Yevhen Marchuk: Politics is Driven by Principles, not Ideology
Every issue must be treated with an eye to its background, legal framework, and expert estimates — three components of Mr. Marchuk’s inherently professional attitude as a politician with a keen insight, as evident from the following interview which is perhaps the first one after the presidential campaign.
“My first question is about the Orange Revolution. What was it? What are the causes behind the events that came to be known as the Orange Revolution? What lessons should politicians and society be drawing from the election campaign that just ended? Or has it?”
“This was a profound social upheaval stemming from the protracted buildup of tension in society’s ‘tectonic plates,’ which was largely caused by subjective factors relating to the previous government. At a certain point, at the end of his first tenure, I think, former President Leonid Kuchma began to ignore alternative sources of information. He began receiving all his information through a narrow channel. Roughly the same thing happened to Gorbachev in his final days in office. His entourage sensed exactly what could beguile the presidential ear. When I said that it was sad to see how Leonid Kuchma was ending his presidency, I meant his personal tragedy. Because if one is to be objective, there is no denying that during his ten years in office Kuchma accomplished a few things. Yet the extent to which he discredited himself and was rejected by a large part of society is tremendous. His predecessor Kravchuk did not experience anything remotely similar when he left office after his defeat by Kuchma.
“On the other hand, growing public dissatisfaction with those in power and too many old faces were also among the causes. But most importantly, during the presidential elections, the election campaign, the first round, and the runoff, Yanukovych, Kuchma — all the machinery that administered these elections — went overboard with what they did during the 1999 elections. Many have forgotten that the same people were in power during the 1999 presidential elections. Election fraud was rampant in 1999, and the mechanisms that were used then were again employed by those in power. This time around, however, there were many more things that simply got people scared.”
“The Western press has been promoting many speculative scenarios, both romantic and cynical, of the role the uniformed and special services played in the Orange Revolution. How would you comment on their role?”
“We don’t have all that many special services that can influence the elections. These are the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and to some extent the Ministry of Defense. Basically, the SBU and all of its elements saved face in this situation. This is not to say that they behaved perfectly. If we recall, the first moves against the Pora students were made with the participation of the SBU, among others. Then the police joined in aggressively, charging them with possession of firearms and explosives, and so on and so forth. But I can say that if the SBU had worked against Yushchenko in a more energetic and aggressive manner, using all of its available resources (which would be illegal), then his victory would have been very problematic.
“The SBU’s immediate response to the fact that part of the military was put on combat alert, and its immediate exposure of the chief of staff, and subsequently Commander-in-Chief Popkov, as the officers behind this criminal order, prevented the situation from becoming dangerous.
“This was preceded by another situation. It is now being concealed and will be almost impossible to prove, but discussions took place around plans to declare a state of emergency.”
“Do you mean a National Defense and Security Council meeting was convened for this purpose?”
“No. Technically, five persons could gather to discuss whether to declare a state of emergency and then call a full NDSC meeting to approve the resolution. This has no real significance. The most important thing is that key figures discussed this issue. When I learned about this, I appeared on television and addressed the special and uniformed services in order to explain in brief the implications of a state of emergency.
“I have had occasion to participate in the drafting of bills and served as minister of defense, state security, and emergency management. In general, the procedure of imposing a state of emergency is quite complex and involves political risks — it must be approved by parliament within 24 hours. When a state of emergency is declared, many restrictions are enforced that people don’t encounter in normal life: curfews, legalized censorship; parliament must work on a daily basis as a body that controls the enforcement of the state of emergency; special restrictions are imposed on banking operations and contacts with the outside world; the activity of civic organizations and parties is restricted; citizens’ right of assembly is restricted and meetings are banned. When hundreds of thousands of protesters are in the streets, any attempt to impose a state of emergency would have led to bloodshed. Kuchma was told: ‘Use your authority and establish order.’
“Here we must be objective, no matter how people may feel about Kuchma. He could have declared a state of emergency. There were some formal reasons for doing this. But this would have been his complete failure and even his tragedy as a politician. And he was perfectly aware of this. He didn’t dare declare a state of emergency, probably without knowing all the technological specifics; but he realized that if he had done so, it would have been the end for him.
