Yevhen Marchuk: “Transition to NATO Membership Action Plan in 2004 is possible”

UKRAINE’S INTEREST IN IRAQ

“You were the first Ukrainian dignitary to support this country’s involvement in the stabilization forces in Iraq. What were your arguments? Why should the parliament and taxpayers go along?”

Vladimir Putin said the week before last that the CIS is in a sphere of Russia’s strategic interest. This is perceived as being quite normal. My question: Is Russia in the sphere of Ukraine’s strategic interests? It is. What I mean is that the transition to a new geopolitical thinking in Ukraine should break quite a few stereotypes, above all that Ukraine has no strategic interests beyond its borders. I can now substantiate why Iraq is in the sphere of Ukraine’s strategic interest. First, because Iraq is the world’s second oil-producing country. Second, there is a new Iraq being born, and a new ruling elite is being formed. Aiding Iraq at this stage is a good investment in our future bilateral relationships. Third, Iraq is a challenge to the traditional stereotype of Ukraine’s role in world politics. The new Iraq could become a long-term partner of Ukraine in terms of energy supply and other economic sectors. Suffice it to recall that the Ukrainian-Iraqi commodity turnover amounted to more than $300 million. Can we afford to lose a partner like that? Should we allow pseudo-patriotic arguments to gain the upper hand under the circumstances? I am convinced that Ukraine must not succumb to such tendencies. Given this [new] way of thinking, Ukraine may become an active participant in international life. The Iraqi situation is a different kind of experience compared to that of Kosovo, for example. It is an important school for our diplomacy, political leadership, elite, as well as for our political reserve and party leaders. In this sense, changes in the attitude of certain Ukrainian Communist leaders toward the deployment in Kuwait of a Ukrainian radiation, chemical, and biological warfare defense battalion is quite indicative. (Friday before last, CPU’s Heorhy Kriuchkov admitted on Radio Liberty that the decision on the battalion was justifiable — Ed.) Remember parliament’s aggressive response? Two months later, politicians who had attacked the decision started discussing the positive results of the battalion’s mission. Therefore, do we have to go along with pie-in-the-sky arguments with a shelf life of two months? There is also the military aspect. The kind of experience our military will get after making a final united decision will be different from that of our peacekeeping contingents in Sierra Leone or Kosovo.

What I have in mind is an important nuance. The mission of the stabilization forces in Iraq — if and when Ukraine participates by dispatching, say, a brigade — includes work with the populace, local, regional, and central authorities. The Ukrainian contingent would have six months or a year to establish legitimate contacts with the new Iraqi decision-makers at various levels, an extremely valuable opportunity. Without the Ukrainian presence, our diplomats, figuratively speaking, would have to spend decades trying to get the results they could have in six months with Ukraine’s participation in the stabilization forces. Finally, such participation means better confidence on the part of serious NATO and US partners.

The scope and the kind of cooperation involved in the stabilization forces would require a great deal of competence from the commanding officers. This would mean investment in terms of personal and official relationships among midlevel officers. Ukraine would send young officers and men to Iraq, people serving under contract. After returning home, those officers would have better career prospects, in view of the professional experience thus gained. Their partners would be servicemen about the same age, representing the armed forces of 15-20 countries. The ability to cooperate under extreme conditions, trusting and helping each other, would soon evolve into a phenomenon known as camaraderie and friends in arms. It is something never obliterated by circumstances or time.

“Could you specify the kind of military unit?”

It could be a brigade with a HQ unit and two battalions. The strength and structure would be proposed by every country concerned. Ukraine, for example, has expert sappers. There could be motorized infantry units involved, a one of the key tasks of the stabilization forces will be the protection of vitally important and strategic targets: power industry, bridges, large enterprises, communications, water supply networks, and oil fields. One thing is certain: the police will not be the supervising force. The armed forces of Iraq will be shaped alongside and we could also play a role there.

“Why is the Polish sector of Iraq being constantly mentioned? Could one assume that the West is forming a Polish- Ukrainian tandem with Poland at the wheel and Ukraine in the back seat, as a subcontractor?”

We shouldn’t place too much emphasis on every sector, because each might involve military units from various countries. In other words, we should be talking a multinational contingent under Polish, US, and/or UK command. Our military presence in the Polish sector is not a final decision. We could be in the British or US sector. The thing is that Poland is so far the only country to have unequivocally stated the possibility of a Ukrainian military presence in its sector. Poland is a quite experienced country and an important partner of the United States (they took part in the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime), and it is a NATO member state. Also, we must consider the lingual aspect and the experience of the Ukrainian-Polish peacekeeping battalion in Kosovo.

“Therefore, we could consider Ukrainian presence in the British sector of Iraq?”

No one knows for sure at the moment. First, we have to wait for many decisions to be made by all the parties concerned.

