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Refat CHUBAROV: “But for the president’s pressure and authority, the Crimean Tatar issue would have never been approached.”

18 May, 00:00
May 18 marked the sixtieth anniversary of Crimean Tatar deportation. President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, meeting with the Majlis leader in April, said he was sure the tragic date should be marked at the governmental level. Among the commemorative events were requiem soirees in Kyiv and Simferopol and a mourning rally in the Crimea. People’s Deputy of Ukraine Refat Chubarov, one of the Majlis leaders, believes, however, that the main thing today is comprehending problems relating to the accommodation and adaptation of Crimean Tatars on the peninsula. We pondered the objective and subjective aspects and factors preventing the Tatars feeling at home in their native land of Ukraine, and came with a somewhat different topic of further discussion: Do all of Ukrainians always feel at home in Ukraine? We hope to continue this discussion at subsequent round tables and with the aid of The Day’s readers and experts.

CAUSES AND EFFECTS

“The sixtieth anniversary of Crimean Tatar deportation will have political as well as symbolic meaning and consequences. How would you sum up the past years? How should Ukraine approach this anniversary, with what attainments and understanding of the situation?”

“The social situation anywhere in Ukraine, including the Crimea, of course, is determined by the manner in which local problems are resolved. It is important to understand that different segments of the Crimean community feel differently about this situation. Most problems address all people the same way, but the Crimean Tatars have special problems no one else does, largely owing to the tragedy sixty years ago, the deportation of Crimean Tatars. Those deportees could not return to their homeland for almost half a century, and when they won the right to come back, the then political and economic problems made it impossible for them to fill the niche that was theirs by right. Most Crimean Tatars found themselves outside the processes embracing other Ukrainian citizens. Many remained without plots of land, meaning that they were left out of the land reform. A great many of those that returned are still homeless. They live in settlements with very primitive social and public infrastructures. Add to this such subjective factors as the remaining mythologems affecting Crimean Tatars.

“Many people, especially those wielding power in the Crimea attempt to set the conduct of Crimean Tatars off against the general Crimean interests. This is most often done so as to portray Tatars as active troublemakers, which scares tourists and vacationers away from the Crimea.”

“In fact, The Day has written about ‘Cossacks’ and ‘skinheads’ in the Crimea. How would you explain this phenomenon?”

“Often the opposing sides choose to implement their interests in a manner which they believe can allow them to get off scot-free. Remember what happened in 1989- 91, when Crimean Tatars were returning to the peninsula en masse and were refused plots of land, so they had to take them by force? As a rule, they were confronted by collective farmers or other local residents. In other words, local authorities realized they had to allocate those plots, on the one hand, but didn’t want to do so on the other. Now the situation is different, but the authorities — or separate local ranking bureaucrats — wishing to get the situation in the desired vein find factors allowing them to interfere and then avoid responsibility. That’s what happened in Simeyiz recently.

“Local law enforcement agencies say there are no skinheads in the Crimea. Could be true, in the sense that there is no strong and organized skinhead movement, but it’s also true that there are separate groups of youngsters that must have watched enough television showing people their age in other countries, or read enough about skinheads in printed and electronic media to have adopted the skinhead ideology and then try to practice it on home turf.”

THE UKRAINIAN STATE AND A UKRAINIAN BUREAUCRAT ARE NOT THE SAME THING

“What about Crimean Tatars? Hearing their radical slogans, one has a feeling as though this movement were experiencing a crisis of loyalty toward the Ukrainian state. Is there a limit to radicalism? Do they realize that, in the absence of this loyalty, there could appear another loyalty and a totally different kind of interethnic policy, something like let’s hang them by their you-know-what?”

“Indeed, we hear such assessments and forecasts. I hear them, particularly in Russian media or during round tables and seminars, with noted Russian political architects warning that the Crimean Tatar factor will make itself felt, saying today they are your allies and tomorrow they will be your enemies, yet you keep feeding them, allowing them to turn into your enemies. I always try to make my opponents understand that the course events may take tomorrow is determined by today’s relationships, actions, the way we treat each other now. No one can act the Delphian oracle, yet each can help establish principles today that will prevent events taking an unwelcome course tomorrow.

“Will the Crimean Tatar factor eventually become a threat to the national interests of Ukraine? I can tell you frankly that it won’t, provided we can understand their problems now and do our utmost to solve at least the most pressing ones.”

“You say that Crimean Tatars want to hear from the powers that be, during the events commemorating the deportation victims, that they are prepared to solve their problems the way they want them solved. Granted, but do they know how this approach to their problems fits into the political and legal space of Ukraine, how it conforms to the capacities of the Ukrainian government? In other words, would they be willing to meet the regime halfway?”

