THE POST-BATTLE LANDSCAPE

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When I was working on my book Ukrayina: Vyklyk i Vybir (Ukraine: Challenge and Choice], published by Dukh i Litera in Kyiv in 2003) on long winter evenings in 2001-2002, I never expected that my prophecy would come true so quickly, even miraculously. Allow me to quote: “In the near future (before 2005) certain political and cadre changes will take place in the upper echelons of the government... a purifying process will commence; the people, exhausted by corruption in high offices, will come close to understanding that they can no longer live like that; young people (the new generation), after ridding themselves of the last fears inherited from the Soviet period will refuse to put up with the secretiveness, opacity, and clannishness of governmental decision-making, especially since Ukrainian society will be influenced by the examples of neighboring democracies, by the logic of integration into the EU.”

After returning to Ukraine in 2003, after almost a decade of ambassadorship, and becoming immersed in the Ukrainian political reality, I was horrified by the debased status of the nation-state and society. Living in Kyiv in 2003, I was constantly aware of Ukraine returning to the Soviet past, as though it were being carried there by a time machine; quite a few of my friends admitted that they were secretly scared. They were afraid to voice their opinions in the office and speak frankly on the phone. I was amazed by certain media; having grown accustomed to CNN and CBC practices, I now felt impotent in an atmosphere of rampant, shameless lies, hypocrisy, and dirty campaigning. Bitterly I recalled my naХve prophecies in Canada; the Ukrainian reality boded nothing good and this awareness grew even stronger after the 2004 presidential campaign began.

A geopolitical competition for Ukraine’s destiny was in the making, without a single guarantee of fair play. Law-abiding citizens and MPs who had the nerve to join the opposition became enemies of the people; they were subjected to ruthless criticism and ostracism, and no one even bothered to consider the possibility of the opposition eventually coming to power. I thought of Canada, of course, where the opposition leader has an official residence slightly smaller than the prime minister’s and where the opposition is a respected and integral part of public life.

And then, suddenly purification began, like a burst of youthful, orange flame, the early arrival of spring, like a miraculous revelation.

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The events in November-December 2004, referred to as the Orange Revolution, marked a turning point in our national history; for the first time in the thirteen years of the Ukrainian state’s existence a determined effort was made to alter the dangerous trajectory of its development, which had become disastrous in 2000-2004, with a semi-feudal, semi-monarchical, autocratic-clannish state forming in Europe, where under the guise of virtual European integration slogans a post-Soviet model was being asserted, accompanied by the exploitation of both power structures and criminal elements. All that was missing was the addition of another color to the blue-and-yellow colors of Ukraine’s flag-red, the color of death squads. The result would be the Colombian national flag.

Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, as the government-nominated presidential candidate, brought with him specific methods of state administration, ones that had been tested in the Donetsk region, namely, a total amalgamation of political, administrative, and economic power in manual control mode, total disregard of democratic procedures, social demagoguery, populist rhetoric, and utter incomprehension of Ukraine as a singular spiritual, historical, cultural, and national phenomenon.

Ukrainian society did not become aware of the threat quickly enough. Even worse, a large part of the political community (the so-called in-power coalition) welcomed Yanukovych’s presidential candidacy, regarding him as someone who would continue the “rebuilding” of a type of state popular on the territory of the CIS, in which life is good only for those who are close to the monarch.

The Orange Revolution began with fatally dangerous tardiness, for Viktor Yanukovych had been proclaimed the next president of Ukraine. It was a desperate effort on the part of millions who saw the light and realized what was coming in the next couple of days; who could now see what they could expect from the new government. Mass protest actions swept over the western and central (the most European-minded) territories of Ukraine. Such dramatic actions could not but give birth to fresh myths, legends, and simplified populist notions about exceptionally complex sociopolitical processes that were unfolding in Ukraine.

Thus, a number of Ukrainian and Western media alleged that: A new Ukrainian nation-state had been born and a civil society established in the course of the Orange Revolution; A truly independent Ukrainian judiciary system had been formed and that the media had miraculously turned free and independent.

