Yevhen MARCHUK: “The reform of the Armed Forces reminds me of... the creation of the SBU”
PERSONNEL SURGERY
“March 25 makes it twelve years since the SBU was created. You were the first and as yet the last SBU chairman to be approved by the parliament. The term de-KGB-ization has of late gained new currency, and it had fallen to you to begin this process. Where was the dividing line between the former KGB and the newly-created SBU in 1991, and can you say that Ukraine has moved away from this line irreversibly?”
“In the wake of the coup and proclamation of Ukraine’s independence Verkhovna Rada passed the resolution to dissolve the KGB. A parliamentary commission was created, chaired by Vasyl Durdynets. Its members represented all political forces — over 25 individuals charged with creating the Security Service. That is, the KGB was dissolved and everybody was dismissed. The commission took its time to study the archives and probe the candidates, and at the November 6, 1991 parliamentary session I was appointed SBU chief on a motion from then Verkhovna Rada Speaker Leonid Kravchuk. But I was appointed on a competitive basis, as I was not the first whom Kravchuk nominated for this post.”
“The late Oleksandr Yemets?”
“Yes, the late Oleksandr Yemets. His candidacy didn’t pass, then Kravchuk offered my candidacy, and I was appointed. The debate was heated and situation tense. As you know, the referendum and presidential elections were 24 days away, slated for December 1. I was charged with forming the Security Service. Put simply, everybody had been dismissed. I was the first appointee in the SBU. The procedure of forming the service was the following: I proposed candidates to the parliamentary commission, which reviewed them, considered my arguments in support of them, then interviewed the candidates and made its decision, which was then submitted for the president’s approval. This procedure was used to appoint the SBU leadership — the deputies and chiefs of central and regional SBU departments. The procedure dragged on, for the candidates had to be thoroughly investigated. There were even situations when the commission quizzed me longer than the candidates themselves. On some occasions I answered questions about some of the candidates for forty or forty-five minutes, while the candidates themselves were quizzed for ten to fifteen minutes. In particular, Volodymyr Radchenko was appointed in this way: it took me forty minutes to prove to the commission why he was the right person to chair the Ternopil SBU Department, while they listened to him for ten minutes. I want to stress the following. Many in the former Ukrainian KGB, especially the top leadership, the so- called fossils and old-timers, expected speedy reappointment. And when in a month’s time their seats were occupied by new people, and we parted with seventeen generals and 1,500 colonels, I came under a torrent of criticism for how I managed the SBU. After that the process of forming the SBU lasted four or five months. In this connection unconventional and unexpected appointments were made. For example, Rukh [People’s Movement] deputy Burlakov was appointed chief of the department formerly known as the Fifth Department, with a complete makeover of his functions, powers, and tasks (approved by the commission).”
“Oleksandr Skrypalsky was appointed chief of the Military Intelligence Department, which was a major career advancement for him. Then quite young Vasyl Horbatiuk, who had worked in the Personnel Department earlier, was appointed one of his deputies. These were unconventional appointments. Only people who passed a careful selection process were appointed: aside from my recommendations and professional selection criteria, they were probed by the parliamentary commission that closely studied the personal file of every candidate, so to speak, from his birth to the present. What I want to emphasize by this is that then we began the process of de-KGB- ization. But it was impossible to replace the personnel completely and hire new people who had no idea about the special services. Incidentally, some countries — the Baltic states and before them, it seems, Slovakia and the Czech Republic — initially followed such a path but were later forced to partially backtrack, because some things are essentially professional. I must say that when we speak about the KGB and its notorious devilish traits, this is, of course, true. But few people know that within the scope of the KGB activities there were many things that had nothing to do with the ideology: counterespionage, government liaison, protection of secrets, border issues, and intelligence. Put simply, there were people to choose from. The fact is, in the last years, during the Gorbachev period, the KGB people realized many social phenomena long before the public at large, because the KGB held a grip on serious information that reflected the actual state of affairs in both the economy and society. Another important consideration was that while it was crucial for the Baltic states to get rid of the old personnel because the overwhelming majority of KGB officers in the Baltic came from Russia and elsewhere, in Ukraine 99.9% of the KGB staff were Ukrainians. Incidentally, the procedure of appointments in the SBU dragged on, which made it possible for persons who had a grudge against the KGB or specific individuals to speak out. Conditions were created, under which we could not only read the file on each candidate (to see whether the person in question had committed any crimes against the people or other wrongdoing even from the viewpoint of the laws in force at the time) but also receive any information from the public. There were Ukrainians in the Ukrainian KGB, and due to the specifics of their work they collected information that had awakened many to their national identity and made them realize that independence was imminent. I’m not saying that they were an overwhelming majority, but their number was significant. I knew many of them personally, and it was them whom I proposed for the top posts. Thus, de-KGB-ization began then, above all with the appointment of new people, of course, from among the former KGB personnel. Second, the parliamentary commission was at work, which could find out anything about every candidate. Further, when drafting the relevant bill, we slaved over it and enlisted foreign experts (I must admit that they helped us a great deal), and took great pains to draft it as close to European standards as possible.”
