Kuchma and Kuchmism as a Phenomenon

(Continued from the previous issue)

“ROYAL COURT”: A CONSTANT OF UKRAINIAN POLITICS

L.I.: It may be said that during his first term President Kuchma acted as a pro-Russian politician and he was obviously supported by Moscow. At the same time, Russia was displeased with certain aspects of his policy, perhaps because he wasn’t as Russia-minded as they wanted him to be. Then there was the Melnychenko tape scandal, which forced Kuchma to make a head- spinning U-turn in the direction of Russia. Finally, we all remember his trip to Prague. His team didn’t agree on all matters and practically everybody thought he shouldn’t be making that trip in the first place. There may be different attitudes to our former president, but one thing is certain: that trip was a personal act, for we all watched the kind of humiliation he suffered there, including the way they were seated at the roundtable in alphabetical order, considering that different alphabets were involved. I believe that by doing so, the EU countries acted rudely and inadequately in regard to Ukraine. Kuchma, as head of state, found himself very much offside in this situation, but it’s also true that Ukraine lost a lot of face.

A.Ye.: I believe that if we are using these shadings and colors, we should try to establish some sort of provisional periodization of Kuchma’s evolution as a political figure. Suppose we accept that during the first stage, when he became prime minister, his legend was being created. If we do, it stands to reason that the second stage should be described as access to the system, and the third stage (1997-99) as the end of the second term, meaning his full political power. If memory serves me well, Ukraine wanted to develop a self-sufficient national economy model in early 1992. So when Fokin suffered his fiasco (he wasn’t liberal by conviction or by deed, yet had to implement a number of market economy measures, particularly in the coal industry, the government started looking for a technical figure capable of acting as a foolproof crisis manager. Also, one should bear in mind that the Ukrainian cabinet had a different status and the Verkhovna Rada and its Presidium had huge influence. Add here the lobbies and their interests. I also believe that Ivan Pliushch played a significant role in promoting this figure; he persuaded Leonid Kravchuk that Leonid Kuchma was the right kind of politician, who was controllable and who would cope with the technical problems, and so on. Kuchma’s anticorruption slogans and his theses about the resumption of ties with the other post-Soviet republics were cheered in parliament. In a matter of days he went from being an obscure manager into a national politician. Leonid Kuchma ended his prime ministership against a beautiful information backdrop. Following active PR efforts, including the rehabilitation of social reforms, in contrast to the liberal ones, and reviving contacts with Russia, Kuchma pulled out at the right time. He did it purposefully, knowing he was among the few who could claim the presidency. Later much was said and written on the matter, and Kuchma said he’d thought about refusing the ticket. However, I believe that the realities were somewhat different. To begin with, Kuchma was quickly recognized as leader of that managerial apparatus. Second, he received powerful support from the Russian media as the presidential candidate most favored by Moscow. Third, compared to the conservative and not very successful Yukhym Zviahilsky, the ex-prime minister (like Mr. Yushchenko now), he was the only alternative firmly ensconced in the public mind.

L.I.: It’s interesting to note that Kuchma appeared to be the least Soviet-minded bureaucrat from the standpoint of certain aspects mostly kept away from the public eye. I think even the military-industrial complex and contacts with Moscow, at some level, also played a positive role. Considering, however, that Kuchma was and still is a player in the political game, he found himself in a markedly patriarchal environment where one could be manipulated like in a cat-and-mouse game. Remember how the national democrats behaved at the time? They were hysterical about Kuchma’s pro-Russian political stand and then backed him, at various periods, even during the election campaigns. All this was a Byzantine kind of backstage politicking.

A.Ye.: There was a turning point in 1998-99. After having dealt with his first strong political opponents, Leonid Kuchma found himself faced with the threat of authoritarian isolation, so he backed up and enlisted all those financial and industrial groups, allowing them to rub elbows with the government; that was when he was transformed from a president into an oligarch. I believe that after 1999 he became a collective president; oligarchic mechanisms, on a par with his personal clout and personal power, were working out decisions for him and having them implemented by all the subordinate executive structures behind the chief executive’s back, and so on.