“One day I think Kuchma will reveal how the Orange Revolution came about. He will be forced to. He is facing many charges and there is more to come. And he has no reason to lie: he will say exactly how it happened. And I think his memoirs will cause a sensation: Who insisted on using force? Why?”
A FIFTY-FIFTY GOVERNMENT
“Can you comment on the nature, composition, and formative principles of the new government? There have been conflicting opinions from experts and politicians. Some say that it is in fact a government formed ahead of the 2006 elections to secure victory for the forces represented in it. Others are certain that it is a government of vanquishers whose aim is to destroy the old administrative system and clear away the debris. Still others claim that it is a government that is sharing the spoils of power among the forces that contributed to the election campaign.”
“I think that all these components are present; they don’t cancel out one another. And government mechanisms will no doubt be used during the elections. The impending parliamentary elections will be the first major test of democracy for the new government. Economic and social tests will come before that. During the test of democracy two problems of the new government will come to the fore: first, like I said, the elections, and second — the role of the uniformed services: what and who will be their targets and how they will be involved in the fight against corruption and contraband, especially considering that officials’ salaries will not be raised. This will be an interesting task: since the president’s salary is 2,500 hryvnias ($470), this means that no other official may have a higher salary.”
“As for the composition of the government, it is almost formed, and we can only wish it success. In fact, we all want things not to become any worse.” Since the members of cabinet have been appointed, there is a need to sense, analyze, and predict problems, mistakes, and miscalculations of the governmental machinery as quickly as possible. Naturally, it needs some time to adapt. But there are many government posts that I would call expert-technological ones.
“Some ministries require the appointee to have expertise. He must be a good manager and know his business. It’s good if he’s also a shrewd politician. Everybody is talking a lot about how everything is going to be. In principle, declarations are in order during some period, but this period has continued for too long. Individual ministers are also acting like know-it-alls. But running almost every ministry involves a tremendous amount of knowledge on the subject, aside from a general vision of the political process. In such a special sector as the uniformed services (to which I include the Border Service, the Defense Ministry, the Security Service, and the Internal Affairs Ministry) there is a danger that political orders might be handed down. This is normal from the viewpoint of the state’s functioning, but if such orders go beyond the legal framework, this will lead to the creation of what is known as the rule of political expediency, not to mention revolutionary expediency. We know from history where this can lead.”
“Are the uniformed ministries in their current composition capable of reforming the country’s military organization?”
“A lot will depend on three things: the president’s personal support; funding — since reform carries a heavy price tag; and a blueprint and plans for reform. All this, especially the third element, will greatly depend on whether the reformers begin from scratch or continue to build on the achievements of their predecessors. This does not apply only to the Defense Ministry, but also to the Security Service and Internal Affairs. To give you an illustration, the Defense Ministry drew up a very complex document, the Strategic Defense Bulletin White Book of Ukraine. For the first time it contains a frank analysis of the state of the Armed Forces, their structure, and plans until 2015, all of which was adapted to reflect international legal aspects.
“Moreover, a financial document was developed — a government decree to reduce manpower, the structure, and infrastructure that are eating up a lot of resources. Funding was calculated as a percentage of the GDP in line with a GDP growth forecast. All it would take to endorse this document on defense reform funding is three government meetings. Are they calling it off or keeping it? If they are calling it off, they must develop something new fast. But it takes months to work out this kind of material.
“Reducing manpower is part of the problem. But what about changing the structure and funding? The public welcomes the reduction of the term of mandatory military service from 18 to 12 months. But this is being presented as an improvement instituted by the new government. Yet all of this was planned before, and these changes were supposed to be introduced by the end of this year, along with serious structural changes to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
“What does it take to reduce the term of service from 18 to 12 months? It requires reducing the Armed Forces. Meanwhile, manpower has remained unchanged: let’s say we reduce the term of service, but we are left with 65,000 conscripts, like before. This means that to maintain our manpower at its current level, we need three drafts per year instead of two. Is the system prepared for this? Will the public like it?
“There is a host of other problems, such as the transition to contractual army service. We currently have over 30,000 contractual servicemen. But to resolve this problem we have to answer a simple question: why do 70% of contractual servicemen never renew their contracts after they expire?
