Borys Tarasiuk on systemic mistakes of government and opposition

EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION

“The past year has seen revived interest in the North Atlantic Alliance and the desire of our youth to live the way the Alliance members do and to be in the club of these states. At the same time, there seems to be a pause in the implementation of our strategic course: even the topmost echelons are silent about this. Do you think we are less active in this direction, especially after the Prague summit?”

“If we take the stretch of time from the Prague summit till now, then I agree we have seen no real governmental steps or signals that would show an intention to actively implement the Prague decisions. For example, the summit approved the Action Plan, which I think is one of the greatest foreign political achievements of our state. What is more, this is a success of not only diplomats but also of other officials. This is the success of the National Security and Defense Council and personally Yevhen Marchuk. This is the success of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and personally Anatoly Zlenko. Moreover, this success was achieved ‘not thanks to but contrary to’ some circumstances. The Action Plan is an interesting document. I read it and found nothing that could prevent it from being published in the press. Some time before, the Special Partnership Charter was published for all to read it. For some reason, the government is afraid of disclosing the Action Plan — perhaps because the pubic at large may come to know the commitments our leaders took with respect to the nineteen NATO member states. This symptom makes me doubt that our leadership is sincere when it reiterates the desire to eventually join NATO. The Institute of Euro-Atlantic Cooperation alone, which I head on a non-profit basis, has done more public-outreach work on Euro- Atlantic integration than all the executive power bodies combined. Occasionally, the government even tried to thwart, instead of supporting, our efforts.”

“What kind of impact do you think the implementation of the Action Plan will have on the 2003 budget?”

“I do not think the implementation of the Action Plan will somehow affect the budget. In principle, every budget contains funds for the implementation of NATO cooperation programs. Therefore, the Action Plan implementation as such will entail no additional financial expenses.”

“Are there, in your opinion, any new governmental personalities who follow the same foreign political line that you uphold?”

“As to the Presidential Administration, the number of opponents clearly exceeds that of supporters. This applies, above all, to the Administration’s foreign relations department chief. A comparative analysis of the foreign visits of our head of state and foreign minister shows that, although Euro-Atlantic integration and relations with Russia and the US were declared as foreign policy priorities, the President has shown more preference to Russia, CIS, and Asian countries. In other words, his visits, unlike those of the foreign minister, do not speak on balance in favor of European integration. As to supporters in the institutions of government, their number has increased greatly in the Verkhovna Rada, which was proven by the vote on the development of relations with NATO and the EU.”

“Are you under the impression that the Ukrainian executive branch is perhaps being guided by the following consideration: ‘We have been cornered, we have no other option. Yes, we are still going to declare Euro-Atlantic integration for some time, but Russia builds up pressure. If we are to be rejected by Europe and America, we will have to seek new areas, such as China, Uzbekistan, Russia...’ What is your understanding?”

“This is an absolutely correct observation. Simple logic prompts the government to search for partners in the places where we look more positive, i.e., by the principle ‘If you don’t like us, we’ll go to Russia.’ But this logic will not pay. If analysts and all those related to foreign policy were guided by the strategy of our fundamental national interests, they would conclude: as we have proclaimed a course towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration, we must in fact go in this direction. The trouble is in us, not in the West. It is we who must radically change the situation at home. If we only declare this course but do everything the other way round (upset the balance between the branches of power, violate the elementary principles of media functioning, flout the freedom of expression, human rights and democratic institutions), is there any question of Euro-Atlantic integration? The government should find the root causes of the crisis in the relations with the West and draw conclusions. But, unfortunately, this is not being done. All emphasis is being laid on the consequences of the root causes.”

“THE ANTIPODES”

“The government is supposed to be kept alert by the opposition. A high-quality opposition should be pushing the government forward, while a primitive opposition can only bring the government into a deadlock. For example, after the parliamentary elections, the opposition might have made some effort to form a majority of its own. At the same time, the government took advantage of the opposition’s helplessness and formed a majority by tapping the administrative resource.”

“You said ‘primitive opposition’ — a very interesting term that I have never heard before. The government has been employing non- traditional, amoral and unlawful methods which the opposition cannot in fact employ in response because this runs counter to its fundamental principles...”