“Who exactly helped you? To what extent did the approved law On the SBU conform to democratic standards?”
“With this matter I personally approached the Germans and Americans. Their laws differ from ours, but we fully incorporated their approaches to, and principles of, legislative regulation of the activity of the special services. Some clauses were even radical. Consider for example Clause 35, to which I personally and on the last day added two sentences to the effect that SBU officers shall not follow the orders of their superiors should those run counter to the legislation in force and the Constitution. I was reproached then for adding this, for such things were self-evident. As it transpired later (and I don’t mean to emphasize my foresight), this in fact became necessary. Aside from the personnel issue, the second crucial element of de-KGB-ization of the service was that we were laying down a completely new legislative basis. First, while formerly KGB activities were regulated by a joint resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, we took great pains to draft our own law. Second, the clauses on the main departments — intelligence, counterespionage, department for the protection of the Constitutional order, and so forth — had been approved by the parliamentary commission, and all of this was on the public record. Later, when the internal regulations were being drafted, I remember the aggressive rejection of the Joint Order by many colleagues (even by those who had been already appointed). It was a secret order called the Joint Order of the Prosecutor General (then it was Shyshkin) and the SBU Chief, which regulated the special operative and technical measures.”
“Do you mean what is commonly known as eavesdropping and tailing?”
“I mean secret surveillance, secret searches, review of correspondence, surveillance of premises, and so forth, which are very sensitive technologies employed by the special services. I remember very well when I saw how this is done in Germany and then in Great Britain, with their very strict oversight mechanisms and surveillance operations limited in time. Then Shyshkin and I drafted the Joint Order, which regulated the procedure: above all, secret surveillance operations could be conducted only if approved by the Prosecutor General or his first deputy authorized to do so by a special order. Further, it envisioned oversight and record keeping, which then seemed unacceptable. The General Prosecutor’s Office kept secret records on surveillance subjects, grounds for such operations, and for how long the SBU was sanctioned by the Prosecutor General to conduct secret surveillance. It contained a whole list of compulsory requirements, which regulated the duration of surveillance, grounds, dos and don’ts, provided a definition of ‘insufficient grounds,’ and so forth. The order was in force as long as I headed the SBU. This order was revolutionary in a way, and for me it was a turning point, because the people who had worked in the KGB found it incredible that the General Prosecutor’s Office and the General Prosecutor himself could not only sanction but also limit such surveillance operations in time, decide whether the grounds for conducting surveillance were sufficient, and knew who was under surveillance.”
“And demanded explanations?”
“In writing! One had to report on the case under investigation and cite the grounds for opening it. Without a case, no surveillance operations could be conducted. There were also many restrictions relating to personal information. Later we pointed this out in the law: in the course of its secret surveillance operations and in its work in general the Security Service obtains much personal information. When we included this in the law, many questioned the expediency of this clause. Personal information obtained in the course of investigation and surveillance could not be used in any way. Moreover, the order stated that if in the course of surveillance — through electronic eavesdropping or other means — the SBU obtained information irrelevant to the investigation, for example, different aspects of personal life, no records were to be made of such information. This was a revolutionary turning point in the legal consciousness of the people who came to the SBU from the former KGB. In this connection, the rules and techniques of such activity had been modified, and the rule of retraction was introduced: the prosecutor could withdraw and suspend his sanction if the eavesdropping had not shed any light on the case and the time allocated for the operations had run out. In general, there were many unexpected things for those interested in the activities of the Security Service, as it did what the KGB never came close to. For example, it worked to protect the national interests, national sovereignty, and statehood. As it was a young state, much in Ukraine was still integrated with the Soviet Union. There were no borders as such, and a gigantic military structure was subordinated to the Soviet Union and Moscow. Meanwhile, adapting the activities of counterespionage, military counterespionage, and intelligence for the protection of the national interests proved to be a complicated task.”
