Crisis Diplomacy

“So far it looks as though the opposition, figuratively speaking, were calling on the West for boycotting Ukraine and its president; the opposition press is packed with malicious gossip about Ukraine being dealt with so rudely in Salzburg. Few sober-minded individuals in the opposition camp say they shouldn’t go that far. Why are they trying to use the current situation as another argument against the hateful regime? What is to be done?”

“There is, of course, a degree of inner moral struggle. On the one hand, they’d like to make every effort to show just how bad this regime is, how it is inconsistent with its mission and is not accountable to the people. On the other hand, we as citizens of this country and our posterity that will live here not for a month or year, but for decades and, God willing, for centuries, must think of the prestige of our state. So where is the line drawn between the voices of justifiable frustration with what the regime is doing and that dirt being purposefully piled up to smear this country’s image?”

“By the way, how do you feel attending foreign conferences and watching our homebred politicos wring their hands and saying oh, you can’t even imagine what’s actually happening there? They seem unaware that Ukraine became independent. Have you actually heard any of them and what was your attitude?”

“Yes, I have and let me tell you this. First, one must clearly distinguish between the cause and consequence. If someone lashes out at some actions and goes the limit, this is the consequence, because the cause is somewhere deeper. Actually, the reason is that the regime discredited itself by the manner in which it handled the parliamentary elections — I mean during and after the campaign, when the new parliament was being formed. It discredited itself by its reluctance to communicate with the opposition. There are reasons for that and they are obvious.’

“The regime, in turn, says, “What kind of opposition do we have to deal with?” It is not a systemic opposition that can play with open trumps, summoning all its moral potential. By the way, The Day’ s poll shows that many Ukrainians are displeased with both the regime and opposition.”

“If we take into account such polls, the public opinion appears in favor of the opposition (if we understand this opposition as all of the forces campaigning against the regime). For quite some time those in power distinguished between those officially in opposition and those who could not be there. For example, the Communists were determined by the presidential administration as the only official opposition in Ukraine. But then one ought to remember what happened last March, when the Ukrainian and Polish presidents met in Kazimierz Dolny and agreed on a dialog with opposition. The Ukrainian partner would say later, “What opposition? Let them get registered with the Ministry of Justice first, we will talk afterwards...” Are we now witness to the current regime willing to have a dialog with the opposition? Suppose we put aside the definitions of opposition and nonopposition, and hold a round table with all political forces, as proposed by Our Ukraine. After all, we had in mind not just sitting there and shouting at each other...”

“But what would be there to discuss? Political reform? In a way it was what Our Ukraine was after. But as the president proposed a parliamentary-presidential republic and constitutional reform, nobody seemed to have paid any attention. In view of this, one can only wonder about Viktor Yushchenko’s calls for a dialog. A dialog about what? The stand taken by Tymoshenko and Moroz is understandable; they want the president’s resignation, but that’s an ultimatum, leaving no room for dialog. The president said no. End of dialog. Could you explain what Viktor Yushchenko actually wants apart from the fantastic word dialog?”

“I could offer my own interpretation. Any dialog with the power is doomed from the outset unless joined by the president. Another point is that Viktor Yushchenko and his coalition collected the largest number of votes, meaning that they represent a considerable part of Ukrainian society, just like the Communists and other political forces delegated powers by the people. In other words, things must be discussed with these political forces. I might as well point out that Yushchenko and Our Ukraine submitted a draft cooperation agreement as soon as the new parliament had formed. The documents contained rather specific instructions on what to discuss — setting up a democratic majority in the first place, to form a coalition government and assume responsibility for what is going on in this country; reassignment of the military and security ministries and agencies, making them accountable to the Verkhovna Rada (and not only to the president); changing the principles of the formation of the central election committee. Also the opposition rights and eliminating such negative phenomena as persecution, purges, and use of the repressive machinery...”

“But why discus all this with the president instead of passing appropriate bills in parliament? With that reserve of people’s confidence you could have started by organizing a majority, rather than discuss the need to do so with the president. Otherwise it looks like so many unlucky politicians talking about being gypped, trying to conceal their own inaptitude...”

“I don’t agree with this view and I’ll try to explain why. It is an established fact that those in power collected 11.77% of the votes. If the elections were held on a proportionate basis (what we had demanded and what the president had opposed), we’d have an entirely different parliament. Meaning we should discuss not a bunch of unlucky politicians but the administrative resource unlawfully used by the regime and the whole presidential vertical.”

“We came to the elections in accordance with the election law passed by the previous parliament. Our Ukraine, however, had an opportunity to form a constitutional majority which, even if lacking in strength, would be rather influential. OU passed it up, let’s face it. There was administrative pressure but it was effective to some extent simply because Our Ukraine had formed its roster in a manner leaving the business people no option but to act on a follow-me basis.”

