Yuri LEVADA: “There is no Slavic world and never has been”

RUSSIA: SURPRISED BY UKRAINE’S RESOLVE

Quite a few professional centers are studying our current society. We have always felt subject to politics, although now we hear numerous voices in Russia and Ukraine, urging us to become aware of ourselves within the new realities and become both subjects and masters of our political life.

Levada: Ukraine is trying to do so in international politics, among other things. I think that many in Russia were surprised to watch Ukraine make up its mind to get involved in the Iraqi operation. It was a step taken to assert Ukraine as a participant in the world process and Russia has thus far taken it the hard way.

Do you think that Russia has made any progress in its attitude toward Ukraine after passing through the Yeltsin and entering the Putin epoch? Or could it remain at that same freezing point as during the imperial and Soviet periods?

Levada: I have been following Russian public opinion, not how the regime operates. Regrettably, our public opinion does not always demonstrate wisdom and, having my roots in Ukraine, I take such stupidities especially close to heart. In general, Russian society cannot understand and accept Ukraine’s transformation into an independent country. Ordinary people and a host of politicians cannot digest this, although the politicians seem to be learning to accept the reality. The rest of the people will eventually follow suit, of course. At present, some 70% of all Russians believe that they and the Ukrainians constitute a single people. Still, I feel that Russians are gradually getting used to the notion of Ukraine as a separate state; after all, it is Russia’s second largest neighbor after China.

At one time I was perplexed by that strange Russian Crimea campaign. We can’t keep looking back at the past, what happened, or who had settled where at one time or another. That way the world could be torn to pieces. Moscow Mayor Luzhkov was among the architects of that campaign. Worse still, it was supported by over 70% of the Russian population. The campaign was stopped, but if it started again, public sentiments would be very much the same.

There is a somewhat more tolerant attitude toward rapprochement between Ukraine and the West. The Russian regime is a bit more restrained — not because it has grown wiser, but because those in power have to deal with realities, unlike the man in the street who can voice his opinion, whatever it is. Russia certainly is not happy about this rapprochement; it feels wary about it, although I can’t see any serious reasons there, economic or even military. All these fears are artificial. We are past NATO’s first round of expansion eastward, embracing Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary that strove to join the alliance, and this aspiration was actually Russia’s fault. But for the Chechen War, there would have been no such breakthrough. Those countries simply wanted to play it safe. This caused many reverberations in Russia, but we had to put up with their decision and have since maintained good enougn relations with them.

Concerning Ukraine, the Russian people unfortunately succumbs to various campaigns, as in the case with NATO, frontiers, and customs duties. People get nervous. When we ask them what causes them to mourn the collapse of the Soviet Union, most respondents say they mourn severed personal contacts: friends, relatives, the Crimea... Things like that have become difficult and they touch people, independent of politics.

It seems important to single out presidential stages in the “Ukrainian question” in Russia. Boris Yeltsin wanted his bureaucrats to think every morning what they had done for Ukraine. Naturally, no one would take this seriously, as Russia simultaneously developen closed production cycles, particularly in its defense industry. Under Vladimir Putin, with top-level rhetoric getting even more Western-oriented, many in Ukraine still believe that Russia is this country’s rival in the first place and the motto To Europe with Russia! is regarded as an attempt to hold Ukraine back.

Levada: Of course, everybody would be better off entering Europe and the rest of the world together, but this should have been considered over twenty years ago. Then it became too late, I think. I agree 100% that entering Europe together [at this stage] means holding Ukraine back. There are a host of reasons due to which Europe is taking its time admitting Russia, among them purely geographic and geopolitical, including the eastern Russian frontier, the people, the uncontrollable process there. Ukraine, in contrast, has every reason to follow in Poland’s footsteps in terms of historical ties, type of management, even the human factor. Here one finds quite some similarity.

The current Russian administration is interesting in that it harbors fewer ideological stereotypes preventing those in power from thinking straight and seeing things for what they really are. These people are more pragmatic. Besides, they are Western oriented, at least on the level of slogans. They say Russia has no other way to go, and that’s good, but it’s still a long way to rapprochement between our societies. Under Yeltsin, it was almost officially asserted that Russia was following its own special road, that we needed neither the West, nor the East, that we were now living neither under Socialism nor Communism; no one had a clear notion of what it actually was. All we knew was that it was something different from anything anybody else had. A very damaging approach because it quickly set in and fitted in well with our historical mentality. Now we have a noticeable degree of differentiation of views on the issue. The official motto, repeated by the president, is that we should not invent any special path to follow, that we should follow the course of all normal countries. The population, however, mostly believes it is still on that “special road.” It’s a conservative Russian myth that cultivates backwardness and boorishness. A dangerous and stubborn phenomenon. In fact, the president dispenses his declarations cautiously, so the people do not always hear what they don’t want to hear. Our people are not fond of listening. Some of our elite, patriotic-minded and rubbing elbows with those in power, are active proponents of that myth — be it in the Red form, remindingus that we are an ages-old Socialist community, or, more often, in a manner best described as dark and chauvinistic.

