When the Year of Ukraine Arrives...
Ukraine has moved past what can be described as an experimental model of a new pan-European polity to the manufacturing process, roughly speaking. In other words, any concessions — e.g., tactical geopolitical expediency, historical discrepancies, humanitarian empathy — can no longer be made. I am positive that 2002 is the final year in which Ukraine can afford to go through the motions of making progress. This directly applies to the government (and by “government” I mean not the cabinet, but those actually wielding power), the political and economic elite, and the citizenry.
The project “Ukrainian polity” is made up of chronic elections, total falsehood (with the entire nation willing to be gypped), and naїve hoping for the best. In these circumstances things seeming to be self-evident turn out to be precisely the opposite.
“OLD ORDER” AND OPPOSITION IN 2003
At the start of 2003, we are witness to the umpteenth political confrontation in Ukraine. It suffices to remind oneself of the most vivid examples of such conflicts over the past several decades. In some cases they resulted in civil wars and changes of political power (as in Romania). In other cases such conflicts caused coups d’etat (El Salvador, Chile) or in the suppression of opposition, using military force and media (Russia). There is, however, a fourth option, whereby the powers that be and opposition resort to mutual concessions (Poland). What is happening in Ukraine is a conflict of the new generation, where target designation and actual results have nothing in common whatsoever.
The current political confrontation in Ukraine is the result of the struggle between the “democractic oppostion” and the “undemocratic regime.”
The democratic opposition is proudly represented by people that were an inalienable component of that regime three to five years back (the cabinet, parliament, NBU, regional authorities). At present, being in opposition means campaigning to topple the president and it does not take an expert to see that all opposition rallies and speeches are meant for the media. The whole thing is a high-budget soap opera with tired and confused citizens being used as extras — people refusing to put up with misery and bureaucratic arbitrariness; with professional politicians and businessmen acting as script writers and directors. These people appear as the “motive forces” of struggle against the regime.
The reverse side of this reality is as deceptive. The ongoing political crisis is denied by people representing the regime and by affiliated politicians; they assure that there are no causes for political and social disaster.
Those actually wielding power look self-confident, but with an invariable sour expression; they are unable to change their professorial tone for that of a dutiful public servant. There are government-controlled television channels with their boring empty phraseology about democracy, reform, stability, and well-being (the latter sounds actually unique!). And all this is against the backdrop of limos, pompous state institutions, and bodyguards. This is the “old order” (described as “antipopular regime” by the opposition). Of late, it has been personified not only by ranking bureaucrats quartered on Bankivska St. (the Presidential Administration on the premises of the former Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine), but also by a multitude of yes men in charge of regional authorities, businessmen, and politicians having seats in parliament, people representing the so-called propresidential majority, oligarchic groups disturbed by the need to declare the “first million earned.” Incidentally, these representatives of the “old order” are also capable of collecting votes and securing the desired election turnout, using the stick-and-carrot tactic. And it is also true that this can be achieved without the citizenry-people downtrodden and tired of the powers that be. They act as extras in opposition shows and as “electors.”
The current political confrontation is on an upward curve. Both sides have similar characteristics: the presence of big-time Ukrainian oligarchic capital and democractic verbiage, while actively looking for “external support.” Both sides are not loath to flirt with the traditional Left parties, actively using modern information technologies. Moreover, both sides make no secret of existing in two realities at the same time: publicly warring, exchanging vociferous accusations, while also holding constant talks, consultations, steering a middle course wherever possible, away from the public eye. There is only one principal distinction. One of the “warring sides” actually wields power and the other is denied it (thus considering itself in opposition).
The split ruling class of Ukraine and the monolithic regime, privatized by a certain group of that class, are what I see as the key to understanding the current domestic political confrontation. Whether this confrontation boils down to the regime combating the opposition and whether the advent of the “new order” can be accomplished through a democratic revolution remains to be seen. There is yet another important aspect to the Ukrainian political conflict: the presence of a “third party.” Clandestine agencies, diplomats, world media, and national and international power structures are involved in the Ukrainian conflict as much (maybe on an even larger scope) as was the case with the Triple Entente and the 1918- 21 civil war in Russia.
