THE UKRAINIAN PROJECT

If the goals that were proclaimed during so-called roundtables on European integration had been at least partially reached, Ukraine would long ago have become an integral part of the European community. But more often than not these meetings are boring and unproductive “gabfests.” Cherkasy recently hosted a public hearing called “A New Ukraine in an Updated Europe” on the problems of Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration. This, 32nd, hearing, organized by the Institute of Euro-Atlantic Cooperation and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, was supposed to present new possibilities for integration on the national and regional levels, which emerged after the Orange Revolution, as well as to gauge public perception of the new leadership’s foreign policy initiatives. To underscore the special importance of their forum, the organizers invited Borys Tarasiuk, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine; Michel Duray, director of the NATO Information and Documentation Center in Ukraine; and Johannes Regenbrecht, minister-counselor of the German Embassy. The hearing could have, but did not, become a major event and a serious information breakthrough for the Cherkasy elite, the kind of event that high officials rarely grace with their presence.

Unfortunately, some experts and many participants came unprepared for a meaningful and frank dialogue. The audience only heard hackneyed integration rhetoric and unanswered requests to explain what industries and businesses our region should develop and make them competitive in the enlarged EU, and what the government is going to do and is doing to solve certain problems. The impression was that solid facts were not the forte of the respected experts. Perhaps that was the reason why some members of the audience quietly left the room after the very first round.

Meanwhile, the issues proposed for discussion were of an extremely important and timely nature. The prospects of European integration have essentially improved for Ukraine since the Orange Revolution. Many negative stereotypes of this country have been allayed or mitigated, and the artificial obstacles erected by both Europe and the former leadership in their own interests have been partially removed. What is more, we, Ukrainians, have seen that we are capable of much, that we can apply boundless creative energies no worse (and even better) than others. But to keep this energy from being wasted and brought to a standstill, the government should not only be conducting a dialogue with its citizens but also offering them a full-fledged, convincing, well thought out, and accurately calculated project of transformations.

Ukraine can use European and Euro-Atlantic integration as an effective instrument for tackling its domestic problems. But in order to use this instrument, we must have a clear idea of what we want and how to do it, with due account of our conditions and European development trends. Unfortunately, statements by the new government officials lead to more questions than answers.

President Viktor Yushchenko has named 2015 as the tentative date of Ukraine’s accession to the EU. My question is: on what grounds did the government arrive at this date? Where and when could the public see detailed calculations to judge whether they are correct and well substantiated? Where our neighbors are concerned, Turkey, for example, formally applied for EU membership back in 1987, but it wasn’t until 1999 that Brussels recognized it as a real candidate, but refrained from fixing the date of admission or the beginning of EU entry negotiations.

Or consider this question: What will happen to our calculations and plans if the EU Constitution is adopted? If the EU finally adopts the constitution, this will create a totally new Europe with different institutions and political decision-making methods. Today, the EU uses a rotation system, with member states taking six-month turns holding the presidency. The EU Constitution provides for the permanent offices of president and foreign minister. The president is to be elected by EU member states’ leaders, rather than the population, for a term of up to five years. The foreign minister, also to be elected by European leaders, is to form EU policies and stand in for the president at sessions of the European Commission, an EU executive body that will also be formed without public participation.

The European Parliament (EP), the only EU body directly elected by and expressing the will of the citizenry of EU member states, is already playing a far less significant role than non-elected institutions. Polls indicate that only 50-53% of EU citizens believe that the EP plays an important role in the life of the European Union. In terms of influence, the EP can neither compete with national parliaments (79%), nor national governments (85%), not even local administrations (80%). Forty-three percent of EU citizens think the EP’s powers should be increased, with a mere 11% opposed to this and 33% undecided (www.russ.ru).

The EU has been trying to create institutions and mechanisms capable of establishing public representation in and control over governmental bodies. But should the EU Constitution be adopted, this already limited control will be further eroded. Surveys show that the majority of EU citizens, not to mention Ukrainians, know next to nothing about the EU Constitution, all the more so as this is “not needed:” in order to approve this document, many countries do not have to hold a referendum: all they have to do is get the draft ratified by the national parliament, which suits the authorities perfectly.

