Ukrainian Revolution: a Wave or Geyser?

In the yet unwritten books on the theory of nonviolent revolutions, the events in Ukraine in late November and early December 2004 will probably be discussed in a separate chapter. Perhaps experts will use our experience to finally provide a clear definition for similar phenomena and derive the universal formula for a nonviolent revolution that is as yet nonexistent or so experts say.

So far we are only beginning to realize what is happening. What has it all been about? What is the nature of the 2004 orange revolution and its sociopolitical impact? Who is the vehicle of this revolution and what are its goals? How has Ukrainian society changed? Are these processes irreversible? The editors of The Day discussed the first results of the Ukrainian revolution at a roundtable attended by Oleksandr HUBENKO, editor-in-chief of the magazine Practical Psychology and Social Work first deputy director of the Strategic Research Institute Oleksandr LYTVYNENKO, political scientist Kostiantyn MATVIYENKO, and chairman of the board of Penta Applied Political Research Center Volodymyr FESENKO.

A LONG OVERDUE “REFOLUTION”

“The orange revolution, what is it?”

Kostiantyn MATVIYENKO: “It is a process that didn’t begin yesterday and won’t end tomorrow. It has been underway throughout Ukraine’s independence. Despite all the hardships that have haunted Ukrainian society, this process has two main components: first, an emerging social group whose representatives understand their interests and are ready to defend them; second, an emerging group whose ethics differ from those of the older generation. They are also using different technologies: cellular phones, the Internet, etc. They have seen the European lifestyle. To draw a historical parallel, after Russia defeated Napoleon in 1815, an emerging group of Russian intellectuals saw Paris and subsequently became involved in the 1825 coup attempt by the Decembrists.

“Similar processes have taken place in Ukrainian society. So, when a brutal and blatant attempt was made to impose a certain leadership on this society, it absolutely normally showed its developed immunity in an attempt to reject it. An extremely positive aspect of the orange revolution is that organized social communities or elements of a civic society have influenced the legitimate authorities, the Supreme Court and parliament, which have redirected this social energy into a lawful, nonviolent vein.”

Oleksandr LYTVYNENKO: “I’m viewing this movement from several vantage points. Without a doubt, it’s a bourgeois- democratic revolution in terms of its purpose and goals. Without a doubt, the middle class is the vehicle of this revolution. Yet there are several more components that merit special note. First of all, these events must be viewed not within the context of the velvet revolutions of 1989, but rather within the context of the events of 1997-2001 in the Balkans and other Orthodox countries. The key message of these events was the movement for justice and truth. Nations rose not only and not so much for a specific candidate, as against brutal violations of human rights. With this we have proven the presence of certain specific aspects in our political culture.

“There is another more important aspect. The overriding goal of this mass social movement is to integrate Ukraine into the Western context and find our place in the common European architecture. Thus, it is not only and not so much about resolving domestic problems as about adapting Ukraine’s domestic architecture to that of a common Europe.”

Volodymyr FESENKO: “The question was, ‘What was it?’ I remembered an answer to this question, which, incidentally, was offered by Viktor Yanukovych. ‘What is it, a revolution or the work of political technologists?’ In his view, it has been the work of political technologists. And I have arrived at the paradoxical conclusion that this question cannot be answered in a rational way. I consulted books and articles on the theory of revolutions and was surprised to learn that all authors agree that there is no universal, clearly worded definition of a revolution. East European velvet revolutions were even described using the term ‘refolution,’ i.e. a combination of a ‘revolution’ and ‘reform,’ in which case the revolution evolved into a broad range of political, economic, and social reforms. On the other hand, ribbons and orange color are also elements of political technologies. The opposition used [political] technologies before, but they proved largely fruitless. Yet now a political miracle has happened, and the technologies have blended with the human factor.”

Oleksandr HUBENKO: “In my view, it has been a revolution of a virtual middle class, because our middle class is only emerging, and this process is inhibited by a wealth of socioeconomic, sociopsychological, and political constraints. In effect, this revolution has been aimed against the biggest of such constrains, primarily proletarization, i.e., mass reduction of living standards, loss of property and savings. Shock reforms, which were at one time conducted by Gaidar in Russia and Pynzenyk and Kuchma in Ukraine, took the shape of the shock with proletarization. With their property, people lost confidence and future goals, and it was much easier to manipulate them. This translated into the threat of concentration of property in the hands of the few, i.e., the formation of a powerful system of oligarchs who had not earned their riches, but simply stolen them. The third obstacle to the formation of a wealthy and independent individual is the state bureaucracy that we have inherited from the totalitarian Soviet society. Back then this bureaucracy controlled everything and is now trying to seize control of power, which it is doing not by means of direct methods of administrative pressure, but using indirect pressure, the tax authorities being a graphic example.