L.I.: And it all ended in an utter fiasco, from the point of view of passing power into someone else’s hands, because now we can actually assess the blunders that were made by his administration, the way his team kept aloof from realities in Ukraine.

V.K.: Kuchmism remains at the structural level, because politics are shaped not in cabinet, parliament, or the head of state’s office, but in a “royal court.” The most important decisions are made within a narrow circle of close political associates and personal friends. In this sense, the administration may be best described as a secretariat, yet this royal court remains a basic structural model, complete with intrigues and favoritism.

Ye.H.: The same is true of political systems throughout the world.

V.K.: No, not throughout the world. We have the Oval Office and its decision-making techniques in the United States and a complex of institutions representing the presidential authority in Ukraine, functioning on a competitive basis, including the Secretariat, NSDC, and Cabinet of Ministers, fighting for exclusive domestic and foreign political rights; we see politicians crossing swords to win the right to exclusively moderate and coordinate Russian-Ukrainian relations.

A.Ye.: It’s a kind of collective management on the part of a centralized and unitarian authority.

V.K.: Hear, hear! It’s proof that the European models of political power aren’t mature enough. Note that the very successor model is a quasidynastic model of forming and replacing government. Elections are a faНade, a set of simulated procedures, whereas actual power in the post-Soviet space is wielded by that quasidynastic model of hereditary authority. At certain points it may become figurative, as when Yeltsin handed his presidency over to Putin, and Kuchma tried the same with Yanukovych; elsewhere it is literal, as in the case of Aliyev in Azerbaijan, and the ruler and his son and daughter in Kyrgyzstan, or daughters in Kazakhstan. Ukraine witnessed a revolution that overthrew the quasidynastic principle, but the “royal court” has remained a basic model of the presidency; it still wields supreme power.

How can one govern a society that lacks stable interests, primarily in the political and economic spheres, and is suffering a crisis of values, when politicians are unaware of their mission? In this case, one gambles on petty local emotions, greed, vindictiveness, favoritism, intriguing, and so on. In Ukraine, even political science is often rooted in underhanded machinations: who-said-what-to-whom.

All this is derivative of that “royal court.” They have all worked there. And who has paid for this? Society.

V.K.: Right. Wheeling and dealing is the cornerstone of Ukrainian politics. The royal court, or palace, whatever you call it, be it Bankova St. or the Kremlin, is fenced off; it is the nervous system of our politics.

UNEMPLOYED ARBITER

Ye.H.: I would like to object to this. We seem to have focused too much on one aspect of what is happening, which I would describe as the demonization of a single personality and regime. This is precisely what the current administration is doing and which may cause a big problem in the long run. There is a very complicated process underway in this society, which in many ways is beyond any personality’s control. Personally, I regarded Kuchma’s ascent to power as a paradox, considering that he became president after actually making a mess of the Ukrainian economy — by the way, together with Mr. Pynzenyk, the current finance minister. In less than a year they caused such hyperinflation as to practically reduce people’s savings to nothing. They practically brought the entire population to financial ruin and three times increased prices fivefold.

A.Ye.: But this is our history...