APROPOS THINGS THAT DON’T MEET THE EYE
The Ukrainian economy is undergoing subtle gradual transformations in the course of this political battle; this economy is increasingly less dependent on the Ukrainian oligarchs and progressively relies on foreign capital.
Likewise, the facade of the Ukrainian powers that be is changing. They are no longer a participant in the process of “national rebirth,” but a slowing-down factor, for that “third party” has also appropriated the “evolving force” status (e.g., democracy and a civil society in the West and economy in Russia).
Most importantly, the character of the Ukrainian polity has changed. Quite recently this country was regarded as a “geopolitical key” to Europe and Eurasia, as a “bridge” and “center” of sorts. At present, it is viewed as a “geopolitical space” that can be easily conquered, a passive target of influence that can be manipulated either way.
This is nothing new, considering that Ukraine’s economic and political developments over the past couple of years have been part and parcel of the global transforming process. This linkage, however, must have been markedly expressed during the political crises in the fall of 2000 and spring of 2001. New rules of the Ukrainian political game were established, followed by the Year of Ukraine in Russia, and Ukraine’s de facto isolation from the West, when the Ukrainian powers had to finally reckon with the circumstances.
In this context, I would like to draw the reader’s attention, however superficially, to yet another linkage between the times and events.
Back in 1997-98, Washington, faced with the financial crisis in Asia, threatening to expand and weaken the dollar’s position as a reserve currency, resorted to a radical option to settle the Yugoslav conflict. This resulted in a destabilized and discredited Europe, localizing the financial crisis in Asia and Eurasia, followed by a new wave of speculations focused on democracy vs. nondemocracy, as exemplified by the toppling of Slobodan Milosevic’s regime. In 2000-01, Ukrainian journalists and political analysts wrote a lot about the political technologies applied in Yugoslavia, comparing its Otpor [Resistance] Movement to Ukraine’s latter-day opposition trends.
Here is the interesting point. In the aftermath of Kosovo, it became clear that Ukraine, along with a number of post-Soviet countries, fitted in the Yugoslav pattern perfectly (allowing, of course, for national specifics).
Kazakhstan and its Kazakhgate scandal had the president being accused of corruption. The opposition ex-premier, A. Kazhegeldinov, was most actively involved in the campaign, backed by all those opposition parties and movements. The evolution of these entities is also interesting as material for comparison. In several years’ time, the opposition had changed its tune from “People’s Front” to “Forum of Kazakh Democratic Forces” to “Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan” to “United Democratic Party” (the latter still valid).
Belarus has had a long battle between President Lukashenko and the opposition personified by the Belarusian Popular Front (renamed Zubr [Bison] Movement a couple of years back, compared to Yugoslavia’s Otpor Movement).
Against this background, Ukraine’s Kolchuga scandal, information leaks, opposition warring, and the long-since-discredited regime look as though they are part of a process far exceeding the domestic political scope.
GAMES WE CAN’T PLAY
The Euro’s introduction in 2000 and then Euro cash transactions (2001), activated the time clock of the new monetary and geopolitical post- dollar, post-NATO epoch. This period is marked by changes in NATO’s leading member country and by new forecasts addressing the global financial system.
The competition between the strategies of European and Euro- Atlantic integration is reaching a dangerous peak, even if without outward signs of major damage. The stakes are sky- high: holding the fort, retaining positions seized in the early 1990s come what may, consolidating resources for a new technological breakthrough, emerging victorious in that “confrontation of the century.” Here, even the destinies of countries in the Eurasian region can be used as a bet. The stronger the “image of evil,” the more compelling is the argument of a splitting West.
In this context, Ukraine’s image as a totally corrupt country was anything but coincidental in 2002, with the lowest of ratings, condemned as an undemocratic polity, lacking a market economy, and with countless other most unfavorable characteristics. Without noticing it, starting in 1999-2000 (it is very important to note, considering the political changes in the United States after the Clinton-Gore team was replaced by Bush, Jr. and his team), Ukraine turned up among the discredited post-Soviet countries as an occupation zone with rampant shadow economy, trading in military technologies and maintaining contacts with the Evil Axis (Iraq, North Korea, Libya, et al.).