“It is very important for President Yushchenko not simply to organize the management of the Armed Forces, but also carry out reforms. It has been announced that civic organizations will be created to this end. It is no doubt a good thing for people to know how the Armed Forces will be reformed. But imagine that civic groups are formed to carry out a major reform of the Health Ministry. There are sector-specific tasks that can be undertaken only by experts, not civic groups. For example, if our country keeps its nonaligned status, the Armed Forces should be structured accordingly. If we are looking ahead to the prospect of joining NATO, this means a different path of development for the Armed Forces: we must make preparations for joining the system of collective defense and security with the alliance or some future union between the alliance and Russia. That is to say, the defense system has a strict hierarchical dependence among its various elements. Without resolving problems on a larger scale, we cannot resolve lesser problems. Without defining the direction of military and political integration, we cannot reform the Armed Forces.”
“The president has in fact surrendered his right to independently appoint ministers of the uniformed services: these appointments have also been subject to the principle of power sharing. Why do you think this happened?”
“This is President Yushchenko’s choice and risk. The appointments have been made, and we should assist them and hope that they will justify the trust placed in them. But I think the ministers of the uniformed services should have been appointed and personally supervised by the president.”
“Then what should be the role of the National Defense and Security Council? Petro Poroshenko’s appointment as secretary was unexpected to some extent. Many rumors are circulating in the political milieu about how much leverage the Security Council has or does not have. What does the influence of the Security Council depend on: its ability to whisper in the presidential ear or the president’s decisions? How do you think the political reform will affect the Security Council in terms of its influence?”
“First of all, let me clarify some terminology. The National Defense and Security Council is chaired by the president. Its members are the prime minister, parliamentary speaker, and the ministers of all the uniformed services, the economy, emergency management, internal affairs, etc. It is the country’s supreme collegial constitutional body. Now people sometimes confuse the staff of the National Security Council, which is an important instrument, with the secretary of the Security Council, and the council itself.
“If you recall, all NDSC resolutions without exception become effective pursuant to orders from the president alone. Word has it that Poroshenko has now solicited signing authority for some resolutions. If this is the case, then parliament must pass amendments to the law on the National Security Council. The rumors about the level of influence that you mentioned are to some degree related to persons who have occupied the post of NDSC secretary — Horbulin, Marchuk, Radchenko, and now Poroshenko.
“There is a very simple criterion. When I was appointed NDSC secretary in late 2000, we compiled an official classified report to the president about the work of the National Security Council. We then removed a page and a half of classified text and publicized over 20 pages with the president’s approval. A second report came out in 2001 and we also published it. It does not make for pleasant reading, but it is very interesting nonetheless. We published it in the Strategic Panorama magazine and posted it on the NDSC Web site. Nobody in the NDSC had compiled any reports before us.
“You can fantasize all you want about who has more clout, or you can simply compare who did what in which year. Before me, the National Security Council never submitted a single report. At the time of Radchenko’s appointment as NDSC secretary, there was much talk about the enlarged role of the secretary, etc. What on earth had increased? Can anyone remember anything that happened at NDSC meetings during the past year?
“Yes, there are classified items in the NDSC, but not many. On the other hand, everything will undoubtedly depend on how Poroshenko positions himself. But we must take into account one simple fact, which Prime Minister Tymoshenko has already pointed out: the country cannot have two governments.
“First, by law the NDSC secretary controls only NDSC decisions, not the government’s. Second, with the president’s approval the secretary may conduct a preliminary investigation of certain complex issues that the government considers troublesome or does not want to implement for some reason. This happened in my case. There were many neglected problems in the country. The NDSC staff, together with good analysts, can work on these problems. And you have to take into prior consideration the fact that the government might be displeased, be it Tymoshenko or Yanukovych’s.
“The NDSC secretary must stay abreast of the most important and most complex processes underway in the country and carry out a final analysis. The trouble is, and I think this can serve as advice to Poroshenko, that presidents don’t always like to read complicated documents. Meanwhile, there are problems that cannot be described in a one-page report, especially those problems that I call neglected at the highest levels. These are painful issues that sting individual persons to the quick. Poroshenko will face the same problem, all the more so as I remember that when President Yushchenko was presenting Turchynov as the SBU chief, he said that he would not be reading stacks of staff memos.”
“And who will be reading them carefully?”