“There are two aspects to the revolution. First, it is aimed at implementing the social goals of the middle class in its struggle against the above mentioned threats. Second, the millionaires, who have rebelled against the billionaires and used the revolutionary protest energy of the masses for this purpose, may betray the interests of the vast masses and lose their base of support. Then this revolution would end in a plain Thermidor and degeneration, as has been often the case in history. In my view, this danger is also very real, because we know some of the individuals in Yushchenko’s entourage. Not so long ago they were right-hand men of those who now personify all the things against which this revolution is struggling.”

SYMBOLS AND IMPULSES

“It appears that oligarchs have stepped forward as the front line of the people.”

MATVIYENKO: “Absolutely not. Ukrainian oligarchs are divided into two classes. There are parasitic oligarchs, i.e., those who parasitize on the infrastructure they have appropriated (oil pipelines, generating companies, television channels, etc.). There are also ‘neo-oligarchs’ — productive oligarchs. The former are interested in preserving those socioeconomic and political underpinnings that have formed under the regime in power. Of course, they have made every effort for the successor to this regime, Yanukovych, to come to power. Productive oligarchs want Ukraine to at least be recognized internationally. They need quotas for their exports to Western and other markets. Thus, they have been forced to support Yushchenko as a mouthpiece for Ukraine’s civilized ideals, because they are tying their future to Ukraine.

“My colleague has voiced a very interesting opinion about the danger of proletarization. This is in fact a revolution against proletarization. Meanwhile, our southeastern oligarchs will be able to survive only if the workforce in those regions costs less than it can really cost on the national job market. Their enterprises can function and yield profit only if the proletariat in these regions remains poorly educated, hard-drinking, and willing to work for minimum wage. For this to continue they must block off access to information, because the proletariat ends where free press begins. Understandably, in a postindustrial information society such attempts are absolutely vain and useless. Therefore, they must turn to other technologies, become more civilized, and respect their hired labor. But their mindset makes this impossible for them. Thus, we will be able to overcome them only in the next generation or using rough administrative measures.”

FESENKO: “We have mentioned the middle class, small and medium business. In effect, these are people who began shaping in the early 1990s. Now we are facing two contradictory trends: a generation of revolutionaries, who are beginning to break free from, among other things, conformist dictates. At the same time, there is a generation of conformists. How these two will combine is anyone’s guess. I personally know representatives of the young generation, who are now wearing orange ribbons, but still have a very good idea of how power can be converted into money. Thus, I wouldn’t rush to conclusions that this revolutionary wave has already generated a certain impulse in society, which will necessarily lead to positive changes.”

“Maybe it’s not a wave, but a geyser? After all, the wave has a different trajectory and physical nature. While geyser is an outburst of energy that had been accumulating and has now been released.”

FESENKO: “Yes, but the wave causes some result. And we are already seeing certain results. Aside from essentially political results, which now appear limited, there have been shifts in the public consciousness. In my view, some change has occurred — at least the liberation from fears and conformism. If the middle class can make these changes last, it will be quite some result.”

ENGINEERING A COMPROMISE

“How do you view the compromise that made it possible to pass the package bill in parliament?”

MATVIYENKO: “It has shown that members of Yushchenko’s team lack a common vision of long-term goals.”

HUBENKO: “Speaking about this compromise, we are approaching the question of the tools of the revolution, such as deliberate suppression of any radical actions from the rally participants, which were possible, given the constant tension they felt, anticipating raids or provocations.

“The other component is the search for a compromise. Everybody understood that it was either this or civil war or escalation of the conflict, which could cause the splintering of Ukraine or loss of independence. The people hate oligarchs and bureaucrats, but are willing to forge a compromise, whereby the latter can keep what they have stolen but must let go of power. In this respect, the decision by the Verkhovna Rada is a compromise among elites, a compromise envisioning a division of power and property, instead of expropriation.”

“Do Ukrainian oligarchs see a threat in Yushchenko, who will stop them from using power in their interests and force them to work fairly? Or should people in Yushchenko’s entourage be lamenting the fact that they will no longer be able to use the people much like those currently in power have done?”

MATVIYENKO: “I wouldn’t exaggerate the significance of Yushchenko’s persona. Neither his psychophysical abilities, nor his entourage give us reason to hope that he will bring things into complete order and that everything will be fair and transparent. Still, the conduct of the election campaign has caused quite a social upheaval. If we keep these processes alive, we will have a chance to achieve positive changes by following an evolutionary path.”

“Who would be interested in keeping these processes alive?”

MATVIYENKO: “The newly-formed organized communities, such as self-governance bodies: elected city mayors who have come into politics from business and rely on a different technology of exercising power and different ethics, and local deputies.”

TASTE OF VICTORY

“Who do you consider real winners, if any, in this situation? How can the nature of this victory develop?”

MATVIYENKO: “I consider myself, and by extension Ukrainian society, to be the winner. What happens next and whether I will consider myself the winner one year from now is anyone’s guess.”