“All right, suppose we discuss the manner in which other political forces composed their rosters. Did we complain to anyone? After the Seven stepped away from the arrangements we had all agreed upon, we just said good-bye, we don’t need anyone like you. We closed the subject and never complained. We could blame only ourselves.”

“We say there is no dialog, but there is! A strange dialog, indeed, kept in a backstage political style. Moreover, a number of analysts believe that Viktor Yushchenko and President Kuchma discussed the conditions on which to form a majority during their mysterious rendezvous in August. No commentaries were forthcoming, no one could find out anything. This is evidence of an inconsistent political course; on the one hand, we have a forum of democratic forces with pro-presidential factions, but on the other, we have [Yushchenko’s] signature under a statement demanding impeachment, the very next day...”

“One of the drawbacks of our political system is the absence of a balance-counterbalance system. The president enjoys an unlimited authority and he uses it to keep the legislative branch under control. Therefore, we must change the political system. As it is, the head of the presidential administration sets about forming a majority, but when Our Ukraine initiates a free dialog with the so-called pro-presidential forces that are, nevertheless, prepared to set up a truly democratic majority, Bankova Street promptly and strongly advises those forces against it. And so they back down. I think it’s an undemocratic way to form a majority.”

“About the political reform. Do you think this parliament will pass a package of documents to start the constitutional reform?”

“I think that anything agreed upon in the course of a political dialog with the president taking part will be possible to accomplish. If the president distances himself from that dialog, we’ll have no democratic changes. The president must understand that he won’t live forever — by the way, he said he isn’t going to organize a monarchy in Ukraine...”

“Mr. Tarasiuk, do you believe that a parliamentary-presidential republic would be an effective remedy at this stage?”

“If we understand a parliamentary- presidential republic the way it is understood in the democratic countries, I think it could have positive prospects in Ukraine. Objectively speaking and proceeding from the long-term interests of democratic development in Ukraine, turning it into a functional democracy, a parliamentary-presidential republic would be the best political system. In contrast, a presidential-parliamentary one, the way it has shaped under the current president, rules out the very possibility of democratic evolution. An entirely different situation is possible. Take the United States. It’s a presidential republic but with a powerful and highly effective balance-counterbalance system in the form of the Congress, something we don’t have.”

“Proportionate parliamentary elections would be a progressive move at the start of our independence. There were forces prepared to form powerful parties. Eventually, such parties were purposefully destroyed, so now they are a feeble semblance of what they used to be...”

“I think that we could discuss at least two rather powerful political forces: Our Ukraine and the Communists with an organizational basis and quite extensive electorate.”

“Our Ukraine is not a party yet. Do you think it will be?”

“Yes, I think we must proceed to transform a political coalition into a political party, the sooner the better, for it is dictated by the times. After all, the year 2004 is not that far off, so we must get prepared and have a well-organized structure.”

“How do you feel about electing governors?”

“Officials in charge of administrative regions and districts should be elected, no doubt about that. Their current status makes them accountable only to Bankova St. They hear no one else, recognize no laws, and abide only by instructions and directives from that street.”

“Yet even if some of the governors stop being accountable to Bankova St., the problem won’t be any smaller. Independent large capital and big interests in the East threaten not only federalization...”

“If we had this problem in the first half of the 1990s, I would be adamantly against the idea. Federalization at an early stage in the formation of the Ukrainian state would be extremely dangerous. Today, I think the threat is less serious. Take the Crimea. It’s a most vivid example. So I believe that making the posts of heads of state administrations or governors elective is quite topical, because these people can in no way be controlled by the populace.”

“You think that Our Ukraine should eventually turn into a single

political party, but today the impression is that it is very heterogeneous. Some of your people spend most of the time at the presidential administration, others, like Petro Poroshenko, say that such actions have a negative effect on the budgetary process and that their consequences will be quite adverse. It would be interesting to know what kind of ideology could unite all these people. What kind of ideology could this party have?”

“This is an extremely complicated matter and I cannot rule out the possibility that some of the parties currently within Our Ukraine will withdraw when forming a single party. At the same time, OU simply must become a single party with its own ideology. Personally, I see it as a centrist political force professing democratic principles and liberalism in the economy. By the European standard, it should be a political force maintaining partnership with the European People’s Party in the European Parliament. By the way, the People’s Party unites most centrist parties in the Western European countries. Of course, there could be differences at this stage of working out a common ideology and a search for new approaches to economic and foreign political issues. Such differences could prevent certain political forces from joining us, but we can’t say that Our Ukraine existed and continues to exist like a sailboat without a rudder and sails. If there is a program signed by the leaders of all ten parties, there should also be a common, uniting ideology. Therefore, the process is not as irreversible as it may seem.”

