot be indefinitely based on American supremacy. American- Chinese relationships, in addition to their impact on Russia, have a significance, for the stability of North-East Asia where there is a potential for conflict and they will help to define how Japan defines its own role in international affairs as a major power, not only economically, but also over time, politically and militarily.
It its absolutely essential that these relationships, and particularly the first primary set, be handled responsibly and involve increasing cooperation and interdependence. If handled well, they will promote the transitional devolution of American hegemony into something that might, over time, emerge as a cooperative structure of power that gradually replaces what is today an unique set of circumstances in which one power exercises preponderance, even if not omnipotence. But a great deal depends how the American- European relationship evolves.
When I say the American- European, I'm using two words which have entirely different meanings in their political-military context. American means: U.S. political and military power. European means: the political and military postures of a number of European countries that cooperate closely in economics and are beginning to operate more closely in the areas of foreign and military policy, but do not yet represent a common political and military profile. The European members of NATO, it may be interesting to note, spend two-thirds of what the United States spends for military purposes. But for that two-thirds equivalent to U.S. expenditure, the European states obtain a military capability which can be assessed, at most, at about 20% of American military power.
Here is one very critical example: there was no European country in the recent crisis over Kosovo which could have prevailed militarily on its own against Serbia, a country of ten million people that is rather poor and backward. This means that to be a partner of America in the evolving international system, Europe has to unite, Europe has to integrate not only economically, but politically, militarily, and America must adjust to that process. It is going to be difficult on both ends, more difficult on the European side because it will involve greater exertions, but America, too, will have to make some hard adjustments, say within NATO and the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, where the United States has exercised a monopoly of power.
Restructuring the American- Chinese relationship will be more difficult to handle than the American/European one. Sino- American relations are susceptible to hysteria, in terms of American public opinion, and to hysterical manipulation insofar as Chinese public opinion is concerned. Yet, it is essential that China be co-opted into the international system as a factor for stability and not as a part of some strategical elision involving China, Russia, and India against American hegemony. By opting for cooperation, China can avoid a situation in which Japan is tempted to play an increasingly independent security role, which in some respects it is already beginning to do — indeed, in some significant respects.
If Japan goes too far down this road, however, it would create such tensions in the Japanese-Chinese relationship that it would adversely affect also the possibility for a stable American-Chinese relationship. But if these processes can be handled responsibly, if Europe unites, if the EU expands, if NATO expands, if the American-Chinese relationship is more cooperative, if there is greater sharing of political responsibility for the fate of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, particularly once there is a peace treaty between Israel and its neighbors, if there is triangular discourse, cooperation, security arrangements eventually in the Far East, if Russia realizes that its only destiny is not the recreation of an empire that claims the status of a global power but as part of a more closely integrated Europe, which will create for the Russian people the opportunity to become a truly democratic and modern state, then we'll have the makings of something which provides gradually an alternative to the present, rather unique, phase of American preponderance.
Making all these changes will be difficult. But if the world moves in this direction, something along the lines of a new conclave of political global power will begin to take shape, and that will be the beginnings of a new international system.
The second great change — ie, the end of global ideological division — also raises difficult and, perhaps, more complex issues. There exists today a basic, even on an occasion a ritualistic, consensus regarding the notion that democracy and human rights are the points of departure for political organization with some form of free market with varying degrees of social responsibility based on private entrepreneurship as the basis for economic activity. Yes, one can debate about the third way, or the two and a half way, or the three and a half way, but these are essentially marginal debates. In the short run, the great questions regarding social organizations have been resolved.
But there is growing confusion in the world, in particularly among its most modern societies, regarding a different issue which is likely to be very divisive. The twentieth century was dominated by a debate over the social organization of the human condition based on alternative concepts of history and even of human personality. Now I think we're at the beginnings of a great debate regarding the personal dimension of human life.
The Nazis and Communists represented the zenith of man's hubris in the notion that by political means a human utopia could be created. We may be on the eve of an even greater hubris, but probably exercised spontaneously and not on the basis of political direction. It is going to be much more uncontrolled and dynamic. It will not involve the harnessing of power on a deliberate basis, but rather the harnessing on a spontaneous basis of the exploding scientific abilities to improve, to transform, to create the human person. That is altogether a new era of human affairs.
For most of human history, mankind coped, struggled with, and sought to control the externalities of our existence. Now, increasingly, the great divide and the big questions facing us will pertain to the internalities of existence, to the self, rather than to the outside. Just look at the issues that are beginning to agitate the political debate in advanced societies: birth control, death control, life prolongation, health cures, improvements in appearance, intellectual enhancement, personality alteration, human cloning, brain transplants, synthesis of human and artificial intelligence. All are within our grasp; they are all, in different ways, being pursued, but without any basic criteria guiding their application. We're confused philosophically, we're uncertain religiously.
The danger here is not only of uncontrolled changes with unpredictable consequences, but also of creating a greater gap in the human condition between those societies in which these capabilities will be applied massively and those societies that lack the means for their application. It may create an altogether a new inequality in the human condition, one not measured by income, which was the consequence of the Industrial Revolution to which Marxism responded, but an inequality in the human condition of an organic type. This will pose serious problems in a world which, incidentally, is becoming ever more divided in terms of income as well.
Look at the UN human development report for 1998 which provides a few glaring statistics on the inequality in the human condition economically which may provide the basis for a greater inequality scientifically. Some statistics speak for themselves: the three richest people in the world have combined personal assets, on their own, in excess of the entire GDPs of the 48 least developed countries. Americans spend $8 billion per annum in cosmetics. The UN estimates that it would take $6 billion per annum to provide basic education for everyone in the world. Europeans spent $11 billion per annum on ice cream, making $9 billion dollars available to the UN would provide clean water and safe sewers for everyone who lacks them. Americans and Europeans spent $17 billion on pet food, an increase in aid of $13 billion would provide basic health and nutrition for everyone who lacks it in the world. The world's richest individuals, 225 of them, have the combined wealth of over $1 trillion and of the 4.4 billion people in developing countries 3/5 lack access to safe sewers, 1/3 have no access to clean water, and 1/5 have no access to medical services.
This revolution in the internalities of our existence, which is unpredictable in its scope and uncertain in its direction, is taking place in a setting of deepening division in the material existence of humanity. This, I believe, poses some serious questions for the future. The twentieth century was a criminal century, in terms of its ideological debates and political expression. It started, incidentally, with an enormous wave of optimism. If you go back to the leading European and American newspapers on the year January 1, 1900 they were filled with optimism. As we move towards the next century, I think we would be well advised, precisely because of the victory of 1989, to make a very sober, realistic, and philosophically responsible assessment of the problems that we all may together confront.
N.B. Zbigniew Brzezinski is a former national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter and is currently a professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University.
Newspaper output №:
№31, (1999)Section
Day After Day
