Uniform a Size Too Large: It Will Fit The Ukrainian Army Five Years Later

Four services still remain in Ukraine: Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, and Air Defense. In keeping with the modern structural pattern, the four divisions are to be re- formed into detached mechanized brigades. Their numerical strength will diminish, but battle-readiness and mobility will definitely increase as a result of artillery and air- defense facilities. Another division is adopting a brigade-based system (2-3 brigades included). The commanding bodies of five air force divisions will be disbanded, and Air Force potential will be reduced by 10-12 regiments. The Navy will have three brigade command bodies disbanded and see the formation of a joint squadron incorporating the Navy’s best forces. The 43rd missile army will be finally disbanded. In addition, up to 400 tanks, 289 airplanes (including 180 warplanes), 189 helicopters (including 56 gunships), and 11 vessels (including 6 warships) will be decommissioned and then mothballed, scrapped, or sold over the course of five years. The army is going to vacate 217,600 hectares of land for civilian use.

The plan now envisions forming the following inter-service functional structures as part of the Armed Forces: the strategic reserves, and the main and forward-battle- area defense forces. The latter will include non-nuclear deterrent forces, mobile troops, and covering troops. They will be assigned the role of a sort of “fire brigade,” i.e., reacting immediately to changes in the surrounding military situation and neutralizing a low- intensity conflict. They will be fully equipped and armed with modern weaponry. Should they prove to be insufficient, other forces will intervene.

By 2005 the Ministry of Defense is responsible for improving the qualitative indicators in Armed Forces combat training. As for arsenals, different varieties of weapons will be standardized. For example, a new anti-tank guided missile was adopted last February, which can be installed at a tank and helicopter or used by an infantry crew. A standardized missile is being developed, which can meet simultaneously the requirements of two classes: surface-to-air and air- to-air. The President of Ukraine has instructed the government to create conditions for the modernization, development, and production of weapons. The Ministry of Defense, in conjunction with other agencies, should submit the State Program of Armed Forces Development to the National Security and Defense Council within three months. But it is clear even now that emphasis will be placed on modernization. It claims to be cheaper. For instance, modernizing a Mig-29 into a new-generation fighter plane will cost the budget UAH 22 million, while buying a new plane of the same class will take UAH 180 million. There are also certain peculiarities in the staff-placement policy, education, and other components of army life.

THE ARITHMETIC VIEW

In 2005, the Armed Forces of Ukraine must comprise 295,000 military and 80,000 civilian servicemen. Today, this ratio is slightly higher: 310,000 and 90,000, respectively. The army will meet the new quantitative targets without undue strain. “Personnel will only be cut by 25,000 over the course of five years. This is exactly what we call a civilized approach: demobilizing gradually, not in the hundreds of thousands a year, with salaries unpaid, accommodation denied, and other unsolved social problems. What is more, this will not be just a reduction, but rather a disbanding of the unnecessary military bodies,” Gen. Kuzmuk explained.

This means the Russian, Turkish and Ukrainian armies will be the largest in Europe. But so far, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are outnumbered by the German Bundeswehr with a strength of 460,000, including 340,000 military servicemen and 120,000 civilians. However, a special commission formed two weeks ago suggested to the German leadership that the number of military servicemen be cut down to 240,000 and the forces be reconverted in order to increase the strength of rapid-deployment forces from 50,000 to 140,000, thus boosting the army’s effectiveness. Last year’s hostility in Kosovo unexpectedly revealed the Bundeswehr’s weakness. Berlin was assigned only a minor role in the air raids against Yugoslavia. Additionally, the German military leadership faced some difficulties equipping and sending their peacekeeping contingent to Kosovo on time. One of the main causes of the situation is money: Germany badly needs a strict economy so that the saved funds could be earmarked to finance re-equipment programs. So they decided to economize on numerical strength. In fact, the German minister of defense has a different point of view. To be fully happy, Mr. Scharping needs 280,000 military and 80,000 civilian servicemen. This almost equals Ukraine’s targets for 2005.

If Ukraine suddenly managed to find money for accommodation and social payments for retired officers, could Kyiv decide on more radical steps and a smaller army? Answering this question for The Day , Gen. Kuzmuk said there is a certain limit not to be overstepped, while the Armed Forces are being reduced. As is known, we are a non- aligned state, so it is in fact only we who should worry about our own security. So we have come here to the key question: what should be the optimal strength and structure of our army under these circumstances? There will be no answer unless we finally decide who our likely enemy is and, no matter how categorically it may sound, what threats we face. The Ministry of Defense, as Gen. Kuzmuk stressed carefully, does not identify these threats on its own, so if it was decided to have 280,000, I just wonder what kind of war can be waged and what aggressor can be deterred with this force? For we do not encroach on what belongs to others. If only we could keep what we have!

If my memory does not fail me, our Ground Forces — the very foundation of our nuclear-free army only capable today of waging fourth-generation wars — have a total of about ten mechanized-infantry and armored divisions and approximately the same number of detached brigades. Under the simplified canons of the classic strategy of fourth-generation wars, when the defending side can effectively contain an enemy three times its own size, we have quite a good margin of safety. Who else can scrape up 30 odd divisions? Perhaps Russia. However, there is a snag here: our defenses will be strong as long as there is fuel in the tanks. And do I have to remind you where this fuel is being pumped from and who operates the shut-off valve?

It is still more senseless to take on NATO. Why on earth should they attack us? They have flooded us to death with their hamburgers and pampers even without war. As a result, Ukraine has just behind its back a few states bending over backwards to squeeze their way into NATO. But no one knows if the second wave of expansion will ever be necessary — in other words, for those slow on the uptake, in case of emergency Ukraine could well do with its own non-nuclear deterrent forces armed with high-precision weapons. Our missiles are a formidable force. It is common knowledge.

A VIEW FROM ABROAD

Reforms are costly. The military cherish the hope that next year’s budget will include money for the army reform as a separate item at last, so this money will not have to be picked at the expense of cutting down on other army needs, as is the case today, and that next year this country’s defense expenditures will at last meet the army’s minimal requirements in contrast to this year, when the amount is 40% of this minimum. With due account of money for modernizing weapons, Ukraine’s military expenses will increase on the whole. The Ministry of Defense believes, as if it were the gospel truth, in the long-term economic growth indices drawn up by the V. Yushchenko government. Yes, these indices and the program do exist. The problem is there have been no examples in our history when such programs were fulfilled. And nobody was ever held responsible (or it was too late to bear responsibility) for the figures on paper mismatching the real situation. So we had to turn to the IMF again. However, the new Fund chief, Horst Koehler, has already told The Wall Street Journal he opposes the policy, pursued earlier under the pressure of industrially developed countries, of giving billions-worth of loans to countries with a sizable military potential, such as Russia and Ukraine.

But this is not so terrible. Our military leadership has made public the five-year defense target figures against a far-from- simple foreign political background. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said the Friday before last that the organizational structure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces remains as it was in the Soviet times. Military reforms have not brought the army of our independent state closer to NATO standards. And our generals are still unable to adapt to the customary Alliance requirements, withholding information on some of the activities of the Ministry of Defense from NATO representatives.

Our “retaliation” was terse, as befits the military. Our defense reforms are not intended for Western applause; they aim not to serve the interests of Europe, the U.S., public-speaking ladies, etc., but of Ukraine. Being categorical will surely not go unnoticed by our strategic partner. Does the minister really know something so important that he chose to spill the beans irrespective of the grades, positions and weight categories? I have a lingering suspicion this is not the end of the story...