Oleksandr Kuzmuk’s Golden Hour

Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk together with Interior Minister Yuri Kravchenko were promoted by the President to General of the Army, Ukraine's highest military rank, in commemoration of Independence Day. Previously only four other persons were bestowed it: Vitaly Hubenko, Head of the President's General Military Inspectorate; ex-Defense Minister Vitaly Radetsky; present Chairman of the National Security and Defense Council Vasyl Durdynets, and ex-Premier Yevhen Marchuk. Oleksandr Kuzmuk is the youngest of them and the big stars on his shoulder boards are meant as a sign of loyalty to the Chief Executive.

Circumstances and character. These two things secured Oleksandr Kuzmuk's spectacular ascend on the hierarchical ladder. When still a regiment commander, he was appointed CO of an armored division in Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Apparently, the command decided on the promotion in view of his personal qualities and resolution, rather than his experience. Later, he was appointed CO of the 32nd Army Corps in the Crimea where he proved a capable diplomat and politician when the situation with the Crimean Tatars became aggravated. It was there that the general's flight into the capital orbit began. He was made Commander of the National Guard and Dmytro Tabachnyk, then Head of the Presidential Administration, explained that the appointment was not because of the "new broom" rule, but because the general was younger than the others, energetic, and because he had gone through "a good military school." Later, when the legislature and executive quarreled over who was to control the National Guard, General Kuzmuk declared: "My position is definite and final. All power structures must be subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief. No one else." Of course, this statement was remembered by all parties concerned.

When it came time to supplant the overly ambitious Valery Shmarov, Kuzmuk did not even consider the possibility of succeeding him. In his words, “Quite frankly, I did not consider myself a candidate. But then I was summoned by the President.” Thus Oleksandr Kuzmuk became Ukraine’s fourth and youngest, 42 year-old, Defense Minister. And he has stayed in the post longer than all of his predecessors.

There was the danger of political and military Olympus old-timers refusing to accept the up-and-coming appointee and to start to throw monkey wrenches in the works, but then it transpired that there was no general officers’ opposition in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Valery Shmarov had a point when declaring that “The generals are people who have to carry out orders from above. And so they think this way today and will think and act differently tomorrow.” At first, Kuzmuk’s comparatively young age irritated some of the top brass, but this did not last long, because his former rank as head of the general staff was occupied by Oleksandr Zatynaiko, onetime army corps commander. Moreover, Oleksandr Kuzmuk cut a more attractive figure in the eyes of veteran officers, compared to Valery Shmarov who was decidedly an “outsider,” never to be trusted.

Before long, the new Defense Minister cut the number of the general officers from 386 to 280 (in reality, even more retired), but he was careful not to hurt the “old guard’s” feelings. And the latter includes practically everyone immediately below him in rank and position, including the COs of operational commands. At present, General of the Army Kuzmuk is without doubt the prime factor in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, primarily due to his innate vigor and resourcefulness, trying to have the military show some headway, despite all hardships and inherent stagnation. It is like a rusty mechanism somehow trying to rebuild itself to survive, throwing away parts it can no longer use, retaining the bulk which it does not intend to change. In other words, Oleksandr Kuzmuk should be regarded as a modernizing, rather than reforming military leader.

Formally, the Kuzmuk-headed general staff is to be credited with having developed a National Program of the Construction and Development of the Armed Forces. Something which his predecessor Valery Shmarov could not do and for which he was increasingly often attacked verbally for nearly two years. Oleksandr Kuzmuk had the program ready in a few months. A touch of military genius? Not likely, because the document submitted for the National Security and Defense Council’s approval, meant as an alternative to Shmarov’s. which had been lost in the Defense Ministry and General Staff bureaucratic labyrinth, was basically the same: three operational commands instead of Shmarov’s seven operational-territorial commands, four armed services instead of the three previously suggested uniting the Air Force and Air Defenses messed up by local commanders’ conflicting ambitions, and completion of the Army’s reorganization replacing it with a numerically small but combat-ready force in late 2005.

Almost every NATO mission visiting Kyiv thinks it necessary to discuss issues relating to “democratic control” of the Armed Forces. NATO logic has it that insignia, high military rank, and position are not the Defense Minister’s attributes in a democratic society. After President Kuchma replaced Valery Shmarov with Oleksandr Kuzmuk, he explained for the sake of democratic Europe, “We will decide on appointing a civilian as Defense Minister when our Armed Forces are firmly put on their feet.” At present, such a democratic army control scheme is being shaped in Ukraine, although Kyiv is still to explain the situation to NATO’s persistent observers. In fact, NSDC and its Chairman Volodymyr Horbulin act as precisely such a “civilian” Defense Ministry and its head, since NSDC is entitled to approve all the main decisions relating to the military, thereby rendering all the discussions about whether or not a general in command of the Armed Forces is democratic nonsense.