“It really happens that the current legislation doesn’t make it possible to solve certain problems, in certain spheres. That’s when parliament steps in to pass new bills and annul obsolete laws. As for how the Crimean Tatars understand their position in Ukraine and the prospects of better understanding, I feel confident that Ukraine’s present political and legal space makes it possible to resolve all issues raised by the Crimean Tatars. The Constitution of Ukraine reads that the Ukrainian nation is composed of the Ukrainian nation, indigenous peoples, and ethnic minorities. The Crimean Tatars regard themselves as the indigenous people of the Crimean Peninsula. They believe that they have no ethnic territories or ethnically related countries outside Ukraine, unlike many ethnic minorities in Ukraine; that there should be separate laws providing for the state to guarantee the Crimean Tatars their status and further progress, so they have no fears about assimilation; that they should have clearly defined legal instruments securing the development of their language and culture, as well as for the preservation of their historical gains. Some believe that this Crimean Tatar concept contradicts the general norms. Thus, certain government-affiliated lawyers interpret our desire to have a special law on the status of the Crimean Tatar people in Ukraine as threatening to upset the balance of the ethnic communities in this country. They insist that enacting this law would encourage other ethnic minorities to come out with similar demands. I think that their approach is wrong. Whatever sentiments the Hungarian, Romanian, or Russian ethnic community could entertain, however objective or subjective these sentiments could be, any of these ethnic minorities can always count on help and support from their ethnically related countries. As I’ve mentioned, the Crimean Tatars have no such country. Or take problems relating to the assertion of elements generally constituting the notion of ethnic identity. In less than a hundred years, the Crimean Tatar alphabet has been changed three times. Originally, it used Arabic characters. In the early 1920s, the government replaced them with Latin letters, and in the late 1930s, Cyrillic characters were introduced, meaning that the people became actually illiterate three times. We held several international conferences in the early 1990s to decide what kind of alphabet we should have, being the only carrier of the Crimean Tatar language and considering its specifics. Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian, Romanian, Russian, and Turkish scholars specializing in the Turkic languages arrived at this conclusion: Arabic characters would be best if one wanted to achieve maximum adjustment of the Crimean Tatar lingual specifics; if this adjustment were to be achieved with an eye to the processes underway in the Turkic languages, the alphabet should be Latin. All agreed, however, that the Cyrillic characters would least of all correspond to the Crimean Tatar language specifics. Who is to decide on the Latin Crimean Tatar alphabet? Bodies of the state, of course. We tried to raise the question in high offices and heard in reply, ‘What for? Keep using Cyrillic characters.’ This problem could be solved using legislative initiatives, and so on, but such situations must be envisioned by a law of Ukraine. Most importantly, the Crimean Tatars should see for themselves that the kind of relationships, as proposed by the state, can actually satisfy their needs. The more such options are proposed, the less radical will their approach to solving such problems become. The Crimean Tatars would then start discussing their place in the Ukrainian state, as well as their responsibility for the integrity of this country and the responsibility of the Ukrainian state for preserving one of the original ethnoses on its territory.”

THE LAND ISSUE

“We are approaching a very complicated problem that many nations are trying to solve. For the Crimean Tatars, it consists in finding the golden mean between integration into Ukrainian society and preservation of ethnic identity. Where do you personally see that golden mean?”

“It is necessary above all to determine communal spheres where all efforts will be regulated by the community. I’ve mentioned the alphabet. Add here religion, preserving traditions, things like that. Likewise, spheres must be outlined where regulation remains the prerogative of the state, but only in coordination with a given ethnic minority, and where it is the sole prerogative of the state. Why should the newly elected mayor of Partenit or Simeyiz have the prerogative of giving a hundred hectares of land to a person requesting it? Why not resolve such issues jointly with the people that had lived there once and wish to return, but can’t do so for the time being? The natural resources of the Crimea must be utilized allowing also for the Crimean Tatar interests.

“Plots on the south seacoast are commodities, of course, but only for a certain category. Other people, particularly the Crimean Tatars, proceed from the assumption that one has a right to return to that land where one’s parents lived, and they’re trying to do just that. People other than Crimean Tatars also have land problems; these people want to evolve where they live at present — I mean in Partenit and Simeyiz. However, the three segments I’ve just mentioned (those wishing to have this land as a commodity; those wishing to return, and those that have lived in that land for decades and maybe wishing to build another home) have varying opportunities. The current situation in Ukraine, particularly in the Crimea, helps those capable of establishing specific contacts with local authorities — people with money or contacts in the right places.”

“In other words, it’s a problem of corruption in the first place?”

