A great experiment

(Continued from The Day No.36)

THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION AND THE BOLSHEVIKS

Success of the Ukrainian national cause was anything but what the Bolsheviks were after in their efforts to establish the hegemony of the world proletariat. However, before the revolution they had to demonstrate their interest in solving the national problems of tsarist Russia as they tried to garner the support of workers and peasants. During the revolution and the civil war, and even more so after the Soviet regime was established all over Ukraine, it became clear that without concessions to the national liberation movement and at least seeming national legitimacy they stood no chance of winning the support of even a handful of most radical Ukrainian statesmen. Without this, the Soviet system would never be stable.

It is common knowledge that Lenin created his party on the basis of rigid centralism and was guided by militant principles. It should be noted, however, that directives sent down by the Center had to follow a complicated route, what with railroads, telephone, telegraph, and postal service all being devastated. Therefore, the local [party] organizations, especially in Ukraine, were often left to operate at their own discretion and the central authorities had simply no way of understanding local problems, let alone knowing them in detail. They would often issue resolutions that often had nothing to do with the situation at hand.

Kyiv’s Bolshevik organization was headed by Yurii (Heorhii) Piatakov, an extreme nationalist and nihilist, who, back in 1915, opposed Lenin’s thesis about the right of nations to self-determination, including secession, because he regarded it to be reactionary. Lenin’s rebuttal did not stop him, and Piatakov once again attacked this programmatic statement during the April 1917 conference. Yet even Piatakov knew only too well that in order to have influence on Kyiv, where the Central Rada had actually established an autonomous Ukrainian government, all Bolshevik organizations in Ukraine had to be united under single leadership. And so he convened a party conference of the so-called South-Western Region and proclaimed the establishment of a Bolshevik organization known as the Social Democracy of Ukraine.

On Nov. 11, 1917, the Kyiv Bolsheviks sent a letter to the CC of the RSDPU(B), requesting permission to set up a party center in the South-Western Region and change the name of the local organization. Moscow responded with an unequivocal message conveyed by Yakov Sverdlov: “We consider it undesirable to create a separate Ukrainian party, no matter what its name and program may be.” Lenin’s central government ignored this body and most Bolshevik party organizations in Ukraine recognized only Moscow.

After the enforcement of Soviet rule in Ukraine, with the aid of Muraviov-commanded Bolshevik troops, Petrograd workers manned food procurement detachments that were dispatched to Ukraine without requesting any authorization from the Ukrainian government or local party authorities. In fact, there was no regional party center. Instead, there was constant confrontation between two Bolshevik forces in Ukraine, namely the Kyiv organization headed by Piatakov, and the considerably stronger one in Katerynoslav, led by Emmanuil Kviring. The latter actually wanted to have nothing to do with the Kyiv organization, determined to form a Soviet republic in the Donbas. They did not want to receive orders from any Ukrainian party center, believing that any local competition without military support from Soviet Russia was a reckless adventure, and they generally did not take the Soviet Ukrainian government seriously. Toward the end of 1917, Lenin dispatched his special agent, Mykola Skrypnyk, to Ukraine to straighten out the relationships between these factions.

THE BOLSHEVIKS IN UKRAINE

For Russian-speaking cities, which were the Bolshevik bastions, Ukraine was just a handful of provinces within the indivisible Russian state. Most of the Bolsheviks were as dedicated to the idea of an undivided Russia as White Guard General Denikin. Before Skrypknyk’s arrival in Ukraine, the [local] Bolsheviks practically did not know what country they were living in. There were separate Soviet regimes in the Donbas, Odesa, and the Crimea, which did not have, or wanted to have, anything to do with the events in Kyiv, where the Bolshevik organization, led by Piatakov and Yevhenia Bosh, was weaker than the Central Rada.

Obviously, without support from Katerynoslav, the Kyiv Bolsheviks were unable to seize power. Another important aspect: any party whose name started with qualifier “Russian” stood practically no chance of winning massive support in Ukraine. However, the Bolsheviks in Katerynoslav and Kharkiv adamantly opposed any attempts to Ukrainize the party, even if formally. They essentially boycotted the second convocation of the First Congress of Soviets and proclaimed their own Soviet Republic of Donetsk and Kryvyi Rih. The People’s Secretariat of the UNR, formed by this congress, had no real support from the masses and party organizations. Also, the secretariat was being torn apart by inner squabbles.