PROFESSIONAL UPBRINGING
“In the late 1990s and on the eve of the so-called tapegate, the SBU suffered a series of major blows to its reputation. Above all these were the commercialization of the service, tapegate, which in spite of all its political and legal interpretations sullied the reputation of the SBU. Add to this the Kolchuga affair and the case of the mushroom gatherers. Can one say now that the SBU has climbed out of this pit of scandals?”
“Since my appointment as vice premier in 1994, I have had no direct relation to the activities of the service, but I felt and observed the activities of the Security Service from different vantage points: both in the Cabinet of Ministers and in the capacities of vice premier and prime minister, in the parliament, and in the Security Council. I saw very well how the Security Service was evolving. Indeed, at a certain stage troublesome things began to happen in the service, both from the viewpoint of its reputation and its involvement in cover-ups of various business dealings. I’m not fully aware of the current situation in the Security Service. But to be frank, I don’t envy Ihor Smishko because of his inheritance: the tapegate (an SBU officer was involved in it at a time when the SBU was charged with ensuring the safety of the presidential office) and some other scandals, which didn’t generate as much publicity. Unfortunately, this was a heavy price — the reputation of the Security Service — for unprofessional management of the service. I think that in the future much more will surface. Now there is a pressing need to restore the reputation of the Security Service.”
“Incidentally, what are the motives behind the recent presidential order on de-KGB-ization? Why is this order needed twelve years after the SBU was created? Maybe you could explain it as a person with tremendous experience?”
“We are talking of a routine process. If you look up the law On the Security Service of Ukraine and the law On Operative Investigative Activities, there is a method, whereby SBU officers are sent to work undercover in other institutions. This is a common technique used by special services in many countries. The only important thing is to keep the number of such undercover officers to the minimum and send them only when needed. Most importantly, there should be double oversight over such officers both from the service and from the manager of the institution in question. People are people, and there have been cases when an officer sent to a different state entity abused his position. He would tell his immediate supervisor that he had some very important special assignments to do, while he in fact took care of personal matters or simply idled away. But all this can be easily prevented by means of double oversight. It is an extremely routine and complex thing to interrogate and oversee such officers. As a rule, these are highly-experienced officers with long service records. The important thing is that there are certain restrictions as to how long such an officer can work undercover in another establishment. The post can be attractive from the viewpoint of solving the tasks of counterespionage, but one and the same officer cannot occupy such a post for a long time. In principle, there are various techniques that can be used to monitor such officers, make them perform the assignments required, and simultaneously rule out any damage to the reputation of the service. Yet sending undercover SBU officers to other structures is not the most effective method of investigation. In fact, it should be gradually restricted.”
“Mr. Marchuk, would you comment on the case of Kravchenko? This is not your domain now, but, in you opinion, did Kravchenko do or was he ordered to do what other special services never do?”
“I don’t know what instructions he received, but in the activity of any service there is much routine, which in itself doesn’t surprise anyone when everything is going according to plan, but suddenly people begin to view it from a completely different perspective whenever an incident like the one involving Kravchenko happens.”
“What does this situation show in general?”
“I don’t recall Kravchenko and don’t know all the circumstances. I find this situation comical, because from the professional viewpoint this should never have happened. This should not have happened either from the viewpoint of the activity of an officer of a special service or from the viewpoint of the state’s reputation. I don’t know how he interpreted the directives he received and what Mykola Tomenko has brought or how it sounds, except for what has appeared in print. To me many things of what has been printed and what is purported to be copies of these directives seems laughable. There is a very effective and simple mechanism to probe the officer about to be sent abroad. Moreover, this technique is very developed. And when it is applied in the right way, such lapses never happen. If a person has complexes or problems, they can be brought to light still during the preparatory stage.”