To this thesis, formulated on the wave of public euphoria, Russian and Donetsk-based pro-Russian propagandists added an antithesis borrowed from the Cold War arsenal, namely, that a coup d’Оtat had occurred in Ukraine, an unconstitutional act, as a result of the direct interference of the US and EU in sovereign Ukraine’s internal affairs.

These and other allegations and campaign stunts have nothing to do with realities in Ukraine, although some of them look and sound convincing. They must be refuted.

1. The events that took place between November 22 and December 26, 2004, did not signify a revolution in the true sense of the word (if one understands revolution as a substantial change in the existing political order, ruling elite, and social relations).

What happened then was the promising beginning of a long-awaited revolutionary process aimed at bringing about revolutionizing changes within Ukrainian society (personally, I prefer to describe it as a cleansing process). Such a process is likely to take between five and ten years and will be a complicated and painful one, complete with counterrevolutionary revanchist attempts, considering that the existing confrontation involves the European and Soviet parts of Ukraine.

2. A new political nation is being born in Ukraine; this process is belated, compared to other countries, such as Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Italy, et al. — this process should have started 100 or even 200 years earlier. The previous Ukrainian state did not pay enough attention to the nation-building process in the European sense of the word. What happened on the Maidan in Kyiv made changes in terms of the Ukrainian population and social situation more apparent and better defined, as a new generation had appeared in the arena of life: European-minded Ukrainians aged between 25 and 35, resolved to push to the margins of political life the generation of Red- time managers and administrators, Soviet Communist bureaucrats and aging romantics of the early 1990s. Such is the ruthless law of renewal. The ruling clans, while engaged in pitched battles to expand their spheres of political, business, and media influence, failed to notice the emergence of a new middle class in Ukraine, mostly young and energetic people who opposed the state’s arbitrary rule and were determined to protect their civil rights. The events of 2004 are reminiscent of the bourgeois democratic revolutions of the 17th- 19th centuries in Europe, which were aimed at toppling feudal and monarchic regimes.

3. A civil society is in the making in Ukraine. It’s hardly proper to describe those 150-200 more or less influential nongovernmental organizations and funds (known collectively as NGOs) as hallmarks of a civil society, considering that they are kept afloat by grants from the West. Such NGOs can only be considered as a catalyst spurring civil society into existence, and as its harbingers. Only the introduction of strong local self-government and the emergence of such powerful NGOs (specializing in the protection of human/civil rights, protection of the environment, consumer protection, etc.), forcing the government and political parties to heed their voices, will mean that a genuine civil society has been formed in Ukraine.

4. The courageous and unprecedented ruling of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, which annulled the rigged results of the November 21 runoff election, did not mean that Ukraine was now a state ruled by law. The struggle against corruption and lawlessness in the law enforcement and judiciary domains will be a long and complicated process.

5. Setting up a system of independent mass media in Ukraine is in the embryonic phase. There will always exist a group of influential politicians, magnates who own and run the media, as well as those journalists who serve them, who will be tempted by huge sums of money and great power to manipulate information and distort it in the service of the noblest causes (strengthening the national spirit, upholding public morals, combating internal and external enemies, etc.).

6. The most serious challenge facing newly elected President Viktor Yushchenko and his team is the multitude of inflated hopes for a miracle to be worked in Ukraine, harbored by all those ordinary people who expect speedy changes for the better in all spheres of life. The next couple of years will very quickly show how justified these inflated expectations are. The new government will have to pay a dear price for this trust.

One of the main, and perhaps insoluble, problems is the controversy between the radical, democratically-minded elemental force on the Maidan and the politicking that is inherent in the upper echelons of government, the tendency of leaders to compromise and engage in backroom wheeling and dealing.

