Russia Incorporated

What is happening now in Russia? What opportunities and problems is Ukraine faced with in the current situation with Russia?

Viktor PUKHOV: Our fund’s experts predict three scenarios of Russia’s position in the world by 2010.

Under the first one, Russia will become part of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance as its relationships with the United States and EU evolve, and as Russia will be involved in the strategic logic of NATO. As a result, an official or informal organization will emerge in the northern hemisphere to deal with major problems. I regard this scenario as the most optimistic and the least realistic. First, it doesn’t take into account the US factor. Washington isn’t likely to share its role as the world — and even less so as the West’s — leading power with anyone. By entering the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, Russia with its territory, nuclear potential, and other resources would upset the US-European balance of forces, and this will inevitably call into question US leadership. Second, there is an extremely limited possibility of Russia integrating into NATO. Russia’s appearance there would cause a number of problems for the leading European countries, primarily by lowering their ratio within the alliance. Russia’s geopolitical and geostrategic importance in the heart of Eurasia, it being the key continent in the modern world, is by far greater than that of Great Britain, France, Germany — or even the whole European Union. This became evident especially after what had happened in Afghanistan and Iraq. For this reason, Russia’s complete integration into NATO is unlikely. There could be a degree of interaction, with Russia receiving a certain voice in dealing with certain political problems of the alliance.

The second scenario sees Russia becoming part of Europe politically and economically. I think this is the most logical one, yet there are substantial barriers to making it a reality, primarily objective ones. Neither Russia nor Europe is prepared to digest Russia’s EU membership, and without Russia’s integration into Europe, the latter would be incomplete. The second group of restrictions has to do with the views and sentiments of the key world players. As has been mentioned, the United States is not interested in Russia becoming a full-fledged component of Europe, just as Europe has not as yet decided whether it wants to become an independent center of power, given its strategic cooperation with America, or to accept unconditional US leadership. In fact, Russia is not totally clear about its long-term guidelines either.

The third scenario has it that Russia will evolve in a globalizing world as an independent center of power, doing so in many respects, in a way reminiscent of China. This scenario looks most natural for Russia historically, since it already has been such a center. In terms of world politics, this option would be greeted by many countries, among them China, India, the Arab states, and certain forces in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. Russia as an independent center of power would probably allow the maintenance of a reasonable world balance and a multipolar world, something most countries would like to have.

These two approaches will exist and compete in Russia in the foreseeable future. The first, West-oriented and liberal, will proceed from long-term Russian-EU-NATO rapprochement, aimed at securing Russian influence on EU and NATO policies. Those supporting this approach believe that rapprochement with the West is generally important for Russia from the standpoint of both foreign and domestic policy, among other things to ease the bureaucratic burden on the Russian economy and to provide [adequate] working conditions in a competitive economic environment. This also applies to Russia’s WTO membership, and an attempt to become a center of power is regarded as tantamount to self-isolation from the rest of the world. The other approach, currently faced by the Russian political elite, is democratic statehood; Russia must again try to become an independent superpower, since its accession to the Western alliance is possible only at the expense of its vital national interests. The exponents of this approach believe that no substantial changes will take place in the status of Russia in the next eight years — that there will be no serious transformations anyway. Without doubt, (a) finally defining Russia’s economic model or retaining its current course and (b) modernization based on the development of high technologies will be the most important factor of that country’s future stand in the world. I think that no cataclysms will occur in Russia’s domestic political system before 2008. No one doubts that Putin will be elected for a second term, among other things owing to the presence of the same political high society. After all, a single new political figure hasn’t appeared there in the past decade.

Anatoly HUTSAL: We face the same situation as Russia, considering what is happening elsewhere in the world. In the sense that we are not among the decision-making participants in that process. On the contrary, we are dependent on such participants. In fact, many bilateral issues are often resolved with an eye to a third party’s likely response — be it from Europe, the United States, or from someone else.

Russia is now soul-searching even more than it did under Yeltsin. At the time one could see a degree of stability and national identification; Russia borrowed something from the Soviet Union and something from the former Russian Empire. The result was a kind of synthetic formula that is now being destroyed. Many things associated with imperial grandeur are gradually being discarded, a new picture of the world is being formed, meaning above all a new architecture of world security.

