The Problem of Political Leadership on Television

Two diametrically opposed processes are now underway in Ukrainian society. On the one hand, break with the totalitarian mentality warrants the development of skepticism, individualism, and independent thinking. On the other hand, if this process does not touch the depths of one's conscience (or if one's conscience is primitive), then skepticism takes on a nihilistic overtone instead of an individually subjective orientation. Nihilism toward the regime, the people, and the future of the country is not a cause but rather a consequence of spreading individualism. In and of themselves, the bearers of modern nihilism take no part whatever in the spiritual life of society and are incapable of disseminating anything except panic.

INDIVIDUALITY, LEADERS, AND PSEUDO-LEADERS

Ukrainian individuality perhaps exists in terms of the world context but certainly not in solving domestic political issues. The existence of eight leading parties is a rather good illustration for understanding the broadness of the Ukrainian mentality's spectrum. True, for these eight parties one can scrape up no more than four leaders, whereas there is definitely no shortage of pseudo-leaders in the country. A pseudo-leader is like a spoon-lure for a pike - he is necessary in order to catch the nihilists. Individuality will not catch the bait, but, after all, how many individuals are really out there? Television is much more amenable to pseudo-leaders than real ones leaders - pseudo-leaders are much more telegenic and less subject to censorship. (Who in their right mind will take these clowns seriously?) While a pseudo-leader exploits a political situation, a leader creates it. The former is busy earning political Brownie points (votes, legislative and government posts), while the latter fights spiritually for people's souls rather than votes. A pseudo-leader is followed by a mob, whereas a leader is followed by individuals. For this reason, it will not be a surprise if they find themselves standing on the same side of the barricade.

Contemporary Ukrainian television technology has thus far been unable to create an image of a leader the people can embrace. Why? Because the image of a leader is denied any individuality - any analysis boils down to statements like "Someone is good (or bad) because he is President (or a Communist)." Individuality implies a unique life experience, as well as certain moral standards and rules of conduct. Our television is simply not mature enough to provide that kind of portrayal. And it is not the moral standards, let alone the personalities, that are still immature, it is rather television that cannot handle them. This is why there are so many comedians and so few leaders in the Ukrainian television space. Yet, some leaders do exist.

THE IMAGE OF LEONID KUCHMA AND HIS TEAM

Ukrainian TV has distinguished itself most in creating the image of the President and his team. The print media suffers more from official servility. For the most part, the press portrays Leonid Kuchma as either The Man of the Hour or the contents of a pooper-scooper, depending on who calls the tune. Television, however, is considerably more expressive in this respect. We should honestly acknowledge that the President must himself take credit for creating his current televised image. His staff image-makers did not even attempt to highlight Kuchma's best side. Perhaps, they decided that the high post alone ought to automatically call forth sympathy. The television audience watched Kuchma master Ukrainian, learn to articulate his thoughts clearly, and gain command of economic and political concepts. The fact that his staff simply did nothing while puffing their collective cheeks played a positive role for the presidential team. The President's strong point is that there is nothing made-up or unnatural about his and his allies' boob-tube images. I often heard the offended intellectuals gripe that on the small screen Leonid Kuchma looks more like a collective farm or a factory manager. Obviously, Kuchma has a long way to go to attain an image of a professor wearing horn-rimmed glasses, but for many Ukrainians, familiarity with the management personnel is limited to collective farm chairmen or factory managers. His stumbling speaking style can even enhance his image that he is one of their own. When making a speech, Kuchma has lately learned to stick to the main points, whose number is constantly rising. The President stepped on camera view with a fully exposed face (as already noted, mainly because efforts to conceal or improve something were unsuccessful).

Along with Kuchma, completely candid and open are also Valery Pustovoitenko, Serhiy Tyhypko, Mykola Azarov, Anatoly Halchynsky, and Pavlo Haidutsky. If these people do not answer a question posed to them, they simply do not know the answer. Even those team members who are incapable of being candid (for example, Viktor Yushchenko) make honest efforts to articulate their thoughts. The body language, gestures, and voice pitch of top leaders say much more than they themselves want to. Many rivals of the presidential team mistakenly consider its openness a weakness. One can rub their hands in excitement for as long as they want while watching government officials headed by the President helplessly floundering around on television; yet, a more pompous and, consequently, less down-to-earth team would never be able to push the image of Kuchma's team off the air. For the TV snipers, the officials' revelations are like a piece of sweet candy ("We have strong nerves," Tyhypko noted once), but an image stripped of emotions, contradictions, and drama is simply not interesting for the modern TV industry. Otherwise, we would have to go back to the Party nomenklatura television, but under current conditions one cannot count on the commercial success of such an enterprise.