It was then that Mykola Skrypnyk made his appearance as People’s Commissar [Minister] of Labor. At the time, neither Lenin, nor his milieu took their puppet government seriously. Directives from Moscow were sent through Volodymyr Antonov-Ovsienko who was placed in command of the Bolshevik troops. Their general message is well-known: “For heaven’s sake, take the most energetic and revolutionary measures to ship grain, grain, and more grain! Otherwise Petrograd may die. Use special trains and detachments. Procure and deliver. Convoy trains. Report every day. For heaven’s sake! Lenin.”

Lenin’s telegrams concerned gasoline, salt, and coal. He “of course, did not object to” mass shootings and welcomed a violent punishment of a group of first-class train passengers accused of sabotage. Bolshevik troops operated in Ukraine like occupiers, and Moscow’s entire policy relied on the occupational principle. This caused armed resistance and general discontent, leading to frictions even within the Ukrainian Bolshevik government. The situation often became so explosive that Lenin had to tighten the leash on his overzealous subordinates.

Thus, after commissars were appointed without the Ukrainian government’s knowledge and consent, Lenin sent the following telegram: “For heaven’s sake, make every effort to eliminate all frictions with the VTsVK (Kharkiv). This is of the utmost importance for the state. For heaven’s sake, be reconciled to them and acknowledge any sovereignty they want. Do please dismiss the commissars you have appointed.” (Jan. 24, 1918). On Janurary 1 he suggested to Antonov-Ovsienko that he settle conflicts via Skrypnyk. At that time, Moscow’s policy in regard to Ukraine boiled down to undisguised robbery, on the one hand, and making every gesture to reaffirm the recognition of Ukraine’s sovereignty, on the other. The central government would soon discard all formalities, as is clear from the following excerpt from a telegram: “We need Ioffe not in the Crimea, but in Ukrainian government. Rakovsky will choose an office for him to combat the independence [movement].”

However, in 1918 Ukraine found itself entangled in a knot of conflicting interests inside and outside the country, so much so that the Bolsheviks knew not to come up with chauvinistic slogans. On the contrary, after signing the Peace Treaty of Brest, the logic of political struggle forced the party center into formal recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, so further efforts could be made without Russia being accused of breaching the treaty. The problem was further aggravated by the conditions of the Austro-German occupation and gave a fresh impetus to the debate among the principal Bolshevik organizations as to the ways of forming a republican party organization. On April 19-20, 1918, a party conference in Taganrog resolved - as proposed by Mykola Skrypnyk - to establish “the independent Communist Party with its own Central Committee and party conventions that would be linked to the Russian Communist Party through an international commission.”

The Ukrainian Bolsheviks did not regard their decision as being aimed at ruining the unified party, but as a formal declaration. They sincerely believed that a concession made under the circumstances could be easily annuled any time and that internationalism was inherent to communists.

The Taganrog conference did not have any officially decreed consequences. It was just an idea, although it caused a great deal of turmoil among the pro-Russian Bolshevik leaders of Ukraine-they were fond of posing as defenders of the oppressed nation’s rights but believed that forming an independent Ukrainian nation was an “unwelcome” idea.

A telling example is found in an article written by Yakov Yakovlev (Epstein) and carried by Pravda on June 30, 1918. The author wonders whether or not it is possible “to correctly solve the stated tactical tasks of our party in Ukraine without it being linked and subordinated to the all-Russian party, while maintaining purely fictitious contacts through the international commission?” Further on, lashing out at such independent party functionaries as Skrypnyk, he claims that their desire to form an independent party is explained by their overestimation of the successes achieved by nationalists from the Central Rada; that they fail to see and take advantage of the Ukrainian people’s current negative attitude to the idea of separating from Russia; that Ukraine “was and remains an economic part of Russia.”

The July 5-12, 1918 First Congress of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine, which was convened in Moscow, resolved to merge all Bolshevik organizations of Ukraine into one independent party, while at the same time declaring that “contact with the RKP(B) remains and must be maintained regardless of any formal aspects of the party-building process.”

Let me emphasize again: the Ukrainian Bolsheviks regarded their secession from the RKP(B) as a purely formal act and an independent Ukraine-illusory, to quote Skrypnyk. He sincerely believed that all the communists of the world were joined together in one party.

RIFTS AS STANDARD PRACTICE IN THE UKRAINIAN POLITICAL MOVEMENT

The complicated situation in Ukraine forced the Bolsheviks to resort to maneuvering and frequent modifications of their tactics.

The Bolsheviks had to pose as champions of Ukrainians’ rights with increasing frequency, especially when periods the very existence of Soviet power was under threat.

