Leonid KRAVCHUK on Political Expediency and Historical Prospects

“THEY SAW WE WERE STILL IN SHORT PANTS”

“By what percentage did you manage to stand aside in this book from hot events and say what you consider the truth?”

“By about 75%...”

“Will you be able to specify some points in the future?”

“Naturally. Especially in what concerns the inner foundations of our life and the participation in political processes of the personalities that still play an active role in Ukraine’s ongoing political and economic developments. In other words, I will have to place some accents and perhaps not so much provide new facts as describe more precisely and convincingly the role of some individuals.”

“Have you felt yet the reaction of the individuals who figure in this book? If so, what kind of a reaction was it?”

“In general, those who read the book have appraised it positively. The readers note that it was written honestly, is free of distortions and harsh, supposedly tendentious, judgments. Instead, the book presents realistic assessments, including that of the current president. As I was told, the original reaction was very strong.

“But as time went by the president evidently chose to look over the book by himself. And he changed his mind about the part which applies to him personally. I wouldn’t say his new attitude became fully positive — it became judicious and analytical. He concluded there was no attempt to tarnish the current president with facts and appraisals that have nothing to do with reality.”

“It is very good that the book is richly illustrated. But, for example, a reader who has just graduated from a university sees an absolutely fantastic picture of the first years of independence you described. Do you agree? We usually first outrun Russia and then forget our achievements or even let things go in the opposite direction. Last year newspapers gave front page coverage of Putin riding in George Bush’s jeep or strolling across his ranch... But this is not the point, after all. The point is this clearly shows the quality of relations. When you visited the US, I was in the group of journalists who covered that visit and saw the way we were received. And I want to ask you: how has Ukraine used the credits of international recognition? And why have we been thinking whether or not to go to Prague? Thank God, the situation is not yet as it is with Belarus (our partner in bringing down the USSR), when the question is whether to issue their president a visa.”

“When Ukraine emerged on the world map as an independent state, the US and other countries were first sizing us up and thinking what kind of relationship to build with us and the other post-Soviet states. And when they finally sized us up, relations began to be established at such a breathtaking speed that I barely kept up with the incoming greetings from the ambassadors accredited in Kyiv. The ambassadors literally stood in line to rent at least some apartment for their embassy. In other words, there was a very rapid process of the recognition of and belief in Ukraine. Then we began to build our state. Construction is a difficult matter. For there are problems that can be solved one way from our point of view and another way from the viewpoint of well-established democracies. So the latter began to wonder why we were doing everything in what they considered the wrong way. The first attempt to force Ukraine to do what America and Russia wanted was made in late 1993 and early 1994 with respect to nuclear weapons. They brushed off the very idea that we could take a position of our own!

