Two Rukhs: Every Man for Himself
One of the specifics of the current election campaign is an almost total taboo on rhetoric and waffling by politicians. While formerly those striving for a seat in the legislature have made at least some efforts to clarify their political stands, nobody seems to care about this anymore. Clashing political ideas has been replaced with clashing popularity ratings, with the pollsters’ darlings seeming to have goods they are eager to sell at the highest profit. Against the backdrop of this process, the destiny of the second most influential political party, the Popular Movement, continues to evoke much interest, for, no matter what its political opponents say, Rukh ideas are still too prominent in the heads of potential voters to be ignored.
It has been long since anyone tried to word Rukh’s main idea in layman’s terms. The last time was four years ago when Rukh ideologists came up with the unforgettable and universal slogan, “Bandits to prison!” Apparently, due to the pressure of other priorities, no one at the time ever managed to analyze whether the slogan improved or hampered Rukh’s election results. Now ideas and ideologies are definitely on the back burner. Simple at first sight, the Rukh founding fathers’ big idea is bordering on greatness: since the Rukhs are uniting, unification will become the ideology. Who and would ever dare challenge the idea of unification and when? Such a challenge, even if based on ironclad arguments, will mean defeat in the elections. Hence we see so much talk on unification of the Popular Movement and its potential allies. But everyone opting for unification is, in fact, singing his own sweet song.
RUKHS PER SE
The practical marriage of Rukh with the party under the same name and led by Yury Kostenko is to take place, to judge by the declarations, only after the elections. This mode of unification has been chosen for one small reason: there is no conceivable way for Rukh to unite at present. Unlike the capital, where both parties’ influence, to put it softly, is far from growing, Rukh has viable structures in the regions. It is their existence that makes unification quite a problem. If local Rukh organizations merely resembled some other parties that have just their regional chairmen and registration certificates, the issue would not exist. But when there are two real leaders of Rukh grassroots organizations in a city, oblast, or rayon, things are not as simple as they appear.
Following Kostenko’s abortive attempt to grab the leadership of Rukh in 1999, grassroots organizations did not split up automatically in two, like the Rukh caucus in Verkhovna Rada. Rukh members in the regions took sides with either Udovenko or Kostenko. Those in the minority had to face an uphill task of creating new structures and organizations or revitalizing the existing remnants under fire from those now in the enemy camp. In view of this, any attempt to unite them could only aggravate the situation. Another thing is just to start talking unification.
One should not discard the personal election plans of Rukh leaders. Apart from Verkhovna Rada, seats on oblast, city, and rayon councils are waiting to be filled but their number is too scarce for regional Rukh leaders. Who will back whom in the elections? Who will get a priority to fill the seats? While the parties’ bosses are racking their brains trying to find solutions to the problem, some regional Rukh leaders began to set up joint election staffs headed, incidentally, by themselves. Given the inferior, in their estimates, reputations of the Rukh party chieftains who might prevent them from winning Ukrainians’ hearts and minds, local political eager beavers have started to use Viktor Yushchenko’s name, without his consent.
OUR BOY
At first sight, the former governor of the National Bank and prime minister appeared destined to quell both Rukh’s ambitions and to assume the role of the leader of unification process. While it would be almost hopeless to try to talk Rukh activists into rallying round Kostenko, they will readily swallow any arguments if Yushchenko is dangled like a carrot. Such a viable idea inspired some compromised politicians to cajole the new leader during their all-too-frequent public appearances. Even if we assume that Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc is really made up of both Rukhs, Reforms and Order, and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, rank-and-file Rukh members will have a hard time perceiving anything hidden from view by the long waiting line of all those wishing to get on a party list led by the idol of Ukrainian pollsters.
The newly elected head of the Popular Movement Secretariat, Serhiy Koniev, who is also chair of the Dnipropetrovsk Rukh organization, was the first to sense this danger. His special stand, widely publicized by the mass media, comes down to his refusal to join the Yushchenko’s bloc without retaining the Rukh trademark. It is not difficult to see Koniev’s personal interest here. If Our Ukraine swallows Rukh, chances of local Rukh leaders being elected will be zero. Why, in this case, should local Rukh organizations work their tails off for the heavyweights? Caught in the crossfire of persuasion, the staunch Dnipropetrovsk functionary did not bulge, waving off such arguments that now is hardly the time to assert one personal goals when a wider bloc of party functionaries headed by Yushchenko needs to be built. Although nothing was said that the bloc’s top list will include all those with seats in the present parliament, this is a foregone conclusion.
FURTHER PERSPECTIVES
Thus, we have a situation in which the Rukh leaders are dubious about to the chances of their party to run in the election campaign on its own or in a bloc with its new/old brethren from Kostenko’s other Rukh. In this context, they see a Yushchenko-led unification as a panacea for all their election problems. Meanwhile, local Rukh members are faced with a choice of either towing the leaders’ line or to adopting their own stand. One of the likely options is a Rukh Convention that will approve merger with Our Ukraine, vesting Rukh leaders with the right to form the party election list and bargain for the Rukh’s share and position on Our Ukraine’s total slate. Given such a scenario, Rukh’s leaders might simply ignore any criticism from the grassroots, but maybe not.
The real campaign work is done not in Kyiv but in the provinces, involving sitting on election commissions and campaign workers doing a great deal of hard work. In contrast to the so-called oligarchic parties, Rukh cannot afford to pay for such services, while the number of enthusiasts agreeing to work for virtually nothing is shrinking. This situation, however, gives rise to another. While the embattled knights of the political jousting field in the capital can join forces with anyone anytime anywhere, it will be difficult to explain to rural campaign workers why yesterday’s political opponents have turned today’s allies or vice versa. In order to succeed, party ideologists have to come up with a clearly worded idea that will make the Ukrainians vote the way they are expected to. But, as we have already stated, no one in Rukh is involved in formulating its ideas, with everyone calculating and assessing the resources and likely scenarios. The latter, as shown by the first-hand experience of political wrangling, are far from the decisive factors.
NEVER TOO LATE
Viktor Yushchenko’s amorphous declarations, quickly forgotten due to their lack of content, cannot unite Rukh’s remaining true believers or, to put it an a broader plane, the national democratic ideology. Hence, it is not too late for Rukh chieftains to give up their petty squabbling and define a single party line on the eve of the parliamentary election, acceptable to the rank-and-file and appealing to voters. For a start, they might begin by specifying whether the party is in opposition, and if so, then to whom and what. When such a line has been drawn up, approved, and publicized, it might just become a great deal easier for Rukh to locate its partners and allies.
