TROJAN HORSE BEING BUILT IN THE SHADOWS

Let us begin with the main figure, Pavlo Lazarenko. He obviously lost. He was driven out of his country, cutting short the painful process of his transformation from a shadow economy boss into a politician in full public view, posing as an official uncompromising opposition leader. He also suffered considerable material damage: his money-making structures found other "protectors" when the state ax started falling; now he has to pay his lawyers etc.

However strange it may seem, latter-day developments show that Lazarenko may still get the highest dividends before long, especially when the US refuses to deport him (considering that Washington did its best in early 1997 to build his image as Ukraine's number one corrupt pol, pressuring the Ukrainian government for his dismissal).

New problems arose when Lazarenko, while in US custody, started talking about political persecution, attempts on his life, and threats to his next of kin in Ukraine. American justice must pay close attention to such testimony, because, should the authorities send him to Ukraine they might lose face in terms of what the Americans consider one of the pillars of their democracy: human rights. Should he stay in America, it would be evidence of his being in opposition, and he would be regarded by many Ukrainians as yet another victim of the regime. It is also possible that the Ukrainian Solons would have to offer a public apology, the way they did in the case of Zviahilsky.

In fact, this possibility of having to apologize to a colleague suffering from "unjust accusation" is the main aspect of the Ukrainian Parliament's defeat in the Lazarenko case. The legislators failed to consider all the pros and cons and there was much pressure, but no one will consider these factors important if several months (or years) later Pavlo Lazarenko turns up in Kyiv astride the proverbial white horse. And it is also true that precisely such Verkhovna Rada antics serve to further undermine people's confidence in its "chosen servants." This allows President Kuchma to address scornful words to Parliament as a whole and "stimulate" their efforts using various illegal methods.

However, the main thing is that Pavlo Lazarenko stands a real chance of returning to Ukraine victorious. Assuming that the allegations about his personal wealth correspond to reality even by 20%, the man's bulging bank accounts will stay intact. Western banks are smart and not as selfless as the Ukrainian Prosecutor's Office formally holds. They will not expose clients worth millions of dollars or turn over their money to the public domain, however justified the case. These banks have adhered to the principle of discretion for centuries, and there is no obvious reason why they should break it now, just because there is a presidential campaign underway in a country which is strange and lacking in all political, economic, and civilized respects. By the same token, if they fail to locate Lazarenko's bank accounts with allegedly embezzled public funds the Ukrainian prosecution's case will simply burst like a bubble.

And those newest of allies - the President's entourage and Communist Deputies working together to topple Pavlo Lazarenko - do not seem to have much reason to celebrate. Their alliance against the former premier emerged purely as a marriage of convenience; they were all after one thing: make Pavlo Lazarenko and even more so Oleksandr Moroz step down, for the two were their most formidable political adversaries, considering that the latter could capitalize on the former's Hromada heritage. President Kuchma's sycophants have long (and with reason) been wary of Oleksandr Moroz, while orthodox Reds want Petro Symonenko, not Moroz, as their single presidential candidate.

However, the situation shortly developed in a manner showing that this alliance was stillborn. Mr. Symonenko was offered the Politician of the Year and Prometheus Prestige trophies for playing his part in the Lazarenko venture. The whole thing was so transparent it made one laugh and the number one Leninist was smart enough not to attend the ceremony to receive the Ukrainian Oscar.

In fact, the Kuchma-Communist alliance looks extremely unreal. Both sides represent polarized outlooks. While Leonid Kuchma is going through the motions of building his own bizarre version of capitalism, the Communists adhere to their moth-eaten socialist faith. The vote on Lazarenko in Parliament promptly exposed all the discrepancies. The very next day Heorhy Kriuchkov, one of the Red leaders, stated that the Lazarenko case was to the Communists just another case study in Leonid Kuchma's thoroughly corrupt regime, and that fighting this regime was their top priority. In other words, by throwing Lazarenko to the wolves, the Communists received another trump in their struggle against those in power, no more and no less. They do not care about President Kuchma, as evidenced by People's Deputy Moiseyenko's impeachment speech in Parliament. And we all know that what Mr. Moiseyenko says the rest of his comrades intend to carry out.

And the President's entourage cuts a very unattractive figure as the other member of this ad hoc alliance. They are still trying to play out the Russian election scenario: "Win or You Will Lose!" Leonid Kuchma is being portrayed as the only candidate capable of defeating the Left, stopping Communist revenge, etc. Which means that Administration strategists are rallying for a decisive struggle against the Reds and welcome all volunteers. To looks and appearances, the situation is anything but a lasting alliance, particularly in terms of reaching any subsequent common goals.

Finally, those saying that the Ukrainian state was made to suffer in the Lazarenko case are perfectly right. Only a naive optimist could surmise that Ukraine could rid itself of its totally corrupt image afterward, or that it would become any more attractive to foreign business partners.

However, Ukraine's biggest fiasco is not only that nothing has actually changed within the country. The worst prospect is that nothing will change in the foreseeable future. And not because Leonid Kuchma may be reelected. There are other options and prerequisites saying that the whole situation will remain the same.

It is at this stage of the political game when the players are trying draw each other's blood, biding their time, and resorting to all kinds of nerve-wracking maneuvers, that this author would like to remind the reader of the old Chinese parable about the monkey climbing down the tree to finish off two lions mortally wounded in their duel. In other words, the situation that has developed prompts one to seek the party that can take the best advantage under the circumstances.