“So I officially told first Bush and then Clinton that we would not destroy the weapons unless a document was signed to reflect two fundamental, in my opinion, points: a political one (the US and Russia declare they will defend Ukraine’s interests) and an economic one (the nuclear weapons will be compensated for at a fair price). At first, this was not taken seriously. Boris Yeltsin even said, ‘Mr. Kravchuk, you are setting some fantastic conditions.’ Mr. Clinton said they could accept the condition as a whole, but all the rest should be decided between us and Russia. Then I said without undue emotions and diplomatic niceties: there will be no talks. Some time later they invited Shmarov (vice premier for military, technological and industrial affairs at the time) to America to clear up the situation. He came across Al Gore by pure chance, and they got down to clarifying Ukraine’s stand on the nuclear issue. The US finally paid attention to our position in principle. So, when it is the question of crucial decisions, we do not need to explain something too long or to grope for excuses. But, as time passed, Ukraine began to show that, first, it was not guided by the principle of the rule of law, often ignored freedom in general and freedom of expression in particular, and failed to bring its deeds into line with its declarations... When all this was further complicated by the personal problems of many governmental officials, the West concluded we had taken the wrong path and come to the wrong place — at least for the time being. Yet, I do not take a simplistic view of their attitude. The West has changed its attitude toward this country not because we have been going the wrong way but because we failed to take a well thought-out position. Take, for instance, the so- called multivector approach, vacillations between the North and the West — our different presentations of the same issue in Moscow, Brussels, and Washington... In fact I do not see at least one political leader (even from the opposition) in Ukraine, who would say the same thing in both Brussels and Moscow. Or take the gas consortium: they say one thing in Moscow and an entirely different thing in Brussels and Paris. The West saw that, among other things, we take no clear position on many fundamental issues such as economic foundations, privatization, reforms... So our image abroad is characterized by inconsistent policies and inability to project a proper image. When somebody at least hints today that we are going to do something the way we, not somebody else, want, I like it. For example, we were told to show our Kolchuha radar systems. We did so. But the experts say: lack of convincing evidence. This raises the question: had we not showed the systems, could they have said the same? No, they could just have said we were still studying the situation. But now that they have seen the systems they say, ‘No convincing evidence. Show us something else.’ We are thus backing ourselves into a dead-end. They will say in the long run, ‘Look, two expert groups have toured all over Ukraine and gained no compelling evidence that Ukraine had not sold the radar.’ We will then be talking about the presumption of innocence... The dispute bypassed crucial matters. We should have said at the very beginning, ‘We did not sell it. You say we did, so please prove it any way you like.’ I want to show from this example that we acted similarly with respect to the IMF, NATO, and other international financial and political organizations. They also saw we were still in short pants, that we could be invited or not, and could be toyed with... What comes first is that Ukraine must take a position.”

“YOU SHOULD EITHER RUN AWAY FROM OR GET INTO THE CAR”

“Could you explain the formative principle of the Ukrainian system of government?”

“Our model of government has no analogues in the world.”

“But does it suit us?”

“It does not. It suits those who hold power, not the common people.”

“Until when will it suit them?”

“Until we create a system of power. Now there is power, but there is no system.”

“Who is there to create one?”

“It must to be done by those who will say that the people of Ukraine can no longer live under this regime: Verkhovna Rada, the president, and the political forces that...”

“But they feel fine the way things are!”

“But they could soon feel the ground quaking under their feet. They are OK now in their chairs and will be OK later, but they still should come to conclusions and say: if we do not do this today, we will be OK today but might feel bad tomorrow. So it is pointless to discuss changes unless a system of government is established.”

“And can the opposition create a system of power?”

“The opposition cannot do this by itself because it is imperfect in its current shape. It is still inept. Our opposition is the same as the government. There cannot be a situation where the government vacillates between the past and present, while the opposition has suddenly made such tremendous strides that it became a showpiece and lays claim to the leading role in the system of power. The government and the opposition must strike a collective bargaining agreement. When you lift 20 kilograms, leaving behind 50, you must seek a way out by cooperating with the government. Our opposition distances itself from the government, while a compromise is the only solution. It might not be ideal, but still it would be a concrete step toward the self- improvement of the political system. More steps would follow. But now we are just marking time. Nowhere else will you see the kind of a political organization system that we have. The Cabinet of Ministers, Verkhovna Rada, and the Presidential Administration are not bound by common principles, let alone common interests. If the parliament continues to have no viable pro-government majority, the situation will remain unchanged whoever comes to power.”

“According to many experts, Ukraine is now somewhere between weak democracy and weak authoritarianism. Can it make a choice? Could it adopt authoritarianism — not weak at that?”

“It can because we do not have democratic institutions strong enough to prevent it. This is why we often hear that everything depends on an individual, while in fact everything should be dependent on the system, not on an individual. The individual should be part of the system. So anything can happen.”

“In other words, over the years of independence we have not set up strong barriers against returning to the heavy forms of authoritarianism?”

“Of course, we haven’t. Maybe, it is good that we still have communists — what was left after the first infarct (let me use this term) — for they keep reminding us of the possibility of a return. They repeat every day: people, be careful and vigilant!”

“Why was it necessary to replace the premier?”

“Why? Because we see the clear indications of quite an intensive economic slump. Experts predict this slump will peak in 2004- 2005, i.e., the period when we will be electing the president. Is the current cabinet able to reverse this slump? The president thinks not. Besides, the new premier will have other opportunities to organize life according to new standards.”