The most dangerous thing for Ukraine would be failing to fit into the new world model currently taking shape and finding itself on the periphery of world processes. Actually, how we build our relationships with NATO, Europe, and Iraq is an attempt to fit into those world processes, even though we have no clear idea of that future world architecture. The same is true of Russia. In other words, each country is competing for its place in the world, although we understand that each remains in its weight category. Is this good or bad? Generally speaking, it is not very effective in terms of a new picture of the world being shaped on a cooperative basis. The advanced countries are primarily looking for ways to maintain effective cooperation. This has been accomplished in the economy, while in politics it is still being adjusted to each other.

A final important nuance is that Russia is to Ukraine a powerful generating center in terms of projecting models of political conduct, political technologies, intellect, science, and the economy simply because Russia and Ukraine have so much in common socially and culturally, having evolved within the same framework of civilization. In this sense we may find Russian recommendations quite useful. At the same time, they could be very dangerous if offered for the [secret] purpose of destabilizing the situation. Here we are very susceptible to Russia and less so to recommendations from the West.

Oleh MEDVEDEV: Let me try to formulate how we from here see what’s going on in Russia. At this stage it looks like a quickly and dynamically evolving country. Indeed, Russia has made a number of impressive attainments; economic growth for the past five years, intensively developing the private sector, business infrastructure, noticeably rising living standard (the latter produces the effect of “improving social condition of the people of Russia” and increasingly optimistic moods and expectations). Finally, Russia’s improving international image, at times spectacularly so. In most cases such progress is associated with Russian President Vladimir Putin, although I think that it is utterly unfair to forget the role played by his predecessors Gorbachev and Yeltsin who shouldered the heavy burden of cleaning the Augean stables. Perhaps future historians (including in Russia) will appreciate their efforts. At the moment, with the Kremlin keeping the media completely under control, what is traditionally referred to as Putin’s popularity ratings is being transformed into a personality cult. Popularity ratings are possible to discuss under the conditions of a free press, competition of ideas, positions, views, and personalities. Regrettably, none of this is left in Russia, as Putin’s course boils down to the well-known triad of a liberal economy, controllable or authoritarian democracy, and a pro-Western foreign policy (as of September 2001). At the same time, tactically speaking, Russia is trying to solve the problem of economic modernization. I believe that Russia is faced with yet another, nonetheless serious problem of political modernization. In terms of politics, Russia is outmoding rather than upgrading its political system, moving further away from European standards. On the one hand, Vladimir Putin has to be credited with putting an end to the excesses of the Yeltsin epoch, when democracy would now and then turn into anarchy. He restored the manageability of the state, but most importantly, he secured uniformity in the legal and economic domains. Many Russian analysts insist that, in 1999, Russia was a confederation made up of 89 regions, rather than a federation. Putin, however, could not help going to the other extreme; at present, power in Russia is wielded by a narrow circle consisting of two rival groups, the so-called Cheka men of St. Petersburg and the Old Family. The Russian parliament, especially the Upper House (Council of the Federation), has a purely technical function, the regional elites keep silent, and local self-government is suppressed. In sum, we would want to see Russia modernized economically as well — and even more importantly — politically. It is true that, after all is said and done, Russia’s policy with regard to Ukraine will not be seriously affected by that country’s status. I have a feeling that Russia, whether democratic or authoritarian, will spend decades and perhaps centuries regarding Ukraine as rightfully being its own. Discarding our traditional let-the-man-next-door-suffer approach, we wish our neighbor to fare well, to effectively resolve his problems of economic and political modernization. In any case, having a democratic Russia next door is better than an unpredictable authoritarian state.

Is there a difference between Yeltsin’s and Putin’s policies toward Ukraine? And if so, what?

Oleh MEDVEDIEV: I think Russia’s political strategy is aimed at keeping Ukraine in its sphere of interest, although I’d say that Putin is more subtle in carrying out this policy, he shows more skill and pragmatism, employing all kinds of innovative techniques. Many in Ukraine are still waiting for Russia to declare that it wants us to rejoin it. They should know better; it will never happen. There are new means of influence in the modern world, so there is no need to go about it by forming another union or some kind of single space. It is enough to take a sober look at the degree of Russia’s impact on the Ukrainian economy, politics, human sector, and so on.

PUKHOV: Speaking of Russian policy toward Ukraine, I can tell you with utmost confidence that there has never been a strategic course there. And, quite honestly, I wouldn’t even venture to describe it. Take the meetings between our leaders. Their public relations aspect has been thoroughly hyped by literally all the media, yet this is by no means a criterion in assessing relationships or any strategic programs by one country concerning any other. The fact remains that the most recent forums, despite all those incredible arrangements, failed to yield the expected results. Russia actually faces more problems than Ukraine probably does, so there is simply no strategic line whatsoever. When they point to [Russian] capital and businesses operating in your country, I am sure that, should any Ukrainian businesses have any interests in Russia, they’d surely get along there as well.

