To Slay the Dragon

SYMBOLS AND ARGUMENTS

We have received numerous calls from our readers, asking us to explain what is actually happening, how all this will end, and how to untangle that knot into which the most important events of the year — the political reform, Single Economic Space, and so on — have been tied. How can one classify all this? What are thinking Ukrainians to be proposed, as well as those in power that are also trying to find a way out? We know that there was a very relevant round table at the East-West Institute recently. What were the most important conclusions reached there?

Serhiy MAKSYMENKO: Yes, that round table hosted a heated and open discussion. On my way home last night I asked the driver what he thought about Ukraine joining the SES and what he knew about it. He said, ‘I’m an ordinary citizen and no expert on such things, but I feel ashamed for our country. If we proclaimed independence, why not move in that direction?’ He added that he could clearly see that the whole thing on Russia’s initiative was aimed at returning us back to the Soviet Union. Simplistic perhaps, but my own views tally with that ordinary man’s 101%. Not so long ago I returned from Moscow (we had a meeting of the institute’s board there). There I spoke with leaders of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. Of course, they never used the words Soviet Union, but made no secret that the economic component of forming the SES means nothing.

How do you think the parliament will feel about the draft SES agreement?

MAKSYMENKO: They’ll most likely take their time ratifying it, because of red tape or because of certain forces in the parliament.

Iryna ROZHKOVA: Forming the SES reveals a systemic problem in the higher echelons of power: opacity in making decisions that have nationwide importance and then presenting the people with the faits accomplis of what they did. Then the politicians begin to discuss emotionally and capitalize on them in general. Experts and, very likely, most citizens realize that the referendum proposal is a good opportunity to build one’s political image — as in the case of the Communists who add fuel to the fire and thus get political dividends. Actually, both the Ukrainian and Russian sides will reap political dividends. However, I’d like to draw your attention to specific aspects. The situation that has developed has allowed some of those involved in certain business spheres to solve their own specific problems. It’s a reality which no one thinks proper to discuss. It is there anyway. In other words, we have two aspects, the real one, mentioned by few, and the public one, discussed by one and all.

It seems that the details relating to business interests remain little known. Yet the important thing is that the cabinet has for the first time held a quite frank discussion on the subject. All the ministers concerned voiced their disagreement. This was truly unprecedented. Another socially important thing happened the next day when Viktor Yanukovych said that the SES was good. Although we all understand that all the admonitions we’re talking about boil down to formula “everything that doesn’t contradict the Constitution.” However, what will be left of the document after deleting all provisions running counter to the Constitution? The point is that Ukrainian politicians and experts sometimes also avoid passing judgments and speaking, using universally accepted standards. For otherwise they’d find themselves in a very embarrassing situation with regard to those in power. Economy and European Integration Minister Valery Khoroshkovsky says the future entity is interpreted in different ways. We talk about a free trade zone, and they about a customs union. Which of the experts will please clarify the matter: What has been actually signed and what will come out of it?

Oleksandr LYTVYNENKO: An analysis of the current treaty and legal basis with Russia — especially the Grand Treaty of 1997, the 1998-2007 Economic Cooperation Program, and the CIS accords shows that there has actually been nothing accomplished in the SES framework agreement. If all the parties concerned really wanted to go along with this basis, we would already have what we’re supposed to be after through the new agreement. In other words, the question is: Why do this anyway? Second, if we believe that this agreement can be implemented, there is another question: If Russia wants this so much, why hasn’t it integrated Belarus, considering that the latter is much weaker, with an extremely weak elite, significant economic and other problems? I’d say that there is yet another problem here. This agreement should be viewed precisely in symbolic terms. The SES agreement is a symbolic act calculated on several planes. To understand what makes Russia want this agreement, one has to address a broader context. This consists of several layers. First is the tactical-strategic level for Russia, the problem of the elections. In our discussions, we very often forget that the Russian parliamentary election will take place in December and the presidential one in March. Putin has to convince the electorate that he is “gathering the lands of Rus’.” Another aspect is that Russia, after 500-600 years of its existence, is turning from a subject of foreign policy into an object of a foreign political game being played by the US, Europe, and China. This situation is intolerable for the Russian elite, and its members are trying to find a way out. Moreover, there are powerful enough forces in Russia that have made their objective choice. Yet even they realize that the larger their symbolic capital (Ukraine being key here), the stronger their preferential status in the future situations. The Russian Federation has its reasons for making the agreement. Therefore, I don’t see any major prospects for the SES as an economic project.