“What do you mean by new opportunities?”

“The opportunities of making deals, including one with Our Ukraine. As far as I know, Viktor Yanukovych has seen Viktor Yushchenko twice. If Yushchenko himself had wanted to meet him, he would have failed to do so; there are some obstacles, but I don’t know the details... But if Yanukovych had not wanted to meet Yushchenko, this would mean he saw no point in it. So he wants to negotiate a broader platform of support. As far as I can figure out, a new premier has come and wants the economy to develop, wants to put an end to carving up the pie, and to do some concrete things (and knows how). Look, he has 5.5 million Donetsk region resident to back him, he managed to come to terms with industrial generals and Donetsk bosses who wield a great deal of clout and to clear up the situation with financial flows. And he did all this in such a disciplined and organized way... I know by experience that if you see, figuratively speaking, a car that dashes by at a breakneck speed, all you have to do is either run away in order not be run over or get into this car. There is no third choice.”

THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE AN ARBITER”

“Do you think the current pro-Russian tilt in Ukrainian policies may increase?”

“It cannot increase any more. It can only become more transparent. There are many things now which the general public is unaware of — I mean who owns what. This should be made public. The common people should know that the share of Russia in Ukraine’s economy accounts today for, say, 27%. We should know this. And if it is 67%? All the more so, we must know this.”

“Now about the coming presidential elections. Ivan Kuras told our newspaper: yes, of course, the premiership is usually assessed as the No. 1 steppingstone. But he also thinks that everything is not confined to this office, and the presidential elections could be of an entirely different configuration. Your forecast?”

“If we really think of a system of power, we must switch over, step by step, to the system now prevailing in Europe. Let’s call it the parliamentary-presidential system. The next elections of the head of state should be the elections of a president vested with a different kind of powers.”

“I DON’T SAY ALL ARE READY TO MARCH TO EUROPE IN FORMAL ATTIRE, BUT MANY ALREADY THINK SO”

“Leonid Makarovych, you belong to a party that ‘breathes’ better than the others. It began to take shape earlier than the others, but still there must be some problems, for it takes some time for a party to be able to influence society. What are the most immediate plans of the SDPU(O), including those for the year 2004? What goals have been set in general? What is the prevailing mood in the party?”

“We still do not have a clear course. We came to a conclusion after the elections that we must undergo many changes: first, in policy formation, and, secondly, in educating people and attracting broader masses of educated people to our party. During the elections, there were some party organizations with nobody to give a public speech or even an interview. The party has a structure but is short of public leaders.”

“So is it the sort of party dominated by a leader?”

“We had no well-developed system to train cadres. We’re realists and think of forming party structures where they do not exist so far. I recently went to Kharkiv and was very glad to see the real picture: no elections, but the party lives on. You come into an office and see people smoking cigarettes, crouching over computers, doing something, and writing something... We do have organizations like this. But there is also a different kind of party cells — with no work in an available office. We have not yet worked out a position to be taken in the presidential elections.”

“Do you think it is too early?”

“Yes, we deliberately consider it too early.”

“Do you agree that the parliamentary campaign strategy was, might we say, utterly ill-considered and very cost-intensive nomic sense?”

“I think it was perhaps the last attempt of this kind, when the system of elections was used to push into Verkhovna Rada people who prefer to take advantage of, rather than fulfill, their duties as deputies.”

“We have discussed what happened to the bloc in power. But what is then the use of replacing the premier? For the new government will also have to constantly buy support. It is clear that the forces that backed the candidacy of Yanukovych in exchange for, say, the office of National Bank governor will hardly say they are satisfied and demand nothing more.”

“The system of power has the following peculiarity: when new people come in, they have and use a certain safety margin. This also applies to the premier.”

“We really wish we could see who wants to take something from Mr. Yanukovych...”