“How valid are the statements made off the record by certain Western experts to the effect that the SBU is being used for political ends? For example, the US Embassy did not officially confirm information about the incident during the conference attended by Madeleine Albright, but the rumors that she was tailed by the security services were actively circulated.”
“I don’t want to comment on this, because in this case I simply don’t know. Frankly, I’m hard put to name the purpose of visual surveillance of Dr. Albright. One should make up something fantastic or too complicated to explain.”
“How do you picture the SBU in the future?”
“The activity of officers of special services is a very sensitive matter. Meanwhile, states with established political systems and traditions treat the special services differently. Without doubt, there should be very effective — I don’t mean strict as long as it is effective — oversight of the SBU by civilian institutions. Great Britain, Germany, and the US have created very effective systems of oversight of the special services. On the other hand, they have developed a very effective system of protection of the special services, especially the intelligence services. You know, quite recently Tony Blair said that according to their longtime tradition they do not comment on the activity of the special services, although the situation there was quite tense. Perhaps we are not mature enough for this, and perhaps it is too early. But oversight and protection should come together in the special services: effective control coupled with protection. Effective control means not to let the SBU become involved with whatever is none of its business. Meanwhile, protection means protecting sensitive information that can not be discussed publicly, information that affects the national interests.”
“Should a special political culture be developed with respect to the special services?”
“Yes, above among high officials. Clearly, for politicians and journalists the SBU is a favorite subject of discussion, and this is impossible to forbid. Yet the service can be quickly disorganized and demoralized should the priorities be misplaced. I think that now that the president has given a go-ahead to de-KGB-ization, we have to set everything straight. Another issue on the agenda is whether intelligence should remain within the SBU or whether it is time to create a National Intelligence Service. Currently, the Security Service has such powers, but we know that in Russia, the US, and Germany it is a separate service. Military counterespionage is almost nonexistent. In European countries all this is within the defense ministry and not in the armed forces. Soon we will face the challenge of government liaison and who will ensure its safety. Of course, this should not be addressed as part of some political campaign, for there are too many specifics involved. But these are inevitable problems, which will have to be addressed sooner or later. I also think that soon the question of whether fighting crime is the job of the Security Service will arise. This is no doubt about this when it comes to fighting big international criminal rings involved in arms trade, human trafficking, and drugs. Fighting international criminal organization and big criminal organizations in Ukraine is the province of the SBU, because it involves the interaction of many departments, especially now the war against terrorism is taking on a new dimension. The scope for the SBU is tremendous here. I think a major changeover of the whole range of special services specifically involved with fighting terrorism is imminent — beginning with financial intelligence and ending with units like Alpha Group. Put simply, I think that the SBU will soon undergo major and quite complex transformations. The main consideration here is that this must not be started for the sake of some campaign. One must prepare for this seriously. And this must come not only from the outside in the form of imperative political orders, but also from within the special services. This is not easy but must be done.”
DEFENSE REFORM: SECOND READING
“Speaking of the defense reform, as far as we know, Verkhovna Rada will vote on the second reading of the Defense Reform Bill.”
“Yes, on April 6.”
“What decisions on the defense reform are planned for the immediate future? How is the reform progressing? What are its preliminary results?”
“The reform of the Armed Forces reminds me of how the Security Service was created. I remember that when I dismissed seventeen generals and 1,500 colonels in the space of two months I was told, ‘You’re finished, you don’t know who you’re messing with.’ The most important thing now is that a huge number of officers have quickly realized that a reform is needed. To me this matters most and, to be frank, it was the toughest part. It takes months to convince people that the gangrene has affected only a finger, which should be cut off now. And although painful, this will save the whole organism. That the defense reform is so heatedly debated now is only natural, and I take this in stride. Many people are really worried: who will benefit from the reductions? Especially worried are those who are to be laid off. But any reform is painful. As for the very sensitive issue of social guarantees for those to be affected by army reductions, I will say the following. Currently the bill — tomorrow (March 24 — Ed.) the Security and Defense Committee will receive the bill in its final wording ready for the second reading — envisions the maximum possible social guarantees. But there is a limit to any guarantees, let alone privileges, because if this limit is overstepped, this might provoke hostile sentiment toward the military. On the other hand, there is a different aspect: over the past seven or eight years the Armed Forces have been reduced by some 200,000 servicemen. Nobody passed any special laws, and nobody provided for any additional guarantees for these people, either in terms of housing or anything else. They were simply laid off, and that was that. Now personnel reductions — a second component of the reform after infrastructure reductions — come with such social guarantees that nobody could have dreamed of. Granted, they can be bigger or smaller — it will be either six months or a year, during which time the officer laid off will continue to receive money allowances commensurate with his post, rank, and so forth. Either option is possible. A year would be better. But there are other arguments. Thus, speaking about the current stage of the reform, the most important thing is that the military understands the fact that it’s necessary. The politicians are yet to understand this, and some politicians will use it in their political struggles. I think that when the bill is considered in the parliament, we will all hear many things as yet untold. In fact, the truth should be made known. I oppose any wishful thinking.”