On the other hand, Ukraine has found itself in an extraordinarily complicated situation with the presidential election a year away. Our political figures and experts show a telltale response to an obviously bad symptom, the SES dispute between the US and Russian Ambassadors Herbst and Chernomyrdin. Herbst voiced his opinion in a way that could be interpreted any way one likes. A week passed in silence, then came Moscow’s vociferous response and it all started. The important point is that Ukraine’s choice and future are disputed not by domestic politicians, but by two foreign ambassadors. In this sense Ukraine emerges not as a subject of international relations, not as a state, but as a certain territory. This is a very bad signal.

Is it just one more symbol?

LYTVENENKO: Actually, it’s a symbolic situation. On the one hand, we’re losing what’s left of our status as an active subject; on the other, a very complicated situation is developing domestically. The Constitutional reform (I still think that it had its objective preconditions: the need to strengthen the parliament and effect a transfer of power), after the appearance of a fourth bill, and with a fifth one in the making, is turning into a...

Farce?

LYTVYNENKO: I didn’t say that... However, Ukraine is faced with two important questions: what to do with the 2004 elections, how to carry them out. And, on the other hand, how to fit into the fast changing foreign political context.

“THE SES IS A SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISHED MISSION”

Who can answer such questions?

LYTVYNENKO: We’ll all try.

MAKSYMENKO: I agree with your thesis concerning the situation in Russia and also that the SES will have minimal economic impact, including on Russia. But I don’t think that the elections in Russia are the main reason for this project. After all is said and done, Russia has made such efforts for the past three years. It’s a reflection of the current world realities. In this sense, I think that the way all this has been articulated by Ukraine is more important.

Larysa IVSHYNA: The Yalta press conference and Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s remarks point more to this symbolic action’s foreign policy effect. At the same time, the whole thing has a somewhat different meaning for Ukraine: its competition with Russia and steps toward European integration. I turn your attention to Symonenko’s interview in one Kyiv newspaper. He says Ukraine would be better off to slow down a bit, so it could join the WTO together with Russia. I wasn’t surprised by his stand, but I was surprised to realize that many people still support it. However, this position — think about Russia first and then about Ukraine — in Symonenko’s mouth speaks about the usefulness of Russian lobbyists competing with Ukraine. It’s just a way to hold back Ukraine and give a signal to the West that Ukraine is in no hurry to move in that direction, so that eventually Russia and the US will solve their problems, sidestepping Ukraine, and that we will again be given a minor supporting role. Few mention tough things like competition, while we have to learn to identify such things, qualify them, and discuss them, to use contemporary terms. And if our elite remains silent, it becomes clear that we haven’t yet formulated a public code of behavior from the standpoint of Ukrainian national interests. This silence speaks only about political survival, not about life in the full sense of the word; it means to camouflage oneself, wait, bide one’s time, hoping that perhaps it will all just go away. Such logic is not that of a mature political elite. But in fact this is not the logic of behavior of a healthy political elite, although even posing the question in this way is already a challenge.

LYTVYNENKO: The crux of the matter is that this project isn’t meant to be carried out. From the Russian point of view, it has already played its role.

Do you think Ukraine has benefited from this in any way?

LYTVYNENKO: Here again one has to answer the question of what is Russia and what is Ukraine. In any case the country is a very complicated system. Of course, certain individuals and groups in Ukraine have reaped considerable advantages. In this sense, one might proceed from the formula that what’s good for General Motors is good for America.

We don’t have General Motors in Ukraine; maybe this is what makes our situation special...

