Heorhy MANCHULENKO: Withdrawing our military contingent from Iraq would sully Ukraine’s reputation

Ukraine’s national security and the prospects of the Armed Forces reform and the coming presidential elections is one of the most burning problems for Ukrainian politicians. The Day has more than once invited representatives of different political forces to discuss these issues. Our today’s interviewee is People’s Deputy Heorhy MANCHULENKO (Our Ukraine faction, left in the photo), member of the parliament’s National Security and Defense Committee.

“Verkhovna Rada approved the other day, albeit in the third attempt, sending a Ukrainian peacekeeping force to Liberia, following a UN request. The Our Ukraine faction, except for one deputy, did not support this decision...”

“On the one hand, it is good that top UN officials approach Ukraine with a request to send a peacekeeping force. Of course, we have some promises to keep, as far as this organization is concerned. But nobody forced us to send 350 men. The Russians confined themselves, for some reason, to 45 just to be counted. Why not send a small peacekeeping unit of, say, twenty men? We would have thus responded to the UN call and avoided at the same time bearing the burden of colossal expenses and risks.”

“But what the UN expects us to do is not just be counted. Is maintaining as good as possible relations with this international organization not an matter of national interest for Ukraine?”

“We do not have enough means to keep our peacemakers at the level other, even not so well developed, countries do. While all the other peacekeepers are paid additional benefits from the state budget, ours earn just what the UN allocates.”

“Sending the Ukrainian troops to Iraq was an equally difficult decision in terms of legal, political, and moral responsibility. Yet, Our Ukraine supported it by quite a wide margin...”

“We are broaching again the question of national interests. Ukraine does have national interests in Iraq. Some Ukrainians work in the local interim administration. There are some prospects for participating in economic projects. For example, a deal has been made that the Luhansk Diesel Locomotive Plant will manufacture a number of locomotives for Iraq, not to mention such a strategic project as the Odesa-Brody oil pipeline which has attracted the interest of the European Union and some US oil companies. So it is in our national interest to be involved in reconstructing Iraq. Doing a peacekeeping job there, we are implementing, albeit slowly, our idea of Euro-Atlantic integration. It is this reasoning that made us vote for sending a contingent to Iraq, although our faction’s members were not unanimous on this point at the time.”

“Some opposition forces, including the Communists, use the demand to withdraw the contingent from Iraq as part of their rhetoric...”

“The most valued thing in foreign policy is consistency. Making such a difficult decision, we undertook a certain commitment. And now, just a few months later, it would be, to put it mildly, illogical to raise the question of pulling the contingent out. This would only undermine Ukraine’s international prestige, not to mention the loss of all the positive effect that our presence in Iraq can produce. This kind of initiative has the right to exist. But I strongly doubt it will gain 226 votes needed to just recommend the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to reverse his earlier decision.”

“What in fact crowned the outgoing Year of Russia in Ukraine was the Tuzla problem. What lessons should this country draw from this situation? What has Ukraine lost and what has it perhaps won?”

“Ukraine has won very much as far as national cohesion — in terms of politics, not ethnicity — is concerned. I can say the absolute majority of Ukrainian citizens, irrespective of their region of residence, faith, and political preferences, knitted closer together in rejecting unfriendly actions against Ukraine. The unwise, to put it mildly, actions of the Russian side strengthened the European aspirations in Ukrainian society. The crucial thing now is not to squander the dividends we got after this, without exaggeration, unwise decision of Moscow, not to be lured by petty cheap concessions. Very much will depend on Ukraine’s authorities, both on the central and local level, especially in the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea. Today, with Russia pursuing such an unfriendly policy, Ukraine has every reason to begin unilateral delimitation and demarcation of the Ukrainian-Russian state border’s sea sector. For international law allows one of the sides to do so if the other side shows no goodwill.

“There are losses also. The current around the Island Tuzla is now faster, the island is being washed out, and reinforcing the coast line will require considerable funds. It is so far difficult to assess environmental hazards. Yet, I think our losses and gains are incomparable. If there had been no Tuzla, it would have had to have been invented.”