“Talking about Ukrainian-Russian relationships, do you think that their current status is what we and Russia actually need? Because it looks as though the Americans were constantly driving us into a corner, and that every time Russia were there to give us a hand. At present, Putin is a welcome guest at every “salon,” both Ivanovs are met by Powell with a warm embrace; Chechnya is forgotten; there are joint Russian-NATO military exercises. Maybe they’ve just taken us for a ride?”

“Both Ukraine and Russia are interested in maintaining these relationships on equal friendly, neighborly terms. We profit from trade exchanges with Russia and we are interested in it as a trade partner. We are perhaps less interesting for Russia in that capacity. We benefit from Russia’s constructive and predictable relationships with the West, the United States, and NATO. This creates a more positive atmosphere in our relationships.

“What we find disadvantageous about the bilateral relationships? It doesn’t serve our benefit when they talk about the Year of Ukraine in Russia and then start by levying additional duties on imported Ukrainian goods, additional export duties on electricity supplied to Ukraine. How can we have normal trade contacts under the circumstances? Obscure schemes in economic relationships should be regarded as disadvantageous by both our countries, yet both Ukrainian and Russian business people are strongly attracted by them, expecting excess profits. Moreover, when the Russians accused us of stealing gas, it was only part of the truth, because there was theft on both sides, while the Russian government scolded ours for being unable to get the situation under control.”

“Of course, we want to be an equal partner, but Ukraine and Russia have different economic, raw material, and territorial capacities. We must exert more efforts to do something which they can do with considerably less exertion. Have we done anything to set ourselves on an equal footing with them? Wasn’t there a demonstrative shift westward while you were foreign minister and wasn’t it used to retire you?”

“To set a normal course for our relationships, Russia must once and for all discard all plans to get Ukraine back under its control, discard its double standard policy in the economic domain — I mean when Russian authorities, using nonstandard methods in dealing with Ukrainian partners, actually squeeze out their consent to projects that are economically disadvantageous to Ukraine. The Ukrainians must develop an immunity to fits of the inferiority complex registered now and then in Ukrainian-Russian relationships; they must discard the idea that Russia will continue supplying electricity and they will continue paying nothing.

“As for that demonstrative shift westward, I certainly don’t agree with such interpretation. I think that each should do his job well. If you are a foreign minister of a country, you must serve that country’s interests, and never mind whether your partners, America or Russia, like it or not. Our interests must come first. I can assume that my stand was not appreciated by the Kremlin. By the way, Washington didn’t like certain aspects — say, in conjunction with nuclear weapons — either.”

“US Ambassador to Ukraine Carlos Pascual said that the Ukraine- NATO summit in Prague is still on the agenda. It is increasingly obvious that Poland wants to occupy a place in Europe, which Ukraine could have had in principle, so it can be a doyen for Eastern Europe. What kind of support could we count on with regard to the NATO membership action plan? What should we do despite the damage to our reputation?”

“The resolution of the National Security and Defense Council of May 23, if and when consistently implemented, will have most serious long-term positive consequences for Ukraine. I think, however, that it was a belated decision. We created a situation in which our partners in the West and East could not appreciate our intentions and make appropriate adjustments in their policies relating to us. The West took our vague stand for reserving the option of an alliance with Russia. Russia also considered our vagueness as a possibility of Ukraine distancing itself from the West and joining Moscow. The resolution of May 23 dotted the i’s. It was a message correctly interpreted in the West and East. But then we received no applause from the former and no hysterics from the latter. Meaning that we should have done it earlier, not being pressed by circumstances in the aftermath of September 11 and Russia’s more effective policy, as well as because of all those opportunities we had passed up. We should have done so in a situation where no one could have said that we did it because it was okayed by the Kremlin. As it was, the decision made by Ukraine did not look an independent one.

“It is true that Poland is the regional leader and we shouldn’t blame the Poles for this; we should blame ourselves in the first place. In the second half of the 1990s, Ukraine did its best to assert its status as the regional leader, showing an active foreign political and military- political performance. And then we lost that status. The question is whether we can regain it. Poland has remained a country which, even if not actively lobbying for Ukraine’s interests, energetically reminds NATO and the EU that Kyiv should not be ignored in any general European structures. We must be thankful for that and we also must do better than we are doing. Bearing this and the Prague summit in mind, I believe that we haven’t done all we could so that we could start the Membership Action Plan in Prague. Under the circumstances, we can expect some sort of an in-between option: neither MAP nor intensified dialog. It is our miscalculation on the one hand. On the other hand, I think that NATO couldn’t muster the political will to read the signal from Ukraine, regardless of its motivation and persons involved.

