Triangle of Ukrainian Chances
RUSSIAN HYPOTENUSE
The September 11 terrorist strikes merely confirmed that a new system of coordinates in a new so- much-talked-about world should have emerged long ago — immediately after the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War ended. Conversely, vestiges of the Cold War made themselves felt each year and demonstrate convincingly that both the West, personified in this dimension above all by Washington and NATO, and the East, in the person of Moscow, were simply unprepared to fully accept the new realities and find courage to drop their confrontation.
The steps Russia has recently made toward the West first of all raise questions. This especially applies to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statement in Brussels that it is worthwhile to consider the conditions and principles under which Russia might join NATO. Moreover, both sides stress this should not be regarded as an official announcement of Russian desire to become a member of the alliance.
Prominent Russian political scientist Sergei Karaganov told The Day that under Mr. Putin’s leadership Russia is looking West and, although this has not been said officially, Moscow is seriously exploring the possibility of joining the European Union. According to this pundit, it is not being said on the official level in order not to trigger an immediate reaction of rejection. It is the opinion of not only Mr. Karaganov that, in moving toward the West, Moscow should pay the closest possible attention to Ukraine so that both countries do this together without unnecessary rivalry. The idea of joint movement toward Europe has found a host of fans in both Moscow and Kyiv.
It will be only fair to say that Russia was perhaps the only country that refused to join the boycott of Ukraine during the cassette scandal. In addition, the Russian leadership took a surprisingly mild attitude toward the Black Sea air crash affair. So Ukraine itself has given Russia some big trump cards.
It should be also noted that Russia — with its nuclear arsenal and quite an effective aspiration to retain control over Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia — truly is an important strategic partner for NATO. Russia is a major fuel supplier to Western Europe. Russia has overtaken Ukraine in establishing actual contacts with the West. It is thus little wonder that Moscow maintains today far more serious relations with the West.
Simultaneously, a different aspect is also important. Russia is not the Soviet Union which failed to endure the military and political confrontation even with the formidable potential it had. Sober calculation suggests that partnership would be much cheaper. Declarations about aspiration to join NATO can be interpreted in many ways: as kind of a probe seeking what the reaction might be or as an attempt to implement the old postulate: if you cannot reverse a process, you should lead it (we mean first of all Moscow’s painful reaction to the likely admission of the Baltic states into NATO). It is obvious today that a new structure of relations between Russia and NATO would undoubtedly be positive for Ukraine, for this would truly demonstrate the end of the Cold War. It should also be remembered that the current perception in the European Union and NATO is that, despite the importance of advanced partnership for both sides, Russia will never become a member of these organizations.
On the other hand, the Russian economy itself needs a massive shot in the arm. The financial, technological, R&D, and other vital resources for upgrading all spheres of life remain outside Russia.
Following in the wake of Russia, a thing inevitable in implementing the To Europe With Russia idea, first of all implies continuously making allowance for Russian interests and excludes the very possibility of setting and solving problems on Ukrainian conditions, which relates both to Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-Western relations.
Still, it is obvious that the new Russian leadership has laid the principle of partnership-style coexistence of the two countries as the basis of a new model of relations with Ukraine, which is in itself positive. All we can say is that Ukraine should find a way to build this partnership on the basis of its own long- term interests, of which the national political elite does not seem to have a clear idea.
A VIEW FROM THE WEST
The September 11 events have been and will continue to affect the revision of the model that has hitherto existed in the relations between Ukraine, Western Europe, and the United States. Normalization is the best word to describe the way the process has been unfolding recently. This has also been confirmed by a changed list of issues discussed at prestigious international forums and conferences (such as the recent international conference called Ukraine: Crucial Political and Economic Challenges held in Britain) and a noticeable increase of political contacts at various levels.
The West has unequivocally appreciated Ukraine’s decision to furnish its air space to US military transport aircraft involved in the antiterrorist operation. But, at the same time, although it is not being said aloud, the image of Ukraine was again seriously tarnished by the behavior of its leadership after the Russian airplane accident. Some Western diplomats told The Day that the issues of responsibility and trust have always been and would be pivotal for them to identify the nature of relations.
It is hardly worth overestimating some positive shifts in the relations between Ukraine and the European Union. Vice Premier Vasyl Rohovy was perhaps right saying he had “no illusions” about EU membership. Yet, interest is clearly piqued.
