Ivan Mazepa and Peter I

1. KHAZAR MYTH VS. EMPIRE

Ivan Mazepa’s siding with Charles XII remains a thrilling topic for both professional historians and the Ukrainian public. Why did Ivan Mazepa and his associates do so in 1708? At the dawn of the 21st century Ukrainians are starting to take an interest not in assessments of individuals of the past, but in the individuals themselves.

On the one hand, people who lived in the Hetman State in the 18th century were different from us. They had a different worldview and material and cultural values. The motives and reasoning behind their actions were also unlike ours. On the other hand, Ivan Mazepa, Pylyp Orlyk, Dmytro Horlenko, Danylo Apostol, Pavlo Polubotok, and many other representatives of the Cossack elite were like modern people with their ambitions, sentiments, and passions.

Historians perceive the motives behind what a considerable part of the Ukrainian elite did in 1708-09 in the peculiar political culture of Central European societies. Volnosti (liberties) was the keyword of this culture. For people in Central Europe of the 18th century, volnosti served as an expression of their earthly life, and they used other notions in documents, such as “rights,” “freedoms,” and “privileges.”

In Central European societies volnosti gave the elites wealth, power, and a prestigious status. Since volnosti were the ultimate purpose of earthly life, the elites were prepared to die for them — this is precisely what happened at the turn of the 18th century when Central-Eastern Europe plunged into wars that would last for decades.

During this “general crisis” the volnosti of the Central European elites were called into questions, and so they were defended in all Central Eu­ropean countries. In addition to Ivan Mazepa’s well-known rebellion, Johann Reinhold Patkul in Livonia made an agreement with Augustus the Strong of Saxony and Poland in 1699 on the transfer of his country under the protectorate of the Saxonian king-elector, in exchange for protection of Livonian volnosti. Also, in 1711 Prince Dimitrie Can­temir of Moldova signed an agreement with Peter I, placing his country under Muscovite suzerainty, in order to protect the traditional volnosti. Similar cases involved Prince Ferenc (Francis) II Rakoczi of Transyl­vania, Frederick I, Elector of Brandenburg, and Stanislaw I Leszczynski of the Po­lish-Lithuanian Com­mon­wealth.

The Cossack officers (starshyna), the Polish and Hungarian nobility (szlachta), Moldovan boyars, and Livonian barons identified themselves as peoples-political nations that determined the well-being of their fatherlands. In their concepts and ideas they “cared” for the volnosti of the pospilstvo, i.e., the rights of peasants and burghers. Interestingly, historical sources testify that the pospilstvo largely recognized this, too. Under the circumstances, Cossack intellectuals in their written works justified their people’s volnosti, i.e., the right of their fatherland to evolve in its own way.

This intellectual protection of Ukrainian statehood resulted in the concept according to which Cossacks originated from the Khazars. Historical sources are ambiguous about the author of this idea. The Khazar idea was used by Hryhorii Hrabianka in his works (and by the authors of manuscripts on which he relied), as well as by Pylyp Orlyk and Samiilo Velychko. The Khazar myth was the Ukrainian echo of the aristocratic Sarmatian idea in the Rzeczpospolita. Samiilo Velychko was among the first to combine the Sarmatian and Khazar legends, identifying the “Cossack people” with the “Sarmatian szlachta” of the Rzeczpospolita.

According to The Chronicle of Colonel Hryhorii Hrabianka of Hadiach, “the Little Russian people, known as the Cossacks, has the deepest Scythian... Khazar roots...” According to the Khazar concept of the origin of Cossack history, “the Slavic people, or the Khazars, were at first a source of fear for the peoples that lived in the east, north, and south, but after the war with the French they were reduced to nil. Only those Khazars were left who had long lived by the Black Sea... Although this tribe became smaller, their courage remained the same... all memories of the Polovtsians and Pechenegs had faded, but the Little Rus’ warriors differed little from the Khazars, except for the name — they are called Cossacks.”

In the late 17th century, some of the Cossack starshyna began discussing the idea of a “Cossack nation,” like the “szlachta nation,” that had inherited the land from its ancient owners. Pylyp Orlyk’s Constitution (1710) portrays the Cossacks’ ancestors, the Khazars, the way Poles depict their Sarmatian forefathers. The adoption of the Polish Sarmatian myth obviously indicates that the Ukrainian starshyna was inclined to have a sociopolitical status similar to that held by the Polish szlachta.

It is important to note that creating historical myths was characteristic of the times. Velychko often quoted from the nonexistent diary of the fictitious regiment scribe of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Hryhorii Hrabianka in his Chronicle constructed the theory of Cossack descent from the Khazars proceeding from the similarity between the two words (Cossack and Khazar), and so on. At that time Cossack intellectuals were not overly meticulous in dealing with actual historical facts.

In Khazar terms, Ukraine was perceived as an entity which was separate from Muscovy. Ancient Cossacks were known as the Khazars, who bore no ethnic, political, cultural, or religious resemblance to Muscovy. Some historical sources identify Ukraine and Belarus of that period as “parts of ancient European Sarmatia.” These concepts and ideas stemmed from the Central European concept of public life that was sufficiently secular at the time. The Khazar myth, therefore, ran counter to the ethnic, genetic, and religious legend generated by the adherents of the Little Russian idea whereby the Eastern Slavs descended from the sixth son of Japheth. The Khazar myth also secularized Cossack genealogy and severed the religious link between the Hetman State and Muscovy.