Taking all this into account, are our citizens and leadership prepared to forego a considerable part of their recently acquired independence and sovereignty in favor of a European bureaucracy? Of course, one might say that if even EU citizens have no idea of their future constitution, why should we know about it? But we are the ones who seek to join them as soon as possible, not the other way round. This raises a far from rhetorical question: do we really want to be part of Europe?

The results of opinion polls reveal a picture that is not quite rosy. Five years ago I pointed out that Ukrainian citizens do not identify themselves with the political Europe and take a dim view of the most important European institutions (Den, No. 142, 2000). In 2002 SOCIS center experts found that a mere 2% (!) of Ukrainians considered themselves bound for Europe. Can one seriously speak of European integration if there is no critical mass of people with a sense of European identity? A nationwide poll conducted in 2000 by the Ukrainian Institute of Social Research and Social Monitoring Center revealed that 29% of respondents completely trusted the EU, 35% had no trust at all, and 36% were undecided. The same survey showed that 21% of respondents fully trusted NATO, 45% did not trust it, and 34% were undecided.

To put into perspective the dynamics behind the changes in Ukrainian preferences that occurred between 2000 and 2005, let us first see how our compatriots “voted” in the “intermediate” year 2003. According to a poll conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Taylor Nelson Sofres Ukraine Company, if a referendum had been held, 54% of respondents would have voted for European integration, 24% against, and 12% would have ignored the referendum. Twenty-eight percent of respondents favored NATO membership, 35% opposed it, and 14% would not have showed up to vote.

Now, in 2005, a poll by the Democratic Initiatives Foundations and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) has shown that 44% of citizens support the idea of Ukraine joining the EU. Were a referendum to be held on this question, 28% of respondents would oppose Ukraine’s entry into the European Union, while 28% would be undecided or refuse to vote in the referendum. The same poll showed that if a referendum were held on NATO membership, 48% of respondents would oppose it, 36% would be undecided, and 15% would be in favor.

Sociological surveys thus highlight the unstable growth of Ukrainians’ positive attitude to the EU and a simultaneous increase in the number of those who have a negative attitude to NATO. The latter fact is alarming, given the government’s ever-increasing efforts to pursue a pro-NATO course. More surprisingly, the Ukrainian leadership is naively convinced that, if other states first joined NATO and then the EU, this recipe is good for all times. This is a flagrant example of ignoring the essential differences in the situation of our neighbors, i.e., the Baltic and Central-Eastern European countries.

These countries managed, with some difficulty, to reach a public consensus on EU and NATO membership. They viewed membership in the alliance above all as the only possible way to ensure their security against Russia. In Ukraine, though, the public does not regard Russia as a possible military adversary. Most Ukrainians believe that Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly states with open borders and without visa or customs barriers. This was the opinion of 62.9% of those polled by the Democratic Initiatives Foundations and KIIS on April 14-24, 2005. A small proportion of respondents, 13.3%, said that Russia and Ukraine must maintain the same relationship as other countries, i.e., with closed borders, visas, and customs points, while 21.4% thought that Ukraine and Russia should form a single state.

In previous years the Ukrainian leadership was reluctant to demean itself to the public and preach convincingly about the advantages of NATO membership. So it was Russian spin masters who took up the task of “informing” Ukrainians about the true face of the “aggressive military bloc.”

At the same time, it would be wrong to think that the current animosity to NATO in Ukraine is only the result of myths, phobias, and stereotypes. People are not stupid and they form their views on a rational basis. If we sum up the arguments that anti-NATO Ukrainians offer in Internet forums, they essentially boil down to the following: people believe that under the current conditions Ukraine’s entry into NATO will not improve this country’s security; on the contrary, it will create new dangers and damage relations with Russia, a country in which 25 million Ukrainians have relatives and on which we depend to a large extent.

In this situation, the attempt to “smuggle” Ukraine into NATO does not simply appear undemocratic: it can split the state and society for years to come. Therefore, before making such a serious decision, the leadership must promote public consensus rather than shun open debates, if, of course, this leadership wants to remain in power. Let us imagine, for example, that the government decides to hold a nationwide referendum on Ukraine’s NATO membership. What result does it expect? Will this not discredit the integration process in Ukraine? Will this not thwart the hopes of European-minded Ukrainians?

An attentive observer may have noticed that in the past few months, as Ukraine has been attempting to draw closer to the EU, the Kremlin- controlled online media have changed their tone with respect to the EU, calling it the “Fourth Reich” or “fascist state.” These epithets suspiciously resemble the ones that the opposition used when Poland was joining the EU. Is the Ukrainian government prepared to repulse foreign and domestic information attacks?