“I can imagine how this must have sounded to the whole staff of the Security Service’s information and analysis system. Without a doubt, there should be a strictly disciplined system for supplying the president with analytical data. This is a complex but well-known science. Otherwise the president will be reading staff memos from dawn to dusk.”
“In your view, is this Yushchenko or Tymoshenko’s government?”
“Perhaps fifty-fifty.”
LUSTRATION AND SHOCK
“It would be strange if I didn’t ask you about lustration. At one time you also experienced a kind of lustration: you were endorsed as SBU chief by parliament, and before that you passed approval by a commission that included representatives of the Rukh People’s Movement.”
“Yes, this was a 28-member commission, including everyone from the Communist Kotsiuba to Stepan Khmara. The idea of lustration raises the question of what period it should cover. Ukraine is in the fourteenth year of its independence, and it’s too late for any lustration. Everybody is equal before the Constitution. There is a legal procedure for those who commit crimes. Who will be the supreme justice to decide who is subject to lustration? Moreover, the KGB was managed by the Communist Party organs. Is the former Communist Party leadership subject to lustration or not? For example, Heorhiy Kriuchkov and Leonid Kravchuk were ranking functionaries in the party’s Central Committee and in a sense managed Ukraine’s KGB. Are they subject to lustration now? I think not.”
“What about involvement in election fraud?”
“Consider what happened in 1999. Oleksandr Volkov has admitted that he was involved in ‘technologies.’ Is he subject to lustration? Lustration is essentially a political idea that will confront many paradoxes in the legal sense. Justice Minister Roman Zvarych has already said that he opposes lustration. And I think he should not simply say so, but also explain why.”
“But the president is keeping silent on this matter.”
“Yes. But its initiators must understand that it is an essentially populist idea that might unexpectedly result in the lustration of some current high ranking officials on Yushchenko’s team and in parliament.”
“What effect would the publication of lists of secret intelligence agents have?”
“I think it would cause a major shock on a national scale. If this process is triggered, I don’t rule out the possibility of some fake documents cropping up. The following explanation would be offered: many people and chiefs were replaced in the KGB; perhaps some documents were stolen from the archives. Now they are surfacing. And some people in Russia would turn this process to their advantage and would do so in a very professional manner.”
IRAQ
“Ukraine’s foreign policy sphere was perhaps the hardest hit as a result of the election campaign. Speaking of Ukraine’s involvement in Iraq, what do you think should be the procedure for withdrawing the Ukrainian peacekeeping force? Should we withdraw from Iraq now?”
“First of all, our withdrawal from Iraq is beyond any doubt, and I mentioned this during my first visit to Iraq. The question is when and how. It’s obvious that we should not remain there long. I think that we must first answer the question of whether Ukraine has used all the opportunities afforded by its involvement in Iraq in line with its national interests. No. The price we paid for Iraq is very high — the deaths of our servicemen. But I should mention that every year more than 100 servicemen die under various circumstances in Ukraine, not in Iraq. I said in parliament that in the past five years 700 servicemen have died in Ukraine. If we withdraw from Iraq in a hurry, without coordinating our withdrawal with our partners in the multinational division (the Poles and Americans) we will be creating problems for them. This would not be a military thing to do, because we would be exposing a large part of the territory, their rear, etc. On the other hand, we would be losing the opportunity to return to Iraq with other missions, primarily economic and energy projects. One of the arguments in favor of sending troops to Iraq was the fact that Iraq has the world’s second largest proven oil deposits. The deposits in the country’s north are very close to the Black Sea, and we have the Odesa-Brody pipeline. Some day it will finally be put to good use without any reverse pumping. The pipeline was built as an element of the nation’s energy security. Oil could be pumped via Odesa-Brody. The most profitable scenario is for Iraqi oil to be pumped to the Black Sea, from where Ukraine would take it to Europe, bypassing the Bosphorus. By withdrawing from Iraq now, we will be abandoning the goal that the government set when it was deciding to send troops to Iraq in the first place. I think a final decision on the withdrawal should be made after consultations.