“The opposition just has no opportunities to do so. If it had some, it would surely be doing so. Your previous interview dealt with the principles of forming the Our Ukraine list. The Day was by far the only newspaper that pointed out that this method of formation would lead to a crisis, which we in fact see today. The ensuing crisis in the bloc was predetermined precisely by the way the list was being formed. In how our government and opposition essentially differ is that the latter has no administrative resources.”

“I do not share this view. But, from a systemic point of view, I consider it a gross mistake that the Ukrainian parliamentary system accepts such a thing as the presence in parliament of ‘pure’ businessmen. In my opinion, this is a systemic mistake by both sides, which creates problems for Ukrainian parliamentarianism in general. For if a business representative, whether pro-presidential or pro-oppositional, comes to parliament, he will, one way or another, fall into the field of vision of law-enforcement bodies — in order either to keep him afloat within the limits set by the government, if he is in the majority, or to bring him down as businessman. This is, in my opinion, what caused some problems for the Our Ukraine faction. Business must take care of itself, while political forces must care about creating normal conditions for business, no matter whether it is ‘of their own’ or ‘someone else’s.’

“As to how the opposition differs from the government, I think Our Ukraine, unlike the other opposition units, can show concrete facts that prove its difference from the current ruling forces. And we proved this in the eighteen months that the Viktor Yushchenko government was in office. Although Yushchenko indeed could not form a hundred-percent ‘his’ team (he had no say in the appointment of security ministers and the minister of finance), he managed to show how to work in an altogether different way, the way the whole democratic world works.”

“Mr. Tarasiuk, you said politicians must create equal conditions for businessmen. But the problem of the opposition is that it is still taking the same steps as the government is. It has perhaps managed to create a better ‘theater.’ But Yushchenko included Yuliya Tymoshenko, a high-profile figure, in his Cabinet. It is with her help that business was divided into ‘friendly’ and ‘alien:’ it is common knowledge Ms. Tymoshenko maintained close ties with business. This was the ‘Achilles’ heel’ of that government. One should not forget this because, when the electoral list was being formed, Yushchenko repeated the same things. Our opposition will be unable to reach a decent level until it revises this practice.”

“I still assert that the Our Ukraine team proved with its concrete actions that it is capable of handling the most difficult issues.”

“Still, many people are aware that Mr. Yushchenko failed to make full use of his parliamentary election victory.”

“There are several problems here. One of them is of a systemic nature: there should have been a law on proportional representation. If this law had been passed, we would have no parliamentary problems today. Parliament would have been consolidated, with the majority comprising precisely the forces that the public placed its confidence in, rather than the forces that lost the elections and eventually established a factual majority by manipulating public opinion and twisting facts. Why did the first-past-the-post nominees join the so-called majority? Because they contested the elections ‘on their own,’ as they put it: denying any relationship with the ruling forces, they were in reality supported by the latter. This baffled the electors: they failed to understand whom exactly the candidate represented. It is essentially from this reserve that the government formed the majority by resorting to all kinds of falsifications and coercion. So it is wrong to say that Yushchenko failed to take advantage of his victory. Our Ukraine had no majority, although it is the largest faction. Neither the election results nor the actions of Bankova St. (Presidential Administration —Ed.) suggested that a Yushchenko-bloc-centered majority could be formed.”

“But Our Ukraine did try to form a majority, and Mr. Yushchenko held talks with both the opposition and United Ukraine. Maybe, the government indeed lost the elections, but it could not help taking advantage of Our Ukraine’s vague position, which it did. Now we must look ahead: what turn will the developments take, what will be the future of this parliament?”

“When the two sides — Our Ukraine and some majority parties and blocs — were on the point of signing an agreement, Bankova St. sent a command — of course, to the majority factions — to cut the process short. I know this for sure. In fact, Our Ukraine and all the oppositional forces had to join forces against a big bludgeon. But how can one possibly overpower the bludgeon? Some say one can do this by wielding another bludgeon. But the opposition can only wield a ‘constitutional bludgeon.’ The opposition is even being denied an opportunity to exercise its legitimate rights, such as access to the media. The sprouts of opposition rights that resulted from the June accords have been in fact stamped out. The government and the pro-governmental parliament members do not understand where they are leading this country to.”

