Mykhailo Pohrebynsky on the stimuli for parties, opposition’s ways to survive, and centrist zeal

SENSE OF PARTY LIFE

How would you assess parliamentarism in Ukraine today?

Such a parliament, such parliamentarism. Parliamentarism is based on political parties. It cannot be adequate without an advanced party system. This system cannot be advanced unless the parties have stimuli for development and activity. The main and only stimulus is for an effective political party, being supported by the population, to have an opportunity to wield political power. Our political system rules out all such opportunities for political parties. Now that we have a coalition government, formed as an unlawful precedent (the Constitution does not provide for it), all these processes appear to be taking place as though on purpose. For example, we expect a party having a large faction at the Verkhovna Rada to propose its candidates for certain posts in government. Yet polls show that this party does not exist, in the sense that people practically know nothing about it. When, after the political reform, our legislative system allows the parties to determine the sense of their existence and self-development, the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada can be expected to turn into a Ukrainian parliament. The kind of legislature we have now is a transition model between the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and a modern European parliament. Therefore, what happened on the last days of its fourth session is a perfectly normal situation. Strange as it may seem, I believe that heated debate and confrontation are signs of a mature parliament. We have an opposition and a majority. The opposition wants strict observance of the rules orders, on the one hand, but on the other, unaccustomed to playing the game by the rules, once they don’t like a decision being made, they besiege the rostrum, blocking parliamentary work. This inspires optimism. It’s almost the way they do it in Israel, Italy, and Japan, countries with quite strong democracies.

Does this mean that the political reform will stimulate the advancement of our parties? Isn’t this a risk? Would our parties, in their current status, be able to handle this new and extremely responsible mission?

Here is a very simple answer. Yes, we would, but if we didn’t we would get stuck in the current situation, without any hope for positive changes. We now delegate power to clans and this option is hardly any better. If and when we give an impetus to party growth, all those clans and business-political groups will receive a stimulus to strengthen political parties. Only a party will be able to come to power, there will be no other way. I wouldn’t want to offend Labor Ukraine, but they are the most vivid example. Our economic bloc in power is actually distributed between two influential groups, the Party of the Regions and Labor Ukraine. While the Regions have become a party (if only owing to their leader becoming prime minister and remaining extremely popular in one of Ukrainian oblasts), and now it stands every chance of making it to the next parliament by themselves, Labor Ukraine must work hard to have significant influence not only within power structures, but also in the public domain. It’s only one of the reasons why the current situation shouldn’t be allowed to last much longer. Paraphrasing a well-known saying, let me tell you that mankind has not invented anything better than building a democracy; just as there is no better way to build a democracy than through party democracy. Therefore, we do need reform to make the chain of responsibility continuous, when the government is formed by the party winning the election. If this government turns out a bad manager of this country, next time they won’t be elected; others will be.

Among the main results of the past decade was the emergence of the Ukrainian state, also the fact that the Soviet economic system was dismantled by privatization. However, in political terms we simply made something we called parliament, president, government, and democratic republic, without bothering to fill these notions with appropriate substance. What we actually did was a reform of the nomination, not the essence of the political system. In the political sense, we are living through a relapse of the old Soviet authoritarian model of state administration. This slows progress in state building, economic development, and above all, social reform. Why did we manage the economic reform and privatization? Because influential individuals, among them former Soviet functionaries, were interested in that reform. A reform can’t be carried out if the subject is not interested. Yes, those people profited from it. Fine. Because if they didn’t, we would be very much like Belarus from the economic standpoint. But I don’t want to criticize that country. In fact, we should sympathize with these people, for they still have to travel that thorny path of market reform.

Social reforms are still in their first stages, although most Ukrainians are interested in them. Simply because those capable of doing something about them are not very interested, for they have everything they need. Remember a charming and promising politician speak during the 2002 parliamentary campaign? He said he didn’t see any problems with pensions. He thought that children should get jobs and secure their parents a decent living. Only a prosperous individual can afford to say things like that, knowing how millions of pensioners would respond to them. For most people such a statement sounds like utter blasphemy. However, our population is totally isolated from decision-making. Our decision-makers, mildly speaking, do not attach much importance to what the electorate thinks. Therefore, social reforms will never be carried out with the political one. The political reform will close the circuit between those in power and the people. Those in power will then pay attention to what pensioners will have to say.

Do you think that Bill #4105 is the best possible, as the destiny of the political reform is most often linked to it nowadays?

