Mykola Tomenko: Scared Stiff by Business

Mykola Tomenko, chairman of the parliamentary freedom of speech committee, can be described as one of the Our Ukraine (OU) bloc’s newsmakers. Unlike most other People’s Deputies, this politician and analyst always knows where to look for “hot stuff” and how best to “sell” it to journalists. Political assessments and forecasts by this most public spokesman remain interesting. Among other things they serve as indicators of moods among OU leaders and as a means of probing the rivals.

The third session of the Fourth Verkhovna Rada was called on February 4. What do you think the parliament wants to do this time?

The main point I think is that most majority and opposition people’s deputy have the same understanding of the standing and mission of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) in the modern political system. We agree that parliament must be independent. Apart from lawmaking, it must also exercise parliamentary control over the government, containing and counterbalancing the executive, as the public representative of various political forces. This body has voted on some of the most important, realistic socioeconomic bills required under the circumstances.

In general, the experience of the second session shows that parliament can be effective only when its divisions do not change, but exists as previously agreed among different political forces. In other words, rigidly formalizing the situation on the for-and- against-the-president principle may result in the dissolution of parliament. Therefore, I am very serious about the idea of the parliamentary Majority as an institution and I support the idea of a law regulating it. But the Majority should have been organized before parliament elected a speaker and appointed new cabinet members. Now the situation looks as though it will be possible only after the next parliamentary elections.

Our Ukraine or the Yushchenko bloc claims to be an opposition force. At the same time, it has more parliamentary committees than the whole majority. How does this agree with the European practice, where the Opposition must have only three committees?

First, we must proceed from the understanding that today’s Ukraine is not a presidential-parliamentary republic, but one that is purely presidential. All decision-making institutions reside in the executive branch: the president, presidential administration, cabinet, and local administrations. There are no OU people in these executive structures. As the Opposition, we claim no executive posts. Even if a majority faction recalled its people from the cabinet, Our Ukraine would never take advantage of the situation, even if Premier Yanukovych requested that we appoint our people.

OU promptly supported a number of cabinet bills, particularly the one on the state budget. Don’t you think that your faction has thus assumed responsibility for the government and should no longer be referred to as Opposition?

You won’t find a single political force which, while in Opposition, would oppose all cabinet decisions. Everything depends on a given situation. In the US Congress, ninety percent of members may support of the president’s proposal. When we voted on the budget we proceeded exclusively from our program principles, namely, that a budget bill should be passed on time, and that it should meet minimum socioeconomic needs. But we will not assume any degree of responsibility for its implementation. We will make every effort to monitor the government’s every step in implementing the budget. Responsibility must be borne by the political forces that haven’t as yet severed relations with the government.

Our Ukraine is prepared to support every well-crafted bill serving the good of Ukraine. It aims to ban cloning. If the government proposes tax reforms answering our approaches, the Yushchenko bloc will most actively lobby for them. I, for one, will support and lobby for a recent cabinet bill worked out by the state information committee. It aims to ban cloning.

What about the government’s action plan? Would you support it as well?

It’s a theoretical possibility. Keeping the government in suspense wouldn’t make sense. Personally, I will campaign to adopt the action plan. At least we’ll have something to demand from them.

You have been quoted as saying that this year will determine the key contestants in the presidential marathon. Do you think those in power will nominate a single candidate?

They will do their best to have a single nominee. As a researcher and analyst, all I can say at the moment is that this candidate won’t be someone we don’t know. If they agree on a single nominee, it will be a well-known name.

Who do you think stands the biggest chance to profit from the current alignment of forces?

I can think of two hopefuls, Viktor Medvedchuk and Viktor Yanukovych. They stand out from the rest with their high ratings in polls. But each has a good team and an opportunity to continue muscle-building. Both are on excellent launch pads, for the head of the presidential administration and the premier have everything to do with the executive. Both have done well for the executive. I think that President Kuchma is faced with an exceptionally tough dilemma. You can’t envy him, because Medvedchuk and Yanukovych are equally powerful figures.

Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn also stands a chance, but he is in a considerably more complicated situation. Experience shows that the speaker’s seat is not a good launch pad. Remember Ivan Pliushch and Oleksandr Tkachenko? The Verkhovna Rada is discredited as a social institution, so its speaker is automatically associated with all this negativity. Lytvyn also has a noticeably weaker team than Medvedchuk or Yanukovych. As for the other candidates, their opportunities are rather dim. I suppose that from a purely theoretical standpoint, one ought to mention National Bank of Ukraine head Serhiy Tyhypko. His post is a good launch pad. One or two other names could also be discussed.

Our Ukraine has officially announced its participation in the presidential race. Which of Viktor Yushchenko’s possible adversaries would you consider most dangerous?

Viktor Yushchenko’s most formidable contender from among those wielding power remains unknown. Communist leader Petro Symonenko comes next. The rest can also prove dangerous. Among those dangers I would single out two. First, the possibility of curtailing Viktor Yushchenko’s electorate with the aid of ten or fifteen second-rate candidates. Suppose we call this the French threat, for a similar scenario has been played out during three presidential campaigns in France. Some 24 to 27 percent of the electorate determined to vote for Yushchenko splits into groups. It transpires that part of Viktor Yushchenko’s exponents are patriotic residents of western territories. So they find a popular Western Ukrainian politician. Nominated, he says the same things as Yushchenko, maybe in a somewhat more radical, nationalist vein. That politician wins four percent of Yushchenko’s potential supporters in that western region, meaning 1% nationwide. By “cutting” such portions out of Yushchenko’s electorate, it is theoretically possible to place him third in the first round of elections, so that the other, so far anonymous, contender and Symonenko get through to the second round. In other words, I regard the assumption that Viktor Yushchenko is sure to make the second round erroneous and extremely dangerous.