“You have mentioned changes in the attitude of some Communists toward the idea of sending the Ukrainian battalion to Kuwait. Yet there is also domestic political conjuncture to be considered in the non-Leftist opposition. Ukraine’s participation in the stabilization forces offers a good opportunity to improve relations with the West in general and with the United States and NATO in particular. They [the opposition] aren’t likely to benefit from this. Do you think the Ukrainian opposition could rise above this conjuncture and view the situation from the standpoint of the national interest?”

I wish they could, as decisions such as those made on the Ukrainian battalion in Kuwait and Ukrainian involvement in the stabilization forces are of tremendous importance for Ukraine’s future. For example, the fact that more than half of the Our Ukraine faction opposed the Kuwait decision is evidence that the Right opposition failed [to rise above the political conjuncture]... This could be explained by several reasons. I will not offer any hypotheses. I think that the key factor was that the whole idea came from the powers that be; it was Leonid Kuchma’s initiative and decision. So they acted the way the did to spite Leonid Kuchma... It’s an old logic, a matter of domestic conjuncture that keeps one from thinking 10-15 years ahead. It’s not easy for people to break loose of today’s psychology and rise some 16,000 feet above it, moving some ten years ahead of the times and then look back at the current situation. Regrettably, such is our reality and I’m afraid that this mentality will be at play when deciding on Ukraine’s participation in the stabilization forces. I have mentioned the arguments put forth by the Communists, with a life span of two months. The same applies to Our Ukraine and their two-month inability to see the future. Yes, their decision [otherwise] might have weakened their opposition to the president, there could have emerged various speculations, still their HQ strategy turned out one of “shallow philosophy in deep places...”

“Ukraine did improve its relationships with the West in general and with the United States in particular by sending the RCBWD battalion to Kuwait. What about so-called old Europe and Russia? How could Ukraine’s involvement in the stabilization forces in Iraq affect our relations with the other strategic partners?”

We should keep this effect in mind, but we shouldn’t include it in the logic of our decisions. Let me give you an example shedding light on the situation. During one of the conferences, a high official said, “You’ve made a decision, but you have failed to bear in mind my position.” The reply was, “We have taken your position into consideration, but we made a different decision.” In other words, taking someone’s opinion into account should not mean acting the way that person thinks we should or making changes as proposed by that person. Our dispatching the battalion to Kuwait did nothing — nor does it do anything now — to damage any of Russia’s interests. The Ukrainian and Russian stands [in the matter] are similar in the sense that we never supported a forcible solution to the problem of Hussein’s regime. But then we made a different decision. As for “old Europe,” I don’t see any problems. We know that Germany eventually decided to dispatch a battalion there. And I don’t see any difficulties about the participation in the stabilization forces, simply because Russia and other Western partners of Ukraine appear to make quick changes in their attitudes.

FORMALIZATION OF RESOLVE: ONE YEAR ON

“Mr. Marchuk, last year you announced the NSDC decision to start the process whose ultimate goal is Ukraine’s integration with NATO. Many analysts, experts, and journalists alike interpreted this as the end to Ukraine’s multidirectional course. However, soon came the idea of a single economic space, and the issue of the Eurasian Economic Community received fresh impetus. What are we seeing now: an end to our multidirectional course or a sequel to it?”

“I believe it should be stressed that Russia changed its stance along with us. The difference was in the space of one day, the Rome Summit resulting in the Russia-NATO Council and the NSDC session, which was held a day before. Now we may say that for many our session seemed a bit hasty...”

“And yet for many it seemed overdue...”

“This is a different issue. But the two events in fact coincided in time. The Rome Summit resulted in the NATO-Russia Council known as the Group of Twenty. On May 23, Ukraine adopted a new strategy whose objective is integration with NATO. As for the multidirectional course, I wouldn’t say a certain course was ever outlined in any instructions. There was none. Because aside from the development of our relationship with Russia and relations within the CIS we actively cooperated with NATO. Recall the 1997 Charter on Special Partnership with NATO. Ukraine alone has established a special partnership with NATO. Thus, in this multidirectional flow there is a major trend, a Euro-Atlantic mainstream, if you like. Meanwhile, our relationship with NATO developed even before last May. I would say we witnessed a legitimization and formalization of our resolve to set the ultimate goal. After all, the Charter on Special Partnership is also a quite active form of cooperation with NATO.”

“When this decision was made public, opposition experts and politicians were skeptical, calling it an element of the game with the West designed primarily to solve problems the executive was facing in its relationship with the US. It will be recalled that in the heat of the tapegate, when some Ukrainian high officials incurred the ire of Washington and our relations were at a low ebb, you attended the Congressional hearings. Recently you have met with Condoleezza Rice, and Donald Rumsfeld was cited as saying, ‘Thank you for being with us during these trying times.’ The temperature of contacts seemed quite different. What happened within the space of time from the Congressional hearings to the recent Washington conference? Would you comment on the changes in the atmospheric pressure, temperature, and wind direction in the relationship with the USA?”

