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WIND FROM THE WEST

10 July, 00:00

We have heard the last chord of the sparkling dynamic symphony called The Pope in Ukraine with its somewhat drawn-out introduction, dramatic movements reflecting the struggle between the forces of good and evil, and the triumphal finale with the last note being John Paul II’s parting words, “Goodbye, fraternal Ukrainian people.”

Ukraine greeted the pontiff as the epicenter of ideas, encyclicals, and sayings focused on man, his dignity, and freedom. It would be hard to find a single speech or document of his not addressing painful modern issues, not defending the downtrodden, not pointing to social threats, some quite well camouflaged. “Pope John Paul II has raised the pontifical level very high and his successor will have a hard time measuring up; his contemporaries holding Orthodox cathedrae will find it difficult keeping at that level.” (Larysa Ivshyna)

“What will the Moscow Patriarch have to say after that?” Yevhen Sverstiuk asked rhetorically after the Pope’s first address to the Ukrainian people.

A Western diplomat said once, “Ukraine is still firmly linked to Russia by two chains: energy resources and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).” Indeed, the Moscow Patriarchate pursues its religious-political line in Ukraine via UOC bishops, parish priests, and religious communities. The UOC MP clergy disseminates ideas alien to the Ukrainian people (the “noncanonical” and “heretical” nature of the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church, the apocalyptic threat of the pontifical visit and of contacts with any adherents of different creeds, the need to have a political union of Eastern Slavs, etc.). Moreover, they canvas congregations for pro-Russian politicians during elections, voicing ideas that Russia’s professional orthodox politicians cannot for reasons of propriety.

Small wonder that the Moscow Patriarchate should be so anxious to keep the Ukrainian flock under its exclusive control, lest the slightest breeze from the West ripple the immaculately smooth and clear surface of this influence. The UOC has a considerable part of the faithful tied not only to the Moscow Patriarchate but also to Russia, the East, and often to the Middle Ages. The Pope means Europe and modern times. “Pro-Moscow Orthodox leaders, who boycotted the Pope’s trip, believe that he wants to divide the Orthodox world, enabling Rome to make converts and to bind postcommunist Ukraine to the West in religious as well as secular terms,” wrote The Times.

Indeed, if Russia’s Orthodox empire falls apart, as did the secular one, and if the Moscow Patriarchate loses jurisdiction over the UOC, the Russian Orthodox Church will no longer be the world’s largest one in its own right (the United Ukrainian Church would), meaning that its influence on world Orthodoxy would diminish.

Apart from political and religious reasons, there are, of course, purely objective factors that made the Moscow Patriarchate so strongly opposed to the Pope’s visit. One can only try to imagine the feeling with which the Moscow hierarchs watched the holy Father’s invariably triumphant visits to different countries over the past decades, and the media coverage, following the pontiff’s every step and word, while heads of state across the world hurry to pay a courtesy visit to the Holy See. Vladimir Putin visited the Vatican a couple of months after his inauguration. Many are convinced that he would have invited the Pope to visit Moscow, but for the Patriarchate.

Even though the Moscow Patriarch’s logic is transparent enough, his political strategy in conjunction with the pontifical visit to Ukraine looks quite strange. The Third Rome could have displayed a more flexible stand, among other things by foreseeing the reality of the visit. But it did not, and the Moscow Patriarchate believed up to the very last minute that it would never take place (vehement demands to cancel the visit were heard even as the pontifical jet was airborne). The result was a visible public fiasco, placing the Patriarchate and the faithful in an extremely embarrassing position. In fact, Moscow failed even to make the best of a bad bargain, as Patriarch Aleksiy II came up with several statements, the lack of diplomatic propriety of which left everyone amazed, whereupon he suddenly went West to Belarus (just as the Pope was traveling East to Ukraine), perhaps to seek consolation in Lukashenka’s company (but the faithful in Belarus hardly noticed the arrival of their chief pastor).

The Holy See, in turn, suffered a certain, albeit predicted, defeat in Kyiv, failing to meet with UOC MP representatives. John Paul II’s press secretary Joachim Navarro-Vallsa, however, stated that “the Pope is not too disappointed by failing to meet with Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan). He is a realistic and very consistent person. The Pope will not stop making efforts to improve relationships between the Catholic and Orthodox churches.” In other words, the pontiff was not offended, nor did he want to show just how stubborn he was. The statement was meant to demonstrate the Catholic hierarchy’s awareness of the need to conduct a dialogue and establish normal standing relations with the Orthodox side.

Because of its rigid diplomacy, the Russian Church ultimately could suffer even heavier losses, particularly in terms of the UOC MP status. Its ongoing stiff no-concessions policy, rejecting not only the autocephalous option, but also UOC MP autonomy, could eventually result in the total loss of the Ukrainian archdiocese. Evidence is found in recent polls showing significant differences in the views of the clergy and adherents on the Pope’s visit. Despite the anti-visit campaign lasting for months, a mere 6-8% of rank-and-file believers were opposed to it, in Ukraine as well as in Russia.

The Moscow Patriarchate’s reaction to the Pope’s visit reaffirmed the old truth that Russian hierarchs refuse to reckon with or adjust themselves to realities. True, only recently the Russian Orthodox Church did not have to, as it relied in its stand on the tsar’s troops and later on Soviet nuclear missiles. Now that they are no more, the Moscow Patriarchate may find itself in a marginal position a couple of decades hence, as was the case with several once celebrated Eastern Orthodox patriarchates. The process is underway, as evidenced by withdrawals from the ROC in Ukraine and Moldova.

