OPPOSITION: Damage Tolerance Test
There is the notion of ship’s damage tolerance in naval parlance, meaning that a ship can withstand so much damage on a combat mission, have so many years of service life, and how well she can be repaired after what damage. There are a number of methods to check damage tolerance, including assessment texts. Projecting this notion onto our political plane, we might try to assess the “new opposition’s” damage tolerance; how many hits these people can take from the regime and still be able to reach their goals.
The ultimate goal of any opposition at the initial stage is to come to power. This goal can be attained depending on a number of factors, the presence of a charismatic leader being a priority; also a uniting constructive idea in the form of a program, and mass support. Without such support even to hope for success would be naive. These factors make it possible to (a) achieve unity within the opposition’s leadership and (b) rally and direct if not the majority then a considerable part of the protest electorate. These factors form a causal nexus along the temporal axis: without a strong leader capable of rallying people professing different ideologies it is impossible to unite the opposition; without such unity it is impossible to work out a constructive program; the absence of a constructive program is an obstacle to winning over the protest vote, for the latter remains neutral until people can see that there is a leader and a program.
These factors are the necessary condition of the opposition’s damage tolerance. Let us see precisely how these factors relate to the current “new opposition,” including the Forum for National Salvation (FNS) and For Truth alliance.
The FNS is the most variegated and thus most representative, its members being leaders of parties and volunteer organizations. Which of these politicians can claim the post of a sole leader and, most importantly, stands a real chance?
Yuliya Tymoshenko’s head- spinning political career (without overlooking some personal traits) is explained more by her belonging with Dnipropetrovsk’s industrial- financial group than her political skill. This group was known as the breeding ground of cadres under the Soviets, and her status is largely explained by political support from a number of influential confreres. Objectively considering Mrs. Tymoshenko’s endeavors in the executive field, one must admit that she is mostly remembered for her PR projects, not for specific practical attainments. Look at the facts. Remember her indefatigable verbal battles as chairperson of the parliamentary budget committee in 1998-99? I mean those for the “social orientation” of the budget, followed by silent surrender when the 1999 budget bill was approved. Many then believed that she gave up struggle not disinterestedly but in exchange for suspending penalties levied on the Unified Energy Systems of Ukraine, a company she had headed earlier. Then the cabinet sequestered the state budget in March 1999. Tymoshenko promptly responded with wrathful statements, but then everything suddenly became quiet, and nothing changed. In December 1999, when drafting the 2000 budget, she demonstrated “genuine care” for the people. As proposed by her, the Social Insurance Fund’s money was included in the state budget, the result being a smaller number of resort treatment accommodations paid for by this trust fund. The so- called reforms in the energy sector really boiled down to a reallocation of money flows in the field (this author broached the subject at the outset, see Den, March 5, 2000, not translated in this digest). A certain increment in payments for electricity was achieved by making power supply futures contracts with prepayments (using a discount, which is even now lowering prepayments) and increasing the money mass in circulation.
Nor can Mrs. Tymoshenko boast any achievements in uniting political forces; instead, there is evidence of her inability to resist the split in Hromada and later Batkivshchyna. As for her allegedly criminal past, albeit still not proven and being investigated by the Prosecutor General’s Office, this can hardly augment her political charisma. Precisely these personal problems, which she will have to solve, combined with her bent on compromise when solving them, make certain opposition leaders wary. Some analysts believe that Yuliya Tymoshenko might quit FNS in exchange for her and her husband’s freedom. For this reason, a detailed analysis shows that she just does not measure up as a charismatic leader. Incidentally, she is herself aware of this. She stated in a recent interview that the opposition has several “spectacular personalities” capable of taking the lead, adding, however, that she was prepared to do just that, given a vote of confidence.
Strange as it may seem, the regime appears to be working to increase Tymoshenko’s popularity. Our people have always felt especially protective of those persecuted by the authorities without really bothering to find out who is being persecuted for what. Who needed all that hubbub with first arresting Tymoshenko, then releasing her, then arresting her again, and finally overruling the arrest warrant? Was it fear that she would flee Ukraine like Pavlo Lazarenko? But no one had even tried to stop him when leaving the country he had plundered (au cokntraire, say some —Ed.). As it is, Yuliya Tymoshenko could never even dream of a better publicity campaign, while some in high office ought to have given some thought to the consequences of some of their decisions.
Another figure that could claim (or maybe he does) sole opposition leadership is Oleksandr Moroz. However, there are a number of significant factors obstructing his path. First, the opposition is more Right than Left, so most would resolutely reject the very idea of being led by a Socialist. Is this why Oleksandr Moroz, after triggering off the political conflict and showing enviable activity in the initial phase, has been seen increasingly less often at the opposition’s events? Nor did he add to his political laurels by botching the Kaniv Four project. NSDC Secretary Yevhen Marchuk once noted, “Moroz has an excellent experience in breaking up political alliances at the most crucial moment.” Will his opposition allies — and, most importantly, the people — believe in his leadership? Those very people whom the Socialist leader invariably describes as sheep and slaves? Incidentally, it would be interesting to know what status Mr. Moroz ascribes to himself in this context, good shepherd or Spartacus.
As we see, the two most distinguished political figures are not likely to become leaders capable of unifying the opposition. There is no use discussing any other candidacies among the FNS politicians; suffice it to glance at their influence and public confidence ratings (some are not even mentioned there).