“Even before, when no such corruption barriers existed, [local] authorities did their best to settle Crimean Tatars the way they chose. Of all the deported Crimean Tatars (some 200,000), 70% lived on the south seacoast (Yalta, Alushta, and Sudak districts) and in the central part of the territory. In the spring of 1990, the then Crimean Regional Council adopted a Crimean Tatar settlement pattern, whereby Crimean Tatars couldn’t make up more than 23-25% of the residents of any given populated area, town, or village. Even then we assumed that this was done to prevent Crimean Tatars democratically influencing the local authorities. However, another specific feature of that scheme was to leave the south seacoast out of the settlement program. I happened to take part in clashes with Soviet law enforcement agencies, in 1990. At the time, all attempts of the Crimean Tatars to settle on the south coast were ruthlessly suppressed. The Tatars were directed to the steppe regions of the peninsula. We shouted that there would be internal migration, however hard the authorities tried to prevent it — not because the Tatars are so fond of migrating, but because most people returning to the Crimea regarded the process returning to places of birth, places where their parents had lived, literally tracing their roots. Those roots were cemeteries no longer there (destroyed as soon as the Crimean Tatars had been deported), but which we remembered.”

“However, adopting a squatter tactic doesn’t seem the best solution to the problem. That’s why Crimean Tatars are accused of tending to act contrary to the law.”

“If only all those commissions sent from Kyiv to investigate such unauthorized settlements published their findings and offered an analysis, I assure you the figures would show that such acts were numerically insignificant. At present, such unauthorized settlements have spread all over the peninsula. The guilty parties are individual and corporate persons in a position subsequently to prove that they took the plots on legal grounds. Regrettably, two-thirds of more than 300 Crimean Tatar settlements started in precisely such unlawful manner. Crimean Tatars refer to such acts as self-resettlement. People were refused parcels of land, so they seized them. Gradually, such settlements turned into miniature townships with streets and then local authorities began to legitimize them.”

“Some sources point to the Majlis making sure Crimean Tatars form very compact settlements. Why? Among other things, it is assumed that such compact settlements are intended as a political resource. Are such compact settlements so important for the Crimean Tatars?”

“Yes. Without compact settlements it is impossible to restore what we have already lost, our language. Crimean Tatar schools must be close to the homes of those studying at these schools. That’s the first argument explaining the need to have such compact settlements. Another one is religious. Religion is very important for the Crimean Tatars. But for the religious dedication of our parents, we’d find it very hard to survive the years of exile. At present, opening mosques among scattered settlements is next to impossible, in view of tangible resistance. I remember when we attempted to resume services at several surviving mosques in Simferopol and Yalta. We were met with a violent resistance. We were told that the people didn’t want mullahs ‘yelling’ from the minarets, and so on. Third, compact settlements make it possible to solve social problems. I don’t mean to offend anyone, but villages with 25-30% Crimean Tatar residents proved more effective in solving problems such as water supply, electing a good chairman — I don’t mean Tatar, Russian, or Ukrainian, I mean a decent and responsible individual taking communal problems close to heart, capable of maintaining normal relationships with tenant farmers. Where the Tatars constituted less than 10% of residents, they had to act like the rest, staying passive. We are prepared to cooperate with all the local political forces in combining efforts to solve social problems.”

FRIENDS AND FOES

“How do you picture the algorithm of solving the land issue in the Crimea? Anything lacking?”

“We lack the power structures’ good will and understanding — I mean the Crimean authorities in the first place, although I wouldn’t place all blame on them, because very often Crimean authorities depend on what Kyiv has to say. I believe (and we make no secrete of this; we mentioned this when meeting with the President of Ukraine) that it is necessary to take stock of all parcels of land allocated previously, so all unlawfully owned plots can be impounded and allocation priorities established (primarily with regard to the south seacoast). Plots must first be given to the ex-deportees and people (not only Tatars) in need of homes. Only then plots must be allocated for resorts, in areas where such projects are expedient. The main thing is to keep the land allocation process transparent, regardless of all priorities, so every such decision is made public. Unfortunately, despite all our attempts, only several prosecutors have entered protests against unlawful land allocations. Here is an example. The village of Amurske. There were 800 petitions filed by Crimean Tatars and other residents with the chairman of the village council, requesting at least two arable hectares per petitioner (which is in accordance with the law). At the same time, five residents of Simferopol requested fifty hectares each to set up farms. Normally, the council chairman would take care of the villagers first. Not in this case. He gave the Simferopol farmers over 700 hectares, meaning that each received over 100 hectares, leaving 800 families landless. By the way, the man has long moved to Russia, but the conflict is still there, lasting almost eight years. It can’t be settled because the original decision was made formally in keeping with the law.”