The Council of People’s Commissars, the VTsIK, the CC of the RSDRP(B), and other organizations addressed the Ukrainian workers, soldiers, and peasants with an appeal dated Dec. 8, 1917 that read: “Ukrainian Brothers, you are being assured that we are against Ukraine’s self-determination. This is a lie! We are not even thinking about violating Ukraine’s rights. The revolutionary proletariat is only interested in securing for all nations the right to self-determination, including secession.” However, the situation was changing rapidly. The Central Rada was gaining increasing support and a mere “right” (to which no one had a copyright) was clearly insufficient for propaganda in Ukraine.

On December 12 Commander in Chief Nikolai Krylenko declared: “We want a free life for Ukrainian workers and peasants in Ukraine. We promise you freedom without any restrictions; we will fight for an independent Ukrainian republic together with you, but this republic will be like ours with all the power in the hands of the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies of Ukraine.”

Similar messages were sent to Ukraine on a daily basis. Only after they had exploited the idea of Ukraine’s independence to the full, drowned cities and villages in blood, and annihilated all opposition parties, the Bolsheviks adopted resolutions to the effect that the independence idea had “completely discredited itself in the widest working masses” and that the party’s main task was now to “fight for the unification of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism, within the boundaries of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic.”

The biblical adage “Nothing is secret that shall not be made manifest” proved to be true, but it took a while. The Ukrainian parties that spearheaded the national liberation movement found themselves immersed in continuous squabbles and rifts that started only a short time after the fall of the tsarist regime. These became the major phenomenon in Ukraine’s political life at the time. Radical socialist forces that had adopted the Marxist platform quickly parted company with the parties that upheld the idea of an independent, sovereign, and united Ukraine. Quite a few former members of the Ukrainian Socialist Democratic Party and the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries migrated to the Bolsheviks in large groups.

It would not be safe to assume that they had no doubts about Moscow’s intentions in regard to Ukraine, but they sincerely believed that by joining the struggle for Soviet rule in Ukraine they would head the state-building process. Among these people were truly singular, outstanding personalities, such as Vasyl Ellan-Blakytny, Oleksandr Shumsky, Hryhorii Hrynko, and Yurii Mazurenko. In fact, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, First Secretary General and Chairman of the Ukrainian Directory, quit the Ukrainian movement and joined the Bolsheviks in 1920. Vynnychenko was a seasoned politician, yet for a short while he believed that a free and independent Ukraine was possible in an alliance with Soviet Russia and its communist regime. Vynnychenko‘s illusions were dispelled in a matter of weeks, while the dreams of the Borotbists and Ukapists (members of the Communist Party of Ukraine) lasted until the tragic end.

BOROTBISTS

Borotbists represented a major variety of national communism and originated from the strongest party in the Central Rada that was also the most popular one with the Ukrainian masses in 1917. After the hetman coup, at the illegitimate Fourth Congress of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR), the radical faction headed by Ellan-Blakytny and Shumsky got the majority of votes and took control over the party organ Borot’ba (Struggle). The previous leadership and their like-minded associates broke away and retained the title UPSR (centralists). The left-wing group led by Ellan-Blakytny opened a debate on whether they had anything in common with what they called the “nationalistic” UPSR (the old party) or whether they were a new party pursuing a radical transformation of society. Shortly afterward, they became officially known as the UPSR (Borotbists).

Members of this faction referred to themselves as Borotbists (after the title of their newspaper, Borot’ba) and quickly evolved into a separate party. After the Bolsheviks refused to recognize their revolutionary committee as the government of Soviet Ukraine at the Fifth Congress in March 1919, they decided to support the idea of a Soviet republic, provided it was independent, had its own army, and other full-fledged state institutions.

Initially, the Borotbists accused other Ukrainian parties of excessive nationalism and a tendency to view Ukraine’s independence as an end in itself. They were against setting up “artificial” borders between countries and believed that there was no cause for a struggle between the working people of Russia and Ukraine. However, they also believed that a union with Soviet Russia should be based on equality and Soviet Ukraine should be Ukrainian, i.e., a product of the Ukrainian revolution innately linked with its forces. They had no doubt that the Ukrainian revolution was an accomplished fact and that it was of a different nature, with its dinstinct trends, participants, and supporters as compared with the Russian revolution.

After the fiasco of Skoropadsky’s Hetman State, the Borotbists saw their objective in proclaiming their own Soviet Ukraine and Ukrainian Red Army under the command of Otaman Hryhoriev. In this way they wanted to present themselves to Russia as a fait accompli. After the Bolsheviks refused to recognize the Borotbist Revolutionary Committee, they had to choose between giving up struggle and starting hostilities against Soviet Russia. They chose to serve the Bolsheviks.

