LAST SESSION BEFORE PRESIDENTIAL EXAM

So far it is known for certain that this session, unlike the previous ones, will be kept entirely closed to the ears and eyes of the Ukrainian citizenry. Vadym Dolhanov, President of the National Television Company, declared that even the first plenary day would not be covered live by any television or radio channels, contrary to the parliamentary leadership's expectations. As a result of this brilliant decision, out beyond doubt by the head of state, the new political season is starting in a situation marked by a pitched confrontation between the branches of power on the election's eve. Access to the air will be barred not only Leonid Kuchma's 12 opponents in Parliament, but also people representing political forces which, having united in a pro-presidential bloc and added to the Zlahoda Association, intend to secure their victory in the still remote parliamentary elections of 2002. Considering that part of the pro- presidential forces have not received any Cabinet seats and are now being denied access even to their electorate, it is safe to assume that the incumbent's strong arm tactic in the legislative domain is aimed at a rather clear target: to eventually provoke an anti-Cabinet sortie ending in a government crisis shortly before the election. It is not difficult to see that here the biggest stake is on the Speaker's changed attitude toward the Premier; Mr. Tkachenko has admitted he made a mistake speaking against the Cabinet's ouster during the previous session.

Meanwhile, all attempts made to send Oleksandr Tkachenko into a fit of pique channeled at the Premier may traditionally be of no consequence for several reasons. On the one hand, the Speaker and presidential candidate, as represented by his favorite mass media representative Dolhanov, is not likely to regard the whole thing as any scheming on Valery Pustovoitenko's part. Most likely on the contrary, he sees Leonid Kuchma behind it all. This was precisely why — and some analysts have noticed as much — the national television president drove a wedge between the Speaker and President, which has made it impossible to renew any contacts between these top functionaries and candidates in the presidential marathon. And a such renewal of contacts was intended as the best way to incapacitate the Kaniv Four. Accordingly, Mr. Tkachenko may finally reject the idea of using Parliament in toppling Premier Pustovoitenko, thus playing into the President's hands.

On the other hand, this summer showed that the current government is making every effort to damage the President by economic parameters. Example: the President assures everyone that Ukraine has a billion hryvnias to raise pensions and pay some of its social arrears. Boldly, he makes promises to the voters left and right. Later, high officials publicly turn to commercial banks for a loan of that same billion hryvnias for the Pension Fund, against Cabinet guarantees (considering that the Cabinet is left two months at best). And all this takes place against the backdrop of begging IMF for another $100 million to stabilize the banking system. The reader can guess whether it will benefit Parliament to topple the Cabinet that has just made certain the President will be unable to carry out any of his promises to the electorate before the election.

Finally, consider the third and most important reason, financing the election campaign. Mr. Kuchma personally blew it, vetoing the bill with amendments to the 1999 budget program. Afterward, he publicly demanded that Parliament and the Cabinet provide funds for holding the campaign in full measure. It is generally known that the sole and real campaign finance source is the Social Protection Fund in the name of Mr. Volkov. Problem: will the lawmakers and Cabinet proceed to «dispossess» this «charitable» fund? If they do, will this secure the President's victory in the runoff, provided the campaign is financed in full? If they don't and if — as the Central Election Committee maintains — there is really no money left for the second round (considering that this round cannot be postponed according to the Constitution), would not it be simpler for Parliament to pass an amendment to the presidential elections law, so that the candidate ending in the first — and only — round would become the new President? The more so that Verkhovna Rada is still to override Mr. Kuchma's veto on amendments to the Civil Procedural Code, amendments which, if enacted, would safeguard the elections against any falsification.