“Where to, incidentally?”

“They are leading the country to discord. This is very dangerous. Now about what is in store for our parliamentarianism. Today, we witness a new onslaught on democracy and parliamentary rule. It is difficult to say now what this face-off will end up with. Yet, it is beyond a doubt that these brazen and cynical actions against the Verkhovna Rada caused the opposition to cohere and form an interfaction association called For Ukraine, Democracy and Parliamentarism. They undoubtedly made the opposition understand the necessity of joint and coordinated action. And, while Our Ukraine has earlier refrained from calling for nationwide protest campaigns, now the faction considers it necessary to call on the people to take an active part in them. Aware of what this may imply, we are still prepared to involve our organizational and human resources in this.”

“Do you believe that the calls for street protests will force the government to accept, to some extent, the opposition’s demands? Do you think these actions will yield results or just remain an act of emotional outburst? For politicians should think about effectiveness, not only about effects...”

“I know — not from publications but from my own experience of communicating with people in various regions — that the current government enjoys very low prestige. I know that the political forces and politicians who have managed or will manage to prove that they differ from the ruling forces are and will be popular. Therefore, I am sure the grassroots are somewhat disappointed that the political forces that they sincerely supported in the elections fail to bring about the promised changes. At the level of instincts and emotions, the opposition is, of course, expected to show resolute actions, protests, and so on. But you must have noticed that Our Ukraine has been consistently refraining from using its sizable potential to make people take to the streets, for which our opposition partners criticized us. We have been constantly favoring a dialogue, a roundtable debate between the governing, oppositional, and other political forces. Yet, the government did not accept this. What is the opposition supposed to do? In my opinion, protest action is the last-ditch step, the last resort of the opposition — I mean Our Ukraine, first of all. Should this occur, the government will have to sober up and act less defiantly.”

THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC SECTOR

“Mr. Tarasiuk, there is another sore point to discuss with you: the present and the future of Ukrainian national democracy. Debates are going on again regarding whether the two Rukhs can unite. We know, in particular, that there are a lot of those who would like to see you as leader of the new united Rukh... What do you think about the existing problems and the ways to solve them?”

“In my opinion, the patriotic-minded democratic forces of Ukraine have lost their clout and squandered — not in the least due to the split — the enormous credit of trust they had in society shortly before and after Ukraine obtained independence. They failed to adapt their ways to the new conditions, failed to change their street-rally mentality in favor of mastering the art of being in power. Even if such attempt were made, they were unfortunately failed. I think the split of Rukh dealt the most powerful blow to democratic forces. In my view, these forces are facing the following choice today: either to continue losing prestige, or to be downgraded to regional representation, or to restructure into a new political force capable of responding to modern challenges and convincing the public that it can take up leadership. Very much should be reconsidered here, including fundamental programs, the forms and methods of activity, etc. So the first thing to be done is, in my view, uniting the two Rukhs.”

“But are they prepared for this? For even these parties themselves harbor differing ideas about the mechanism of unification, nor do they clearly picture the way this should be done...”

“You know, both sides have accumulated so many reciprocal complaints and ill feelings that they must try to meet each other halfway. In my view, leadership is a secondary question, with unification being the primary concern. So they must first decide in what way, on what grounds, and within what time limits they should unite and only then discuss who will lead the united Rukh. My latter-day discussions allow me to forecast the unification in the first half of 2003. But I am deeply convinced that Our Ukraine must go further and use the united Rukh as a steppingstone for achieving the declared goal of turning the bloc into a single party.”

“A single party or, rather, a political coalition?”

“Establishing a coalition will perhaps be the first step, for we formally set up an electoral, not a political, bloc. Incidentally, contrary to some allegations, the Reform and Order party (PRP) has never set a goal — at least since I joined it — to ‘undermine’ Rukh. What is more, PRP sincerely tried to implement the agreement between Vyacheslav Chornovil and Viktor Pynzenyk on joint actions and a single electoral bloc. This still remains our goal. Let me note, without any reference to personalities, that there are real prospects for the rapprochement between the NRU and PRP. In my opinion, this trend makes it possible that the two Rukhs’ unification may be followed by further processes of integration. These three parties (PRP, NRU, and UNR), now the nucleus of Our Ukraine, can well form the center of a new patriotic democratic coalition.”