Regardless of the domestic political context (e.g., Yushchenko vs. Kuchma, Tymoshenko vs. Surkis...), Ukraine is being pushed forth as yet another carrier of evil and threat against the community of democratic nations. This scenario started to play out in 2002.
If Ukraine continues to act as a student wishing nothing but another go at an exam flunked, in the next couple of years the Ukrainian regime and its backup forces may well bring forth a lot of problems for themselves and the neighboring Russian elite.
RESPONDING TO EXTERNAL CHALLENGES
Domestic politicians and experts show an enviable degree of enthusiasm playing in their home sandbox, trying to convince the rest of the world that Ukraine has a competent and effective parliamentary majority, a coalition government, and that it is actually on the stated path of European integration and effective economic reform.
Countless useful but totally unlikely projects are proclaimed: tax, administrative, territorial, political, and other reforms. The overall impression is that the authors are totally unaware of the difference between promotion and implementation. Promotion-tired best describes Ukraine and its people in 2002.
Moreover, those in power, while reaffirming the European choice and an inclination (sic) toward Euro- Atlantic integration, have taken practical steps in the opposite direction, namely:
(a) amazing political and spatial timing: 2002 marking the Year of Ukraine in Russia; 2003 marking the Year of Russia in Ukraine (I will only point out that 2004 marks the 250th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, placing Ukraine under the Russian crown);
(b) presenting the largest geoeconomic project in Ukraine’s independent history ever: the international gas transportation consortium with Russia and Ukraine being thus far the only actual originators);
(c) unprecedented Russian- Ukrainian diplomatic activity, with “All Quiet on the Western front”;
(d) Ukraine being invited by a number of leading Russian politicians and statesmen to receive full-fledged status within the Eurasian Economic Union, with EU diplomatically depriving this country of close European integration (the “neighbor” status is very much like a painkiller prescription).
The result is nothing totally unexpected. The Ukrainian president becomes head of the CIS. Ukraine is an associate member and a new Eurasian leader. Something to write home about, although, considering hasty statements made by the Foreign Ministry and Presidential Administration, a series of presidential edicts concerning the Eurasian policy, it is something no one has expected at the higher echelons of Ukrainian power. Now they have to cope with the situation that has developed.
This situation is sad and tough. After heading CIS and refusing Eurasian alliance, Ukraine has nothing to say to the European Union. The possibility of Ukraine’s NATO membership looks manifestly utopian, considering Washington’s accusations (US being NATO’s leading member) addressing Ukraine’s alleged supplies of weapons to Iraq (the latter being described as a threat to the democratic world in general and NATO in particular). Still, FATF sanctions sufficed for the Ukrainian leadership to quickly realize just how much confidence the West had in Ukraine. It was then that NATO’s cooperation program was clutched as the proverbial straw (the opposition and regime proved strikingly unanimous in meeting the FATF requirements).
Hence, the only logical inference. The Ukrainian regime and affiliated political elite have (perhaps inadvertently) demonstrated geopolitical disorientation and the absence of a national development project.
“What are we building and what have we built?” was a rhetorical question posed in 2002, which has remained unanswered, ranking with yet another catchphrase, “We have what we have.”
WHO WANTS TO LEARN 2002 LESSONS?
Regrettably, the Ukrainian political elite did not use the opportunity to study the 2002 global situation. The reason was the difference in cognitive scope. This is yet another subjective result of the past year.
Instead, big-time capital was consolidated, centered on the current regime, sensing rather than realizing the external threat. This consolidation manifested itself as reshuffling in-power positions and securing the powers that be reliable support (in the broad sense of the word). This consolidation is increasingly like that Alliance of the Three, where every participant has to count on his own attainment and on the timely move of his newly formed partners. Here a timely move, getting the better of others, is most important and the time factor has become the highest priority.