The fact that this legislative session will handle exclusively political issues, even if in camera (meaning that no one will have to deliver impassioned speeches aimed at the public), is beyond reasonable doubt. The economy is of little interest to the People's Deputies now that Parliament's decisions are not complied with anyway. Thus, it is safe to assume that the 2000 budget issue will be shelved until December. Mr. Fialkovsky, of the Green fraction and a member of the Budget Committee, has already introduced an «alternative» budget bill, without even seeing the Cabinet's one, just to make sure. In other words, Parliament is prepared to immediately do away with the Cabinet bill without ousting the Cabinet. The President might accuse the Solons of torpedoing the budget process, but since Mr. Kuchma has not determined his own appointees of the National Bank's Council, which was supposed to prepare the new budget's monetary policy guidelines, the pie-in-the-sky aspect of the issue is predetermined.

Thus politics remains in the forefront. Apart from the constitutional amendments which the previous session submitted to the Constitutional Court for examination, the new session, according to the Speaker, will have its share in changing the supreme law of the land. First of all, 300 votes must be registered to finally enact the amendment authorizing the Accounting Chamber to monitor budget disbursements and revenues.

Considering the campaign situation, putting this to a vote will largely determine whether the process of curbing the executive's powers will continue. Specifically, whether the legislators — or at least the Speaker — succeeds in delegating to Parliament the right to not only appoint, but also dismiss the Premier and take part in the appointment of heads of military and security ministries and agencies, including (most importantly!) the Head of the State Tax Administration. Naturally, not all of these amendments will be enacted before the election. However, Presidential Administration analysts correctly point out in Fakty that even the preliminary vote will show Parliament's readiness to redistribute authority vested in the branches of power among forces determined to replace not only the President, but also the entire executive network. The current (rather, acting) chief executive has no such projects to offer and it is too late to initiate any. Hence, he can only block such efforts by the anti-presidential coalition and the next week will show if he can do even this.

Incidentally, appointing two heads of the special committees to major Cabinet posts — Anatoly Kinakh, head of the industry committee, as First Deputy Premier, and Volodymyr Semynozhenko, head of the education and science committee, as Vice Premier responsible for gala shows as part of the President's campaign — is another way to destabilize Parliament's performance. The two newly appointed Deputy Premiers so far only promise to surrender their lawmaking seats, meaning that there will be a problem of filling the vacancies. If they, and the other legislators combining jobs in Parliament and executive posts in Mr. Kuchma's election headquarters, volunteer to comply with the constitutional norm in the next few days of session work, this will be eloquent proof that they believe in the President's victory and that Parliament will have to look for replacements. In other words, a very complicated process of inter-faction reallocation will begin. Otherwise, if the said politicians entertain any doubts about Mr. Kuchma's chances, the Speaker will have to come to their rescue, filing appropriate claims with the Kyiv City Court. Most likely, the case within Parliament will be put off, regardless of the President's ministers' confidence in his victory, until it becomes necessary (or unnecessary) to carry out a full-scale reform of the legislature's leadership in case Oleksandr Tkachenko is elected President. Judging by the quality of repairs on the premises, one finds it hard to believe that the Speaker plans to move out of the building on Hrushevsky Street with the hammer and sickle, emblem of the Ukrainian SSR, renovated on its facade.

Incidentally, this restored emblem of a no longer existent Soviet republic should cause Leonid Kuchma's loyal political forces to develop a strong idiosyncrasy — with, of course, the Right following suit — and make them unwilling to step inside. Well, thirty days are left. In principle, a demarche like this is not likely to bungle the opening session, although giving the President another excuse to raise the matter of Parliament's dissolution, even if in retaliation for the Speaker's repeating The Day 's thesis that a person whose authority has expired has been occupying the President's constitutional post over a month. Until the Constitutional Court, challenged by one of the presidential candidates, decides whether the President has the right to be referred to as one after July, a virtual collision; will remain half a year before the end of his term of office, the President cannot dissolve Parliament. And what happens after the term expires? The debate would look humorous, except that the problem of the legitimacy of power is gradually entering a phase when real power turns out in the hands of bureaucrats of not only minor rank, but also absolutely unauthorized to do so.

In reality, dissolving Parliament is out of the question, for this would mean that the newly elected (or reelected) President would have nowhere to be inaugurated and take the oath. Thus the Verkhovna Rada session now in progress go about its work in peace, even if unseen by the Ukrainian citizenry.