Army to be cut by 24,000 men and 900 pieces of equipment
“Ukrainian citizens, who pay taxes to ensure the state’s defense capability, must be convinced that the army presents no threat to anyone...” Addressing the annual session of the Ministry of Defense board on November 5, President Leonid Kuchma regretted that he “could not be sure that tragedies (like those in Brovary, the Crimea and Lviv — Ed.) will not happen again” and urged the attending generals, ministers, and members of parliament “to do all you can to avert any catastrophes in the future.”
In the president’s opinion, effective transformation in the Armed Forces should be based on the atmosphere of “security and stability around Ukraine.” Noting that “the not-so-simple problems with neighboring states have been solved by diplomatic methods,” Mr. Kuchma believes that “the solution of urgent problems in the military field depends not so much on the military as on politicians and diplomats... I first of all mean our, I am sure temporary, complications in the relations with NATO,” he said. The chief of state rejected “the logic that some absolutely unfounded suspicions (investigation of the Kolchuha affair — Ed.) could undermine Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO.”
What cannot be rejected, though, is the painful, to put it mildly, question of inadequate funding of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (and, hence, the security of Ukrainians), which was the leitmotif of Defense Minister Volodymyr Shkidchenko’s speech. The Day has already written about the vagaries of the 2003 budget, as far as this point is concerned. Instead of tiring our readers again with a fog of figures and percentages, let us turn to comparison to show our state’s defense capacity in clearer terms. Experts estimate that budget expenditures per serviceman in, say, the neighboring Poland (with an army of about 175,000) is the equivalent of UAH 115,000 a year. In this country (with an army of 400,000), the same index is UAH 9000 in theory and still less in practice. The point is that Ukrainian servicemen have been authorized by the Cabinet of Ministers to raise funds for our defense capability on their own, namely, by selling surplus military property. Gen. Shkidchenko noted that 86% of the army-related spending was being done through a special state budget fund. As of now, the military has received a mere UAH 290 million out of the 813 million provided by the special fund.
What became perhaps the pivotal point in the Defense Ministry’s session is admission of the futility of the military bureaucracy’s attempts to keep the army at its present numerical strength. About 3000 artillery pieces, over 3000 tanks, and as many infantry combat vehicles... The total number exceeds that of the armies of France and Germany combined, minus proper maintenance and obsolete characteristics. Does Ukraine really need unserviceable mothballed tanks? The generals also found it difficult to explain to the Commander-in-Chief why the state maintains hundreds of undermanned regiments (or, to be more exact, their COs). Incidentally, the president pointed out that “staff cuts” would not touch upon the officers corps. Yet, there is a brisk reduction in the number of officers, with about 2000 of them having resigned their commissions, as well as dwindling prestige of the military profession. We do not know if similar trends are happening in Poland, but even generals themselves admit that the rank of practically each fifth Ukrainian officer does not correspond to the position he holds. Nor do they deny that 50,000 servicemen are on housing waiting lists. There is every reason to suggest there are not so many generals on it.
No wonder the session discussed — after the Lviv air show tragedy — the problem of training targets. It turned out that only the Ground Forces command can report on this without undue qualms, for they meet 90% of the targets. As to the Air Force (widely regarded, for quite an apparent reason, as the indicator of situation in the Ukrainian Armed Forces), Gen. Shkidchenko said the number of training sorties had dropped from 8450 in 1998 to 2750. A likely enemy (God willing, he will be absent not only on the pages of our state’s defense concept) would be greatly pleased with these figures.
“I insist that next year’s budget take into account the army’s minimal requirements,” Pres. Kuchma said, adding he would not sign the budget otherwise. Gen. Shkidchenko, in his turn, unexpectedly admitted there is no clear procedure of financial support for the military reform (i.e., what the money should be spent on). So he promised to cut the army in 2003 by 24,000 men and almost 900 pieces of armaments. “As a result, the minimum requirement for the Armed Forces of Ukraine will go down in 2004 by about 250 million hryvnias,” he said.
