On a “smokescreen”

In Russia, the whole media space is filled with news about Ukraine. There is no other news. The question arises, what will happen if the topic of Ukraine disappears, what will the Rus­sian media cover and the Russian TV channels broadcast? And most impor­tantly, in general, for what purpose it is done: do they want to distract peop­le’s attention or to prove that Ukraine is part of Russia? The Day asked inde­pendent Russian journalist Semen NOVOPRUDSKY to comment on the situation in the Russian media and what was behind it all.

“THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT WILL DO ITS BEST TO DELAY THE ONSET OF STABILITY IN UKRAINE”

“It seems to me that the Rus­sian government has not had any specific Ukraine strategy. The fact that Ukraine has become a big red herring amid growing economic problems in Russia is obvious. It is even questionable whether what Russia is doing in Ukraine is part of Russia’s foreign or domestic policy. I think it is more of a domestic policy, because, of course, Rus­sia has almost no debate now about what is happening in the economy. Meanwhile, Rus­sian journalists overlooked dangerous trends in the economy, which was an amazing thing for me, because after all, the economy does get some co­verage. A couple of days ago, Russia’s statistical agency announced some economic indicators, and it turn­ed out that Russia’s GDP decreased by 18 percent in the first quar­ter of 2014 compared to the fourth quarter of 2013. I even check­ed if this information was true, because I was afraid that it might contain some error.

“Indeed, the Russian economy is in crisis. Even if there is some growth over this year, it will be within a percent or less. In general, of course, the Rus­sian government has eliminated economic problems from the information agenda for six months already as they pushed the Ukrainian topic. In this sense, of course, it is more of a domestic policy thing. The question is whether it can go on on the same basis for too long and what will be the econo­mic consequences of doing so. In my opinion, Russia still has not openly recognized the independence of the so-called people’s republics in eastern Ukraine due to internal economic reasons, not political ones. Indeed, the risks are very high, and despite people saying that sanctions are rather trifling, they have had an effect. It is unclear what happens next. But in any case, it is a smokescreen, primarily to cover such needs.”
Even if we achieve stability, will Ukraine stay as the main topic in the Russian media?

“It seems to me that the intensity of the propaganda was such that the Rus­sian government, firstly, will do its best to delay the onset of stability in Ukraine and secondly, it will hardly recognize it. I think it is not to be expected that the Russian media will broadcast news that all is well in Ukraine, if Ukraine preserves its current shape and the current government will have some achievements. In the best case, there would be silence. After Saakashvili lost the election, they stopped talking about Georgia. Georgia has ceased to be such an important media and political enemy, it has just disappeared from the information space of the official Russian media. In the best case for the Rus­sian public, Ukraine will disappear for a while. But it is unlikely that the current Russian authorities will ever say that stability is reigning in Ukraine, and they are unlikely to abandon attempts to delay this stabi­lity in every way they know.”

“VLADIMIR PUTIN THINKS THAT HE HAS MADE A NAME FOR HIMSELF WITH THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA”

Is not the purpose of this pro­­paganda to show that Russia and Ukraine are one? After all, Putin has said that the Novorossia is part of Rus­sia and it is here, especially in the east of Ukraine, that the Russian-armed terrorists operate.

“In fact, Putin has never consi­der­ed Ukraine as an independent state. Clearly, his map of the world does not have Ukraine as an independent state. Moreover, all these geopolitical games, imperial ambitions, and all that jazz are partly present in his personal ambitions. But it is relatively subordinated to a desire to preserve the ability to rule and maintain his and his entourage’s access to assets of the country. Relatively speaking, the business interests of the state determine such logic of behavior to a large extent. When it became clear that the current Russian government is by and large unable to cope with the economy and the president’s approval ratings fell, they decided to establish such a mechanism.

“I do not think that the creation of the Novorossia is Putin’s idee fixe. I think it is more important for him to have a high approval rating and get the Russians not to wonder what is happening to the economy of the country. If they already start wondering, the government tries to instill the thought that the true reasons for the malaise have nothing to do with foreign or domestic policy of Russia, but a lot with the intrigues of foreign enemies. In this sense, sanctions are also the best thing for the Russian authorities ideologically. The Russians’ reaction is understandable, since many of them have never been abroad, and the government is still exploiting this fact. Thus, blaming it all on the intrigues against Russia is very easy. Part of the audience will be this gullible.
“The Novorossia project is a minor one in Putin’s mind, and if he feels that it is not a priority for his inner circle, it is unlikely that he will start to implement it.

“Putin’s problem is that he has ruled for longer time than his predecessors, Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, combined, and he does not have anything to show for it. Now he thinks that he has made a name for himself with the annexation of Cri­mea and that will be enough. It is impossible to be sure about it, though, because on the one hand, the government has dramatically increased the degree of aggression in society, and on the other hand, it is also clear that no economic bright prospects are vi­si­ble under the current contours of Rus­sian economic policy.

“Anyway, it is problematic to use Ukraine as a smokescreen, which prevents the Russians from seeing what is happening inside the country, until 2018, when the next presidential election is scheduled to be held. That date is just too distant.

“Meanwhile, the economic problems accumulate in Russia. It is not clear whether it will be able to sell gas to China as proposed in the deal of the century. It is necessary to build the infrastructure, and money for it is by and large absent. For the first time ever, they have begun to talk about the necessity of recapitalizing Gaz­prom using the public money. Gaz­prom and Rosneft have restarted their public quarrel over who should build the pipeline.

“It is hardly possible to be sure of something, because the Russian go­vernment is totally unpredictable. To raise the pressure of the Ukrainian si­tuation to the level of information war is very dangerous for the government, including for its selfish interests.”

“RUSSIA’S MOOD FEATURES A STRONG PATERNALISTIC AND IMPERIALIST STREAK, BUT THERE IS NO LITERAL DESIRE TO GO TO WAR WITH UKRAINE”

Is there a feeling in Russia that the people, the opposition can wake up from this euphoria, and social discontent will arise, and the people will say: “we have had enough of war, let us eat”?

“The situation is not entirely clear. Judging by various surveys, there is a decline of interest to news from Ukraine and the Crimean news set separately. In addition, the economic crisis will increasingly impact the residents of large cities. It is unknown how people will react. In Russia, the statistics has determined that the real incomes are falling for the first time in a long while. This may lead to some dissatisfaction. Russia’s mood features a strong paterna­listic and imperialist streak, but there is no literal desire to go to war with Ukraine. The public clearly has no appetite for war. The annexation of the Crimea was a real boost for Pu­tin’s ap­proval ratings, but its bloodlessness contributed to this to a great extent. Therefore, the Russian autho­rities are trying to carefully hide information about all these volunteers or mercenaries killed in Ukraine.

“A hot war would not create a smokescreen like that created by the events in Ukraine. The Russian go­­vern­ment has used all these months as a smokescreen, and all the evidence suggests that they will have to think of something else, not a war.”