The Khazar myth remains in history as an intellectual at­tempt to explain Ukraine’s distinct character of the early new epoch. In the following decades of the 18th century it was almost totally forgotten, although it is mentioned in Semen Divovych‘s Razgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei (A Conversation of Great Russia with Little Russia) and Hra­bian­ka’s Chronicle. This myth was the ideological foundation for the struggle waged by the Uk­rai­nian elite against the Russian empire. This struggle was rapidly gaining momentum.

2. VOLNOSTI VS. COMMON GOOD

The history of perception of Ivan Mazepa is inseparable from the history of evolution of Ukrainian national consciousness. One of the distinct features of Ukrainian history was the fact that early Ukrainian na­ti­o­nal myths were created at a time when avoiding any mention of Mazepa’s hetmancy was a matter of course. The historical memory of the modern Uk­rai­nian nation sees him as a central figure in national memory.

To pass judgment on what Ivan Mazepa did in 1708, one must know about people who wielded power in Central Europe in the 18th century. This is important because at the time Christian Europe was clearly divided into Western, Central, and Eastern Europe. Each regio n was dominated by a certain political culture that allowed people to resort to certain actions (or made them forget about common sense). For example, in countries such as Rzeczpospolita, Livonia, Moldova, and the Ukrainian Hetman State people in power thought, spoke, and acted within the boundaries of the volnosti, which were a substitute of today’s laws, political culture, and even relationships within the state.

In Eastern Europe (Russia) of the time, beginning with Peter I, the political leadership perceived the political idea as being “the common good.” Peter I’s reforms were largely imposed on both Russians and Ukrainians as serving the common good. Both disliked them and resisted the powers that be, including armed resistance. Nevertheless, Mazepa’s move against Peter I was regarded as an act of treason against the Russian state.

Contemporary sources described Mazepa’s act as “Mazepa’s betrayal,” and the Ukrainian-Swedish alliance as an “unhappy Swedish year.” What was the attitude of Central European countries? As mentioned earlier, similar things were happening in all the countries of the region. What were the reasons behind them? Why should people risk their lives? Volnosti were the ultimate sense of earthly life, so people were prepared to pay for them with their lives. To comprehend the kind of volnosti adopted by Central European societies, it is necessary to consider their three main components: wealth, power, and status.

Wealth. The Hetman State stepped into the 18th century as a periphery of the early modern European economy. What helped early modern Ukraine’s effective development was its location at the intersection of trade routes between Eastern Europe, the Muslim world, and Central European countries. The turn of the 18th century was marked by economic growth and increasing foreign trade turnover.

Its economic might that made the Ukrainian elite politically important in its own eyes. And so its predominant economic status secured its actual power in society, the power that was enhanced by the “Khazar ideology.” According to this ideology, the Cossacks descended from the ancient Khazars. This concept allowed the Ukrainian elite to run its country the way it pleased. The central Russian government’s actual and imaginary restrictions on the Cossack elite’s volnosti (the economic ones in the first place) led to the events of 1708-09.

Power. At the turn of the 18th century, preserving the traditional economic and sociopolitical order was the main task for the Cossack elite and its hetman. This was possible provided that Ivan Mazepa and his supporters among the Cossack starshyna could further strengthen their power, but this was impeded by the actions of the protector of the Ukrainian state. Peter I’s reforms were largely incomprehensible even to such an erudite as Ivan Mazepa, let alone the Cossack starshyna. They adhered to Central European concepts and ideas, so they regarded any changes to political life as restrictions on — or the denial of — their power.

The Ukrainian elite was prepared to take the risk of losing its set way of life because its protector was changing it before their very eyes. One of the starshyna leaders, Vasyl Kochubei, secretly informed Peter I because he wanted a different hetman who would better protect the Ukrainian autonomy. Faced with a complex political situation, Mazepa seized the initiative but was defeated. It should be noted that at that period of complicated military confrontations in Central Europe representatives of the Hetman State emulated examples of their counterparts in Livonia, Hungary, and Rzeczpospolita. Their examples, in turn, were emulated by Moldovan boyars.

Status. The Ukrainian elite gave its lands and power a qualitatively new status within Cossack society. Under Ivan Mazepa, the new elite became officially known as the Notable Military Fellows (Znachne viiskove tovarystvo). All its members were entered into the Cossack register and were allowed to wield power in the following manner: a member would carry out various duties (in the courier service, a court of law, etc.), but after he was assigned a military or administrative post, he was struck from the membership lists. This way there was a stratum of people vested with authority and on whom the hetman’s administration relied.

Notable Military Fellows eventually turned into a hierarchical three-level structure. Men from the wealthiest and most influential families in the Hetman State became known as bunchukovi tovaryshi, i.e., assistants to the standard-bearer, a senior official in the Hetman State. They reported directly to the hetman and took no orders from the local administration.

The overwhelming majority of the top-level functionaries (the general starshyna, colonels, and regiment starshyna) began their careers as assistants to the standard-bearer. Viiskovi tovaryshi, or military fellows, were on the middle rung of the hierarchical ladder. They reported to the General Military Chancellery. Captains (sotnyks) and chancellery clerks were appointed from among the military fellows. Znachkovi tovaryshi (fellows of the banner) were the lowest, most densely populated stratum. They were commanded by colonels and served as lower regiment starshyna and office clerks.

To sum up, it was protection of the traditional, age-old Cossack volnosti and the imposition of Peter I’s concept of the common good on their adherents and that triggered most conflicts in Ukrainian history of the early 18th century. This is where one ought to look for keys to numerous tragedies of that epoch.