Of course not. This bill has countless shortcomings. Yet it is the way it could be to keep a chance of securing 300 votes. It has clauses I am resolutely opposed to. I don’t often agree with Volodymyr Lytvyn, but I absolutely agree with his criticism of the imperative mandate. It’s a monstrous proviso; it actually means that we don’t have to elect 450 deputies, just the leaders of five to seven factions. Under this imperative mandate it’s always possible to create a system in which an individual deputy’s opinion will have no meaning whatsoever. Should this deputy disagree with the faction leader on some or other points, the leader may simply have that deputy ousted of parliament. In a word, the said clause is a very bad one, yet the Communists fought for it, and so did Yushchenko and Moroz. In this case, I believe they relied not on considerations of effectiveness and democracy in the future political system of Ukraine, but on purely tactical reasoning.

I am also against amending the Constitution with the parliamentary elections clause. The law on elections can be changed whichever way to suit any election campaign. This is normal practice employed all over the world. From what I remember, Hungary has changed its elections law eight times in the past 15 years. This law reflects the maturity of the political system. In other words, the law on elections changes pro rata maturation of the political system. Does it mean that we have to make changes in the Constitution every time? But again, the opposition factions insist on this clause. Without them no changes in the Constitution can be made.

I am against the proviso establishing the president’s right to veto economic bills. The president will have nothing to do with the economic sector in government. It’s the sole prerogative of the majority and the prime minister, so they don’t have to agree anything with the president. To veto a bill, the president must have an appropriate apparatus, like the Presidential Administration’s economic department. The way I see the political reform, Presidential Administration won’t have any such departments, but retaining the veto clause means that it will have a department like that. In actuality, the PA is a structure with limited functions and it assumes no responsibilities. Besides, there will never be a 300- vote majority in parliament, maybe 235 votes at the most. Parties making up the majority promised something to their electorates during the election campaign, then they drew up a general cabinet action plan acceptable to all sides, and then set to work. The government submitted a bill supported by the majority. Now suppose the president doesn’t like it and vetoes it. After that the majority has to furnish 300 votes to override the veto. Where will it find the votes? In a situation like that the cabinet-forming parties would be correct to point out that the president prevents them carrying out their program, so they cannot assume the responsibility before their electorate. In reality, they would most likely table the bill or start playing political games to find the lacking voices to get over the veto.

Under this bill the president is to be elected by parliament.

Yes, but again, he will be elected by 300 votes. Now this makes a very big difference. 226 deputies constituting the majority can elect a strong head of state. Besides, a strong president can be elected by the people. But he cannot be elected by 300 votes, not in our political situation. Anyway, he would have to be someone acceptable to the Communists and the oligarchs. He would be a very decent man, obviously without any authoritarian inclinations. Or someone acceptable to the Communists and the nationalists. I honestly can’t think of anyone meeting these qualifications. Or someone acceptable to the nationalists and the centrists. Well, you can picture political figures you consider potentially strong. You’ll see that this coalition won’t back a strong candidate.

What kind of crisis do you think we have on our hands now?

If work in parliament is blocked for some time, you have every reason to discuss a parliamentary crisis. Talking about a constitutional crisis is absurd. We live under the current Constitution, and we haven’t made any changes in it yet.

As for finding a way out of the parliamentary crisis, I personally feel optimistic about the following option. I think that the opposition has exhausted its aggressive blocking potential. Of course, both sides will have to take certain steps before the next session. I don’t think that the members will be persuaded to hold an emergency session, just as I don’t see it as a good idea. However, majority and opposition people will have to meet to discuss things. In fact, the opposition won’t benefit from blocking parliament for long. They don’t want the majority to convene on different premises, so they can pass whatever resolutions they choose. In that case the opposition would be isolated from making all important decisions and other proceedings, including the political reform. It would then be completely marginalized. The opposition believes they have a good presidential candidate, so they are interested in having the central election committee announce the campaign. So I believe that things will get back to normal soon, and the sides will come to terms. The television program I host recently featured Yushchenko and Moroz. Considering what they had to say, I came to the conclusion that there is a short way left to compromise. Yushchenko and Moroz said that they both oppose only one clause in Bill #4105, precisely the short-term presidency. Oleksandr Moroz is actually one of the ideologues of the parliamentary republic, so he, of course, has nothing against parliament electing president — well, maybe not in 2006 but later. I believe that, by and large, it’s all the same to him. Yushchenko is a different story. He wants to be president with a long term of office. Great, let him try to persuade the Communists or majority members that the short-term presidency is expedient. But why block work in parliament? I further believe that Yushchenko would benefit from president being elected by the people in 2004. He must realize that, even if he becomes the next president, it will be presidency for only one part of Ukraine. The east and south of Ukraine will support a different candidate. Why not use the two years to convince the rest of the electorate that he’s a good head of state? In that case parliament would vote for him in 2006. Also, he could lose the campaign. If he fails to become president for two years, he will still have a chance, but if he loses the five-year presidency, this will be the end of his political career, I’m sure.

