Signals of Readiness
After the pontifical visit, after what the Ukrainian leadership believes to be positive signals from the EU summit in GЪteborg, and after the Ukrainian-Polish summit in the general context of livening up diplomatic activity, there has been talk in Kyiv and in the West about Ukraine’s rehabilitation. In any case, such is the opinion of Ukrainian politicians and the British press. Indeed, outwardly the political environs look once again favorable, at least if compared to the level reached last year, although no mention has been made of anything fundamentally new in the relationship between Ukraine and the West. Most likely, the situation should be viewed pragmatically.
The Pope’s visit was a political move in the first place and the fact has been mutually recognized, causing quite some discomfort within the Russian Orthodox Church. It is also true that this discomfort proved to contribute to the visit’s success. Former Foreign Minister Hennady Udovenko went as far as saying that the decision to invite the pontiff was Ukraine’s first truly independent step made without looking back at Moscow. His current counterpart Anatoly Zlenko also said that the ROC had not attained its goal (without specifying it, but few would doubt that the Moscow Patriarchate was out to uphold Moscow’s stand; Moscow does not mind Ukraine’s cooperation with the West but only so long as it is kept under Moscow’s control).
The pontifical visit turned out an event of great psychological impact; earlier the ROC tolerated the Vicar of Christ visiting Romania, Bulgaria, even Georgia. But Ukraine which Moscow continues to regard as its canonical territory! Also, the visit made a tremendous contribution as a true information breakthrough in the West concerning Ukraine. While previously it was mostly an information blockade and then, in the aftermath of the tape scandal, the information was obviously one-sided, now the pontifical visit and the attendant circumstances received media coverage embracing various aspects of life in Ukraine. This is likely to have its effect on Western political stands regarding Kyiv, just as the Vatican’s position is likely to be taken into account when working out Western strategies in the East, as well as various political moves, although all of this will remain off-screen politically.
So far it is possible to assume that the Eastern policy of the European Union in general and separate member countries in particular is simply becoming real, meaning that, without changing its essence, this policy is more reality-oriented than, say, half a year ago.
STABILITY UBER ALLES ?
The reality is that the Ukrainian president has proven that he is in the center of real power, and that everybody will have to deal with him, even though he shows a standard distinctly other than the much-advertised Western one. Ukraine cannot be shrugged off, because it really is an important country and might eventually develop an important market and become an important EU and NATO partner in many spheres. In fact, EU and NATO leadership have often mentioned this and Swedish Premier Goran Persson emphasizes this in his article (he did a great deal to return the situation to last year’s status quo while his country presided over the EU). More evidence is EU Foreign and Security Policy High Commissioner Javier Solana’s visit to Kyiv, planned for over a year, and that Leonid Kuchma and Aleksander Kwasniewski met almost immediately after the pontifical visit. In a word, one can no longer complain about the West’s lack of attention to Ukraine.
Indeed, the EU has admitted that it did not pay enough attention to Ukraine previously, but this does not mean that Brussels’ Ukrainian policy will be revised as a whole and that Ukraine will be offered not “partnership” (implying no commitments) but specific and complicated work in preparing for at least associate EU membership.
There was also news, which passed almost unnoticed, concerning the results of the Ukraine-EU Cooperation Council, where Ukraine was represented by Premier Anatoly Kinakh. The European Union promised to assist Ukraine with the equipment of its eastern frontiers. This can be regarded as the first step toward a serious dialogue about Europe’s united future and certain mechanisms to prevent Europe’s rigid division and Ukraine’s new isolation. Yet, there is still a long way to go to such a dialogue.
Western experts and diplomats often agree that Western Europe needs internal reform, along with the required EU reforms (evidence of this need is found in numerous political scandals), and that with all this on hand Ukraine will be treated as a minor issue. The more so that Western political leaders and societies are not yet prepared to critically revise stereotypes dating from the Cold War, and changes in mentality are known to require most time and energy.
The main thing is that the West, with its numerous problems, is now interested in maintaining a degree of stability in the east of Europe, so it is noticeably less scrupulous about the methods of such stability or their consequences for any given country of the region or Europe as a whole. Many politicians, media outlets, and experts find it most convenient to approach Ukraine within the context of Western-Russian relationships; they believe that this status will not change in the next decade, even if Ukraine registers unprecedented achievements. Under the circumstances, the invitation of Ukraine and Moldova to attend the European conference means that both countries are in Europe, whether or not they become EU members. And this is a fact to be reckoned with.