A very interesting observation, but suppose we focus on this. Our experts say that, just as Yeltsin said, “You should ask yourselves precisely what you have done for Ukraine,” explicit instructions were issued upstairs, to the effect that there should be no joint ventures made with Ukraine, especially in terms of defenses. Granted, there is no purposeful policy at the top, because all those instincts and actions made on the spur of the moment prove damaging, as they will be made public knowledge sooner or later. The elite on both sides knows this only too well; they also know precisely what is happening. It’s just that no formal statements are made. Meaning that the stables must be cleaned, so one can figure out what is in which condition, what modern models can be offered, what expectations can be promoted, what issues can be resolved, what is there to make both sides interested or not, why some stereotypes survive and multiply. Things like this are of utmost importance to the elite...

Oleksandr LYTVYNENKO: After communism started to degrade in the late 1970s, Russia realized it was necessary to formulate its existence under fundamentally new conditions and answer questions like what we are here for and what we have to accomplish to justify our presence. This issue surfaced in the 1990s and I don’t think it has been solved in the way best for Ukraine (considering numerous indicators, specifically Vladimir Putin’s latest message to the Russian parliament). Characteristically, the Russian journal Expert commented on his message to the effect that Russia has throughout its history waged a policy of expansion, so it must keep up such expansion, forgetting that such expansion was more justified in the past. I believe that democratic Russia’s expansionism can be as damaging to Ukraine as that practiced by [any given] authoritarian regime.

Also, to raise the question of what kind of Russia they actually need (here I would like to extend special thanks to The Day), it is necessary to facilitate — and in every way support — the establishment of Ukrainian schools of Russian studies, scientific analyses of our closest neighbor’s perception. Indeed, we are witness to Russia and Ukraine struggling to fit into the modern world. However, I imagine that the roles we are playing and will try to play in the next five to ten years cannot be regarded as final. Therefore, positioning Ukrainian-Russian relationships (so very important as they are) within the Russia-US-Europe-Ukraine rectangle seems worthwhile if viewed in the short or medium term. Long-term prospects require the introduction of Chinese parameters — and the PRC is taking a quite active stand, primarily in regard to Russia, the Moslem world, even Latin America. It stands to reason that we are all in a sufficiently favorable situation at the moment; we can shape Ukrainian-Russian relationships with fewer factors involved than there will be 15-20 years from now. Unless we make the most of this opportunity, we will have to cope with the same problems, but in much more complex circumstances.

HUTSAL: A couple of remarks, if I may. I think that Russia is trying to answer the question, To be or seem to be, given its ongoing self- identification process. Putin’s Russia is different from Yeltsin’s Russia in that Putin tries to see Russia for what it really is. He outlines problems clearly and without observing the dictates of Western political protocol. Those [wielding power] in Russia know only too well that instilling European democractic standards in that country is quite difficult, considering the Russian social tradition. And they say so openly. By the way, this is what makes Russia different from Ukraine. We are not sure as yet what will happen after we try to instill those European standards.

I agree that the Russian policy has remained situational rather than systemic. But there are distinctions. Yeltsin’s policy relied on administrative coercion. Russia’s current foreign policy proceeds from the interests of various political groups and oligarchic clans.

The latest summit in St. Petersburg seems to refute your assumption in many respects. Outwardly, the whole thing looked very much like a show...

HUTSAL: The West very likely viewed it that way.

Judging by Western media coverage, many people expected the heads of states to show new initiatives, that they would take new steps. In a word, they expected the summit to mark a special event in history. Instead, they demonstrated what’s probably best described as small European hinged window panes... Many people in Ukraine say we should enter Europe together with Russia. I think a less logical assumption would be difficult to contrive. Russia doesn’t get such facts straight. The Russians believe that their country represents a special kind of civilization. It would be wrong to say that Europe is good and Russia is bad in every respect. After all, Russia may have a different kind of future; it might eventually reconsider certain things, harness its internal resources, and emerge quite attractive in the end.

HUTSAL: What came to pass in St. Petersburg was a classic Russian response. Russia has never behaved in any other manner throughout its history. Luxury and pomp. That’s Russia. Nothing has changed. Russia may have failed to show anything new or desired by Europe or America, but it showed itself for what it really was, without false modesty.

(To be continued)