And this is precisely when Oleksandr Tkachenko, Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament, emerges on the scene in our story. Incidentally, he was also offered a Prometheus Prestige award and declined to attend the ceremony. The man does not seem to need the existing regime's accolades, looking further ahead and being viewed by many as ready for a new role.

I think that his political future was decided for him precisely when he was elected Speaker, also due to a "situational alliance" between the President's sycophants and Red People's Deputies. At the time Presidential Administration decision-makers wanted anyone except Oleksandr Moroz or any Lazarenko protОgО. Tkachenko looked the most agreeable choice, so they took the risk.

Today it is becoming increasingly obvious that Tkachenko not only has an ability to compromise, but that precisely this is the up and coming Speaker's greatest strength, making it possible for him to please a great many. The most important thing is that he can please the fundamental opponents in contemporary Ukraine home-grown capitalists and Communists alike.

On the one hand, he is an outspoken Leftist, with his love for collective and state farming, command economic planning, and state regulation; he is loath to see land or any other private ownership. On the other hand, he is an established private owner and a successful businessman, making his name in business under President Kuchma and proving his skill operating in both the shadow and legitimate sectors. Oleksandr Tkachenko's "dual" approach is also evident with regard to the state; he swears allegiance to independent Ukraine (and well he should, for this independence secured him access to the top of the Ukrainian Olympus) and calls for "closer integration" within the CIS and "Slavic space," just because he feels certain that the notions will be appreciated by his Soviet-reared electorate and current allies - precisely the way he made Verkhovna Rada pass the bill joining Ukraine to the ill-famed CIS Interparliamentary Assembly.

When asked to comment on his ambition and character, Mr. Tkachenko declared that he is "not the first but neither the last," a meaningful statement. Those trying to work out his political profile should concentrate on it. What did he use in his big-time political game? And Comrade Symonenko should busy himself with this little puzzle in the first place.

Why? Because, should pragmatic strategists on Leonid Kuchma's and Petro Symonenko's side bet on the "capitalist Communist" Tkachenko in the forthcoming race, rather than on their respective odious leaders, no one would give either of them any political guarantees. The current political situation in Ukraine is such that many rely on hope rather than realities. The Right hopes that Ukraine can be guided further along the capitalist path with a new man at the helm. The Left believes that, after getting their man in the Chief Executive's seat, they will be in a position to dictate their terms to the IMF and World Bank. Oleksandr Tkachenko is being viewed with some hope by the local industrial elite as well as the so-called Red managers, dwelling on "state protection of the domestic producer," "self-reliance," "government-run economic reform," and "protection of the domestic market against cheap merchandise from the West." The Ukrainian nouveaux riches expect him to live relying on more than his government-allocated salary, so he will not allow nationalization, and that, after Leonid Kuchma's "multivector" hectic shifts hither and yon, being himself a political-battle-hardened conservative, will see to it that more or less equal rules are instituted for the national business game, even if to protect his own business. For want of anything better, daydreaming might even help...

The way things are, most analysts agree that Oleksandr Tkachenko has always been prepared to play his own game, but has never done so because others would not let him. He went all the way up the Soviet hierarchical ladder, always referred to in confidential eyes-only party personnel files as a "highly dependable, aspiring administrator; he knows what he is doing; his lack of charisma is made up for by his determination and toughness." Also, one should allow for the fact that he cuts a figure fitting in perfectly with the surviving Ukrainian mental pattern of having "our man" at the top, one capable of making changes to improve the life of the Ukrainian man in the street; he is not to be rated among the political stars, but he is an able administrator, something we need in the first place. He will not let Ukraine go down the drain.

After all, a closer look at Oleksandr Tkachenko gives us deja vu. Yes, we had a "top-notch' administrator in Ukraine and he did act relying on the belief that he who does not win shall be routed. And we know his name: Pavlo Lazarenko. The whole Ukrainian political establishment had to rally together to fight him. That was it! End of the vicious circle.

Under the circumstances one is left to decide whether anyone is aware of Lazarenko's "second edition"(15 years younger than the first) or that this issue is playing into the hands of those occupying high offices - e.g. nomenklatura men planning a smooth change of power from the current President to those betting on Tkachenko (unlike Lazarenko, Oleksandr Tkachenko is not an "upstart" but an embodiment of the old system). Meaning that the Lazarenko-Kuchma case is alive and kicking, and it remains to be seen whose concept will prevail in the end: Kuchma's "economic openness" or Lazarenko's "isolationism" after Oleksandr Tkachenko comes to power, in which case a lot of positive changes previously hoped for will never come to pass. In a word, what those ruling Ukraine believe is their victory is something else altogether, viewed from outside.

Why hasn't the Ukrainian Speaker started racing in the presidential marathon? Perhaps because he is so very cautious; it is in his blood. In addition, he is accustomed to planning every move, outwardly explained simply as trying to act in strict accordance with the law; he is in no hurry to jump the gun. And, of course, no Trojan horse was ever built in view of the adversary. Building it takes time and effort. Mr. Tkachenko has declared that he will not run for the presidency himself, but if the masses ask him to he will not be in a position to say no to his beloved proletariat. A closer look at the Speaker's latest statements, sitting together with the President, shows that he weighs every word to deliver it not as a courteous gesture to the Chief Executive, but as something to be remembered by those who would elected him next President. His is a "complex" approach to all matters relating to the Ukrainian state. And his vision thereof is much clearer, for the President, as usual, either starts threatening somebody or launches another moralizing treatise, which can no longer either frighten or interest anyone.