RUNOFF ELECTION: WHAT’S A WIN-WIN FORMULA FOR UKRAINE’S FUTURE?
The first round of the presidential elections has taken place in Ukraine. Overall, both the voting and the vote count passed calmly, in sharp contrast to the pessimistic forecasts. Aside from numerous violations, such as inadequately prepared polling stations and mistakes in voter rolls, there was no mass rigging that would significantly affect the voting results. All major political forces have shown that they understand the real threat of political destabilization. Of special significance for the future is the very complex and responsible decision made by the opposition leader to call off mass rallies in the square facing the Central Election Committee. No less significant and positive is the self-possession of the government and uniformed services and their ability not to yield to possible provocations. This political maturity, displayed by both presidential frontrunners and their camps, is the main positive result of the first round of the presidential elections.
All exit polls without exception and the preliminary vote count announced by the Central Election Committee suggest that Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych each enjoy the support of 40% of voters. Unlike during the presidential elections in 1994 and 1999, this time the third most popular nominee Socialist Party Leader Oleksandr Moroz did not receive even 6% of the popular vote. The first round of the elections has already shown an unprecedented concentration of voter support for the two presidential frontrunners, which is typical only of the runoff. Both victors have used up most of the aces up their sleeves to mobilize popular support. Already by September and October both Yushchenko and Yanukovych had proposed creating a broad coalition of “popular trust,” a technology that is normally used only before the runoff. Therefore, November 21 will in fact see a repeat election with all the resulting consequences.
In these elections leftist candidates were dealt the most significant defeat in the history of independent Ukraine. In all, Moroz, Symonenko, and Vitrenko garnered no more than 12% of the vote. However, these results do not suggest a decline of socialist and communist ideas in Ukraine. On the one hand, the resources of the leftists’ post-Soviet nostalgic model are almost fully exhausted. So we should expect more dynamic transformational processes in the ranks of the Communists. That the Socialist Party leader gained a 0.5% edge over the Communist leader will help the Communist Party to better understand the need for change.
On the other hand, the defeat of the leftists is proof of the largely non-ideological nature of the 2004 elections. Campaigns built on the antagonism between the political myths of “hope” versus “stability,” as personified by the frontrunners, have significantly leveled all other factors of electoral choice, which are otherwise crucial. The activation of the oldest binary archetypes in the public consciousness, which took place in this campaign, explains the excessive role played by irrational factors in the voters’ decision-making process.
One of the consequences of such a campaign scenario is the artificial activation of historical socio-cultural differences among Ukraine’s regions. The results of the Sunday vote show that while Yushchenko scored an undisputed victory in the country’s western and central regions, Yanukovych secured unquestionable support in Ukraine’s south and east. In these conditions, the use of linguistic, ethnic, national, religious, and other similar factors in the campaign requires the utmost caution and sense of responsibility. Notably, while building a strategy and tactics for the two frontrunners during the two remaining weeks in November, it is imperative to take into account the highly active external forces that are aimed at deepening the regional, primarily socio-cultural, antagonisms in our country.
Another consequence of the mythical scenario of the election campaign is its excessively conflict-prone nature. As we know, good and evil cannot agree in principle. Without denying this axiom in general, we would like to remind you of another undeniable political truth: to believe in self-created myths and begin to perceive the world through their lens is a major threat to a politician. By contrast, arguably the most important trait of responsible political elites is their ability to forge a compromise for the sake of the nation’s future and hence their own future.
Recognizing how difficult it is to reach public agreements between two election rounds, we nonetheless believe that the coming two weeks should be used not only to solve short-term goals of the pre-election tug-of-war, but also to hold talks aimed at finding mutually acceptable arrangements. Such a compromise could be legitimized after the elections by creating a coalition government that enjoys public trust. At the same time, it is not worthwhile ruling out the possibility of a quick passage of the constitutional reform, whole or piecemeal, in the form of the laws “On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine,” “On the President of Ukraine,” “On the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.”
The key item on the current political agenda should be a viable pact among the elites for the coming eighteen months, i.e., until the 2006 parliamentary elections. The major goals of such a pact should be ensuring the controllability of sociopolitical processes in Ukraine, maintaining positive trends in the socioeconomic sphere, and implementing the European choice strategy and fundamental reforms that are vital for successful development. The immediate priority is a court reform, i.e., the introduction of reliable and effective mechanisms of ensuring legal and human rights and freedoms of citizens, guaranteed by independent courts. Second, there is a need to finally regulate relations in the political sphere by implementing the long overdue political reform by March 2006. Third, there is the need to map out a government policy toward large national businesses and to outline mechanisms for regulating their influence on political processes in the country. Fourth, there is a need for a fundamental administrative and administrative-territorial reform aimed at creating bureaucratic accountability as a systemic governmental factor. Finally, national defense, namely the army and the uniformed services, also need fundamental reforms.
The camps of both frontrunners have powerful “parties of war” that think it is possible and appropriate to use the winner-takes-all formula. Yet the results of the October 31 vote are convincing proof that an alternative to the pact of elites will be an uncompromising political confrontation of two opponents in the same weight class, which could not only result in the self- destruction of the political elite, but also threaten the lives of ordinary Ukrainians. In this conflict there will be no winners in Ukraine, perhaps only beyond its borders.
Wise politicians, who form the overwhelming majority in both the People’s Power coalition and the camp of the pro-government nominee, must sacrifice their ambitions. Ukraine’s political elite has every opportunity to prove that it can meet the challenge of time. Let’s hope that it uses this chance. Cause for such hopes is the level-headed and responsible attitude of our politicians, which they demonstrated on October 31, as well as the generally favorable social atmosphere.
