LESSON OF HISTORY

March 9, 2001 became one of the tensest days in our recent history. Let us briefly recall the course of events: the tapegate scandal was picking up momentum. In a nationwide address of February 13, 2001, President Leonid Kuchma, Verkhovna Rada Chairman Ivan Pliushch, and then Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko characterized the opposition actions as “an unprecedented political campaign with all the signs of a psychological war” unleashed against our state. “Ukraine and the world are still to disclose the hirers, organizers, perpetrators, and motive forces of this act of provocation,” the document said. “But even now it is clear that the latter involves those domestic politicians and political forces who place their own interests, ambitions, egotistical strivings and expectations of immediate gain above all else. They whip up hysteria and psychoses, hoping that this wave will help them shake loose the public institutions and break their way through to power.” Admitting the obvious “unfortunate manifestation of a lack of professionalism” in investigating the disappearance of journalist Heorhy Gongadze, the signatories simultaneously condemned the attempts to turn this tragedy into a “bargaining chip in cynical political speculation” and use it for “maligning our state in the eyes of the Ukrainian and world public... The attempts to stir up unrest on the street and apply overtly provocative techniques, by means of which they want to deepen the split in society and thus prompt the authorities to resort to strong-arm tactics present a real threat to national security,” the address also emphasized. “One should not forget the lessons of history: suffice it to recall how fascism came into being.”

What perhaps produced the greatest shock for the founders of the National Salvation Forum which “the letter of the three” calls “a motley gathering” of leaders “smarting from their own political defeats and failures” was the signature of Viktor Yushchenko, now the opposition’s great hope, under the document. Jumping a bit forward, let us note that no sooner had a year passed than the former NSF militants had forgiven Mr. Yushchenko this supposed sin. Moreover, they got into a fierce fight for a place on the Yushchenko Bloc election list.

Let us return, however, to the February and March 2001. On February 22, Verkhovna Rada failed to dismiss Ukraine’s Prosecutor General Mykhailo Potebenko, for the Communists, whose votes could have been crucial, abstained from the vote. On March 1 law enforcement tore down the tent city put up by participants of the Ukraine Without Kuchma drive on Khreshchatyk, and on March 7 the same lot befell a few tents pitched next to the Taras Shevchenko monument. Yuliya Tymoshenko had been detained in the Lukyanivka pretrial center, the Melnychenko tapes had aroused the interest of foreign experts, while the president suggested that public officials take stock of their political views and “either vacate their office of administration or publicly dissociate themselves from anti-government formations.” In reply, Mr. Yushchenko readily said, for example, that his cabinet had no ministers who oppose the presidential course. “This is not just my conjecture; this is what I am convinced of,” he told journalists.

Then came March 9. What the opposition leaders, especially Taras Chornovil, did was not just trample on the flowers and rip off the ribbons of the wreaths laid by the president to the Shevchenko monuments: they trampled out the already stable image of Ukraine as perhaps the only post-Soviet state where political conflicts could be resolved by legal means. The demonstration ended up in bloodshed and mass arrests. Incidentally, no court decision has thus far been announced about the UNA-UNSO members arrested on March 9. It should be noted that the action organizers, now in different election blocs, have politely thrown down their UNSO allies.

Although the current political situation in this country is stable, albeit only to some extent, it is obviously too early to consider this page of our history as turned. And the point is not in the fact that even now there is no full clarity about the “hirers, organizers, perpetrators, and motive forces.” We hoped that those on both sides of the March barricades had made the necessary conclusions and learned their lessons. Alas, the developments of today (the so-called tapegate-2, applying the Melnychenko factor in the election campaign, utter absence of principle in drawing bloc lists, etc.) cast serious doubt on this. Or perhaps the authorities and the various political forces have already begun a political dialogue called in the address of the three “the only correct and possible way of settling contradictions and differences, strengthening political stability, speedily solving economic and social problems, and improving living standards?” As the phrase goes, the question is rhetorical.

So what did we witness on March 9, 2001? Can we say there is a political opposition in Ukraine, and, if so, what are its goals and means? A year later, The Day asked Yury Lutsenko, an active participant in those events, and Mykhailo Pohrebynsky, a political scientist, to answer these questions.