“Before anything else it should be stressed that those who know what NATO stands for, those familiar with the new technology of joining NATO, have not said that the NSDC decision was based on the considerations of the moment and was just so much empty talk. NATO is a very serious partner. And if we are slow in honoring our commitments, they could get the impression that our decision was in fact a political stunt. Thankfully, this didn’t happen, and we started making headway, though not without hitches. As you know, the May 23 decision was followed by the NATO-Ukraine Summit in Kyiv with the participation of George Robertson and all NATO ambassadors. When making the decision we knew that in a month or so professionals of the highest level would visit Kyiv and would understand whether it had been merely a political stunt or whether they were dealing with people who know what integration with NATO means. On my initiative a letter was mailed to all governors explaining the NSDC decision. This letter was quite extensive. Far from all in the executive understood it was in earnest. Moreover, certain government structures did not understand how many problems they would have to solve. May 23 saw a political decision. The Action Plan and Target Plan were endorsed during the Prague Summit last November. Despite political negatives that accompanied the Prague Summit for reasons we know, we have nonetheless shown that we mean business. When the disruption in cooperation with NATO occurred due to the change of government I had to admit in January that the slowing down caused our NATO partners and the NATO Headquarters in Brussels to question our sincerity. This is the worst for Ukraine. When the Yanukovych government was formed, George Robertson sent his warnings in a letter. Then the National Center for Euro-Atlantic Integration and State Council on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration start to function. Thus, organizational and practical impulses have been given.”

“A year after the decision, what are the major achievements and failures of Euro- Atlantic integration?”

“Our work in the first quarter of 2003 has been approved. We have made headway in all directions, but much still remains to be done. We have made significant progress in terms of legal provision both in the defense and social spheres. The bill, On the Fundamentals of National Security, has passed its first reading in the parliament and is ready for the second reading. The laws, On Civil Control of the Defense Sphere, On Combating Terrorism, On the Border Guards, and a number of amendments to the money laundering laws have been adopted. We are holding consultations and meetings all the time. The defense reform has seen certain advancements. Now it’s time for a structural transformation of the Defense Ministry. But the biggest challenge still lies ahead, namely, drawing up the military doctrine, changing the structure and reducing the strength of the army, and upgrading weapons. Among the biggest challenges will be to bring the defense structure into compliance with our economic capabilities, creating a modern and mobile military in keeping with European standards and placing it under strict civilian control.”

“Does this mean reducing the number of posts of military commanders and generals?”

“Absolutely.”

“What makes this difficult?”

“The problem is that upgrading the military and reducing the strength of the army requires substantial funding. Economic benefits from the reduction will become obvious in three to five or more years. To lay off a military person, one has to provide for that person, and this is how it should be. This involves dwellings, social guarantees, disbursements, and whatnot. On the other hand, military settlements will be vacated and ammunition disposed of. Over a million and a half pieces of light armaments require disposal, as well as hundreds of thousands of tons of ammunition. Thus, the biggest challenge will be to fund the military reform.”

MINEFIELD

“This means that you have made progress in most directions on the way to NATO. What about social support? Imagine that Ukraine will eventually adopt NATO standards, but the nation does not support Ukraine’s NATO accession. Are you working in this direction?”

“Yes, this problem exists. All the countries that have sought NATO membership faced it. Public opinion tends to vacillate. Recall how social support of Euro-Atlantic integration waned during the Balkan crisis. One should proceed from the fact that no one will agree to Ukraine’s joining the alliance, NATO included, if we do not secure support from at least 50% of all Ukrainians. Unfortunately, this is no push- button process. There was a discernible positive trend last year. Then support waned for various reasons. Today we cannot speak of strong positive dynamics of social opinion shifting toward NATO. This is a major problem for the authorities. There are few NGOs providing arguments and explaining why it is advantageous for us to move toward NATO. It’s a big challenge for the authorities, and I think it will soon be our major disadvantage. Still, we have reasons for optimism. There is a stable percentage of people who will not change their negative attitude toward NATO, which is due to their age. Each year a new generation of young people with an impartial attitude toward the alliance becomes adults. Thus time is on our side. Simultaneously, we should not expect to secure support from half the population in a natural way. Today we cannot say that we have managed to considerably shift social opinion in the positive direction.”

“Do the authorities understand the scope of this problem?”

“It’s hard for me to speak for the authorities...”

“If the executive were to vote in a referendum on NATO...”

“The executive?”(laughing — Authors.)