In the end we have an intercorporate coalition sponsoring public politics. It will exist until the presidential campaign. Every participant has his own presidential candidate, a coiffured “decent” political party, and large funds. Anyway, this coalition emerges as an actual force. The outcome of the power play will depend on the stand taken by the players and their alignment, also considering that it is the second component of the regime, along with the current government (in the broad sense of the word).
For Ukraine, the “main cue” in the above-mentioned global scenario is the specific “bipolar” domestic political system. The Ukrainian government has its ambitious plans to secure (appoint) the desired successors, as does the rigid implacable opposition. They include Leonid Kuchma and his candidates and Viktor Yushchenko as an alternative.
Two idols of the crisis — the regime and the opposition — have shoved everyone onto the bed of Procrustes. It is either survive with the existing government (in the broad sense of the word) or play into the opposition’s hand.
What we have in the final count is a scenario developing to change Ukraine’s role in Eurasia (big-time capital’s backup stance in supporting the regime); being unaware of the scope of what is actually happening, groping in the darkness of interfactional ambitions, getting even with rivals...
Does everything stated above mean that the regime’s disoriented stand is a reflection on the newly- established intercorporate coalition? Yes, it does at the moment (e.g., at the start of 2003). How long will the regime remain shortsighted? It is anyone’s guess.
Let us suppose a totally illusory situation in which the bipolar domestic political pattern is changed outside both poles. Neither Kuchma nor Yushchenko, et al., can step outside the corridor they built for themselves.
Others will, those investing tangible and intangible assets in the ongoing political struggle, a struggle that has become senseless but nonetheless cruel. To do so, however, they will have to stage a dialog, a “horizontal” one, adopting an optimum agenda addressing Ukraine’s future without all those idols and mystique.
In big politics, “coloration” depends on the scope. Whatever palette is used, the big gamble places every player in his proper niche, unless these players are capable of choosing their positions. Who says that the pro- Western/pro-Russian party dualism is an insurmountable obstacle? Who says that there are no preconditions for setting up a pan-Ukrainian party, it being a subject rather than object of tampering with from without? Think this over; we are into the year 2003, yet we have to reckon with the 2003-04 political prospects, starting December 31 and on to January 1st.
IN LIEU OF EPILOGUE
Quite a few among the professional analysts support the “cyclic” theory, attributing 12-year solar cycles to those of social progress. Thus, 2002 (the eleventh year of Ukraine as an independent polity) is considered the turning point, changing the political cycle. Courtesy of our domestic sociologists, we have been able to see this year, again, that most Ukrainian citizens are for strengthening our national independence, for its parity status in international relations, etc.
There is, however, another vivid trend; our people are totally disillusioned about all those in power; they distrust our politicians, and I daresay they don’t think much of the state- construction program to be carried out in 2002. The Ukrainian state remains that “external force” being led not only by oligarchs, but also burghers; everybody wants to live in a “shadow civil society.” This is a spontaneous phenomenon that cannot be described using any formulas. However, the earliest evidence of its presence is alarming (whether coming from politicians or arising spontaneously). What I have in mind is all those claims concerning the Galician Republic, Russian Crimea, Federation, and so on. It should be noted, however, that the above options do not rule out the Ukrainian status; rather, they are aimed at revising the political system. It suffices to remember what happened to the Soviet republics after the USSR’s collapse (1990-91).
All such political readjustment projects are highly alarming; they are destructive. Yet I believe that any such national project should stipulate something other than changes in the constitution or in the political division. First and foremost, it is the ability of the national elite (in whatever evolutionary phase) to combine tradition with modern trends, using and enhancing national resources, forming and strengthening the social environment, doing so above regional and provincial preferences. In the final count, it consists in mastering and cultivating national history, without reservations addressing whole centuries, without dramatics and references to the gold age. A polity, like a human being, is a harmony of body and soul.
Unless the current Ukrainian elite can cope with this tremendous task, the “shadow civil society” will have to look for a counterelite. Also, it is important to understand that Ukraine can be “revised,” using sources within. A revision must be done so that Ukraine can no longer be used as a pawn in someone else’s game, or play a shameful role in a new world construction scenario, written by others caring little for Ukraine’s national future.