“When we accomplish everything planned for 2004, there will be an immediate and significant improvement in the army’s financial condition. In two years, if everything goes according to plan and the law passes, we will effect radical changes in the Armed Forces.”
“In what sense?”
“Today (March 23 — Ed.) I heard the report of the Southern Operative Command and will hear the report of the Northern Command on Friday. I went to the Western Operative Command and visited the units that are being disbanded. Disbanding the units that Ukraine doesn’t need, since they are not combat-ready and never will be, have been inadequately funded for a decade, and everything there has gone to ruin, will release nearly UAH 600,000 annually without defense budget cuts. We will embrace a new budget structure, whose bottom line is that we are moving to a new stage in the development of the Armed Forces. Currently, we are struggling with a model inherited from the Soviets. This is a model of degradation, depletion, and wastefulness.”
“There is a crisis in the Armed Forces not only in terms of funding. It is lamentable to see young officers hindered by the clots that have formed in the General Headquarters, the central apparatus of the Defense Ministry, and in the military corps. I would call these things unacceptable, if not criminal. Just consider what I’m now dealing with. I was appointed in June. There were no openings to be filled by the cadets graduating in July. The Armed Forces had not been reduced, the reform had not begun. There were no places to assign nearly 3,000 young, handsome, skilled, and professional officers. Who could have planned this? I asked the personnel department, planners, and staff officers. We take great pains to assign these officers to posts that do not match their specialties. Of the 3,500 graduates only 1,100 could be placed. Of the 188 officers trained for service in the landing troops, every boy’s dream, only 55 could be placed. Of the 136 officers trained for the tank troops only six could be placed. Of the 220 officers trained for the missile force, only 28 were needed. Of the 405 air defense and aviation officers only 170 could be placed. For the 178 naval officers, only nineteen openings were available. What kind of cadre policy is this? The planning was done only three or five years ago. I repeat: no radical reductions were planned then. For me the most difficult part of the reform is that the units to be disbanded — and they must be disbanded, because they are redundant, are a burden on the people, and do not make any difference — 50% of the personnel are young officers who have not served for twenty years. They’ve had no opportunity to be promoted. Now we have 321 generals, of whom 110-120 should remain. This is enough for an army our size and conforms with European standards. Thus, the second extremely difficult problem of the defense reform is clearing the way for the young. As Iraq has shown, we have superior officers. Meanwhile, they remain in the same posts without promotion for years. In the military, if you occupy the same post for five years and are not promoted, you are considered unpromising. Such is the law of military formations: the officer must continue to climb the career ladder. Unfortunately, the vertical for the promotion of the young is occupied. The third problem is combat- readiness, combat-worthiness, and weapons. Put simply, since it is impossible to fund everything adequately we take all resources of the Armed Forces and select the best units, which are funded fully. These are the joint rapid deployment forces, some 30,000 or 35,000 servicemen or 10% of a 355,000-strong army.”
“What issue would say will be considered in the National Defense and Security Council in the immediate future?”
“The defense reform.”
“Its current status or anything else?”