One other option left the opposition is Viktor Yushchenko. To an extent and at a certain stage, his taking over command could satisfy everybody in the so-called new opposition. Yet, being a conspicuously cautious man (he would not even sign the National Bank’s currency reserve instruments alone), he is only too well aware of the dangerous implications of his siding with the opposition should the latter collapse. And so he is in no hurry to determine his stand by saying either yes nor no. On the one hand, he signs a statement by the three top figures officials condemning street extremism, and on the other has made statements betraying a degree of sympathy for the opposition: he supports Yuliya Tymoshenko to an extent. In other words, Viktor Yushchenko can hardly be expected to openly confront the regime by heading the opposition as its sole leader.
Therefore, FNS is hard put to look for a charismatic figure. Meanwhile, the leadership problem has aggravated now that the regime seems prepared for negotiations. Until recently, FNS leaders accused Leonid Kuchma of being reluctant to join them at a round table. Now the reverse is true; FNS will do their utmost to postpone it by coming up with preliminary conditions, knowing the regime will never accept them as they sound more like ultimatums, debating the names of those they could accept as parties to the negotiations, etc. And all this for just one reason; the opposition is not prepared to hold talks at this stage, so it is afraid to begin them. It is one thing to walk out in the street, organizing rallies, torch marches, and other dramatized events, yelling “Down with!” But it is an altogether different thing being able to organize talks, because that takes intellect rather than “street technologies.” Having been carried away by street actions, the FNS leaders are hastily working out a common platform for talks, putting together the negotiating team. Yet if they really wanted that round table, they ought to have made the arrangements beforehand. As stressed above, working out a joint stand and an ability to defend it, putting forth convincing arguments, coming out as a single front (forum, to be precise), is impossible without having a unanimously recognized leader capable of uniting everybody. And I will not even mention polite debate, for statements made by certain opposition leaders make it clear that there is no such courtesy.
I will hazard to suggest that serious problems will arise even in shaping the opposition’s negotiating team. Some do not want to see Yuliya Tymoshenko there. Others insist that separate negotiations between the regime and certain FNS figures are out of the question. And an internal power play could well ensue from the absence of a single charismatic leader with a clean record even in the presence of agreement on other issues. We have on more than one occasion seen that the adage about two Ukrainians making three hetmans is not without foundation, and not only in Ukraine’s distant past. Suffice it to recall the opposition’s futile attempts to put forward a single presidential candidate during the presidential campaigns. In fact, the entire modern history of Ukraine’s political parties is a record of splits, not unity. The stronger the sweet smell of political success, the more vicious the struggle for leadership. Aware of its weakness on the eve of the talks, the opposition is trying to weaken the other side. This explains the increasing number of recent statements by opposition figures about the impossibility of talks with Yevhen Marchuk. The point is not the video cassette (Marchuk, being an experienced politician, did not take the bait) or other pretexts, like his role in the Kaniv Four (an attempt to let him carry the water for someone else), or attempts to split the opposition (here Mr. Moroz is an indisputable, perhaps unmatched expert). The point is that the NSDC Secretary is feared in certain quarters as a formidable political contender when it comes to any round table, because when a considerate, balanced, and well- argumented approach is in order, rather than vociferous flag-waving and breast-beating — in a word, all that which is referred to as intellectual culture — I think that any FNS leader would be a poor match for Mr. Marchuk. And so every effort is being made to bar him access to the talks.
As for the opposition’s program, here the situation is even worse than with its leadership. By focusing their attacks on the president and offering nothing constructive, the opposition has shown itself in the role of a battering ram meant to pierce the wall of the regime, in precisely the least fortified place, threatening to paralyze the executive system and thereby draw this country into a domestic political conflict, trying to solve problems by street fighting, not at a negotiating table, followed by early presidential elections (or so the FNS leaders plan), with the president in power, being practically unable to run this country, if only due to the absence of a team of his own. After all is said and done, such a scenario is a step toward anarchy. In such a situation, a third force could well emerge triumphant, a force which is taking no part in the current political conflict. Battles being waged by the Right and Left-Center opposition with the regime are causing both to be weakened, offering the Communists a better chance to get a majority in parliament in the 2002 elections. And this is not just another Communist bogey, like the one which the electorate believed during the last presidential campaign but a clear and present danger. Petro Symonenko and company will surely appear onstage after the regime and “new opposition” have heaped enough dirt at each other. Needless to say, the number-one Leninist will look immaculately clean. Yuliya Tymoshenko’s assurances that the opposition’s program action is ready remain just that, assurances.
In an attempt to ward off accusations of not being constructive, the opposition has declared that their priority objective was reforming the sociopolitical system. But so did Leonid Kuchma. This in itself is a point of contact, something to start a round table with. Yet neither side shows any enthusiasm. The impression is that the opposition will remain opposed to the current sociopolitical system until it comes to power. It is common knowledge that there are certain oligarchic forces behind the opposition, ones forced to backtrack from their positions in the course of severe competition and now determined to regain them come what may by seizing power.
It is clear now that the only way out of the political crisis with minimum casualties is through a round table. While previously the regime had to be pushed toward the table, now it seems the opposition’s turn. And time cannot be wasted, because this society really and badly needs serious reforms and has to overcome its crisis as soon as possible.
For this reason, without a charismatic leader, constructive program, support from the masses, but with multiple internal problems, the opposition cannot pass muster when exposed to a damage endurance test. Like with a warship failing to measure up and transferred to coastal shipping, the opposition will have to make do with street marches, rallies, and other public theater, something more akin to marketplace farce than political action. The opposition must first heal itself.