Ye.H.: They did this not at the market level but at the administrative level. Indeed, our public opinion perceived it as an alternative to Kravchuk, so he [Kuchma] was elected president. To me it was an amazing paradox, and at the time I couldn’t understand what was happening. Yet when big business began to emerge in the course of hyperinflation in 1993 — such phenomena are always a way to bring forth such capital — they had to look for an arbiter. Otherwise, the end result would be mutual destruction. By the way, Yeltsin played the same role in Russia; he cultivated people representing big business. Meanwhile, privatization was only beginning. Mass privatization had ended before 1999, and this was a significant period in Kuchma’s presidency. It was in 1999 that the economy showed the first signs of reviving. In reality, objective changes had taken place in society and so no arbiter was required. Someone must have been needed instead, someone capable of pursuing a different kind of policy. Experience shows that if Yeltsin wanted Putin as his replacement, he could do it. But this happened five years ago. We must be in a phase when this is no longer practically possible. One might assume that Kuchma could leave a successor other than Yanukovych, since the latter was simply unacceptable to very many people because of his past. This didn’t happen perhaps because there was no active pressure from big business, which no longer needed this as badly. People hoped that they would gain more without confrontation, and so they didn’t actively defend him. In fact, he didn’t actively defend himself. That was the paradox, because he left the regime practically unprotected.

V.K.: Yushchenko isn’t an arbiter, either. In this sense today’s epoch signifies the introduction of a target-oriented, purposeful, systematic, program-based, doctrinal policy. Another thing is that during the Kuchma epoch, particularly in the early years, the problem was maintaining some sort of balance, so as to obtain certain results that could be used as a doctrine of progress.

A.Ye.: Speaking of doctrines, maybe this one wasn’t articulated by Leonid Kuchma, although some of his program speeches were noteworthy. The regime had a degree of intellect and he tried to figure out what to do with a system that had been unable to evolve for 12 years. However, Leonid Kuchma’s team was oriented toward an autocratic economic model that was half-closed and based on an opportunity to dispose of the available resources at a maximum profit. Today we have a different kind of government, with a different doctrine aimed at internationalizing the economy. There is no denying that implementing this doctrine at an accelerated rate will bring about even greater cataclysms. In any case, they will serve as new supports for the new political system. Unlike Kuchma, Yushchenko’s administration won’t have to flirt constantly with oligarchs and resort to collective governance. Internationalization will be supported by large companies that will invest and share in the Ukrainian economy.

V.K.: Here is the main aspect. Kuchma sought to form an independent economic and social development trend, the way he understood it and as best he could. The new administration wants to delegate some administrative functions to transnational corporations.

A.Ye.: And constrain economic sovereignty.

L.I.: It’s possible to say that the first period of Kuchma’s presidency didn’t counteract the spontaneous creation of national capital. Yet national capital wasn’t converted into any new rules of the game, there was no access to new markets, perhaps owing to the regime’s reputation in particular. It’s clear that the kind of advances this country is liberally receiving were more needed at the time, and that there were more people who could measure up. Herein lies the staggering controversy of that period and the possibility of disillusionment with the new regime.

V.K.: The adoption of a systematic policy was impeded by Kuchma, who concentrated on defense throughout his second term. It was a policy of defense against the tape scandal, Yushchenko, and the young elites. The Kuchma epoch began showing that it was in crisis with the appointment of Viktor Yushchenko as prime minister. Kuchma was no longer needed by young businesses and Western partners as a moderator of that space that we know as Ukraine.

MAIDAN: TORN UP INTO SOUVENIRS

V.K.: I’ve mentioned that Ukraine became a nation-state under Kuchma and was recognized on the international arena, and that there was basic internal consensus with regard to independence. Yet this unrealized society made this policy critical, unstable, and bent on underhand machinations. Therefore, the task today is to wage a policy aimed at forming an adequate society and a new political system.

Can you see any encouraging signs?

V.K.: No, what I see is a sequel to the same intrigue, but one that is playing out with different people, in different conditions, and against the backdrop of revolutionary expectations. In fact, this intrigue involves the revolution as a symbol, myth, and fetish. The Maidan is being torn up into souvenirs that are given away as presents and used for manipulations in certain parks and even whole regions. Strictly speaking, we’re entering a period of political instability in Ukraine and in the post-Soviet space, which will last 10-15 years. This will introduce serious corrections to domestic policy and interfere with the establishment of a society in Ukraine. There is a dangerous possibility of the emergence of two “external” societies in Ukraine. A “Russian” one, as Russia will try to carry out humanitarian projects, finance [Russian] communities and civic organizations. There is also an “Atlantic” society set up with the aid of grants and humanitarian means, as well as of a humanitarian geopolicy formed in Ukraine. There is another possibility to direct efforts toward the creation of inner resources for an inner society. This is a serious task, of course, but it must constitute the policy of the new system.