“The status of the reform. The process of the defense reform had a very long preparatory period. An extensive legislative groundwork had been laid, which is quite complex and was prepared for the first time in Ukraine. A legislative hierarchy has been established, and a military doctrine in a new wording has been drafted. It is a complex document that is on public record. A strategic defense bulletin is a document with plans until 2015, which contains some things that used to be top-secret and top-priority documents a decade ago. It contains arguments and motives, how Ukraine views the situation along its borders, what it views as a threat, and the goals of the Armed Forces. Further, it states what the Armed Forces should be like in terms of their structure, strength, and armaments; the international dimension — cooperation, peacekeeping efforts, and so forth. The State Committee on the Defense Reform has approved documents regulating the structure and strength of the Central Apparatus of the Defense Ministry and the General Headquarters. Incidentally, I have been criticized for going ahead with the reductions at a time when the bill had not yet been passed. But I began the reductions in the central apparatus, in the General Headquarters and the Defense Ministry, both down by 1,500 persons. Moreover, they have been reduced in a completely new way. Scientists and specialists have developed a technique for determining the number of man-hours required to perform different functions. Neither these 1,500 persons nor their superiors could prove that they were indispensable. I have proven and I will prove that there is scope for reductions. Not to mention such things as computerization, electronic management, and bookkeeping. I was appalled to find out that the Defense Ministry did not have a unified system of bookkeeping. Those who have at least some idea of bookkeeping did not believe this could be possible. While there was no unified bookkeeping system, the inventories that had been allegedly taken did not reveal the real picture. And when we made two inventories in the space of six months — the first before my appointment and the second after — the difference between the two was UAH 900 billion in assets. 900 billion, no mistake about that. I wasn’t satisfied with the results, and we streamlined the inventory techniques and enlisted new people, and on last count this figure was up another UAH 100 billion. Put simply, nobody had any definitive idea of the army’s assets. Unfortunately, there have been other incidents. Now we are looking for several hundred missing missiles. They have been taken out of service, but we can’t locate them. Supposedly they’ve been utilized. Fine, utilized. But every such missile contains gold, silver, and platinum. Where are the results of their utilization? All this happened because an elementary thing was missing. In 2000 the law On a Unified Bookkeeping System was passed. In the Defense Ministry it was ignored until the summer of 2003. And the model of wastefulness that I mentioned is connected with this.”
ISTANBUL: CAPRICES AND CHANCES
“Let us move on to the prospects of our relationship with NATO. The US Department of State has made some sharply worded statements, emphasizing the media freedom in Ukraine and the quality of the presidential campaign. Western diplomats and experts say that there is no denying the progress of the defense reform, but what about the elections and the media? What should we expect from the Istanbul Summit? A Membership Action Plan, a continuation of the current format of cooperation with NATO, or a third option?”
“I will confine myself to saying the following. As far as the defense reform is concerned, we are progressing with difficulty, but the pace is normal. The defense review will be completed in late May, and one may say that the strategic defense bulletin is ready — these are the fundamentals of the defense reform and military cooperation with the alliance. Organizational provisions for the defense reform have been made. Add to this cooperation with our partners in Iraq and the presence of our peacekeepers elsewhere — in Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Kosovo, and Lebanon. It would not be an overstatement to say that we are moving according to plan. And, of course, it is somewhat distressing that the aspirations and efforts of our structures — the Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces in general — might prove if not vain, then might not work in the interests of Ukraine, as this would happen if the Istanbul Summit resulted in a transition to a more qualitative level of the relationship between Ukraine and NATO. Thus far I cannot forecast how the events will unfold. Granted, our partners — above all I have in mind the defense ministers of the European states and the US — emphasize the fact that the military cooperation, political, and defense reforms are progressing adequately. But they also stress the fact that much will depend on the quality of the election campaign and the internal transformations in Ukrainian society. To this I would say that we should not take offense or view it as caprice. The fact is that all of this is set forth in the Ukraine-NATO Action Plan approved in Prague and in the Target Plan. Thus, this is not something unexpected, only requirements listed in the Ukraine-NATO Action Plan. The political reform, judicial reform, freedom of speech and the press, and human rights are all components of the joint action plan. Unfortunately, the current situation is still vague. I believe that Ukraine can make a major leap forward and propose a new, higher level of cooperation with the alliance.
“Like the Membership Action Plan?”
“There is its variety — an intensified dialog, which is almost the same as the Membership Action Plan but not quite. What matters most is a transition to a new level in the relationship, which is a legitimate question that Ukraine can raise. Our partners have long been following the election process and political situation in Ukraine, perhaps even too attentively. Maybe they exaggerate the problems that exist in Ukraine, but we have to take this into account.”