Does the Russian regime reckon with public sentiments in shaping a new model of conduct, or does it simply size them up to keep that regime in power?

Levada: I don’t know what those in power are doing.

Are you asked about this?

Levada: They don’t have to, for we tell everybody everything we know. The regime must have other sources of information, but I don’t know how it uses such information. I think those upstairs choose what they like, acting in the same old way.

THE HABIT OF BEING A SOVIET MAN

One of your monographs is dedicated to an “ordinary Soviet individual.” Has that individual changed much over the years?

Levada: We have a long-standing project, with research being done every five years. A new round will be launched soon. We try to monitor precisely that ordinary individual. We are not politicians, we need no machination — or technology, as it is called these days — as we are sociologists, above all. What has changed? We believed that people will soon become more democratic and rid themselves of both the Soviet and pre-Soviet legacies. By pre-Soviet I mean mostly stereotypes of national self-identity. Now they hold on tightly. The conference in Kyiv examined the results of a comparative analysis of the younger generation. Among the questions posed to young people was one about the role of the state, whether the state should determine the rules of the game or interfere less with people’s life, or whether the state should provide everybody with everything they need. Over 70% of respondents aged under 35 in Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan (presumably the most active segment of the population, knowing little about the Soviet period) replied that the state should take care of everything, otherwise the people wouldn’t survive. Naturally, this attitude is explained by the fact that realities are not changing quickly enough and not always for the best. Approximately half of the Russian population consists of employees of state enterprises or the so-called state joint-stock companies. Young people are willing to start in business, but as they grow up they realize that it’s easier said than done; all the good places are occupied, and there are countless barriers set by corruption. So people increasingly often recall the old let-the-state-take-care-of-us formula. In addition, there is an energetic president saying he has assumed responsibility for everybody. If so, people assume that we must turn to our bosses for help when our roof leaks or when we lack money. The trouble is that those above can’t solve all the problems [even in the unlikely event of their wanting to do so]. The result is a vicious circle from which we can’t break free.

On the other hand, people are already accustomed to private ownership and the market economy, to shopping centers packed with goods. In fact, they take all of this for granted. Late last year we asked about the key changes over the past decade. The respondents mentioned the Soviet Union’s collapse in the first place, also mounting poverty, economic crises, and the absence of commodity shortages (placing it twelfth or thereabouts), although previously they would refer to well-stocked stores as one of the first factors indicating serious [positive] transformations in their country. Of course, the current attitude, common to practically all the people, has its reasons; first, prices; second, personal incomes, and third, the threat of unemployment. Also, there’s the old habit of paying attention to what hurts and not noticing what doesn’t.

Naturally, we are getting used to the notion of being part of this big world, rather than a separate realm; that we must learn to live the way the rest of the world does. People have started traveling abroad, reading, communicating, and seeing things. This has a varying effect on different individuals. We can’t become European overnight. One doesn’t jump over that vast abyss in a single bound. And we have never been able to undertake and carry out anything demanding long and painstaking efforts, so there is still much left over from our inglorious past.

The Communist ideology as such does not have that many exponents, even among those who vote Red. People do it partially by force of habit and partially as a gesture of protest. It’s actually hard to say how much they know about that ideology. Even the Communist leaders have long since discarded the official slogans.

THE LOST GRANDEUR SYNDROME

How would you interpret Vladimir Putin’s statement in St. Petersburg about Russia either becoming a great power or ceasing to exist? What does this mean to Russia’s man in the street?

Levada: That’s an old trait, trying to be not just a big country, but also the greatest of powers. In [Dostoyevsky’s] The Possessed, Shatov says that it’s not worth living in a country unless it’s first in the world. Russia cannot put up with its post-Soviet status, not only because it has now a territory and population half that of the Soviet empire, but because it is no longer reckoned with elsewhere in the world as it used to be — in particular by countries that only recently were practically autonomous within the USSR. Hence the problem of lost grandeur.