“Incidentally, recently two major pro-government parties held their congresses calling for a friendly attitude toward Russia. Another congress raised the issue of dual citizenship. How does it agree with our Euro-Atlantic course?”

“You see, some political parties and their ideologists still believe that by playing into Russia’s hand they can count on its backing in the elections. I think that’s wrong. Remember how one ranking Russian executive supported the For a United Ukraine bloc in public and what it led to.”

“I think it was a washout in Western Ukraine...”

“Not only that. The desire to gain Russia’s favor and those of the Russian-oriented population is a minefield for our politicians. A similar minefield is the idea of a dual citizenship. The Constitution clearly defines the issue of citizenship. Our Euro-Atlantic course cannot be anti-Russian. We cannot count on normal integration with Europe when there is even a slight confrontation with Russia. Nobody will ever welcome Ukraine in Europe if it has frictions with its neighbors. And we should ably and effectively cooperate with Russia and not kowtow to it.

“This is a vestige of the seige mentality of the Cold War period. I believe it will be a serious school and challenge for certain politicians who have ascended the ladder of politics quite recently. Without doubt, any politician is entitled to have his personal view on citizenship or language. Granted, a politician has the right to take risks. But if a politician is simultaneously a public servant, a clear distinction should be drawn. He should be very specific, bow before the Constitution and say, ‘I have piously followed and will follow the Constitution, but at the same time I have my own personal opinion...’”

OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO

“Your meeting with Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser to President George W. Bush, received little coverage in Ukraine. What did you talk about?”

“First, we discussed further possibilities of breaking the impasse in the relations between Ukraine and the US. One may say that such an opportunity exists in principle. Condoleezza Rice confirmed this. Dr. Rice confirmed Washington’s interest in reviving and reinforcing the dynamics of the relationship between Ukraine and the US. She stressed that the US understands that Ukraine is a major player on the European pitch, and without Ukraine’s participation European stability will be problematic. Simultaneously, she stressed that it will be difficult for Ukraine to ensure its security on its own.”

“How do we accelerate our integration with NATO? Is it possible to join the alliance ahead of time?”

“We have asked this question. It is only natural for Ukraine to ask it. But this is possible only on one condition, that is, if we make big strides in implementing the Action Plan and Target Plan. In fact, the Action Plan is a de facto Membership Action Plan (MAP), for almost all steps envisaged by the MAP have been included in the Action Plan. We have the footing to dash us off: we have a security infrastructure and normal attitude on the part of NATO Headquarters.”

“US Ambassador Carlos Pascual once outlined a timetable according to which Ukraine could integrate with NATO. Can a similar timetable be outlined by Mr. Marchuk?”

“Before all, barter is out of the question. In grand politics this is unacceptable. We can do the following: do more than we planned and then offer a trade: ‘You see, we’ve done it, and we’ve done more than we promised. Now we think we can pose a different question.’ There is such a plan, but I am not in a position to reveal it, since I am a state functionary.”

Could you name any specific dates? Based on your recent meetings in London and Washington, can you offer any estimates or forecasts: after we have passed the current stage of relations with NATO, is advancement to the MAP possible in 2004?”

“I think it is. Another NATO summit will be held in 2004. I think it will result in additional requirements for prospective members. A year from now we will have an opportunity to do everything required of us to raise the question of the Membership Action Plan. This is not to say that Ukraine might join NATO in 2004, but advancement to a higher level of relations is quite realistic. Moreover, we will also have presidential elections in 2004.”

INTERNAL RISKS

“How big is the risk of the Euro-Atlantic component of Ukraine’s foreign policy being changed in the wake of the presidential elections?”

“Such a risk exists in principle. If the political reform is effected and the new president receives other powers than those of the incumbent, and the powers of the government and the procedure of forming the parliament are changed, then this risk will diminish. If everything stays the same, there will be such a risk because much depends on the president, since he is entitled to make decisions affecting national security. Considering the overall trend and political processes in Ukraine, the politically accumulated potential of support for the Euro- Atlantic direction in our state and society is quite considerable. However, the president will go, and the parliament will remain. The present parliament cannot be the initiator of this because of its political composition. It cannot be the locomotive to speed up Ukraine’s NATO accession. That’s how it’s structured.”

“Mr. Marchuk, let us return to your meeting with Condoleezza Rice. The three negative factors in our relationship with the USA — the Gongadze case, tapegate, and the Kolchuga affair — seem to have been shelved. Could they be revived?”

“They could.”

“Under what circumstances?”

“I can’t predict. A major process is underway. Meanwhile, many stones are left unturned. Maybe with the development of the situation around Iraq the Kolchuga affair will be shelved. But thus far, Washington says the question has not been taken off the agenda. Who, if anyone, would be able to reopen it and under what conditions is hard to tell. But we must remember that something of the kind exists. But positive cooperation should outweigh old problems.”