How are we to preserve the priceless revolutionary energy of the masses (their orientation toward decisive changes) and, at the same time, to help the new political leadership retain the ability to carry out subtle political maneuvers in order to reach a number of vitally important compromises — e.g., between political parties at the Verkhovna Rada, between the government, the regional elites, and big business, between the new Orange revolutionary generation and professional diplomats loyally serving the new regime, the military, special services, and other power structures? Poland’s cadre experience after Solidarity’s victory may come in handy here, considering that not only the revolutionary wing but also liberal-minded communists got a chance to create a third Rzeczpospolita. In the end, only the most odious figures, who were tarnished by their participation in the crimes of the previous regime, were removed from the chessboard.

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One should expect the following priority moves from the new Ukrainian government: Economic/business freedoms to be conferred on the broadest strata of society by decisively deregulating and de-bureaucratizing excessively complex bureaucratic procedures (the possibility of registering a business within five days), along with a sharp decrease in inspections by regulatory authorities, the elimination by the state of preferential treatment for individual representatives of business, including tax concessions, and so on); Basic law enforcement reform in order to secure the rule of law; the separation of the executive from the judiciary branch; the creation of a special agency in the Presidential Administration to monitor observance of citizens’ constitutional rights and liberties; Initiation of a strategic dialogue between the regions of Ukraine in order to overcome existing controversies and to develop a program to decentralize central power, while authorizing the regions to exercise maximum economic and social rights, along with retaining Ukraine’s unitary status; Preparations for an actual political reform, with an eye to the European experience; Rendering maximum assistance to foreign investors by liberalizing customs clearance and official registration procedures, while waging a resolute struggle against corruption in these domains; Implementation of several programs aimed at increasing the employment rate (e.g., inexpensive housing construction programs, with construction costs payable in 20-25-year installments; setting up a modern transportation infrastructure, like in the US, organizing technoparks, reviving Ukrainian towns and townships, and developing tourism); Ensuring the reliability of social programs-e.g., implementing a realistic health care reform.

Without a doubt, the main criterion by which people will consider whether their dreams are coming true will be the overall domestic atmosphere rather than external attributes; they will pass judgment proceeding from whether the life of an individual has become easier, whether the Ukrainian living standard has improved; whether the gap between the state and the people has been bridged; whether people are no longer afraid to voice their opinions; whether talented young people want to live and work in Ukraine.

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The Yanukovych phenomenon, including the twelve million voters who support him, deserves serious attention. On December 26, 2004, Viktor Yushchenko’s campaign analysts said their candidate would win the campaign with a larger margin (e.g., 60/40). A complete, unbiased analysis of the campaign turnout will not be helped by talk about treacherous regional authorities and turning people into zombies through disinformation. Even if several million voters cast their ballots for Yanukovych out of “regional patriotism” — or owing to the absence of any moral criteria (“OK, he is a con, but he’s our man!”) — the problem cannot be reduced to schematic, superficial explanations.

It is true that the idea that Viktor Yushchenko is an embodiment of evil, that he will persecute all Russian-speaking citizens and will ban Pushkin and Leo Tolstoy in Ukraine, was pounded into the heads of millions of people. What is tragic is that millions of people believed or were prepared to believe this propaganda.

Here one has a vast opportunity for research in the spheres of psychology and social studies. Despite decades of official propaganda about the fraternity of all peoples (Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, etc.) that formed the great Soviet nation, we are now faced with the phenomenon of mistrust, dislike, and even hatred for all things Ukrainian. The bitter truth is that some Ukrainian nationals despise Ukraine and Ukrainians, so they could only reject a candidate who was sincerely devoted to his native land. I was shocked to read statistics revealing that most electorate in regions with a Russian population of over 13% voted for Viktor Yanukovych. Convincing these Yanukovych supporters to support the Ukrainian choice is only possible by providing tangible economic arguments, never by way of forceful Ukrainization. One is reminded of Canada and the Quebec challenge, when that French-speaking province was on the verge of withdrawing from the country of the maple leaf. The fleure-de-lys [floral emblem of Quebec] hotheads sobered up only when they realized that this would mean an exodus of English-speaking capital and business and a sharp decline in the local economy.