“Experts, politicians and journalists failed to arrive at a common conclusion as to what the Russian side tried to achieve by provoking the Tuzla crisis. What do you think?”

“It was a special operation that pursued several goals. First, to make Russian society believe that the current government is gathering the lands of the Great Russian Empire. Second, to test the Ukrainian side’s ability to react to this problem, to find out if we are prepared to stand our ground. Third, to enable the Rogozin-type Russian politicians to reap dividends. Who could imagine that the Motherland bloc would surmount the 5% Duma membership barrier? It was like a bolt from the blue. Russian President Putin’s long silence against the backdrop of his subordinates’ overtly unfriendly actions against Ukraine confirms that all this was done with his knowledge. But, even if the Russians gained something, they lost still more by seriously harming Ukrainian-Russian relations. Things like that are not easily forgotten. This was a multiphase combination that provided for several scenarios of developments, including pressure on Ukraine in delimiting the sea sector of the Ukrainian-Russian border. This problem will be hanging over us during the delimitation talks.”

“When and in what way do you think everything will be settled in this situation?”

“What was in an active phase has now passed into the so-called negotiating phase. Of course, the Duma’s current lineup will further foster chauvinistic sentiments in Russian politics. No doubt, the new old Putin will be elected Russia’s next president. Accordingly, the Russians will be pursuing a tough aggressive foreign policy, first of all, within the CIS. So it is very difficult to predict today how long it will take to settle the disputes over the Sea of Azov, the Azov-Kerch Strait, and Tuzla Island. There are reasons to expect mounting pressure from the Russian political beau monde. All we must do is cling to the standpoint that Tuzla is Ukrainian territory, and delimitation should be carried out on the surface, not the bottom, the more so that we are right from the juridical point of view. I think there will be rather lengthy negotiations.”

“In any state, its armed forces is one of the strongest guarantees of national security. Verkhovna Rada has approved recently the 2004 national budget. Do you think the budget’s military appropriations are sufficient enough to support the army reform?”

“Out of the appropriated UAH 4.9 billion, almost 800 million comprise a special fund, which means the army must earn money on its own. The Armed Forces are not capable of earning this amount by just selling its surplus property or equipment. In any case, it will be not so easy. In other words, the real figure will be lower than those on paper. I don’t mention the level of servicemen’s pay and the negligible funds allotted for reforming and developing the Armed Forces. The chronic, year-by-year, underfunding of the army is like a natural calamity. The point is that, if something requires, say, 10 billion hryvnias today but only 6 billion was allotted, the same thing will require 15, not 10, billion in a year. This approach can bring us to a situation when it will be very difficult indeed to find the required funds in the state budget...”

“What do you think threatens our national security today?”

“First of all, there are threats of domestic nature, such as the low living standards of the Ukrainian people, mounting tension, deep stratification in society, etc. Add to this the unpopular and inconsistent actions of the government, especially in pursuing Ukraine’s foreign policy.”

“With the presidential elections coming, the opposition faces the problem of whether to nominate one, two, or four candidates. Quite recently, the No. 2 man in the Socialist Party, People’s Deputy Yosyf Vynsky, suggested in a letter to the leaders of all the four opposition forces — the SPU, Our Ukraine, KPU. and BYuT — that they put forward Oleksandr Moroz as a single candidate from the opposition. How did this idea go down with Our Ukraine?”

“I think we have made the same mistake more than enough since 1991. One must draw correct conclusions from the mistakes made a short time ago. To win power, one must take realities into account and make an adequate assessment of each presidential candidate’s chances. As of today, Viktor Yushchenko is the most popular, no matter whether or not somebody likes it. This is a reality to be reckoned with. With this in view, the troika — Our Ukraine, the Socialist Party, and BYuT — should discuss the role and place of each of their leaders in the united team. As to the Communists, it is obvious that their leader will be a candidate on his own. That one of the Communist leaders, Adam Martyniuk, was elected vice speaker instead of Hennady Vasyliev speaks volumes about the role the Communists will be playing in the elections.”

“Does discussing the roles mean distributing offices?”

“Let it be so if you like.”