The other serious threat is that Yushchenko may be unable to register as a candidate or those in power will revoke his registration. Some political scientists I am in contact with believe such an action is a very practical way to solve the “Yushchenko problem.” I have reason to believe that our adversaries are working on both scenarios.

Yuliya Tymoshenko once again urged her opposition colleagues to agree on a single candidate the other day. Do you think this scenario holds water?

All talk about a single candidate from among the Opposition blocs has been ridiculous and nonsensical from the outset. So long as the Opposition is composed of ideologically opposed political forces, a single candidate is impossible in principle, not even if the candidates turned out great friends. Even if Petro Symonenko pulled out in favor of Viktor Yushchenko, the Communists would come out with another nominee, such as Leonid Hrach. Otherwise the Communist Party would acknowledge its final political defeat. Our problem with Oleksandr Moroz and Yulia Tymoshenko is difficult. Living in a country with a de facto presidential regime, every politician realizes that passing up a presidential campaign is extremely dangerous from the standpoint of his or her political future. A politician may refrain from running only with certain guarantees and an understanding regarding that politician’s future endeavors. I think that both Tymoshenko and Moroz stand a chance of coming to terms with Yushchenko. Everything depends on them. To me, Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Symonenko as presidential candidates are axiomatic, but Oleksandr Moroz and Yulia Tymoshenko, a matter that’s debatable.

What would be the price of making a deal with the Socialists and the Tymoshenko bloc? Tymoshenko’s people openly ask for the premiership as her reward. How can Yushchenko as president work with this premier?

First, the matter has never been discussed. Playing by civilized rules, every hopeful draws up a list of cabinet members, heads of local executive authorities, and others, all before the elections. At this stage, neither Our Ukraine, nor the Tymoshenko bloc or the Socialists are prepared to compose such lists. If it comes to that, it won’t happen before the official start of the campaign, and it could happen after the first round.

Analysts have repeatedly pointed out that the Verkhovna Rada majority’s potential amounts to at least three hundred market- oriented people’s deputies. Do you think there is the slightest possibility of agreeing on a single candidate to represent that potential majority?

If they did we’d actually have no elections. A single candidate from the majority, Our Ukraine, and part of the opposition versus Communist Petro Symonenko would mean his defeat in the first round. I am all for saving budget money, but it’s hard to believe that the legislative potential will also be the presidential one.

Will OU try to lure part of the current Majority?

Yes, we will, but only during the campaign. What supporters we may have among the pro-presidential forces are best kept secret. They are in no position to formalize their relationships with Our Ukraine. Now is not the time for them to announce their affiliation. But they will after the campaigns begins.

What do you think will be the winning factor in the presidential race: pre-election ratings, administrative resource, money, foreign political influence, or what?

I think the decisive factor will be the candidate who is able to meet the social requirements imposed on the next president. I am convinced that Leonid Kuchma did just that in 1994. Our society needed a tough, rational man as president, one capable of straightening out the country, overcoming corruption, putting aside Leonid Karachi’s state construction concept. I believe social demand for this “format” will play the crucial role. The only problem is being able to prove that a candidate will actually have the required parameters.

How much will it cost to win the campaign?

I’ve made no secret that I have been a campaign manager for several candidates. Yet there is a problem I still can’t figure out. It is campaign finance. I am one of those scared stiff by business and finance, so there is nothing I can say on the subject.

Well, there is one point I could make. Infrastructure and well-trained canvassing agents, in both urban and rural areas, are very important in a presidential campaign. The previous elections showed that the media had switched from principal canvasser to a mere communicator. Individual canvassers proved far more effective than the media. Now all the candidates are trying to figure out whether to invest their campaign funds in manpower or media. I recommend that if you don’t have a lot of money, it’s best to invest in manpower, not media. If you have a lot of money, invest in manpower and media.

Once you promised to pay 5,000 hryvnias to a journalist who could prove that his or her field was subject to censorship. Have you paid it?

The thing is that state employees, rather than journalists, helped me realize that censorship existed. I ought to have paid that money to such an employee. I didn’t because I knew he would be fired. And so I decided to spare all those people at the presidential administration, regional state administrations, and Kyiv city state administration that supplied me with documents serving as irrefutable evidence of political censorship. Journalists also provided interesting facts, but, fortunately, none asked to be paid. I understood the gesture as their desire to win the right to carry out their professional duties unimpeded, rather than to be paid that five thousand hryvnias.

Several months ago our media exploded with stories about OU allegedly planning to set up its own media concern. Then it all died down. What’s the status of the project?

New media projects are underway and they will have nothing to do with any specific political forces. An independent news agency will appear shortly. We are discussing television, radio, and newspaper projects. I might as well tell you that Our Ukraine will soon have a newspaper titled “Without Censorship.” It will be registered in a matter of days. It won’t have a large print run, because it’s meant rather for our supporters and affiliated structures.