COMMENTS

Yury LUTSENKO, secretary, political council, Socialist Party of Ukraine:

“I am still sure the Ukraine Without Kuchma campaign could have achieved its minimum goal of dismissing Leonid Kuchma from office. Everything favored this: up to 50,000 people came out into the streets. Yet, we never received the support of those who, in compliance with their program objectives, were supposed to give it. First, from the Communist Party (KPU) which betrayed its voters and its programs, failing to say aloud that they wage a resolute struggle against the anti-people regime, to use their terminology. Secondly, from Natalia Vitrenko who delivered fiery speeches in other pubic squares. Thirdly, we found no support from Viktor Yushchenko and his team. All his subsequent actions, starting with his signature under the statement about so-called fascists and ending with today’s support for the president and Kravchenko, show that the diagnosis of his spinal disease is political, not medical.

“But what was done cannot be undone. That was a deliberate provocation which tarnished the opposition’s reputation and shook public confidence in it. Besides, the government managed to instill a view in public consciousness that the clashes were masterminded by the opposition forces. The main trouble was that the opposition had no access to the media. It was a time of very tight censorship and a very cash-strapped opposition. In addition, those who tried to protect their property interests from the current regime did not want to help the opposition financially or at least by granting access to the media.

“Nevertheless, the Ukraine Without Kuchma campaign achieved a two- pronged success: first, we managed, for the first time in ten years, to rally various political forces under a common and universal demand of changing the system of power; secondly, those actions exposed the roots of the evil, the inherent flaws in the system of governance and the necessity of changing the latter through changing the Constitution. This list of Constitutional changes is sure to be discussed in the next parliament.

“Further prospects depend on the election campaign and the extent to which society will be allowed to support opposition demands and vote fairly. All the issues raised by the Ukraine Without Kuchma campaign will be debated in the new Verkhovna Rada representing, in all probability, the SPU, Tymoshenko bloc, Our Ukraine, etc. When it comes to changing the regime, an alliance between Moroz, Tymoshenko, Yushchenko and rank-and-file Communists is possible at least for the reason that the draft Constitutional amendments bear the signatures of Symonenko, Moroz, Matviyenko and Rukh people. Pleased with Mr. Yushchenko’s popularity, Rukh may have become more conformist. Yet, election campaign realities are sure to dampen Yushchenko’s filial sentiments.”

Mykhailo POHREBYNSKY, director, Kyiv Center for Political Research and Conflict Studies:

“The March 9 events constituted an abortive attempt to change power by means of mass protest actions. The ostensible or true organizers of this process apparently thought that the situation was so bad that the active actions of two to three hundred people would be enough to rouse hundreds of thousands and force the president to resign. Even at that time I had no doubt it was a well thought out plan to oust Leonid Kuchma from office ahead of term. I think the tapegate was only the beginning of this grand design, but the scenario authors miscalculated the potential for discontent with the current authorities.

“In essence, there was never been any organized opposition. The opposition was formed on the fly by entirely different politicians, each of them pursuing his own interests and nobody seeing the ultimate goal. It is quite clear that, by betting on Viktor Yushchenko, the scenario authors failed to take into account that mass protest actions could only have an effect if the Left opposition also actively supported them. This was one of the key errors of the architects, for it was clear that the Communists would never march under the colors of Yushchenko. The designers of this scheme also did not take into account Yushchenko’s weak character: they hoped the situation would carry him away and he would assume responsibility, while still retaining the premier’s office. Later, when the process had begun, new forces came and began to play a new game. In particular, when it became obvious that it was impossible to bring Mr. Kuchma down in this way, an attempt was made to, so to speak, gradually force the president to name Yushchenko as his successor. In my opinion, these attempts still continue to be made. That decision coincided in time with Yushchenko signing the letter of the three. This spotlighted, to my mind, not only Yushchenko’s weak character but also his ability to betray. This was, above all, a hint from the scriptwriters: since the original version of the game had failed, it seemed to be a good idea to call oneself the president’s son and, trying to maintain a short distance from the head of state, show him that you are capable of mustering a large number of followers. And if Yushchenko now fails to win a major victory in the parliamentary elections, this will be interpreted as unfair elections. Incidentally, I think the current transparent elections campaign is also part of the new/old plan because it prepares explanations for an insufficient victory of the Yushchenko Bloc.

“In my opinion, March 9 and the tapegate scandal are already part of history, from which all sides have drawn their conclusions. And it is Yushchenko himself who will curb those who will actively try to draw him into the revolutionary process (in case such people still remain in the Our Ukraine Bloc). There are indications that the so-called opposition will again try to take to the streets on March 9. But I think this can only be done by extremists unaware of the new plan’s essence. Mr. Yushchenko will not support such actions and will, instead, follow the line, ‘I’m so good that you should believe me that I will also be good when I come to power.’ Well, we’ll see.”