LYTVYNENKO: We’ve already missed the time to establish our own corporations.

Yes, we have wasted time sitting in the shadow of the great empire. Mr. Maksymenko, you saw the round table at your institute. Did you feel that different Ukrainian politicians, while defending or objecting to an idea — for example, the SES — still use a common language or categories?

MAKSYMENKO: This is not a simple question, and it could take a very long time to answer. In short, the discussion was interesting, and the conference did provide material for analysis, conclusions, and so forth. In a broader context, considering what’s been happening of late, I think that no matter what, Ukraine has shown a degree of unity, rallying round values that may not even be formalized, but have taken some shape. Also, I find it hard to agree that the SES project doesn’t have any geopolitical prospects; its architects have received certain results that they are satisfied with, and that’s enough ... I would say that I’m optimistic about that and the discussion during the conference in a way served to prove my point. I think that the next couple of months will be quite interesting. Today, there are many people with something to tell this society, they want to be heard... If we didn’t have that Single Economic Space idea now, it wouldn’t be difficult to think up something like it. Granted: Ukraine hasn’t had great success in terms of carrying out its European choice, but it has done a great deal otherwise, including in terms of European integration.

The European Union says it does not yet regard Ukraine as a potential associate member. Are there any reasons for this?

LYTVYNENKO: There are always reasons. I find the Freedom House findings quite telling. They show that the democracy index in Ukraine is lower than in Georgia or even in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That’s a controversial assessment...

Here is another component of our domestic problems. Our experts must keep monitoring the information domain, for the Ukrainian interests’ sake, and supply journalists with their own findings — in other words, show them how certain facts should be viewed. That’s an important part of our professional and civic position.

LYTVYNENKO: Let me make one more remark. There is one more very interesting thing, the way our Russian and American partners think, especially the Russians. Look, the Russian leadership actually consists of two powerful groups. These people all think in a purely instrumental way. If they have a problem, that problem must be solved. Therefore, the SES and to an extent other things must be approached from precisely this standpoint. The SES is a mission accomplished successfully and with certain results. Later will come another mission. Judging by what I heard from Russian experts, I don’t think that they have far-reaching plans.

What about the Ukrainian elite?

LYTVYNENKO: I personally have the impression that the Ukrainian elite isn’t national or state-building. This is the problem of urbanization, the urbanization of thinking, the modernization of thinking. One of our round tables at the institute dealt with problems of the elite. We heard interesting statistics: 58% of the domestic Establishment come from the countryside; 30% from towns with less than 100,000 residents. This is only normal and natural. However, these people bring with them old, traditional ways, of thinking, drawing conclusions, and so on. Backwardness isn’t the point, but the fact that this reflects the condition of society back in the 1940s- 1950s. The biggest problem is transition from that traditional mentality to a more modern one.

POLITICIANS STIMULATE AND THE PEOPLE SIMULATE

We have already mentioned polls showing that 70% of the respondents supposedly support Ukraine’s SES membership. However, many other polls (a well-known phenomenon) indicate that roughly the same percentage favors rapprochement with the European Union. The situation with the political reform, all those bills, political models, parliamentary and presidential republic, and suchlike, is even more confusing. The impression is that public opinion will accept any kind of political reform. That the people will accept whatever they’re offered. By the way, we all remember the turnout of the 2000 referendum, when 90% voted yes. This is abnormal percentage for a democratic society. How would you explain our public opinion and how does this affect the degree of responsibility of our politicians?

