Doomed to Come To Terms
The presidential campaign of 2004 is proof that the government and the opposition have failed to steer a middle course in the event that the opposition candidate becomes the next president. Hence the campaign of the government’s candidate looks more like a spetsnaz operation, and that of his principal opponent as another Spielberg project.
Meanwhile, the need to reach an understanding between the two principal political forces of Ukraine — those who represent the traditional, pro-governmental forces and the social-reformist opposition camp — remains vitally important, otherwise all kinds of political excesses are bound to occur. There is also the possibility that certain political forces within Ukraine and outside its borders are counting on precisely such occurrences, in order to undermine Ukraine’s law and order, and to portray this country as politically unstable.
Apparently the outcome of the 2004 presidential campaign will be the trump cards that one side will offer the other in its political aspirations to achieve such a compromise, which cannot be avoided under any circumstances.
ELECTORAL MOODS
Before the 2004 elections, particular attention was focused on the electoral moods in the east and south of Ukraine, which is inhabited by approximately 50% of the electorate who will ultimately determine the nationwide election outcome.
During the 2004 election campaign, the government was clearly struggling to win over the traditional electorate in the eastern and southern regions, using not only social payments, but also administrative and other measures of special influence. However, the final results of the 2004 elections in these regions may prove worse for those in power than the outcome of the parliamentary elections in 2002. First of all, the people currently in power in these regions are gradually losing the monopoly over forming the citizens’ moods. The Russian-controlled democracy model of regional government is hard put to work for the benefit of the government-sponsored presidential candidate. The populace remains stable in showing distrust of the local authorities, so every effort on the latter’s part to promote Viktor Yanukovych is popularly regarded as pressure exerted on the people’s free will. Add to this certain miscalculations by cabinet politics that led to various crises (e.g., gas shortages, price-setting policy, etc.) and subsequent public outcries. Also, the local democracy is not powerless, given the experience of democratic self-government in a number of cities like Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, and other eastern and southern regions, which has led to certain political consequences.
A word should be said in defense of the political honor and dignity of the Donbas, which both in Soviet times and today’s independent Ukraine has often been exploited by the ruling circles in order to pressure their political opponents. The nomenklatura-oligarchic forces still regard it as a Ukrainian industrial Vendee that, given the right juncture, could exert force to suppress any attempts aimed at altering the political status quo. But these expectations are futile, as are the alternatives proposed by these forces to their electorate: e.g., patriotism or nationalism; friendship with Russia or with Europe, etc. This is even worse than President Leonid Kuchma’s multivectoral policy that his opponents have so frequently criticized.
Concealed behind all this is nothing more than the simple xenophobia of all those politicians who follow in the footsteps of the Roman conquerors: divide et impera! Unfortunately, it is not they who will reap the gains of this xenophobia but all those young people whom they are propelling into its embrace. The xenophobia of local politicians has always been opposed by the high cultural standard of the Donbas, embodied by the most outstanding Ukrainians from this region. Donbas is culturally closer to Bukovyna and Zakarpattia with their trilingual characteristics, and multiethnic and extremely hardworking populace, despite its Russian-language factor, than it is to the eastern regions. The Donbas region should, therefore, be regarded not as a Ukrainian Vendee but as an eastern Piedmont of Ukrainian statehood, and in time this territory will indeed become the Piedmont of the east.
HISTORICAL COMPROMISE
If the government considers its presidential candidate’s technical victory in this election campaign, meaning the use of various campaign technologies (ranging from billboards to special operations), then the opposition is relying on its candidate’s victory by exploiting the sociopolitical factor — i.e., by establishing a charismatic connection between the main opposition candidate and the people who, in the opposition’s opinion, will pass “final judgment” on the government during the 2004 election campaign. The struggle between the authorities and this candidate has only served to enhance the people’s confidence that this candidate is precisely the one that the existing regime fears the most, the one who can place all of them under popular control. However, because it underestimated the role of constitutional-legal institutions and internal relationships, the opposition failed to resolve a number of political issues that would have helped them achieve victory. First, they could not neutralize the administrative resource of the government with the help of parliamentary control, court, and actions of public influence. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine did not even demand any orders and instructions from the central executive authorities, which they would have to abide by during the election campaign, nor did parliament bother to verify their conformity with existing legislation and the president’s edicts on the organization and holding of the elections, so as to ensure their openness and public control.
Second, the opposition presidential candidates failed to work out a single tactic of struggle for national objectives during the elections. At certain points the struggle among the opposition candidates was more serious than with their pro-government opponents. It appears that where the opposition is concerned, the tradition of large political compromises, which helped enact the current Constitution on that “constitutional night”, has been forfeited.
Third, there is proof from Viktor Yushchenko’s camp of the opposition’s weak position specifically in regard to Ukrainian-Russian relations. Moscow took advantage of the situation and found “adequate and radical measures” to respond to it by openly backing the government-nominated presidential candidate. In fact, the final phase of the 2004 elections made it clear that Russia’s influence was the very trump card that, according to the Russian scenario for the elections, would be played in order to help Viktor Yanukovych win the campaign. True, the Central Election Committee’s failure to create more than 400 polling stations in Russia (approximately one million additional votes) means that this scenario was not as successful as it appeared earlier.
However, just like in 1998, the chances of the leading opposition candidate appear rather slim, considering his reliance on the people’s disillusionment with the existing regime. His victory during the 2004 election campaign can be guaranteed only by achieving a historical compromise with a certain part of the government forces or those close to them — not by merely siding with all those other oppositional forces. The team behind the leading opposition candidate should, of course, know which political forces to side with under the circumstances.
After October 31, in keeping with universally acknowledged democratic procedures, the presidential candidates who make it to the runoff in 2004 should send their campaign agents to the Presidential Administration and request information about the mechanism of administration and preparation for the accession to office of the winning candidate. Considering that the new Ukrainian president will most likely be opposed by the current majority in the Verkhovna Rada, at least for the duration of the transition period until the next regular — or perhaps extraordinary — parliamentary elections, it would seem appropriate to form a national unity government based on a nationwide consensus. This government would be useful if the 2004 elections proved to be invalid for one reason or another, and if the Verkhovna Rada set a different election date. Such a government could have been formed at the beginning of the recent presidential campaign, but the politicians did not pay enough attention to this idea.
Finally, the events that took place on the night of October 23 near the Central Election Committee, when blood was spilled, are proof that a historical compromise had to be reached, one that would have prevented all those mounting social tensions and the possibility of mass protest actions in the subsequent period.
Without a doubt, the election campaign of 2004 will mark another step in the direction of democracy, either a controlled one (as in Russia or Belarus) or a parliamentary one, like in the Baltic republics, or some kind of mixed format. Time will tell. Much will depend on the people who are honestly discharging their functions as members of election committees. But they can do only so much. Now that the government is refusing to be accountable to parliament, contrary to the constitution, and parliament does not want to report to the people, any political metamorphoses are quite possible.
However, no matter what happens, after this year’s elections the political forces must draw conclusions, proceeding not from hurt political feelings or small-town ambitions, but from big-time politics. In other words, they must acknowledge both the achievements of their political opponents and their own mistakes. Our society wants changes and is prepared to realize them.