The idea of national rebirth is extremely important in the evolution of all countries of the former Soviet bloc. All these countries but one demonstrate their independence, that they have their own national history, language, and culture; that they should be treated according to international protocol (even though simultaneously making quite a few not too rational moves). This is only natural. Russia is the exception. All those years after the Soviet Union’s collapse it has felt about it as a disaster, loss of grandeur, as a crippling disease. Neither the powers that be nor the people can bring themselves to accept the fact.

Every politician promises to make Russia a great power, as though it were the only way to communicate with the electorate. Instead, they should first turn it into a normal country, regardless of the size of its territory and population, with normal business and living indices, as well as identity.

Do the people in Russia want it to be a great power? By and large they do, although above all they want it to be a happy and thriving country. When we ask how they understand the word great, in most cases we hear that it addresses a country where everybody can live well, where law and order are upheld, a country respected elsewhere in the world. References to military potential and nuclear weapons placed toward the end of the top ten.

Does this mean that Russian society is not showing a higher degree of aggressiveness in conjunction with the war in Chechnya?

Levada: This degree varies. It is generally assumed that Chechnya is encroaching on the grandeur of Russia. Boris Yeltsin would eventually say he was sorry to have started that war and that he thought it was the worst mistake of his administration. Few heard him at the time. The politicians refused to hear any of this, and the next president began with that same war; it was promised to be quick, victorious, and instrumental in building Russia’s political image. This seemed to have worked and there even appeared an element of national mobilization; voices were heard in the democratic camp, saying that victory was important after all. Yet this proved short-lived, with Chechnya turning into a constantly hemorrhaging and festering wound, infecting all of Russia with its puss. We are into the ninth year of that war (after some intermission that was actually a period of preparation for the next round of hostilities). And this is after signing a peace agreement. Well, neither the military nor political elite of Russia would put up with ending on us the losing side.

With regard to [the new round of] the Chechen War, public attitudes in Russia fluctuate from 70% approval to rejection, on almost the same scale. In early 2001 it became clear that practically everybody was sick and tired of the war, the masses, the military, and the political leadership. It is equally clear, however, that no one knows a way out, as no one has Boris Yeltsin’s adventuresome resolve. He could pose as an autocrat. Sometimes it worked, other times it didn’t. None of this would work now. Also, there has never been a true antiwar movement in Russia.

The masses are tired of endless losses. A recent poll showed that 16% of the respondents knew someone who had died in Chechnya. It doesn’t mean that so many people actually got killed there (no one would believe official statistics even if seeing the figures in print). It means that there is a strong personal connection with the casualties. People hate the war not because they can see it as unfair, but because they get tired of it.

This explains public mood swings. Last year, some 30% of the respondents protested the Chechen War and 60% supported the idea of peace talks, but then followed periods of heightened militancy; frustrated, disillusioned people would resort to desperate acts of violence that could never be approved, yet their roots had to be traced. The latest outburst was at Dubrovka. At the time, 46% supported the war and 44% wanted a negotiated peace. That ratio held for a month. In May 2003, 71% favored peace talks and a mere 17% did the continuation of hostilities.

Needless to say, the Russians are now and then affected by calls for the setting up of a world antiterrorist front as well as by anti-Moslem sentiments. On such occasions some 10% of the respondents display a militant attitude against Chechnya.

After the Dubrovka tragedy, those in power tried an interim referendum option, meant to legitimize the existing status without making arrangements with or concessions to anyone. It was as though the people were being persuaded that peace would eventually reign in that insurgent republic. The attempt seemed to work at first, but then acts of terrorism took place with explosions and kamikaze deadly tricks, causing unprecedented public outrage over the past month.

THE PRESIDENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HOPES AND THE GOVERNMENT FOR REALITIES

Do you think that the Russians actually believe in a well-meaning ruler wielding power with the proverbial iron hand?

Levada: They do, because that’s what they want to believe. On the one hand, there is some hope that Putin will eventually straighten things out. On the other hand, most believe that he isn’t measuring up. Hopes that seem to have nothing to do with the reality. In Russia, the government is responsible for realities and the president for hopes. Hopes remain high so far, as is Putin’s popularity, yet both are showing a slight decline. The president’s ratings were the highest right after Dubrovka. Then they registered a smooth downward curve, 2-3% a month. Nothing to get Putin and his entourage worried, for it was simply the status quo being restored after harboring those fantastic hopes and experiencing that fantastic fright. Still, with the situation returning to normal, one seems less anxious to have that iron hand. It’s only when everything is falling apart, when the war is raging, that people turn to whomever they see as their earthly savior.