In March 1919, they moved closer to them by changing the name of their party. Now it was UPSR (Communist Borotbists). They further requested that their party be recognized as a member of Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, or CP(B)U and received a flat denial from Moscow. Lenin personally forced the Ukrainian Bolsheviks to admit Borotbists into the government. He acknowledged that the Borotbists could not be ignored because of their influence on peasants. In 1919, during the “Piatakov era,” i.e., when Piatakov and Rakovsky- both hard-line nationalist nihilists-ruled Ukraine, the Borotbists became known as quiet Bolshevik allies. Even during the uprising led by Hryhoriev, their former ally, they actually collaborated with the Bolsheviks.

In August 1919, when the Piatakov era was nearly over, the Borotbists merged with a small group of left-wing Marxist intellectuals, the “Left Independists,” that had left the USDRP, adopted the Soviet platform, and welcomed the creation of Soviet Ukraine. However, in May of that year, when the independists, led by Otaman Zeleny, rose in arms against the Bolshevik occupation, a small group of party members refused to take part in the rebellion, quit the party, and designated itself as Livy nezalezhnyky (Left Independists).

Considering that the Borotbists had the larger and more influential party at the time, it would have only been logical for the independists to simply become incorporated in this party. However, the Borotbists decided to use this situation in order to discard the old UPSR populist tradition and adopt Marxist ideology. They believed that they would thus achieve ideological legitimacy in the world communist movement. They also adopted a new name for their party-the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists) — and sent a memorandum to the Third Congress of the Communist International with an application for full membership.

On August 7, Shumsky, a Borotbist leader who held the post of the People’s Commissar for Education, submitted a draft decree on the national question to the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee (VUTsVK). On August 28, the Borotbists forwarded an expanded memorandum to the Comintern’s Executive Committee. These documents make it absolutely clear the essence of Borotbism and its adherents.

The first document “On Solving the National Question” contained Shumsky’s draft and an extensive introduction which served as a detailed commentary to the main text. It raised the issue of elevating the cultural standard in national forms: the revolutionaries had to take over, acknowledge, and use the Petliurite slogan “Culture in the Mother Tongue”. The document also contained classical Marxist reasoning to the effect that capitalism is responsible for the systematic enslavement of nations and the forceful non-recognition of nations that do not have their own states. This is why the bourgeois intelligentsia, kulaks, peasants of average means, and even the backward elements of the working class had rallied around the national independence slogan, which was badly damaging the socialist cause.

This was immediately followed by a positive assessment of the stand taken by the RKP(B) in that it condemned any national privileges. However, the Borotbists believed that this was only a passive aspect of the solution-an active response would be to acknowledge the established fact that culture, including national culture, is a weapon of class struggle and this weapon should be used in the struggle for socialism. This is possible only when stateless nations receive their own proletarian vanguard that will accept their national culture.

In this booklet, the Bolshevik policy is presented as an example of how the national question can be deadlocked. The years of forceful Russification on the part of tsarist Russia turned Ukrainian cities into Russian cultural centers and essentially built a national cultural wall between the urban and rural areas. After the revolution, its leaders were urban-oriented; most government employees were representatives of the Russified petty bourgeois intelligentsia. Those who knew rural culture and the Ukrainian language were ignored and their potential was undermined. The practice of concentrating authority in the hands of Russian or local Russified proletarians essentially gave privileged status to Russian national forms of culture. Therefore, despite all the nice words about national equality, this policy had actually triggered an explosion of national antagonism in the countryside.

The Borotbists believed that abolishing national suppression was not enough. It was necessary to take the most urgent measures to raise the cultural standard of the less developed ethnic groups to the level of advanced nations, so they could take part in public life on home turf. This seemed to be a logical continuation of the Russian communists’ slogan about national equality, and it had to be translated into life in order to snatch the national liberation motto from the hands of the “reactionary” forces, which the Directory was believed to represent. This was to be accomplished by attaining real equality between national cultures and facilitating the socialist development of Ukraine’s working masses.

The Borotbists also believed that socioeconomic conditions that had previously caused Russification were eliminated, but its horrible consequences were not. There was the force of habit born of daily life, the reason behind Ukrainians’ backwardness, and the Soviet government had to break this habit by providing large-scale and systematic support for the development of Ukrainian culture. The Commissariat for Public Education had to take the lead in combating the consequences of Russification and deviations leading to Ukrainian chauvinism. Above all, it had to proceed from the fact that the formal recognition of equality per se means very little. The state had to facilitate the cultural progress of the nationalities that had become victims of lawlessness in the past.

This draft decree was essentially a program aimed at fostering Ukrainian culture.