“I think the main thing is what he will want. But I will say frankly: I had a long conversation with him — so in all the 11 years (5.5 years as viewed from today) of his life in the region, he has never had a prime desire to take something away, distribute, or give it to somebody else. It no longer interests him. Somebody took a very great interest in this just six or seven years ago...”

“Six or seven years ago... Do you mean the premiership of Pavlo Lazarenko?”

“What Mr. Yanukovych wants it to do a serious job, such as entering politics with a clean slate, finding a way to Europe, raising our image... This calms me a bit. I don’t say that everybody is ready to march to Europe in formal dress, but many already are. So they are sure to do something. They have not thought this over before.”

“Your book is a unique historical document. Have any publishers, either Ukrainian, European, or Russian, evinced an interest in getting it translated into other languages? In Russia, particularly, the book could be a bestseller.”

“I’ve already received such proposals. One of them — translating the book into Polish — still awaits some final organizational touches. We have also thought of translating it into Russian.”

“Within the framework of The Year of Ukraine in Russia?”

“For example, there was an offer from a colleague of mine to see and get the book translated into English. I had long planned to publish this book — perhaps five years or so. Is it too early, too late, or maybe let us wait a little more? I wish I could give it a different title — not We Have What We Have but, say, Ukraine Lives a Happy Life.”

“The title smacks of commercialism...”

“After all, ten years have passed. And when I decided to prepare the book by the tenth anniversary of independence, I rolled up the sleeves. Now, ten years later, I can say all this nightmare is over at last.”

“3.5 MILLION ADULTS ARE OUTSIDE UKRAINE”

“The STB television channel has recently spotlighted a terrible subject, the so-called social orphans. This term was used in a story about children who stay at best with their grandparents, distant relatives, or in orphanages because their parents work abroad. The program quoted these children as saying that they were doing well and hope this would help their mom or dad come back sooner form Russia, Italy, Spain, or wherever. No GDP figures will ever offset this reproach to our politicians. It is dangerous to play games in the current condition of our society...”

“3.5 million adults remain outside Ukraine. For example, I once stopped over in Istanbul en route from Japan. Among those boarding the plane were Ukrainian women (from Transcarpathia); they saw versation with them. Those people had done their job-seeking tour. They had been attending to childless old men and women. But they left their own children here! They were coming back elated, carrying a hard-earned penny. This is a very difficult problem to explain. For instance, I sometimes hear that the Chinese are going to build a road and the Poles are building something else in Ukraine... But if we invite foreigners to build roads, let me recall that Roosevelt began to ride out the Great Depression precisely by building roads. This was written in all kinds of books and all the presidents used to repeat it.”

UKRAINE’S “ADVOCATES”

“There is another sore point: our ‘advocates’ in the EU and NATO, a much talked-about topic today. First it was Poland and now it is Lithuania (as the best advocates of Ukraine). This is becoming sort of a menacing tendency.”

“I said at the very beginning that we do not value our own position, that we do not want to act by ourselves, and if we still act, we do not take into account the domestic consequences. If we feel things are hard, we tend to find a solution outside, not inside, this country. We want somebody else to support and defend us. We’ve been led by Poland, Russia, who else? Just fancy the phrases ‘together with’ or ‘with the support of...’”

“And ‘with Russia to Europe’...”

“What is this? Tying our hands? Or shall we line up, salute the commander and march toward Europe?.. I think this shows a lack of statesmanship and statesmanlike attitudes, the lack of belief that we can do this on our own. This brings up advocates like Poland or maybe... And, oddly enough, I recently heard that Armenia or something of the kind is going to help us! Moldova is also eager to help us ‘go’ somewhere! I take the same attitude toward them all. Why should we be helped to go somewhere?”

“IF A RELATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF ITALY LIVES IN PARIS, NOBODY RAISES THE QUESTION OF UNIFICATION”

“You have been called a person who could stay dry in the rain going between the drops. What do you think are the pluses and minuses of this trait for a politician and a person in general?”