How do you feel about the majority and opposition’s conduct over the past couple of weeks, from the standpoint of efficiency and political technologies?

In answering your question, I wouldn’t want to profane political technologies. What the opposition did can hardly be described as a political technology. Simply their groups that don’t see any other way to achieve their goals. They also regard their methods as an effective way to survive. For example, we know that the Tymoshenko bloc — and its leader in particular — has lower ratings without pulling such stunts. As for Yushchenko, I think he lost a number of points by blocking work in parliament, although certain groups in his bloc won points. Therefore, it’s hard to find a clear answer to your question. It rates a separate discussion.

What chances are there for the presidential reform to be carried out before the election campaign?

Any forecast is somewhat irresponsible. However, if all the key figures operate in keeping with their political interests, regardless of the private interests of certain figures on their teams, I am sure those supporting the reform will have an advantage. Therefore, I hope they will vote for the reform. As stated earlier, this reform is required by most Ukrainians and at the moment it answers the interests of all the principal political forces.

The opposition threatens to go all the way, even if it means dissolving parliament. As an advisor with the Presidential Administration, would dissolving parliament be a solution to the problem? Would you recommend that the president order parliament dissolved?

No, because dissolving parliament under the circumstances would be an abominably unreasonable act. This decision would contradict the interests of both the current president and the next head of state, the government, and almost every member. I see no reason whatsoever for it, except that there are two dozen deputies wishing precisely this outcome. And most of them do so owing to their own ignorance; they don’t understand that they would never make it to the next parliamentary campaign, because their parties wouldn’t pass muster.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AGENDA

Should the political reform be implemented before the elections, what would the impact be on the presidential campaign? Many believe that the emphasis would then be on the 2006 elections, not this year’s.

In that case, I think, this year’s presidential elections would take place without the kind of tension and hysteria they are likely to have if the reform remains on paper. However, the event would remain a very important one. The president remains a very influential political figure, so fighting for the post will be severe. And then we can only guess. We still don’t know about the majority’s single candidate (if any). Polls indicate, however, that Yanukovych is the only likely figure.

What about the short-term presidency?

It depends on who becomes the next head of state, because a certain candidate, once inaugurated, will set about shaping a political force to win the parliamentary elections. Another one will be determined to annul the reform. If election by the people, he will want to serve the full term. Considering such options, we find ourselves in the sphere of political scenarios, and this is groping in the dark... Suppose we assume that it all depends on who wins the presidential campaign. So far Yushchenko and the candidate backed by the powers that be stand roughly the same chance. That’s my personal opinion. Polls show, however, that the candidate supported by those in power has a better chance.

How will the Constitutional Court’s ruling, allowing the current head of state to run for another term, affect the presidential campaign?

I suggest we wait and hear what the president has to say.

It is safe to assume now that the previous presidential campaign was aimed at reaffirming the results of the initial accumulation of capital and the status of the Communists as a political force having no chance of winning the elections. Proceeding from this assumption, what will be the aim of the coming presidential elections?

The agenda remains to be drawn up. There are several options. For example, in domestic policy, a conflict between the continuity of power (in other words, preserving all the existing positive aspects while promising to somewhat adjust the course) and the idea of decisive changes accompanied by the redistribution of property and an acute rejuvenation of the elite cadre. In geopolitics, it could be a conflict of the concepts of the role Ukraine plays in Europe and accord among those seeing Ukraine as another Poland, meaning a competition for the status of the number one US bulwark in Eastern Europe, and those believing there should be rapprochement with the Old Europe (Germany, France...). The first option obviously implies conflicts in relations with Russia and the second one is sure to harmonize Ukrainian relations with its northern neighbor. But that’s an option, and in a couple of months the agenda could turn out entirely differently.

What kind of president do you think our Euro-Atlantic integration partners and Russia would like to see in Ukraine? Don’t you think that, should the three largest Russian-Ukrainian projects — the SES, Odesa- Brody reverse mode, and gas consortium — be implemented, Russia wouldn’t really care who the next head of state is here?

Suppose I reverse your question: What kind of president would our Euro-Atlantic integration partners and Russia be loath to see in Ukraine? About a hundred years ago, Russian philosopher Konstantin Leontiev wrote, “There are very humane individuals, but there are no humane states...” I think this applies to our present day. Our partners would hate to see a strong representative of the centrist forces as the next head of state, one capable of conducting an autonomous foreign policy, solely for the benefit of Ukraine.