“We should make a level-headed decision. Withdrawing troops is a complicated process that requires major funding, which should be envisioned by the budget. The rotational period of our military in Iraq ends in March. It takes half a year to prepare a new brigade. So, if we are withdrawing the troops, a withdrawal should be ordered and the machinery set in motion. If we are staying, we must prepare a replacement, which involves recruiting, training, and equipping personnel. This is a complex procedure, and we will have to prolong the rotational period. But most importantly, we must understand that it is a simple thing to withdraw troops, but we would then be losing opportunities in Iraq for a long time to come. And Iraq will inevitably become a developed nation with a gigantic energy reserve to supply many countries.
“Finally, the military profession is about fighting. Unfortunately, it carries the risk of getting killed. But everybody chooses it consciously. No one was ever forced to become an officer. If a person chooses a profession with a higher likelihood of getting killed, s/he must be paid a high wage. Real battle situations provide the best training for the Armed Forces. Training grounds, even those with the most battle- like conditions, cannot be compared to real combat conditions. This may sound rather cynical, but this is what the profession is all about. Soldiers who never smelled powder, never experienced the loss of their friends, or never risked their lives are qualitatively different from those who have passed through this crucible. So, like before, I am certain that Iraq has been a blessing for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in terms of professional training. It has been a major test for commanders and training and logistical systems, and cooperation with foreign partners. They could never get to learn this at home.”
NATO: A YEAR HAS BEEN LOST. WHAT’S NEXT?
“As we know, the president will visit Brussels on February 22. Yet to this day he hasn’t said a word about our relationship with NATO. The impression is that the new government is simply refraining from voicing its vision. Why do you think this is happening? Is it because of the 2006 elections?”
“Yes. I think the presidential elections also played a role — Yushchenko hardly said anything about NATO. I think the 2006 elections are also playing a certain role. It’s understandable from the political viewpoint, but I do not think it is quite correct strategically. The point at issue is a policy vector, and standards to which all systems must aspire. After all, NATO requirements — both the Action Plan and the yearly Target Plan — envision colossal demands on civil structures, society at large, the judicial system, and even ecology. What’s wrong with that? Where such standards, a timeframe, and a desire to achieve them exist, they will propel the whole society like a kind of locomotive. Otherwise, Ukrainians will be simply shuffling toward some unknown high standards. I think Yushchenko said nothing for political reasons. By delaying the announcement of his stance, he has given a negative signal to society, bringing down the rating of public support for possible accession to NATO in the future. Without a doubt, Russia’s stance is clear. It opposes NATO’s expansion and will be resisting it. Yet, as we can see, its latest rhetoric is correct: Sergey Ivanov and others have told us to feel free to join NATO.
“In reality, however, Russia’s cooperation with NATO is undergoing a fast transformation. Russia is de facto cooperating with NATO on a larger scale than Ukraine. Perhaps in the future we will be seeing a different, more dynamic mechanism of cooperation between Russia and NATO. So it makes no sense to be afraid of how Russia might respond to Ukraine’s possible NATO accession in the future. First, everything will depend on how we prepare our society. On the other hand, it will depend on what kind of relationship we will have with Russia. I think that no current, past, or future politicians can ever picture Ukraine waging a war against Russia. This is a trench mentality from the Cold War period.”
“Now seems the right time to raise the question of Ukraine’s transition to the NATO Membership Action Plan. But there are no moves or statements to this effect. Yushchenko and the government don’t even have any sort of plan.”
“The West made a mistake in Istanbul, when Ukraine was in fact ready to move to a higher level of cooperation, the Membership Action Plan. This didn’t happen then for obvious reasons. President Kuchma was satisfied that the Istanbul Summit ended his personal international isolation in the West, mostly in return for Ukraine’s contribution to the peacekeeping effort in Iraq. And this was enough for him. Unfortunately, the West followed this line of reasoning: since they could not move to a new format of relations with Ukraine under Kuchma, this new format should be presented to a new president. As a result, almost a year has been lost. Bad signals went out to the supporters of Euro-Atlantic integration in Ukraine; the military doctrine was amended. This was followed by the dismissal of Oleksandr Chaly and me. In effect, no open supporters of this idea remained in the upper echelons of power. All this slowed down the process. And even if Yushchenko now says in Brussels that Ukraine is ready to move to a new level, this might not happen if the West doesn’t roll out the red carpet for us or doesn’t turn a blind eye to some criteria. Almost a year has been lost, and there could be some nitpicking: you haven’t done this or finished that.
