Destruction of a myth

According to data collected in late November, six political forces may obtain seats in the Ukrainian parliament after the elections. Proof of this is found in the social survey “Maidan: One Year Later,” conducted by the National Institute for Strategic Studies. Pollsters questioned 2,000 respondents in early November and 6,000 toward the end of the month. The margins of error are 2.3 and 1.5 percent, respectively.

According to the survey, 24 percent of Ukrainian voters are prepared to cast their ballots for the Party of the Regions; 19.9 percent will vote for Our Ukraine; 15.9 percent for the Tymoshenko bloc; 7.6 percent will support the Communist Party; 7.5 percent will side with Lytvyn’s bloc, and 7.1 percent will remain faithful to the Socialist Party.

In addition, 2.8 percent of respondents are prepared to vote for the PSPU; 2.2 percent for Leonid Kravchuk’s “Lets Unite Ukraine “; 1.6 percent for Pora; 1.5 percent for the Greens; 0.9 percent for the Viche Party; 0.7 percent for the Soyuz Party, and 1.1 percent will vote for another party or bloc. Add here 7.3 percent of respondents who plan to vote against everyone. Electoral moods one year after the Orange Revolution were also monitored. A number of political scientists and sociologists have talked about Ukrainians’ disillusionment and distrust. In this sense the results of the institute’s survey turned out somewhat differently compared to similar studies (small wonder, considering that this institute is an in-power institution): 28.6 percent respondents reportedly view their prospects with hope; 29.1 percent are calm, but have no particular hopes and illusions; 9.2 percent are convinced optimists.

More than half of respondents (54 percent) believe that Ukraine should orient itself toward Russia; 46 percent, toward the West; 68 percent of all respondents support the development of democracy in Ukraine; 32 percent prefer an authoritarian regime; 54 percent want Ukrainian politicians to seek their own Ukrainian path, which should not duplicate the experience of other countries.

Our citizens are also convinced that this society needs serious changes; 41 percent of respondents are in favor of bold and decisive measures; 42 percent support moderate measures; 60.3 percent of respondents, when asked about the new Ukrainian government’s priorities, mentioned higher wages and pensions; 53.3 percent mentioned the anticorruption campaign; 50.3 percent want the agricultural sector revived; 33.1 percent want job security in heavy industry.

There’s more bad news for the current government: quite a few citizens are convinced that Ukraine’s development is moving in the wrong direction. So say 36 percent of respondents, compared to the 24 percent that believe that this country is following the right course. There is special concern (54 percent) about relations between the government and the people, and rule of law. Institute director Yuriy Ruban explains these results: “People can’t be heard on the regional level...That’s why the Presidential Secretariat keeps receiving so many letters from our people. President Viktor Yushchenko declared on Independence Day that the people in power have changed, but the government’s face has not changed.”

There’s another surprise. Respondents were asked to choose the three most important values. Traditionally, in the first three places were well-being, justice, and stability. But human rights are in fourth place (37.4 percent). Sociologists attribute this to the Maidan impact: “Our people have developed a sense of their own dignity.”

Institute experts broached another sensitive Ukrainian subject: is there a rift in Ukraine; to what extent are we different? Can one speak of a psychological trauma affecting people in various regions who voted against the winner of the presidential campaign? Respondents were asked: “Do you consider yourselves first and foremost citizens of Ukraine or residents of a region?” It turns out that after the Orange Revolution, the numbers of Ukrainians who identify themselves exclusively with certain regions have fallen throughout Ukraine, even in the Donbas, dropping from 38 to 33 percent. In 2003 a poll asking people whether they considered Ukraine their homeland yielded 88 percent positive responses in western Ukraine; today it is 97 percent. In the Donbas the changes are even greater: 64 percent in 2003 and 85 percent this year. Sociologists say that “this so-called psychological trauma exists only in the consciousness of politicians.” Hence the questions: “What rift? What federalization?”