Certain Ukrainian politicians and media believe that the Pope’s visit has been largely overstated. Indeed, it is in our character to plunge headlong one way or another; now we laud someone and the next moment start hurling buckets of dirt. Yet in the case of the visit an event of tremendous importance took place, and not only in the religious context. Take Ukrainian- Polish relationships, with hundreds of years of wars, bloodshed, humiliation, hatred and mutual injustice. Not so long ago, mentality was formed by confessional belonging, one of hatred, serving politicians, even the military. The term “Catholic” or “papist” came to be interpreted as an expletive in Ukraine and “Ukrainian” was likewise regarded as derogatory, meaning schismatic, plebeian.

Often the stereotypes worked out over centuries outlive historical memory. Recall Taras Bulba, Honta in Uman, or Sienkiewicz’s With Fire and Sword? Regrettably, little is done in Ukraine to cultivate a different attitude toward and new relationships with our closest Western neighbor.

And then a man visited Kyiv who is not only the world’s number one papist, but also a Pole. He kneeled, kissed Ukrainian soil, and praised our forefathers’ role in Christianizing Eastern Europe. He wholeheartedly wants Ukrainians and Poles to forgive each other and be forgiven; he wants us to cleanse our historical memory, so we can build our future together, relying on mutual respect, fraternal cooperation, and genuine solidarity.

The Pope addressed us in beautiful Ukrainian, which the Polish szlachta had once scorned as a peasant vernacular. His every word was a call for tolerance, respect for human dignity, and freedom of conscience. The people of Kyiv accepted and cheered this Catholic Polish Pope. Naturally, the kind of welcome he was accorded in the heart of Ukrainian Orthodoxy could not be compared to what happened in Western Lviv (where he was received mainly by Ukrainians, for the record). As it was, thousands of Kyivans went out to greet him, quite a few Orthodox adherents attended mass and there was a general atmosphere of keen interest in the city. Not a single case of spontaneous public protest was registered, not counting all those standing guard behind the ancient Lavra walls, squinting through pecpholes, so they could “protect our sacred place from profanation.” (Who were they going to protect it from? A pious old man, a Christian who wanted to offer up a prayer there?) People cannot change abruptly and the same is true of their world outlook, but we all saw what happened. Orthodox Kyiv greeting the Catholic Pope. It was a significant, unprecedented lesson not only for us Ukrainians but also without doubt for the Poles.

Much is being said about the visit’s impact on Ukrainian church life, that it could improve interfaith and interchurch relations. But face it. Miracles are seldom worked that way. One thing is certain: we all must be grateful to Pope John Paul II for meeting with our “noncanonical” autocephalous hierarchs: Patriarch Filaret and Metropolitan Mefodiy (both being ostracized by the ecumenical Orthodox community under pressure from the Moscow Patriarchate, and unfortunately by the Curia Romana). By greeting the heads of UOC KP and UAOC, the Pope greeted millions of “unrecognized” Orthodox believers in Ukraine branded as outcasts and heretics courtesy of the Moscow Patriarchate, a decorous and truly Christian gesture.

This serious precedent must be an example for the world Christian community. Maybe not too soon, but the isolation of our independent Orthodox churches will begin to disappear (especially if they somehow unite).

Not all expectations placed in the pontifical visit came true. Surprisingly, this relates above all to the problems facing the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC). Its faithful expected the Pope to proclaim a Greek Catholic Patriarchate. This would add more independence to the church and extend its jurisdiction to all foreign Ukrainian Greek Catholic bishoprics (they are currently governed by the Congregation of Eastern Churches of the Holy See). No such proclamation was made.

Nor did the visit put an end to the UGCC division (such as the Mukacheve Eparchy refusing to report to the Lviv Archdiocese and taking orders only from the Holy See). Ukrainians are also very displeased by the fact that archaic terms like Ruthenian are still used in official Vatican documents relating to the Mukacheve Eparchy. There are also certain problems between the Catholics and Greek Catholics in Ukraine. Hopefully, the Pope’s visit will help settle them.

Another Greek Catholic disappointment is that, contrary to expectations, Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky was not beatified, but this was perhaps the one really important concession the Holy See made to Moscow, precisely in conjunction with the visit. (Moscow adamantly rejects the metropolitan’s canonization, despite the fact that canonization is the exclusive right of any given church. The fact remains that in view of the Orthodox- Catholic schism, saints recognized by one side may not be respected by the other). There is a ray of hope for the Greek Catholics; Pope John Paul II assured them that in the Sheptytsky case canonization the paperwork is underway.

Interestingly, the Pope’s visit to Ukraine showed considerably more restraint than all the other visits in criticizing the domestic sociopolitical situation. In this sense, the most conspicuous was his reference to the UGCC Synod next year, to deal with social issues “which the Church cannot let pass in silence.” The Pope was more specific and insistent addressing Lviv’s youth, pointing to certain most pressing aspects of Ukraine’s life and offering practical recommendations.

“Ukraine’s future largely depends on you, on the degree of responsibility you can assume... Ukraine needs men and women capable of dedicating themselves to serving this society, so as to ensure the well-being and the rights of all people, beginning with the weakest and downtrodden... Freedom requires a strong, responsible, and mature conscience... God will help you go against the current; He will teach you to love your native land and disperse the illusion of fortunes made quickly and easily abroad. Young people, you are needed at home; you must be prepared to make your own contribution in bettering the social, cultural, economic, and political conditions in Ukraine. You are rich in talent and this talent is needed in your land and for its future... Advanced civilizations are not measured only by economic progress, but primarily by the people’s moral and spiritual level. Do not exchange communist slavery for that of consumer interests!” These words are addressed to us all.

Do widzenia, Papiez!

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