All this is not meant to imply that Kuchma's team is free of any weak spots. Its weakest point is perhaps, the lack of focus on the people - the team's revelations are quite official and situational. Kuchma's team players view the role of the people as passive. Running like a red thread through all their revelations are their ill-considered, narrow, and artless character. More than once, the experts have noted that Kuchma's team does not know how to approach or woo the people, and above all it does not know how to talk to the people, doing so with a condescension obvious to all who look closely. One can hardly count on winning the presidential race only by blowing anti-Kuchma sentiments out of proportion. In the Kuchma-not Kuchma dichotomy, the electorate might be inclined to vote for Kuchma. The current President won in the Kravchuk-not Kravchuk dichotomy, and we should not underestimate his experience. The Kuchma-Leader dichotomy will considerably lessen the President's chances, unless a race with a true leader gives Kuchma's image a new quality. And the Ukrainian television space does have such leaders.

THREE IMAGES -
THREE FRONTS OF
THE INFORMATION WAR

To date, there are only three leader images that can compete with the image of the current President. Each of them in its own way surpasses the President's image in certain ways - Oleksandr Moroz (more traditional), Pavlo Lazarenko (more initiative), and Yevhen Marchuk (more intellectual). Let us recall once again that under discussion here are not the personalities per se but rather their televised images.

Oleksandr Moroz has the image of a leader with a consistent attitude to the traditions. He does not consider 1991 to be a turning point in history; in other words, he does not view life before 1991 as disastrous or "wrong." Although his communist values have undergone transformations, they remain his lodestone. His image is comprehensible to a quite large segment of the population and, since it can be correlated with the old morals, is connected first and foremost with morality, whereas Leonid Kuchma's image can hardly be considered a model of the new morals. Moroz's weak side is his lack of originality, which enables pseudo-leaders and political clowns to win a significant share of the leftist electorate. If this were not so, the former Speaker would have long since become the most influential figure in Ukraine. Time is against Moroz's image since the political buffoonery is shaking the traditions he relies on. In this sense, every leftist buffoon can be viewed as the President's soldier (or guerrilla).

The image of Pavlo Lazarenko, the very image of energy and initiative, is shot through with contradictions. Unlike the other two images, Lazarenko the leader would not have appeared at all if Kuchma's image were more firm and resolute. The President's most recent initiatives have inadvertently put Lazarenko in the shadow. He looks good against a background of idleness and helplessness, but any energetic government activity (or feigning it) makes Hromada's actions look like games for big kids. However, unlike Moroz, Lazarenko does not have a buffoon undermining his ideas in the information space. This is the strongest side of this image.

While in and of itself, Lazarenko's image is both negative and positive, the image of Yevhen Marchuk is more complex. It occupies the most favorable position vis-a-vis Kuchma's, for it is above primitive conflict with the President. This kind of position grants Marchuk autonomy from what Kuchma does. Onscreen, Marchuk does not say anything unless he has thought it over, and he is independent in his choice of subjects for discussion. Thus, Marchuk is likely to start taking action at any moment regardless of whether or not the President is doing something. The strength of this image is its independence. The intelligentsia finds this quality extremely attractive, but one should keep in mind that intellectuals do not constitute the core electorate. Nikolai Berdiaev used to point out that there is something monstrous about thinkers. Force (even calm force) is more comprehensible and tangible when it is in motion. In this sense, Marchuk loses from the national TV's inability to show process (this very calm force). Moreover, there are more than enough accidental people among the Social Democrats, many of whom have not even grown up to be pseudo-leaders. For this reason, the situation-dependent image of the Social Democrats is ruining the integrity of Marchuk's independent image. If Marchuk's image-makers (including Marchuk himself) manage to create in the mass media not their own image (it is already there) but rather an image of a national idea outlining new moral standards and rules of conduct and clearly laying out the immediate tasks for the nation (and not the government, the way Kuchma would have it), this would mean a moral victory even before the elections. Marchuk, like a strategic bomber, bursts into the information space and, having accomplished his mission, flies away. The development of his image is happening outside of the sphere of televised analysis, not least thanks to the national channels' (controlled by the presidential staff) policy of denying access to the airwaves to Kuchma's strong opponents. Rather telling, for example, was the recent incident with the meeting of Yevhen Marchuk, Head of Verkhovna Rada Committee on Social Issues, and the trade union leaders. None of the major news programs (UTN, UT-1; TSN, 1+1) even mentioned the meeting, and only STB and UTAR gave viewers a chance to see the true face of the politician in action. Due to the current regime's tactic of combating its rivals, Leonid Kuchma's TV image has come to dominate the airwaves. At the moment, Kuchma does not have major problems with retaining his leadership in the information space. A victory is celebrated on the moral and initiative fronts, whereas the intellectual front is at a standstill.

The three giants of Ukrainian opposition are in no hurry to spur their horses, while the jesters entertain at the Kyiv Prince's feast...

Yet, this does not mean victory but most likely the opposite.