“Why don’t the people demand that the Crimean Parliament vote to deprive the village council chairmen of the right to allocate parcels of land?”

“It requires amending the law, which is the prerogative of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Sticking to stereotypes has its toll on the Crimea. What happened in Amurske wouldn’t be likely to happen anywhere in Zhytomyr or Kyiv oblast, because all parties concerned wouldn’t be divided on a friend-or-foe basis there — I mean those rightfully claiming plots, those making the decision, and those responsible for keeping such decisions lawful. In the Crimea, this friend-or-foe division holds. Very often, bureaucratic decisions are made depending on who is who, Tatar or not.”

“There are official land costs in the Crimea, yet local newspapers have land sale ads showing a tenfold difference.”

“Further evidence that land allocation priorities must be established. Tracing such ads would lead to a go- between selling someone else’s lawfully owned plot or, more likely, an intermediary between the powers that be and potential customers. Browsing the Internet, you’ll find plots for sale, measuring not several sotkas but twenty or twenty-five hectares.”

“Where is the largest number of de facto owners of Crimean plots?”

“I don’t have exact figures, but an intelligent guess points to Kyiv, Moscow, and Simferopol.”

“Does the friend-or-foe discrimination exist for the so-called ordinary Crimean residents?”

“You can’t compare the situation fifteen years ago to what we have now. Fortunately, the level of confrontation has noticeably lowered, but I wouldn’t idealize the current status. As a rule, there is no discrimination in routine interethnic relationships, but when a decision is made in regard to a problem affecting a social group, another group’s response may not be tolerant. For example, if some of the village residents decide to build a temple (I am not specifying, mind you), and if the site is allocated in the center of the village, the other side may well consider this as an infringement on their rights, the more so if they also happen to decide to build their temple there and are offered a different site. Such problems could be avoided if the local bureaucrats were better cultured individuals, for any village offers enough space even for three temples. A lot depends on the media and it’s especially true of the Crimea. I understand their problems. Journalists have a hard time defending their independence in Kyiv, so you can imagine what it’s like for your regional colleagues. The adverse ethnic stereotypes persisting in the Crimea are largely the doing of the local press. Some media, especially newspapers, have openly taken anti- Tatar and anti-Ukrainian stands. As a rule, anti-Ukrainian media are also anti-Tatar, although not all of the anti-Tatar ones are as much opposed to the Ukrainians. In other words, their owners are careful not to broach the Ukrainian subject, because it involves the Ukrainian state, but they never hesitate to attack the Crimean Tatars, knowing that authorities aren’t likely to come out in their defense.”

DIALOG FORMAT

“We know that the bill restoring the rights of the deportees has received varying responses from the Crimean Tatar community. It has been criticized by the Coordinating Sociopolitical Council of the Crimean Tatar People; they insist that it will not secure a ‘full- scale rehabilitation’ of the Crimean Tatar people.”

“There are very different approaches to the restoration of the Crimean Tatar rights. Everybody understands that these rights must be restored, but different solutions are proposed. If this bill is passed shortly, I think it will be attacked from different directions. Some Crimean Tatars would want all issues resolved in a single law — I mean economic as well as legal problems. On the other hand, I try to explain to my interlocutors (not opponents, I don’t refer to them as such, because I know that they also mean well to our people) that we must proceed from the realities. Besides, I believe that, by taking the first step, if we actually take it, we will necessarily take the second one, again provided this step will be understandable to all participants in the economic and legal process in Ukraine.”

“There has been little press coverage of the meeting between President Leonid Kuchma and Majlis leadership in early April. Could you give us some particulars?”

“Also present were Head of the Presidential Administration Viktor Medvedchuk, Crimean Prime Minister Serhiy Kunitsin, Presidential Representative to the Crimea Oleksandr Didenko, Majlis Speaker Mustafa Dzhemilyov, yours truly as his deputy, and Ilma Umerov, member of the Majlis and Deputy Speaker of the Crimean Parliament. We discussed many topics and precisely a week later the President signed an instruction prepared by us jointly with the Presidential Administration. The document addresses the land issue, the cultural sphere, events commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the deportation, and so on. I found the atmosphere of the meeting and the president’s attitude toward the subjects we broached quite satisfactory. Now we can only hope the local bureaucrats will do everything properly. We also discussed the threat of the Crimean Tatar factor being used outside Ukraine. We drew the President’s attention to certain trends which we believe can be a threat to the Crimea. We spoke about the media and destructive attitudes on the part of certain Ukrainian politicians. We told the President that some experts attribute the stand taken by these politicians to that of the Presidential Administration. Mr. Medvedchuk refuted the allegation. We suggested that he make a public statement to the effect that certain politicians are not carrying out his instructions. It was a very frank conversation.”

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