“But I think that parliamentary elections notwithstanding, the president, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, must clearly formulate Ukraine’s foreign policy and military policy paradigm. It’s clear why the European Union has been placed in the foreground. After all, the question of possible EU entry is not as politicized as that of cooperating with NATO with the possibility of accession. But we must understand that there is no joining the EU without NATO membership as a kind of preliminary filter with serious requirements for democracy. I think the transition to the Membership Action Plan should be made quickly. It means a new level of cooperation and a more specific timeframe, which will push the cumbersome state machinery ahead.
“It’s a good thing that we now have a vice prime minister on European integration. The government should have such a post with regulatory functions. Incidentally, I gave President Kuchma the idea to create the post of vice premier for Euro-Atlantic integration after the Paris NATO Summit, when the Action Plan and 2003 Target Plan were put into effect. The experience of the European and Baltic nations has shown that creating a structure headed by an individual with regulatory functions is an element of the serious organizational work for the Membership Action Plan. Before this we had a state commission at the Security Council, which I chaired without any regulatory functions; then there was Horbulin’s commission without regulatory functions; then another council was created, again without regulatory functions. So it’s good that such a post has been created; it’s an important element of the preparations. But you have to take into account great resistance to change. If there is only the deputy prime minister without any supporting structure, his declarations might be correct, but bringing them to life might prove very difficult.
“I think that the statements Yushchenko makes on February 22 in Brussels will be very serious. We have to make up for lost time.”
RUSSIA: RISKY TO IGNORE
“What steps should be taken to mend fences with Russia? How would you evaluate the first steps the new government has made to this end?”
“The president’s first visit, to Moscow, was correct in principle, but it was just a symbol, a sign, or a signal. Russia has always been a complex partner to deal with, as well as a rival; the farther we move, the stronger a rival it will seem to us. This is normal, and it shouldn’t frighten us.
“I think President Yushchenko and his team should focus on several major directions. First, they should find a common language with the Russians and work jointly to ensure regional security. This is a very complex problem. But if we ignore Russia and work actively in the Western direction, we will have a tough time with Russia. It has very experienced foreign policy officials, and they will figure out our intentions quite easily. Moreover, we must be as open as possible in dealing with the Russians. We should drop the passionate election campaign rhetoric with respect to Russia. We simply have to remember that Europe and the US are moving with Russia.
“The second direction is cooperation with the new Russian business elite that would like to work in Ukraine. To put it plainly, we have to organize economic cooperation with Russia so as to create opportunities for Russian business in Ukraine (in keeping with our rules, of course). The Russians must have as many economic interests in Ukraine as would make them interested in a stable and democratic Ukraine.
“The third direction is personal contacts between Yushchenko and Putin, and between Yushchenko’s top officials and their Russian counterparts. The appointment of Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister has made cooperation at the governmental level somewhat questionable, but this problem has to be resolved.
“I predict a complex relationship with Russia, judging by the fact that the presidential elections in Ukraine ended in the defeat of Russian interests that were manifested in the support that the Kremlin threw behind Yanukovych. Psychologically, this will add a negative touch to the relationship. How long this will last, I don’t know. Yushchenko’s team and Tymoshenko’s government will have a hard time establishing effective cooperation with their Russian counterparts, who are known for presenting strong arguments at the negotiating table. There is also the problem of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea. This is a separate issue that should be handled with kid gloves. The recent statements by Rybachuk and Tarasiuk about the Black Sea Fleet have harmed the Russo-Ukrainian relationship, I think. We cannot hope that the Russians could downplay them as election rhetoric, since the elections are long over.
“In general, there is more tension in the Russo-Ukrainian relationship now than there was under Kuchma, which is bad. Putin supported Yanukovych, who lost. Nemtsov has been appointed Yushchenko’s advisor. There is information that Pavlovsky was allegedly involved in the poisoning of President Yushchenko, that Berezovsky is allegedly moving to Ukraine. All of this is creating a tangle of tensions that are running through personal relations and feelings of resentment among the two countries’ top officials. It is essential for Yushchenko to join the fence mending process with Russia. It is very risky to ignore Russia.
“The correct but long overdue declarations from Ukraine’s leadership about Russia’s significance for Ukraine are not helping the situation. The Russians never forget anything. Russia is an experienced global player.”