Perhaps, what Lord George Robertson had to say in Kyiv about the NATO-Ukraine-Russia triangle and its importance for European security and stability should be understood in precisely this context. At the same time, this desire for stability could play into Ukraine’s hand when discussing the possibility of its participation in the Eurocorps (EU-controlled military formation, most likely as a peacekeeping force). If effective, this, in turn, could be regarded as the first step toward actual partnership, and as its first sign.
EUROPEAN-ATLANTIC DIMENSIONS
NATO is a somewhat different story. Its leadership has never criticized Ukrainian democracy, just as it has never evaded meetings with representatives of the Ukrainian establishment. Perhaps this is because NATO pursues objectives different in principle from the European Union, with overall stability top on the list. One of the tools in its box was recently demonstrated in Yugoslavia. Lord Robertson assured The Day once that NATO would never perform any operations in any member territories. On another occasion he declared that Ukraine was free to choose whatever Transatlantic standards it found acceptable. Now statements like that are not to be treated lightly and choosing the Belarus model would cause the West to respond in a predictable manner.
We hear from politicians that the issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership is not on the agenda as yet. Yet Ukrainian and Western experts, feeling far less restrained, believe that even discussing the possibility in the next decade would be utterly unrealistic — as in the case with European integration.
So far Ukraine’s integration into the European-Atlantic space has only one dimension; roughly speaking, Kyiv enjoys receiving NATO money for using Ukrainian target ranges and waters for peacekeepers’ training, and Ukrainian units willingly participate in NATO-funded peacekeeping missions. Ukraine appreciates NATO’s admission of Ukrainian peacekeepers to such missions... Three dots, indeed, because what we hear about as “special partnership” so far has neither any clearly defined strategy, nor unequivocal prospects, let alone a formula of Ukraine’s role in the system of international relations as an active subject. This was demonstrated by the US rejection of Ukraine as a party to the talks on the 1972 ABM Treaty.
During his last visit to Kyiv, Lord Robertson said that Ukraine’s military-technological cooperation with NATO countries is a matter for the future. Well, it is good to know that no one is denying the possibility.
Frequent contacts between Ukrainian and NATO leaders, which have taken place “in all kinds of weather,” are evidence that Ukraine has not yet been written off and that there are many things still to be negotiated and arrangements to be made. In this sense Ukraine lacks its own clear concept, which, in turn, is caused by a host of domestic political and social problems.
In all fairness, Ukraine could well lose its rehabilitation pace in its relations with the West and finally deviate from its much-advertised course of European integration. We were promised a European integration ministry. Nothing happened. There is a pile of bills meant at least to help narrow the gap between our and European legal practice still to pass Verkhovna Rada, and consider that the new legislation will by no means guarantee implementation at all levels of authority. There is no aggressive information policy to this end. The state seems to be doing its best to let foreign investment, the transit of goods and services, and tourist revenues pass us by. It is a well-known fact that a single publication can ruin a wealth of diplomatic efforts.
Among Ukraine’s failures one could mention the attempt to develop a new cargo plane model based on the An-70 jointly with Western European countries, to negotiate a free trade zone between Ukraine and EU, to avoid visa procedures with countries listed as EU candidate members, and to join the Balkan Stability Pact (Moldova did just that recently). Many Western experts believe the Eurasian oil pipeline project will also go down the drain.
On the other hand, the first signals from Brussels, the introduction of mechanisms of Ukraine’s multilateral cooperation with its Western neighbors, and the appearance of new accents in the Western press leave one with the feeling that some changes are bound to happen before long. Whether or not they will be revolutionary is not the point. The point is that they could have never happened if, for example, Ukraine had chosen the path along which Belarus is marching with such confidence and which inspires so many in Ukraine. A clearly defined stand taken by the Ukrainian establishment, acceptance of the ideas of genuine European integration, along with numerous expert discussions held in public, voicing the pros and cons, being prepared to sacrifice certain tactical aspects, and discarding the policy of constant foreign political balancing for the sake of strict protection of our national interests — all this cannot help but make the West really change accents. And events over the past several months show that the West is prepared to take realities into account.