As for Viktor Yanukovych, his future political career looks highly questionable. Is he really capable of heading a strong opposition faction or party? Mr. Yanukovych has demonstrated that he is a far cry from Richard Nixon; he can’t face up to a real challenge, as evidenced by his lapse into the characteristic language of threats and insults. Viktor Yanukovych has demonstrated his political impotence, and it is also true that champions of destruction and losers are not popular in Ukraine, not even in the Donbas.

The Donbas coal and steel cartels should think about obtaining EU and US export quotas rather than risking their revenues and business stability by supporting a frustrated political outsider.

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The presidential campaign took place in the context of important geopolitical changes in the world political arena, connected with the intensification of globalization. The United States has entered a new phase of the pitched battle for energy resources, setting up a supranational mega-coalition and reinforcing its positions in geostrategic regions of the world, focusing on the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea. Ukraine’s importance, as a country situated close to these regions, is increasing. The United States cannot reconcile itself with the loss of Ukraine and its absorption by the “liberal” Russian empire, most convincingly evidenced by the events of November-December 2004. Prior to the Orange Revolution, Washington issued firm, unequivocal statements to the effect that Ukraine must remain an independent and democratic country, one that is integrated in the Euro-Atlantic structure, while retaining neighborly relations with Russia.

At the same time, the United States, making no secret of its geopolitical interests, acted correctly during the presidential campaign in Ukraine, without meddling in its internal affairs or openly supporting either of the presidential candidates. Russia did the exact opposite; Russian spin doctors acted so brazenly as to cause a massive response of popular protest, which increased the number of Yushchenko voters by at least several million. One should not forget President Putin’s unprecedented meddling in the Ukrainian information space during his interactive interview given in the offices of Leonid Kuchma’s Presidential Administration. Can you picture a Mexican president, urging the US electorate to vote for a candidate favorable to Mexico, speaking from the White House, because that candidate will introduce Spanish as another official language in the States for the benefit of 30 million Mexican Americans?

Among the reasons behind Russia’s fiasco in Ukraine is the Russian elite’s disastrous misconception of the nature of relations between the two peoples, of the great distinctions historically formed under Russian imperial rule, which deepened in the years of Ukrainian independence.

The results of the presidential election are proof that Ukraine (at least two-thirds of the electorate) has chosen to embark on a European democratic and separate, independent road of progress, where individual human liberties are really appreciated, where the state-for-man rather than man-for-the-state principle is predominant.

Regrettably, it is safe to assume that Russia is adopting a different centralist-imperial paradigm in its evolution, a model that I regard as totally ineffective and archaic in both domestic and foreign political terms.

President Viktor Yushchenko will be faced with fundamental foreign political problems, namely: Normalizing relations with Russia based not on subservient obedience to the Kremlin ruler, but on cooperating on truly equal partnership terms; Dealing with the Single Economic Space; Figuring out how politely to call it quits with the CIS nomenklatura-type assemblage of former first secretaries and pull out of this totally ineffective prosthesis of the USSR, and replacing it with a less pompous but more effective mechanism of bilateral and multilateral cooperation; Deciding how to invigorate the GUUAM as a geopolitical energy-transportation alliance of countries in the Caspian Sea region and Eastern Europe; Coming to a decision on how to expedite Ukraine’s NATO membership, thus ending Ukraine’s existence in that gray security area; to this end, it would be important to have a NATO base deployed in Ukraine to counterbalance the Sevastopol Russian naval base; Adopting priority measures for resuming a fully developed Ukrainian-US strategic partnership.

And last but not least: Deciding how united Europe is to be convinced that Ukraine means business; how the Ukrainian people are to be convinced that the chosen geopolitical course is vitally important for the nation.

I would like to point out that Ukraine badly needs its own analytical and forecasting think tanks, something along the lines of the US Rand Corporation, ones that would be independent of the government’s whims and work not to satisfy a leader’s or structure’s interests but to establish the lasting truth, which is often a bitter pill for a government to swallow.

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Few generations have experienced such historically significant events as the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Soviet empire, the emergence of the Ukrainian nation-state, and finally its revival and fresh hopes for a truly free and democratic Ukraine.

Our generation is one of those privileged few.

Let us be worthy of this historical choice. We must measure up.