“This is interesting because our today’s right center looks like a heap of fragments rather than a powerful party. The Day has written a lot about the causes of this. We would only like to recall that even when V. Chornovil was still living, we criticized Rukh for repeating mistakes (whatever party we try to form, we come up with the CPSU). Will the future association meet the new criteria and take into account modern realities? Or will it again assume the shape required by purely political considerations? The 1999 elections showed an extremely self-interested attitude of the Rukh leaders who failed to muster enough courage, even after a crushing defeat, to abandon their offices and give the green light to young, or just any other, figures who have nothing to do with ignominious deals and failures. Is Rukh going to offer the voter any guarantees of renouncing ineffective and outdated policies?”

“Well, I am not the one who can offer guarantees... Yet, may I express an opinion of my own? For the voters to feel that it is, let us say, their party, Rukh must prove it is a political force that unambiguously favors the establishment of a democratic rule-of-law state by modern democratic methods, cares about their interests, knows how and is able to show this in practice. As a matter of fact, this is the only reason why it should get united.”

“The aforesaid ‘legacy’ is one of the reasons why the new cabinet does not have at least one representative from the national patriotic forces — in terms of not only party affiliation but also mentality...”

“As a person who has come to parliament and constantly communicates and works with various factions and groups, I must say there are very many highly professional experts in the two Rukhs as well as in PRP and other groups of Our Ukraine. I feel pleased to stay next to people with such a high professional and intellectual potential.”

“However, as the opposition has been put off the levers of influence, this potential runs the risk of remaining untapped...”

“These people can and want to exert influence, but they are denied this...”

“Are they perhaps themselves to blame, for they assumed a certain attitude? One must prepare himself for the test of being in power. It is bad that the potential of these forces now boils down to rhetoric and calls for taking to the streets and thus pressure the government. Power cannot be seized on the street — it is impossible in a modern society. And if it becomes necessary to form a new patriotic coalition government, who will be standing next to you?”

“Our Ukraine does have such people; I even think there will be competition. A wholesome competition of serious personalities.”

“And are you aware of the metamorphoses that these forces may undergo over the time left until 2004?”

“Yes, I am. The first half of 2003 is going to show a new Our Ukraine.”

“We have already heard something like this: if you remember, we were once promised a ‘new’ President...”

“I mean, the steps which will really enable us to say that Our Ukraine not only was but still is a leading political force which has always positioned itself as an alternative to the current leadership and is ready to take power.”

“And concretely? Is it about, for example, a new program?”

“Why a new program? Our Ukraine’s well-known program is based on the Viktor Yushchenko team’s governmental program and on the successes achieved thanks to the latter. It is about our vision of ways to realize our political potential in these specific conditions, i.e., the conditions of working in opposition. It is also about gathering in one ‘fist’ all the members and followers of Our Ukraine, our elected representatives of all levels, and so on.”

“Mr. Tarasiuk, do you believe that Our Ukraine in general or its activists in particular are able to take criticism?”

“Whoever stops taking fair criticism in stride stops developing. This means such an individual has no future.”

“Could you give a concrete example of Our Ukraine taking criticism, especially if it was leveled by the press? Were at least some conclusions drawn? For example, about the principles of drawing up the electoral list, etc.”

“Please believe me, Our Ukraine is always rife with very frank and serious debates. These relate not only to, say, the instances of somebody reneging on his word, although this was also the subject of meaningful and serious reviews of what we do.”

“Incidentally, why was Oleksandr Omelchenko Jr., who supported Viktor Yanukovych contrary to the general decision, not expelled from the faction? For the point is in principles, not in personalities...”

“I was not present at that meeting, but I know that the expulsion proposal failed to poll the necessary number of votes. Coming back to intra-factional debates, let me note that many members often come up with interesting ideas and suggestions, but there also are some disgruntled ones. So I think such debates help us all to better realize our common possibilities. I do not think our faction has fully realized its potential — it is still to do so.”