However, this scenario, when everyone else remains backstage, leaving Oleksandr Kuzmuk in the limelight, is hardly to the general’s liking. Especially when it comes to such “trifles” as paying the officers and men or financing construction of their homes. Chronic pay arrears along with endless and hopeless home-waiting lists cannot but cause unrest, with the Defense Minister being the target. Almost as soon he received his promotion, Oleksandr Kuzmuk addressed an open letter to his subordinates, stating that “a commanding officer who does not solve his subordinates’ problems becomes a problem himself.” It sounded like a promise. The man was obviously determined to move mountains.

The situation has not changed for the better. Who is to blame? Of course, the man in command. The one who promised to improve things. Oleksandr Kuzmuk is fully aware of his sensitive status. At one of his news conferences he declared that democratic control is not only when the military are made accountable to civilians. It also implies government structures being made responsible for meeting the army’s needs. A transparent hint, but a carefully worded one. He knew he was treading on thin ice. His Russian counterpart, Igor Rodionov, tried to make waves, threatening the powers that be with Russia’s nuclear arsenals getting out of control. He was fired.

In Ukraine, every Defense Minister was retired not because of his mistakes in managing the Armed Forces, but because he tried to play big-time politics. Oleksandr Kuzmuk knew this and was determined not repeat his predecessors’ mistakes. He wants to play the game by the rules, keeping at a safe distance from politics. However, this tactic cannot last forever. He is getting increasingly exposed as a public figure and he cannot help politics drawing him its whirlpool.

General Kuzmuk attempted to organize his subordinates for a massive offensive aimed at getting seats in Parliament (being careful to stay aside from the campaign, although offered to join in on more than one occasion). About a hundred officers were nominated. The aim of this military-political maneuver was to form a lobby in Parliament which would, theoretically, help push through bills the Army needed. The offensive proved abortive. None were elected, leaving the Defense Ministry back where it started, although some political nuances did appear after the parliamentary campaign.

Oleksandr Kuzmuk, who will never shake hands with Communist Petro Symonenko, having publicly branded his as “political dead meat,” was forced to seek an understanding with the parliamentary majority, meaning the Reds, of course, who, among other things, were in control of the National Defense and Security Committee, being of vital importance to the Defense Minister. Eventually, it transpired that coming to terms with its Chairman Heorhy Kriuchkov (Communist) was not difficult at all. During the very first meeting the Defense Minister realized that his task — increasing next year’s military budget spending — was wholeheartedly supported by the Communists who were inherently interested in building up the military potential to fight the accursed imperialists. Meanwhile, the Cabinet in its 1999 budget draft, first promised the military a mere Hr 1.3 billion, Hr 300 million less than this year. Oleksandr Kuzmuk warned that “this decision may have tragic consequences.” This year conscription had to be suspended for want of funds and manpower had to be curtailed at a rate exceeding all planned ratios under that same national army development program. Last but not least, officers had their pay cut by about one-third.

The Communists are not likely to forget or forgive Oleksandr Kuzmuk’s statements concerning Symonenko or his connections in contacts with NATO, especially if and when Parliament gets Ukraine’s military structures under its control. Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko declared: “Certain articles of the Constitution must be seriously improved...” and the National Defense Committee wholeheartedly agreed. He added that “the ministers controlling coercive forces must abide not by the President’s edicts, but by decisions passed by Parliament.” However, this looks like a distant prospect against the background of events that can drastically affect Oleksandr Kuzmuk’s career much earlier, primarily the forthcoming presidential campaign.

The leadership will decide just how much the military can get involved in the battle between Ukraine’s political giants. Ex-Defense Minister Vitaly Radetsky’s is an example of how the brass can influence their men to cast their votes for “the right man.” In the case of Radetsky the man had no alternative. He owed his position as General of the Army to President Leonid Kravchuk. The Armed Forces still had the Soviet system of so-called closed constituencies, meaning that all officers and men cast their ballots separately from the civilian populace. In other words, word could be passed from above, telling every serviceman who should vote for. And woe to those who refused to comply. Oleksandr Kuzmuk had the presence of mind to cancel this voting system. Another far-sighted measure is the institution of a civilian Deputy Defense Minister for Foreign Policy and Public Relations. Now this man will be the natural for handling the presidential campaign in the military domain — and will, of course, suffer the responsibility. True, the most likely candidate, Ukraine’s current ambassador to the United States, declined this kamikaze privilege. Unless this gap is filled sometime in September-October, Oleksandr Kuzmuk may well face the Herculean task of leading the army between the political and economical Scylla and Charybdis. If this be the case, his conduct will show just how much the man will have to pay for his spectacular career.

Photo by Viktor MARUSHCHENKO,The Day:
NEWLY HATCHED GENERAL OF THE ARMY KUZMUK