Semen Novoprudsky wrote in Izvestiya recently that Russia’s political leadership is deadlocked and that President Putin is something like a figurehead, paving the way for his truly creative successor. Who do you think will be the next Russian head of state? One with the same name but with a different mission? What kind of mission?

Levada: I do believe that the model of the Russian president and his administration, worked out toward the end of 1999, is little by little exhausting itself. All the recent events, domestic as well as international, serve to weaken this model. The Iraq case (it is likely to influence the rest of the world for at least the next fifty years) actually resulted in ending the Russia-US antiterrorist bloc. In Russia, that bloc had served two ends, justifying the Chechen War and as a factor building the president’s image. I think the current model will survive until the next presidential campaign and Putin will serve another term. Then we shall see.

Ukraine and Russia will soon launch their presidential campaigns. Have the two peoples learned how to elect? Are there any differences in the manner they cast their ballots?

Levada: I don’t know much about the Ukrainian electoral situation, but I think that there are differences between the election intrigues in Ukraine and Russia. You have different parties in Ukraine, each backed by certain social and oligarchic forces competing among themselves, not in words but in deeds. The situation in Russia is totally different. We actually have no election intrigue; Vladimir Putin really has no rivals, given today’s alignment of political forces. We have the ruling bureaucratic party, Yedinaya Rossiya [United Russia] coveting the majority and predominant status — very much like the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Something Comrade Ziuganov cannot and does not want to happen. But they want it, even though lacking the basis and that machine of intimidation and coercion, which they used to have. The result is a simulation, an attempt to win the campaign come what may, naturally to provide a fresh presidential backup resource. Also, everybody is trying to figure out what will happen in 2008. An attempt is being made to work out a mechanism that will place the crown on the head of whatever person will be found acceptable.

You have written about the confused man in the street, that Russian public opinion lacks self- organization — as does the whole of Russian society. What does this mean? That this public opinion will remain a topic of sociological interest, or that it will never turn into a real force in the modern world?

Levada: Now and then they have to turn to that public opinion; they feel wary about it and try to use it. Yet it has never been a strong force, anywhere, nor shall it ever be. We have never had a regime interested in its own “mirror reflection” that much. Gorbachev believed that such a mirror was not necessary, assuming that he knew everything there was to know. Yeltsin believed it was a bad mirror and that his people loved him anyway. I believe the current regime looks in that mirror every day, scrutinizing its reflection, afraid of finding a blemish. The statistics keep oscillating but invariably say all is well. Also, the masses are not prepared to go through an election campaign; our people have not awakened yet, meaning that all forecasts would be premature anyway. Can you expect a sleeping man to tell you what he will do when he gets up? Does our opinion influence anything? Will it do so in the long run? Perhaps it will, but only if it becomes organized, if our society begets some organized intellectual and analytical forces...

THE SLAVIC MYTH

Our newspaper carried an interesting article concerning reasons for the Moslem world still lagging behind. What about the Slavic world, its problems and prospects?

Levada: The Moslem world is a reality, albeit virtual in some respect. It emerges as an influential force and a bloc of countries, to an extent. True, recent events show that world to be anything but solid. In contrast, there has never been a Slavic world. Instead, there are similarities in terms of languages, history, geography. While the war was raging in Yugoslavia, we heard many voices shouting about the need to defend our Serbian brothers... While it may be true that Slavic tongues constitute a more solid family of nations than the Germanic one (including Scandinavia, England, Germany, Austria, and so on), yet there is no Germanic world. And there is no Slavic world.

Mr. Levada, why does Russia need Belarus?

Levada: It does by force of habit. I think that our powers that be have long realized that they are playing a game costing too much for the players. In fact, economic rapprochement, working out initial EU prototypes like the French-German Coal and Steel Community inflicted losses too heavy to sustain. Russia will have to pay dearly for its rapprochement with Belarus. Yet the regime started playing the game a very long time ago. Now they seem to have agreed that the Russian ruble will be instituted in Belarus starting next year. It’s a process registering sudden upward curves, as last summer when Vladimir Putin suggested to Lukashenka that his country join Russia step by step, oblast by oblast. Now and then we are told about that “single economic space,” although few if any know what it’s all about. Some among the mass of people believe that Russia’s rapprochement with Belarus will mark the beginning of the reintegration of that “Soviet space.” I doubt the possibility. Russian-Belarusian rapprochement will worry Ukraine in the first place. It will cause your country to stay further away. Our politicians should realize that gaining Belarus while causing Ukraine to drift further apart would mean [Russia’s] failure on a very large scale.