The European Union, as it can be often heard nowadays, does not want to capsize its boat with expansion-related problems. Moreover, one can hear increasingly often that the West is taking a positive view of the European vector in Ukrainian policies. We can also note here, among other things, the positive attitude of Britain, the increasingly active attempts of Germany to play a role, and the first signs of French interest in Ukraine.
The EU still believes that both sides should first fully comply with the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which became obsolete the very day it came into force, and only then perhaps raise the question of how to attract Ukraine. Unlike the European Accords the EU signed with Central and Eastern European countries, the agreement does not call for Ukrainian membership. The TACIS program (of technical assistance to CIS countries and Mongolia) on the basis of which the EU is assisting Ukraine has a philosophy totally different from that of the PHARE program aimed at adapting Poland and Hungary to EU criteria, including those concerning improving the elite. The European Union, while admitting the complete failure of TACIS, is offering nothing qualitatively new for an alleged lack of funds.
The EU, as well as NATO, always note two things. First, in no way should Ukraine be kept out of dialog, while the dialog must be ongoing. Secondly, what should be discussed today are specific actions rather than theoretical probabilities. Among the concrete actions are trade and controlling joint crime, drug trafficking, and illegal migration. Quite a standard set that will hardly ever go off the agenda.
Simultaneously, after September 11 the West has reviewed its fuel supply situation, showing greater interest in Ukraine. This creates some favorable prospects for projects with Ukrainian participation. The post September 11 situation also provides new prospects for Ukraine-EU-NATO cooperation on European security. Yet, some NATO representatives can be heard saying that Ukraine “has underestimated the potential of cooperation” with the alliance. The level of the proclaimed special partnership between Ukraine and NATO is still not sufficient for one to say that the Ukrainian position really matters, as is often claimed, or even influences decision-making.
Despite so much talk about the necessity of finding an instrument to ward off new dividing lines in Europe, nobody is offering a realistic decision which would enable Ukraine not only to feel no isolation from the overall European processes but also to take an active part in them. Warsaw, in particular, is suggesting today a simplified visa treatment on the border with Ukraine, whereby a visa could be valid for several years and cost as little money and effort as possible. The European Union, in its turn, demands that membership candidates fully comply with Schengen provisions. There is still not a single indication that the EU is prepared in Ukraine’s case to revise or make exclusions from Schengen rules. EU spokespersons simply refuse to answer this kind of question. Nor do they answer certain other questions. On the other hand, Ukraine has been told increasingly often of late (for example, at international forums and during visits of foreign delegations, in particular one from the European Parliament) that nobody is going to deny its right to join the EU if it meets the so-called Copenhagen criteria, that is, to affirm human rights and the democratic development of society and to build a competitive market economy. This array also includes the freedom of speech and the press along with many other things. Western representatives often point out the necessity of effective public administration and corruption control, that is, of putting Ukraine in order in conformity with European standards. Thus it is little wonder that certain conclusions will be made from the way the parliamentary elections are held. This relates not only to the voting as such but also to the campaign.
UKRAINIAN SCENARIOS
There could be several scenarios for further developments. One of them is following in the wake of Russia with independence remaining formally intact. This could perhaps have suited the West before September 11. Today the situation is somewhat different. Moreover, this kind of development will bury Ukraine’s hopes to become an integral part of the European theater, which consists of not only the West.
Another possible option is still worse with Ukraine remaining a buffer between the West and Russia. Since both, as previously noted, have every chance to establish partnership, Ukraine runs the risk of being left on the fringe of Europe. This could be precisely the result of Ukraine’s leapfrog foreign policy and the underdeveloped domestic political setup based on a somewhat modified (i.e., downgraded) Soviet model. Many would opt for a third scenario: a gradual, difficult, but continuous movement in the European direction, plus true partnership with Russia and the United States, the involvement of various Western sources for the sake of our own development, systemic modernization of all walks of life, integration based on equal rights into the global economic system — preferably, on our conditions. This would really require tremendous effort of our own and adequate assistance from the West. In this context, both rivalry with Russia for the honor to be the first and a fully pro-Western attitude are to no avail at all.
There are many instruments to start with: the gas pipeline system, which could well be privatized by both Russian and Western capitals; providing normal conditions for Western capital to function in this country; finding new sources of oil supplies; fresh initiatives in establishing a European rapid deployment force; eliminating the grounds for uninterrupted Western fault-finding; normal daily work to shape this country’s image on the basis of real facts, conscientious policies, and European-style responses to information. This is an open and constantly debatable secret. But today there is just an opportunity to turn the situation to our advantage.