Seventy-five years ago the Borotbists came up with sophisticated arguments and raised questions that have remained unanswered. If legally established equality as such is not sufficient and victims of past oppression need active help to reach true equality, this implies that there is a possibility of discrimination against those who are not responsible for this past oppression. In other words, there is a threat of providing assistance at the expense of others. In fact, this was the crux of the future Ukrainization policy, and this booklet marked its intellectual beginning.

Another document, entitled “Memorandum of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists) to the Executive Committee of the Third Communist International,” was Marxist all the way and was meant to prove that the Borotbists were orthodox revolutionary Marxists and legitimate leaders of the Ukrainian revolution; that they stood the best chance of guiding Ukraine on the road to communism.

This memorandum starts with conclusions drawn from events that resulted in the August 6 merger of the parties and the adoption of the title “Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists).” The party is referred to the organized nucleus of Ukrainian communism, made up of elements that had left the UPSR and USDRP, driven by the very current of the revolutionary process. These revolutionary elements, reads the memorandum, were guiding the Ukrainian revolutionary masses against the Hetman State and the “bourgeois” Directory. Finally, they merged into a single party to unite all communist elements in Ukraine around one center. The CP(B)U, as a regional branch of the Russian Communist Party, was not in a position to resolve such complex matters because it was alien to Ukraine, so much so that it was unable to recognize the necessity of having a Ukrainian center.

For the most part, the memorandum is a detailed analysis of the Ukrainian revolution and disoriented Bolshevik actions that impeded its progress, considering that most of the officials the Bolsheviks had sent to Ukraine knew nothing about this country and the specifics of the local revolutionary process. The document states that Ukraine is not Russia and has its distinct features and differences; that Ukraine has always been and remains a special and largely independent national-economic organism, with its own way of economic life and an extremely sophisticated configuration of social relationships. This is a largely agrarian country where the industrial proletariat constitutes 15 percent of the population at best.

Since every effort went toward organizing the urban proletariat, little was done to organize proletarians and semi-proletarians in the rural areas. Put together, poor peasants and peasants of average means constitute the overwhelming majority in this country’s population; these people have a deep-rooted instinct of private ownership. The very logic of events dictates that an agrarian revolution is the inevitable consequence of Ukraine’s economic structure. Therefore, to be successful, the Ukrainian revolution must rely on rural proletarians and semi-proletarians, people who are not yet aware of the needs of socialism.

The CP(B)U hates all things rural and Ukrainian. It has demonstrated that it will not be able to gain the support of the rural elements, which are the key to the revolution’s success. The previous weak, short-lived character of attempts to build Soviet Ukraine is due to this party’s inability to rely on rural and urban elements, which, by virtue of their nature, would be the strongest supporters of Soviet power.

The CP(B)U’s tendency of alienating the peasantry was one obstacle on the road to Soviet power. The other was its hatred of the Ukrainian nationality. The memorandum explains that the CP(B)U’s attempt to base Soviet power only on urban workers, who are culturally alienated from the countryside, could not but impede the natural course of the Ukrainian revolution. The many years of national oppression and forced Russification have made Ukrainians suspicious of all things Russian. The Bolsheviks’ bend on Russification further alienated the rural proletariat from urban workers.

The Ukrainian revolution could be led only by those who recognized the national forms of Ukrainian culture. Without cultural equality for the rural proletarian elements, without recognizing their national needs and aspirations, there is no way to enhance rural proletarian consciousness and the awareness of the necessity of having socialism. Only true cultural equality can protect the rural proletariat against the counterrevolutionary slogans of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, and this raises the question of what Ukraine should be as a Soviet republic.

The Borotbists believed that Ukraine’s socioeconomic and national specifics made it imperative that this country become an independent Soviet republic with natural ties to the countryside and an equal member of the future world federation of Soviet republics. They agreed that the national question was a matter of tactics, not strategy. Therefore, it was tactically logical to establish Soviet Ukraine that could use the local forces of the Ukrainian revolution. Tactical mistakes in resolving the national question had aggravated the formation of proletarian consciousness in those rural elements that had to be inevitably mobilized if this revolution was to be successful. The CP(B)U’s mistakes caused peasants to focus on the national question to such extent that it came to dominate over the question of class struggle.

The memorandum concludes that the international struggle between revolution and counterrevolution requires that the Ukrainian proletariat become an equal member of the international proletariat. This, in turn, requires that the Ukrainian communist center and its leadership emerge from Ukraine’s socioeconomic and national-cultural environment. The Borotbists were the only party capable of forming this center.

The Borotbists arrived at these conclusions the hard way and were most likely influenced by the circumstances.