What do you think of the new times in connection with this?

A.Ye.: Let me start by saying that, as an indefatigable observer who often finds himself blacklisted regardless of who is in power, I cannot reconcile myself to the fact that we still have orange colors. This makes me wary. I’m not an expert in psychology, but I think it’s weird and that there is more to it than a revolutionary metaphor. True, there was that struggle for state power, for a new quality of the yellow-and-blue symbol of Ukraine. The orange color won and it’s becoming increasingly characteristic. A new discourse has appeared, one that is both psychological and political. Orange courts of law, orange authorities, orange prosecutor’s offices... So far these things don’t work as a drive mechanism of sorts, so far everything is kept on a symbolic level.

A computer glitch.

A.Ye.: The fact that a new discourse is emerging in connection with a domestic political struggle between the orange government and the blue opposition, and the absence of a symbolic national field doesn’t look coincidental to me. There is another aspect that has become a Rubicon: the new president appears to be a liberal globalist with his views and certain new doctrines, one who is oriented toward ideal and morally substantiated objectives. At the same time he is a liberal with a distinct financier’s conduct, a person connected with regulatory approaches to processes underway in society. In this sense he will be a chronic optimizer, upgrader, he will call for a happier future. Yet the kind of governance he is trying to build — I mean not only the Cabinet of Ministers, but also the new Secretariat, NSDC, the structure of local authorities — forces one to draw parallels with the policy of military communism in 1918-20. My impression is that what this government is actually doing resembles a policy of semi-military capitalism. Correct, economically motivated approaches (liberalization, optimization of relationships with the tax system, etc.) are accompanied by purely administrative, even coercive, methods of their implementation. I see the new regime, including a liberal, globalistic president and military capitalists, as a cross between a prayer hall and a Young Pioneers’ camp with daily propaganda broadcasts teaching people to love their fatherland, sell meat cheaply, and pay taxes correctly. We don’t need agitation to build a civil society. Agitation is used for turning society into a mass that reacts to commands, but one that is incapable of critically assessing the condition of their state and what decisions it makes.

As for prospects, I’m convinced that the configuration of power born of the rejection of the Kuchma period, his government, his team, cannot last long. Among other reasons, simply because it faces ever new threats to which it cannot respond. The first threat: it’s true that the downtrodden small and medium businesses, hired labor, and government-subsidized entities form the new regime’s major social basis. At the same time, big and then medium businesses may be the first to become this regime’s conscious enemies. Big business manifested itself in the hoax with the redistribution of the spheres of influence and revenues; I’m not going to evaluate how fair these approaches are, but in any case it’s a conflictual sphere. Now medium business will be the first to suffer from the nationalization campaign in conjunction with the coming of foreign inland investments and large companies, and fewer opportunities on the domestic market. It is suffering from administrative pressure in terms of taxation and losses that it’s bound to sustain with the appearance of cheap imported goods. It is actually the load-carrying structure of national capital. Therefore, certain new conservative forces will be in demand. I can only hope that they won’t be from among those who support the white-blue-red colors [Russia’s flag]. In other words, there is a demand for a symbolic yellow-and-blue force, and the social base will be formed on the basis of a specific political and economic protest. Generally speaking , we as a country have entered a period when the elites that took part in the meeting at Bilovezhska Pushcha will be replaced not as personalities but as a system. This is a very painful process. It will also be accompanied by the destruction of the architecture that quickly took shape in the post-Soviet space, in the aftermath of the Bilovezhska Pushcha accords. I hope Ukraine survives this as a domestic problem, but it will challenge the sovereignty and integrity of a number of CIS countries.

(To be continued)