The only conclusion is that the government must begin systematically working with the public. Unless the broadest strata of society endorse the idea of European and Euro- Atlantic integration, it will be doomed to remain a project of interest only to a narrow circle of specialists, while Day of Europe will be a celebration for residents of a few cities in Ukraine.

We have heard so many agreeable words about integration up to now that it is difficult to make people look into the heart of the matter, count money, and control the authorities. Regrettably, this spells many dangers. Polls show that more than half of Ukrainian citizens are not interested in politics. A poorly informed and passive society can fall victim to the project being implemented by the government. European integration demands reforms, and it is the weakest strata of the population that always pay for them. In contrast to Ukraine, Europe is openly warning that the new continental entity will not easily fit in with the legal and economic conditions that prevail among the “old” EU members, much to the detriment of ordinary citizens. So we are bound to pay for meeting Europe’s high standards.

For example, if we join the EU, the agrarian Cherkasy oblast has a good chance of going bankrupt because its farm products will be unable to compete with foreign imports. Incidentally, even now we have a surplus of grain because the number of livestock has drastically dwindled. Failure to market our products will increase unemployment and lower living standards.

In Poland, which is showing a 5.3-% economic growth and is considered a showpiece by our experts, unemployment is 20% on average and 39% among people under 25, the highest index in Europe (The Guardian). We are being consoled by the fact that Polish farmers have received heavy EU subsidies, but no one likes to recall that this was possible thanks to a bitter struggle by the Polish leadership, which made a number of high-profile political demarches, including the threat to reconsider EU membership on the very eve of joining the EU. Besides, Poland was actively backed in that struggle by the US and the Polish lobby — a serious factor, as there are millions of Polish-born Americans.

Ukraine cannot boast of an equally powerful force that could help it defend its interests against the European bureaucracy. So we must prepare ourselves well in advance. In the long run, it is we, not our European Union rivals, who need a reformed high-tech farming sector. But the government has not yet disclosed any long-term (until 2015) plans for reforming the agricultural or any other sector.

If we are serious about European integration, we must begin now to set up regional structures that will keep the integration process going. These should include not only the civic organizations and research centers that will be doing preparatory work for joining the EU and NATO, with due account of local specifics, but also agencies and coordinators, with clearly defined duties, which will bear real responsibility for implementing the government’s projects. It is also high time to consider the idea put forward by Ralf Wachsmuth, director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s Ukrainian office, about introducing the office of EU coordinator in the regions.

At the national level we should also be prepared, in terms of legislation, organization, and information, for the so-called “variable-speed integration” that the EU uses for its new members. In other words, we must learn to compete in unequal conditions for decades to come, because the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, now formal EU members, are in fact excluded, due to their underdevelopment, from a number of EU activities.

So far, a new Ukraine and an updated Europe are political projects rather than a reality. The implementation of these projects and our life tomorrow will depend on public involvement. Participation in drawing up the Ukrainian European integration project is a tremendous chance for all creative and enterprising Ukrainians, especially the intelligentsia. In recent years the intelligentsia has been marginalized and lost prestige because it has stopped putting forward socially important ideas. Involvement in the integration project could help rehabilitate it in the public’s mind in the broadest sense of the word.

A special word should be said about our compatriots abroad. Even now millions of Ukrainians are promoting the well-being of Europe with their own hands. For many of them Europe has become not only a workplace but a home as well. Yet, they are deprived of the possibility to participate in shaping Europe’s political face. In all probability, the government should think not only about how to get them back home but also about how to turn this force into the vanguard of Ukrainian integration into Europe by establishing relevant institutions and structures. Millions of human ties with EU citizens could greatly strengthen our positions at negotiations with the European Union.

We can and must debate the advantages and dangers of the Ukrainian and European projects. It is important to realize that there is no alternative to European and Euro- Atlantic integration. It is too late to wait for Russia to sort out its internal problems and be able to offer us an acceptable integration project. Naturally, we will have to pay for the pleasure of boarding the ultramodern European express with decades of hard work, disillusionment, and loss of many traditions and habits. But the game is worth the candle. The main thing is to remember that integration is not a goal in itself and that the goal — society and the individual — is part of the process itself. Only then will the Ukrainian project be carried out.