Maneuver on the March
Ukraine needs a new, detailed, and financially sustainable military reform. All previous attempts to do this were false starts rather than movements toward a clearly defined goal, building a strong structure which would defend the state instead of crushing it with its own weight. This is the conclusion made by experts at the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Research (UCEPR) after studying the current situation concerning the provision of security for the country.
Speaking of military reform, we mean, of course, not only the Armed Forces but also other security structures with a long trail of common problems, such as inadequate funding and a steady desire of uniformed officials to develop on their own, without precise coordination on the national level. The center concludes that this country’s military organization is now too burdensome for the economy, has too many men, and is incapable of fully carrying out its assigned task: to guarantee the security of this country’ citizens. What is more, there is an essential disproportion between the security people’s de jure declared duties and their capabilities.
Yes, this country’s military doctrine calls for effective defense in all directions. However, according to expert conclusions, existing military resources in Ukraine would be sufficient only to contain aggression in one operational strategic direction if the war lasts not more than 30-40 days. Meanwhile, defense priorities include the development of high precision enhanced-power weapons, reconnaissance means and forces, aerospace defense, electronic countermeasures, the air force, and air mobile forces. This would take, UCEPR believes, $80 to 200 billion to satisfy this Brobdingnagian project, while the government plans to allocate the Defense Ministry $240 million in 2000. These funds are not sufficient even to keep up one division up to NATO standards. There are numerous flaws in mobilization preparedness, personnel training, and the social sphere.
Undoubtedly, this is no revelation for those who see how uniformed personnel do things off the parade ground. However, what makes the study topical is not the list of the existing shortcomings but the airing of views on the course of military reform in Ukraine. Such a reform should start with the adoption of a relevant presidential decree and establishment of commissions to draw up a basic concept of military reform, new wording of military doctrine, assessment of the defense-related items in the 2001 budget, and development of coordinated reform programs for all the security agencies.
The new military reform, unlike the existing State Program for Building and Developing the Armed Forces to 2005, should be planned and implemented under direct (and not only general) supervision of the state’s civilian leaders, with the National Security and Defense Council and the government playing an active role. Further, this work should be preceded by a clearly spelled out political guidelines, which has been missing until now and without which defense reform loses all sense. In particular, will Ukraine remain nonaligned or will it join some defensive alliance? Can Ukraine rely, in case of danger, on military assistance from its strategic partners? Does Ukraine’s defense concept allow it to carry out preemptive strikes on the territory of a potential enemy if the latter shows aggressive intentions? What will be Ukraine’s mobilization priorities and principle of recruitment? How will defense be organized in vulnerable areas — by deploying mobile forces there if need be or by utilizing permanently based units?
The main targets for the development of our state’s military organization, as proposed by UCEPR, provide, in particular, for a total peacetime strength of 300,000-320,000 for all security structures. In other words, this means an over 50% cut in manpower. In particular, the Armed Forces should number 170,000 servicemen plus 50,000 civilian employees. It is proposed that by 2005 all military services, except the Ground Forces, will have been completely manned on a contractual basis. It is also suggested that the Air Force be merged with the Air Defense, as well as the Border Security Naval Force with the Ukrainian Navy. The army’s domestic functions should be extended to, among other things, combating terrorism and separatism. UCEPR suggests that, starting from 2001, national defense requirements be financed at the level of at least 2.5% of GDP (it has not exceeded 1.4% in the past three years) and that Ukraine preserve its nonaligned status for the next 10-15 years.
But how possible is it to transfer these proposals from theory into practice, in order, for example, to reform the army? The existing program of Armed Forces development, drawn up by the chief defense agency in an extremely short time under the pressure of political and specific circumstances, has no sound economic basis and is simply doomed to continuous alterations. The Ministry of Defense has recently set up a special work group to work out a draft document on the prospects for the Ukrainian Army to about 2010. The military are also drawing up its own concept for placing the Armed Forces on all- volunteer basis. But the flaw is the same: secrecy. This raises the danger that, after these projects are finally worked out without participation of lawmakers, civilian officials, and independent experts, there will be no guarantees (first of all, financial) that any of these projects will be accepted and implemented. Putting these issues on the top decision-making level could avert this danger one way or another and appease the military who are suspicious about the attempts to encroach on the sphere of their professional interests.
UCEPR is already working out proposals for reforming the military structures and adjusting them to this country’s capabilities. Abolition of the National Guard is one step in this direction. According to some tentative information, it will be further analyzed whether it is advisable for the Ministry of Emergencies to maintain military elements in the ministry for emergencies or retain the top- secret signal troops in the Security Service. Also examined will be the situation in the Border Security Forces. Plans are being discussed at present for an overall reduction of security structures by 26,000 servicemen. “We are now in a paradoxical situation: the economy is not able to ensure 100% funding of the armed agencies; but if this is not done, the structures entrusted with providing external or internal security run the risk of becoming themselves the source of additional tension in this country. However, we cannot optimize our military agencies fast and radically because such measures should be backed up by social adaptation programs,” National Security and Defense Council Secretary Yevhen Marchuk noted recently in an interview with The Day .
Thus the golden mean in the defense reform is still to be found, if it exists at all. For there has not been a single reform that was carried out absolutely painlessly, even in the developed and well-fed countries, let alone poor ones.