“It’s not a great advantage. Rather, it was required by the time. For, if Ukraine is both East and West, if we have the rivaling parties trying to ‘go the same way but have different views’ (I stress going the same way), then one does not have to maneuver between them. One must adhere to his line. If a politician sees that some people take diametrically opposed attitudes and their reciprocal enmity threatens to explode, he really has to balance. Balance must become part of his political activities. But the populace gains an impression that he is of this way by birth. In reality, I’m quite different by nature. I was often forced to seek a compromise. So this compromise is often viewed by the public as an attempt to walk between the raindrops. When Yeltsin and I were discussing the problems of Transnistria and the Black Sea Fleet, I saw very different forces coming out of the cold in Ukraine. And if I had not tried to balance them, I don’t know what could have happened...”

“There is an episode in the book: Gorbachev rings you from the Kremlin, demanding that you immediately fly to Moscow. But you said why you would not come, ‘I’m the president of an independent state.’ When one has somebody to rely upon, he can, of course, maneuver as much as he pleases...”

“You just can’t imagine the way it was. I received a call from Revenko, former secretary of the Kyiv Oblast Communist Party Committee (CPSU chief of staff at the time). He said, ‘Why were you nerves are on edge. How could you dare say you wouldn’t be going to Moscow!?’ I had in fact been visiting Moscow for eleven years without ever saying I wouldn’t come. For that was the System, a unitary state. I was fully aware that I was either to stay within that System and visit Moscow or to quit it and not visit. So I decided to pay visits. But now that there is an independent state and a popularly elected president!.. And he suddenly demands, ‘Come to Moscow at once!’ I said, ‘I’m not going!’ Even the kind of people in the Kremlin could not understand this!”

“We spoke recently with quite a well-known Russian public figure who said, ‘Please stop telling me about the history of Ukraine. What history? Ukraine is a frontier!’ With eleven years passed, many in Moscow still have this view.”

“Just imagine me and Yeltsin’s wife Naina. We were sitting at the same table during a reception. Glasses are being raised, she is sitting next to me, as the protocol requires. So she says, ‘Are really sure we should not live together?..’ I said, ‘With you?’”

“Humor came to your rescue.”

“She began to cite examples, ‘Suppose she has relatives in Kyiv, so she won’t be able to come to Kyiv if need be?..’ ‘But who forbids her to?’ said I, ‘There’s no reason at all.’ If a relative of the president of Italy lives in Paris, nobody raises the question of the unification of France and Italy. They, the political elite of Russia, still don’t believe this is possible; they still can’t picture an independent Ukraine.”

THE 1994 ELECTION: TACTICAL DEFEAT BUT HISTORIC VICTORY

“If you had been eager to serve the second presidential term at any price, you could have managed to do so: you could have thwarted the elections, turned a deaf ear to Ivan Pliushch (then Verkhovna Rada speaker), and sent everybody packing.”

“Yes, there were some chances. But what comes first for me is fundamental values. And if I see that my personal steps might jeopardize, melt down, or endanger these fundamental values, I will never insist on defending my own interests.”

“You then lost in tactics but won in the historical perspective.” “Maybe I did.”

“We just overlooked a very favorable zigzag of history, when the West took an interest in us. Incidentally, it is during your term as Verkhovna Rada speaker that Mr. Bush the Elder made his ill- famed “chicken Kiev” speech saying Ukraine did not need independence.”

“He arrived in Kyiv to talk to me after visiting Moscow...”

“Could this be a Bush family trait? Maybe they consider in principle that Ukraine is a problem?”

“He came to Kyiv under the influence of talks with Gorbachev in Moscow. As I learned later, Gorbachev asked Bush the Elder to come and say to Kravchuk, ‘Why does Ukraine need independence?’”

“Can Mr. Putin ask Mr. Bush the Younger to do the same?”

“He can. Suppose, Russia will support George W. Bush on the Iraq issue and Putin will say, ‘And you please help me settle the Ukrainian question.’ So the former will say, ‘Please settle it.’”

“So what shall we then do with our future pragmatic political elite when no national interests are left? Nobody will be asking us.”

“To prevent this, we ourselves must think what to do. The road is made as one walks, and whoever does not want to go down this road will never reach his goal.”