HUBENKO: “I think we may speak about the victory of certain values and principles, primarily nonviolence and the ability to forge a compromise. There are two ways for solving social conflicts: either reaching a compromise or destroying the opposing side. The sheep must find a compromise with the wolves. Despite all the downsides to the compromise in parliament, the wolves have not eaten the sheep and the sheep have not opened fire on the wolves. The third is the principle of liberties. This principle stems from spiritual, psychological, and socioeconomic values. The emergence of the third estate, the combination of a personality with private ownership triggers the mechanism of self-determination of behavior. This very mechanism breeds the need for freedom. A person begins to treasure his freedom and desires. After all, the people took to the streets primarily because of the encroachments on their freedom.”

LYTVYNENKO: “I’m more pessimistic than that. The people have no doubt won, but they have also lost. They have lost because they were forced to take to the streets to defend their choice, because politicians did not have enough judgment to prevent public dissatisfaction. Another point is that our revolution is still very young. Historically, all revolutions were relatively bloodless during the first month. I truly hope that our situation would prove an exception from this rule, yet we should not forget the bitter lessons of history.”

FESENKO: “In my view the main result is that those who were thought to be sheep did not allow the wolves to eat them. I can cite dozens of examples when tens of thousands of people were rushed to squares, where they had to endure the cold and rain because they were forced to. Meanwhile, in our case the people gathered on Independence Square all by themselves and braved the cold and rain so that nobody would hold them for sheep, and to prove that they also have the right to make their own choice. They have no doubt won. I think that if at least a small percentage of these people preserve this taste of victory, this will be their victory. The main thing is to preserve this taste of victory.

“As for the politicians, I would not like to say which ones have won or lost, because theirs are small-scale battles that probably do not mean all that much to the public. Meanwhile, the fact that the wolves have not devoured one another, but reached an agreement, is no doubt a positive thing. God willing, we will make it through December 26 without sliding back into violent conflicts. Despite all the positive words spoken about the recent events, I get the impression that they are now driving Yanukovych into the corner, which, in my view, is counterproductive and not completely right. Our colleague, Vadym Karasiov, has offered a viable formula for defusing the current crisis: Yushchenko should be given an opportunity to win fairly and those in power a chance to lose with dignity and save their face. If the events take this course, neither party will lose, but society will stand to gain.”

“Those who are now rejoicing over the state of Kyiv and central and western Ukraine pay little attention to the east — a colossal, densely populated area, whose inhabitants feel alienated. Absolutely nonviolent mobilization of the constituents might take place there, and they will show a 90% turnout. Moreover, Yanukovych’s attempt to pose as an opposition nominee is perhaps somewhat clumsy, but the feeling persists that part of the nomenklatura has betrayed him. He might actively capitalize on this factor, winning over swing voters.”

FESENKO: “Estimates of Donetsk sociologists (the ones that I trust, mind you) suggest that the turnout will be even lower than in the first round, and not in the east alone. The current events have evoked mixed feelings. There is a growing non-acceptance of either side among a relatively small number of people, but I think this might cause both a lower turnout and a growing number of those voting against both candidates.

“As for the motives of Yanukovych’s behavior, I have heard from people in his camp that he wants to participate in the rerun not so much to win — supposedly he understands that he can’t eliminate all his flaws in two weeks — as to prepare ground for the future parliamentary elections. He has a chance of becoming the leader of a dissatisfied east, which has lost, but feels that it is not quite fair. Perhaps the mobilization of the eastern constituents will be stimulated by economic problems that will inevitably arise. That is, it is possible that the current conflict might be repeated during the 2006 elections.”

“If the first, bourgeois phase of our revolution evolves into a bourgeois-democratic phase, and everything takes its normal course — the elections will be held on December 26, followed by the inauguration of the new president, appointment of the new government, followed by parliamentary elections — this will become a challenge to the hereditary model of power transfer, which has been developing in the post-Soviet space to date. Are any surprises possible on December 26 and what are the threats, if any? How can this danger be avoided?”

FESENKO: “There is the threat that the voting might be disrupted for technical or organizational reasons, which will be supplemented by specific political actions, among all else, from abroad. The December 8 voting in parliament has eliminated some of the dangers and launched the legislative and political mechanism for resolving these problems.”

LYTVYNENKO: “I hope that the December 26 voting will take place. Without a doubt, there are problems. We can repeat all we want that the December 26 voting will be the most transparent in our history. Yet, it will not be too difficult a task to collect evidence to contest election results. Another election fraud appeal to the Supreme Court perhaps? Granted, the Supreme Court will not negate its own ruling and will not accept this appeal. But in this case Viktor Yanukovych will have many reasons to holler that there is no justice in Ukraine. Without a doubt, parliament’s symbolic voting for the political reform makes such an outcome less likely.”

FESENKO: “Strange as this may sound, we should put all our hopes in the Ukrainian bureaucracy. At one time, the Ukrainian bureaucracy became one of the factors that laid the foundation for the Ukrainian nation: they swore allegiance to the new power, switched to the Ukrainian language before all others did, etc. Now many of them feel threatened, especially in the east. In my view, it poses a major problem for them, and they face a difficult choice. And many are looking for the safest spot.”