Foreign Policy: Gains Without Satisfaction

Mr. Tarasiuk gave as Ukraine's greatest foreign-policy achievements: improvement of relations with the European Union (EU member-states decided at their latest summit to work out a Ukrainian strategy, something Kyiv has long sought), forthcoming consultations about possible formation of a Ukraine-EU free trade zone, progress in delimitation of the Ukrainian-Russian land border (which Moscow resisted so long), launching of the so-called Kharkiv initiative between Ukrainian enterprises and the USA (without any concrete results for Ukraine visible thus far), and Ukraine's assertion as a regional leader (which is more of an expectation). True, Mr. Tarasiuk was quite to the point that, still, last year gave no reason to feel the satisfaction we had the year before; Ukraine failed to either become an EU associate member or be invited to the European Conference of EU full and candidate members; still unresolved with Russia remains the problem of the foreign property of the former Soviet Union.

We could also add the so-called Iranian contract - not so much for our surrendering it (Ukraine is not a direct party to it) as the way it was done, i.e., under the US pressure; and lack of progress in negotiations with Romania on sharing the maritime economic zone and continental shelf (diplomats maintain that Bucharest intends to refer the matter to the World Court). Early last year a great deal was said about intentions of the US Congress to cut federal aid to Ukraine because US business problems. Ukraine never saw any qualitative increase in foreign investments, but, instead, faced a problem with the European Union over the Ukrainian leadership's immoderate love for Daewoo. There were reports from all over the world on new anti-dumping court actions against Ukrainian producers - conversely, nothing is being said now about Ukraine's early membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Admission to WTO requires compliance with its standards, which the authorities and their cronies are obviously incapable of.

The victory on the Turkmenistan front in the shape of gas supplies seems dubious, given the price the consumer will have to pay. There is no tangible progress in the rivalry over the supply routes of Caspian oil.

A high-placed Ukrainian diplomat considers qualitative increase of contacts with oft-cited Poland still puny in comparison with Russia's weight in Ukrainian politics. He maintains that Ukraine may have to pay too high a price for Russian State Duma's ratification of the Ukrainian-Russian Treaty by losing its real gains in the Western direction.

What is visible in Ukraine's proclaimed strategic partnership with Russia and the USA so far boils down to tremendous strategic dependence on Moscow and Washington, while the "multidirectional" pendulum often swings toward whomever spoke last to the President. The absence of a European lobby in government is unlikely to speed up European integration. Ukraine's international image has also been battered by the Lazarenko case, and in the eyes of average Westerners this is much more important than all the state's gains combined.

Perhaps it is impossible to have turned a former Soviet province into an influential, if only regionally, state in seven years, although there were some chances and efforts are being made. This may be exemplified by the informal GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) group. But the crux of the issue is that, clearly, for a state to stand firmly on its own two feet on the international arena, for it to be reckoned with by all - from the USA to a Nigerian tribal chief - each of its citizens must feel like a human being. The current Ukrainian regime has proved that this is beyond its capabilities.