The European Union is not for poor relations
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We entertain a rather primitive concept of EU membership as requiring conformity with some mythical standards, with the emphasis often being on legislation. Laws, however, can work or remain on paper. It is possible to enact laws similar to those of the Union – and nothing will change whatever. If we are discussing Ukraine’s eligibility, legislation crowns the process rather than causes it. Now the domestic situation is an altogether different matter. Here one must adhere to a certain kind of iteration, whereby laws emerge as preconditions in some cases, and in other cases as a legitimization of changes that have already occurred. In other words, we often need such laws to get things started. The West needs these laws as proof that the process has been accomplished. Legislation, therefore, is important but not sufficient in itself. The main thing is the process actually underway. And the standards must not be technical-economic or just legal – all this is of minor importance. Above all, the standards must reflect a high level of the economy and well-being. Only then can we start talking about human rights, democracy, civil society, and so on. Why only then? Simply because the institutions of freedom and democracy are inevitably distorted and corrupted in a degrading society.
There are other circumstances (apart from the formal requirements) that make me place standards in terms of development over everything else. The thing is that the European Union as such is fundamentally different from all other such communities; here competitiveness is secured not only by expanding the space, but also by the opportunity to apply uniform regulations throughout its territory. Expanding the space is also an advantage, but not the most important. The main aspect of competitiveness is the quality of that space. The European community is the only one in the world to have been able to apply roughly the same interest rates up to now and conduct a uniform monetary policy throughout that space, using a single currency without any special problems and resolving budget issues. In this sense the European space is unique.
However, these advantages are easily destroyed once they let in weak partners. As soon as Spain and Portugal joined the Union it started to crack, suffering from the shock of asymmetry. As it was, Germany’s investment interest rate had to be low, while in Spain, with the downpour of capital and the need to scare away investors and avoid overheating, it had to be raised. In other words, a uniform interest rate was no longer possible. Worse, the admission of those two countries led to a redistribution of resources that caused the overall budget to begin to crumble. Germany was especially alarmed by the situation, and the government channeled most capital into its lagging industries. It was then that Europeans realized that admitting weak members was tantamount to destroying their unity and losing competitiveness. After all, the European Union was formed not to help poor relations but primarily to be able to compete with the United States.
And so, after it became clear that letting in low-standard countries caused such small disasters, EU countries began to resist the process. How could be seen in postponing admission dates, followed by the proposal to levy a six-year moratorium on the Schengen privileges, meaning a ban on the freedom of movement. Besides, the Right was becoming active and resistance to outsiders mounting. Yet a political decision on the admission of neophytes had been made much earlier (not without pressure from Washington) and there was no turning back. This means that they will soon be there and that the Union will find itself faced with absolutely new problems. Even now they are going easy on helping those countries. Spain used to receive billions of dollars, but Poland, et al., had to be content with millions. Such cuts on the redistribution process means that potholes will appear on the road and that it will be harder for the regulators to operate throughout that space; finally, that competitiveness will go down accordingly. In other words, the European economy will be undermined as staggering sums will have to be spent to help those countries get on their feet. This will mean a heavy blow to competitiveness. Now this problem of reaching a certain level is precisely the problem of standards. I am completely convinced that, after admitting today’s applicants, there will be no parity admission. There will be different standards or maybe no admission, lest identity suffer. Or they may set up two or more zones within the Union, one for the elite countries, with all the rights secured and all regulators effective, and the second – or third – zone will be a kind of drain trap for the marginal ones, without any rights but with a host of obligations.
A question arises: Is joining the EU in that capacity worthwhile? I don’t think so. I feel skeptical about the admission of countries such as Ukraine and Turkey. But suppose I am wrong and the Union door will be held open for us. In that case (the possibility should be considered, even if for the sake of our own medicine) we should think not of how to curry favor and invite ourselves. And nor should we make the rest of the world laugh with our assurances that we are European. The task should be to show attainments that would make others treat us like Europeans, meaning that we should be able to meet EU criteria. Rather than shouting about being European, straining our ears to catch every voice speaking in our favor in the West, and feeling happy about it, we should radically change our internal environment and alter the vector of our development..
What does changing the internal environment mean? Our worst evil is the criminal environment. It is different from what they have in America or elsewhere in Europe – and not only in scope or malignancy, but also in that their economy works even in such an environment. Ours paralyzes our entire life, denying us progress, ruling out the possibility of competitive structures, adequate replenishment and rational use of the state budget. There is no way we can reorient our money. Therefore, what we must do first is get the better of the domestic Mafia. It will never disappear, of course, but it must not be in a position to exert a decisive influence on social progress. Otherwise there will be no progress, just moving by inertia, and we will still be dominated by archaic industries. And this despite the fact that this country had a chance to develop a topnotch economic structure. We could have reached an enviable hi-tech level during the past decade, even compared to the Soviet indices. We would have been in Europe by now; I think we would have been ahead of Spain and Portugal, even Italy – let alone Poland. This is the task we must set ourselves. Black soil itself will not secure true success. Of course, the chernozem feeds us and rescues us, because all EU countries build solid defenses precisely in the agrarian sector, to ward off foreign farming products. This means that turning this into export potential is a big question. For example, if we redistributed export proceeds, that fertile soil on which our oligarchs grow and blossom (although they mostly originate from imports and could be regarded as compradors, in a sense), Europe would let us in without further ado. And then we would have no problem quickly asserting our liberties, democracy, and human rights.