ROZHKOVA: I’d formulate what you’ve just said as: those in power do something, and the people respond by pretending to be satisfied with it. In this case we are dealing with a crisis of professionalism and shortage of specialists — experts not only on public opinion, but also on how to convey expert opinion to the public. Our people were faced with both the SES and Constitutional reform as practically faits accomplis, without any calculations or arguments. So people start interpreting those facts each in his own way. What we have now could be described as a medium-term political intrigue — the presidential campaign. The drama of possible presidential candidates is that those with relatively high popularity lack adequate administrative, economic, intellectual, and media resources. And those with such resources have low ratings. This means that what we’re seeing is a situation of shaky stability. Every camp, every financial-political group has begun to calculate its options allowing some to come to terms and others to try to play for higher stakes. I have a feeling that any variation of the political reform is engineered by an interested financial-political group acting according to its own scenario. Recently, I was thrilled to find out that the latest variant (at the time of this round table — Ed.) was the thirteenth episode of the soap opera called “Constitutional Reform.” The saddest thing is that in this latest episode was about the parliament electing the president and extending the deputies’ term for another year, making the voters unnecessary even as an audience. The proposal has the head of state being elected by a political gathering. I think this is already a political theater of the absurd.

One of the people’s deputies said not so long ago in an interview that politicians can relieve the people of the need to bother themselves about political problems, like going to the polls, expressing their will, and so on. They might let the people live and enjoy themselves, while doing all the hard work for them. We remember that the people were also an inconvenience for politicians under the Soviets...

LYTVYNENKO: Who do you think constitutes the modern Ukrainian elite? The nomenklatura stratum is very substantial in it.

And how do you think the knot of, say, political reform will be untied?

LYTVYNENKO: I would distinguish two basic factors. First, the objective needs. We have them and they must be satisfied somehow. There are also attempts to use the political reform to solve the problem of continuity, the problem of the presidential elections. These two factors have presently combined, and the latter appears dominant. As for the political reform bills, it is logical that they should fail. On the other hand (as evidenced by the SES situation), they just might collect 300 votes. However, in that case we would again face the problem of amending the Constitution in three or four years. And we would have to go back, so to say. I am convinced that a parliamentary republic would be stillborn in Ukraine. Incidentally, we did have a parliamentary republic, from August 24 to December 1, 1991.

Returning to public opinion, could it influence the situation?

ROZHKOVA: I think that here it makes sense to talk about the role of the media and experts. The more ideas we have, the greater the number of professional opinions; the broader their media coverage, the more competent the electorate. Our level of public competence is so low that polling makes little sense.

There is yet another problem. The Day recently quoted the Center for Social Forecasting as saying that the “ratio of indifference” is 61% in Ukraine. The author of the article, Center Director Anatoly Tykholaz, concludes that most Ukrainian citizens don’t react to what those in power are doing and how or what political model to choose and what to integrate with. In other words, this society shows almost no response to anything. Do you agree with this more than disheartening inference?

ROZHKOVA: I think it’s a kind of signal for the powers that be. I’d compare today’s relations between the people and politicians to a dinosaur with a huge body and tiny head, or maybe a dragon with several heads. You chop off a head and a new one instantly appears. The trouble with the dragon is that his heads are always fighting each other. And the body keeping them alive is the people. Therefore, I consider such inferences quite realistic. The thing is that the heads of that dragon and his body are connected by a thin neck. The problem of connection appears once every four or five years, when it’s time for another parliamentary or presidential campaign. Then the heads look down to examine the body and around to check the situation...

And now they want to halve that possibility ...

ROZHKOVA: But the head can’t exist separately from the body; it won’t be viable.

You mean the parliamentary republic and the president being elected by parliament?

ROZHKOVA: I have in mind the relationship between the elite and the people. Any option of the political reform is a private case. Let’s not fool ourselves that the “head” of the opposition is very much different from the “heads” of all those financial-political groups. This head is attached to the same body and lashes out at the other heads for the same reasons. It’s all one system. I think that our common problem, as citizens of this country, is that our politicians should ponder the indifference ratio of their respective constituencies. What are the teams of the key runners in the presidential race doing? I have a feeling that, instead of supplying Ukraine with normal legislative “software,” they are producing bugs to sabotage their rival’s computer. And there could be other, positive objectives, like taking care of their compatriots by offering them products they can use. Our politicians come from the economic, administrative, and other spheres, which makes itself felt. These people bring to their political life the same algorithm they operated before entering politics. A bureaucrat will remain one in the political domain, just as a businessman will build his political strategy using the business criteria he understands.

(To be completed)