“Of course, the latest [Kolchuha] scandal, as a backdrop for the preparation of the NATO summit in Prague, doesn’t help create the desired Ukraine-NATO atmosphere. Moreover, I wouldn’t be surprised to hear that the invitation [to this summit] will be called off unless we provide sufficient evidence of no military supplies to Iraq — I mean if the problem gets suspended. Now this would be a heavy blow to the Ukrainian strategic interests.

“I believe that our Western partners should not see Ukraine through the eyes of one man they may not like at all. They should see Ukraine in perspective. NATO leadership’s statement supporting Ukraine’s membership intentions would be perfectly justifiable. I think that Ukrainian and NATO experts should put their heads together and work out an action plan, even if it doesn’t provide for full- fledged membership. A clear-cut system of monitoring its performance would be the next step. NATO must be satisfied that Ukraine treats all this very seriously, that it’s not just another image-repairing declaration but a conscious political course.”

“You returned from Strasbourg not so long ago. How do you feel about our position in the Council of Europe?”

“I had a lot of formal and informal meetings during the day and a half I spent in Strasbourg. I met with the chairman of PACE, secretary general of the Council of Europe (I know him personally). The Council’s attitude isn’t as negative as a year ago. Both its MPs and executives see the Gongadze case as the biggest roadblock in the EU-Ukrainian relationships. Next comes freedom of the press and Ukrainian media status. The Council of Europe doesn’t regard the Ukrainian domestic political situation as an especially grave one. Probably for want of first-hand information or simply because they are paying less attention. My meetings in Strasbourg left me convinced, however, that the Council won’t stop monitoring Ukraine, as insisted by Kyiv.

“As for the European Union, Commissioner Verheugen’s statement can only make one worried. European Commission officials have no right to make such statements.”

“Could Ukraine, particularly its foreign ministry, voice an official stand in the matter?”

“I think they should. After all, Mr. Verheugen is not the European Commission, even less so the European Union. I think that such rash statements addressing Ukraine should not be heard from EU, even if some of our political leaders aren’t popular in the West.”

“Do you think there is a critical mass in our elite, thinking in terms of a united Europe? Or maybe we don’t need it, just a dozen professionals who will know where to lead this country?”

“First, the political elite in any society must play its leading role. These people should be way ahead of, say, the public opinion. They must set the right course and convince the rest of the society. If they can’t, society must have this political elite replaced, for such is the law of democracy. At the same time, one mustn’t ignore public opinion. In this sense, the situation in Ukraine isn’t that bad. An average of 60% of the citizenry support Ukraine’s EU membership. Although it’s no reason for self-delusion, regarding a poll turnout one likes as a sign that the situation has essentially changed. Ukrainian citizens have to be provided with enough information to make conscious decisions. As director, on a voluntary basis, of the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, I’m doing just that. The institute has held seven round tables and the project is still underway. We will make trips to regions where, unlike Kyiv, there is always a shortage of information concerning the EU and NATO. We initiated parliamentary hearings of Ukrainian-NATO and Ukrainian-EU relationships at the European Integration Committee, scheduled for October 23 and November 20, respectively. I think this will help Ukrainian citizens learn more about the Alliance and the Council.”

“For some or other reasons, quite a few MPs are busy doing something having no bearing on parliamentary work. How is our legislation being adjusted to the EU standards?”

“Here the executive, the cabinet must be in the lead, of course; they must implement the political course the president proclaimed strategic. At the same time, we can see that even the executive branch doesn’t have a clear idea about what has to be done to send the European integration ball running. At the start of the year, the president adopted an urgent action plan to expedite Ukraine’s WTO membership, there are specific bills that must be passed first thing. Still, the government doesn’t even mention them in its proposals to the parliament. Another evidence that declaration and concrete deeds are different things. Another evidence is that a mere 10% of the meager budget appropriations for the adjustment of legislation was actually issued this summer. Our committee pressed the cabinet for allocations to secure the European integration course, otherwise it will be nothing but gab sessions.”

“A lot of people feel that the legislation adjustment budget appropriations are spent on MPs traveling abroad. Even if they fly there to learn from local experiences, they are in no hurry to use it in Ukraine when they fly back. Would you refute this stereotype?”

“I surely would. This money isn’t used by MPs but by specially designated fund managers — ministries and agencies. MPs have nothing to do with this money whatsoever. What we are after is helping certain ministries and agencies receive appropriations for certain integration programs.”